Conlee v. Rasco et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 11 Final Judgment Dismissing Case. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 7/9/13. (mhg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
WESTERN DIVISION
ROGER DALE CONLEE, JR.

PLAINTIFF

v.

No. 3:13CV22-A-A

SHERIFF BILL RASCOE, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Roger Dale
Conlee, who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the
purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated
when he filed this suit. Conlee claims that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by keeping him in Administrative Segregation
and for failing to respond when he called for help during an asthma attack. For the reasons set
forth below, the instant case will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
Factual Allegations
From December 8, 2012, through January 24, 2013, the plaintiff Roger Conlee did not
receive one hour of recreation per day, though he was locked down 24 hours per day during that
time. On three days during this period, he was not allowed to shower. In addition, he suffered
an asthma attack on December 27, 2012, but no guards would come to check on him until much
later during change of shift. Conlee recovered from the asthma attack and has not alleged any
lasting problems arising out of it.

General Conditions
“[T]he Eighth Amendment may afford protection against conditions of confinement
which constitute health threats but not against those which cause mere discomfort or
inconvenience.” Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969
(1989)(citation omitted). “Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences, and services of a
good hotel.” Id. at 849 n.5 (citation omitted). It is clear that prison officials have certain duties
under the Eighth Amendment, but these duties are only to provide prisoners with “humane
conditions of confinement,” including “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care . . . .”
Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994)). Based upon a review of the “totality of the circumstances,” McCord v.
Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1990), the instant claims do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Plaintiff has not identified any “basic human need” which he was
denied for an unreasonable period of time. See Woods, 51 F.3d at 581. Strict lockdown for 47
days does not constitute a deprivation sufficient to state a claim for unconstitutionally harsh
general conditions of confinement. As such, this claim should be dismissed.
Denial of Medical Treatment
In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff
must allege facts which demonstrate “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
prisoners [which] constitutes ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment . . . whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors or prison guards
in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care . . . .” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104-105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260 (1976); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992).

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The test for establishing deliberate indifference is one of “subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor
may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless plaintiff alleges facts which, if true, would
establish that the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 838. Only in
exceptional circumstances may knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm be inferred by a
court from the obviousness of the substantial risk. Id. Negligent conduct by prison officials
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106
S.Ct. 662 (1986), Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). In cases such as the
one at bar, arising from delayed medical attention rather than a clear denial of medical attention,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered substantial harm resulting from the delay in order to
state a claim for a civil rights violation. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993);
Campbell v. McMillin, 83 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Miss. 2000). A prisoner’s mere disagreement
with medical treatment provided by prison officials does not state a claim against the prison for
violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545 (5th Cir.2001), Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th
Cir. 1997).
Although the plaintiff alleges that the guards improperly ignored his pleas for assistance
– and those of his fellow inmates on his behalf – he does not allege that he suffered substantial
harm from the incident other than difficulty breathing. These allegations to not meet the strict
standard for deliberate indifference and must therefore be dismissed.

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In sum, all of the plaintiff’s claim are without merit, and the instant case will be
dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim. A final judgment consistent with this
memorandum opinion will issue today.

SO ORDERED, this the 9th day of July, 2013.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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