Rowland v. GGNSC Ripley, LLC et al

Filing 37

ORDER denying without prejudice 27 Motion to Compel. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 9/29/14. (jtm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION

CLETAS ROWLAND, individually
and through her power of attorney,
Gail Crowe

PLAINTIFF

V.

No. 3:13-CV-00011-DMB-SAA

GGNSC RIPLEY, LLC, d/b/a
Golden Living Center Ripley; GGNSC
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC;
GOLDEN LIVING; and
GOLDEN LIVING-CENTER

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This is a medical malpractice action brought by Plaintiff Cletas Rowland individually and
through her power of attorney, Gail Crowe, against Defendants GGNSC Ripley, LLC, d/b/a
Golden Living Center Ripley; GGNSC Administrative Services, LLC; Golden Living; and
Golden Living-Center. Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of Tippah County, and
Defendants removed the action to this Court.1 Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to compel
arbitration.

Doc. #8.

In their motion, Defendants argued that Crowe bound Plaintiff to

arbitration when she signed two arbitration agreements on behalf of Plaintiff at the time Plaintiff
was admitted to Defendants’ facility. Id.
On July 2, 2013, District Judge Michael Mills issued an order finding “that the arbitration
issues in this case are unusually fact-intensive ones.” Doc. #16. Based on this conclusion, Judge
1

This action was removed by Defendants GGNSC Ripley, LLC, and GGNSC Administrative Services, LLC, who
represented that the remaining named defendants do not exist, as Golden Living and Golden Living-Center are mere
trade names and are not legal business entities. Doc. #1 at 1 n.1. Plaintiff has not challenged this assertion. This
Court proceeds under the assumption that Defendants GGNSC Ripley, LLC, and GGNSC Administrative Services,
LLC, are the only defendants in this matter. See Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Prudential Healthcare, No.
301CV1999X, 2002 WL 24255, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (accepting defendants’ representation that named
defendants were actually trade names for true defendant).

Mills denied the motion to compel without prejudice, directed arbitration-related discovery, and
afforded the parties an opportunity to “submit revised briefing on this issue after discovery has
been completed.” Id. On October 18, 2013, Magistrate Judge Allan Alexander issued an order
directing “that all discovery should be concluded and any briefs and/or re-filing of a motion to
compel arbitration should be submitted on or before December 2, 2013.” Doc. #25.
On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration.” Doc. #26. Later that day, Defendants filed a
renewed motion to compel arbitration [27] and an accompanying brief [28].2 Plaintiff did not
respond to the renewed motion.
In a similar case, Judge Mills found that “[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court arguably
suggested in Adams [Cmty. Care Ctr., LLC v. Reed, 37 So.3d 1155 (Miss. 2010),] that either a
formal power of attorney or health care surrogacy agreement was required in order to allow [a
child] to sign a nursing home agreement on behalf of their mother.”

Gross v. GGNSC

Southaven, LLC, 3:14-cv-37-MPM-SAA (N.D. Miss. Sep. 3, 2014). In Gross, Judge Mills
concluded that the text of Adams warranted additional briefing on the issue of whether an agent
may hold authority to sign an arbitration agreement related to nursing home care in the absence
of a formal power of attorney or health care surrogacy agreement executed by the principal. Id.
This Court reaches a similar conclusion.
Accordingly, the renewed motion to compel arbitration is DENIED without prejudice.
Defendants shall have fourteen days from the entry of this order to submit a renewed motion
which addresses whether Crowe, who did not hold a power of attorney or health care surrogacy
agreement, had authority to execute the arbitration agreements on her mother’s behalf. Plaintiff
2

The memorandum brief [28] is improperly designated as a motion on this Court’s electronic docketing system.
The Clerk’s Office is directed to correct this error.

2

shall have fourteen days from the filing date of Defendants’ renewed motion to submit a
response in opposition. This additional briefing will allow the Court to address a complicated
issue of first impression and will provide the parties an opportunity to address the odd procedural
posture of the current outstanding motion to compel arbitration.3

SO ORDERED, this the 29th day of September, 2014.
/s/ Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

The Court is aware of the length of time this case has been pending and will strive to ensure that the renewed
motion to compel arbitration is promptly adjudicated.

3