Scott v. Corrections Corporation of America et al

Filing 51

ORDER denying 45 Motion to Compel; denying 46 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden on 5/20/14. (ncb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION

JACKIE SCOTT
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV00168-MPM-JMV

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION
OF AMERICA, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Before the court are two motions filed by Plaintiff: (1) motion to compel answers to
interrogatories [45] and (2) motion for appointment of counsel [46]. For the reasons set out
below, both motions are DENIED.
Motion to Compel
Plaintiff has filed this motion pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 37(a) seeking an order compelling
“Defendants” to respond to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories to Bobby Phillips dated March
22, 2014. Plaintiff states she “submitted” the discovery to Defendant Bobby Phillips on March 22
at 1020 Highland Colony Parkway, Suite 1400, Ridgeland, MS 39157. Further, Plaintiff states
she conversed with “defendant” by telephone regarding this matter on Thursday, May 1.
The court notes several deficiencies in the instant discovery motion, including the fact that
it is unaccompanied by the good faith certificate required by L.U.Civ.R. 37 and the fact that it was
not filed sufficiently in advance of the discovery deadline to allow a response, a ruling by the
court, and time to effectuate an order prior to expiration of said deadline per L.U.Civ.R.
7(b)(2)(B). Most importantly, however, it appears that Plaintiff seeks discovery from an
individual who, though named in this suit, has made no appearance. Indeed, there is no indication
that either Defendant Phillips, J. Wardlow, Charlotte Burns, Miranda Rankin, or Gina Robinson

have been served with the amended complaint [30]. For these reasons, the instant motion is
denied.
Motion for Appointed Counsel

Plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated she is entitled to appointed counsel. There is
no automatic right to counsel in Title VII cases. Caston v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 556 F.2d
1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977). Instead, a plaintiff may receive appointed counsel “in such
circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In making this
determination, the district court should consider (1) the merits of the plaintiff’s claim of
discrimination, (2) the efforts taken by the plaintiff to obtain counsel, and (3) the plaintiff’s
financial ability to retain counsel. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th
Cir. 1986). No one factor is conclusive. Id.
While it appears that Plaintiff made considerable efforts to obtain counsel, the court is
not convinced that Plaintiff is unable to afford private counsel or that her claims are meritorious.
Based on her application, Plaintiff is married, and she and her husband may own a substantial
amount of equity in their home. Plaintiff did not indicate what amount of her husband’s income
is at her disposal. And, considering the fact that several attorneys have apparently declined to
take Plaintiff’s case and the fact that according to her right to sue letter, see Dckt Entry # 17, her
underlying EEOC charge was not timely filed, the viability of Plaintiff’s Title VII case is
questionable. Cf. Paskauskiene v. Alcor Petrolab, L.L.P., 527 Fed. Appx. 329, 333 (5th Cir.
2013) (upholding finding that plaintiff not entitled to counsel though she had limited financial
means and had made significant efforts to obtain counsel where EEOC had found no evidence of
discrimination). In addition to these findings, the court further finds that because Plaintiff is a
2

college graduate and has successfully prosecuted her case up to this point–the end of the
discovery phase–she is sufficiently capable of continuing to represent herself. See id.
(considering plaintiff’s ability to represent herself as an additional factor).
SO ORDERED this 20th day of May, 2014.
/s/ Jane M. Virden
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3