Martin v. Tunica County et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 6 Final Judgment. Signed by Neal B. Biggers on 11/20/13. (cr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
CRITONYA MARTIN,
PETITIONER
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:13CV198-B-A
TUNICA COUNTY, et al.,
RESPONDENTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the pro se petition of Critonya Martin, Mississippi
prisoner # 170518, for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents have
moved to dismiss the petition as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, and Petitioner has
failed to timely respond to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, Respondents’ motion is
granted, and the instant petition will be dismissed with prejudice.
Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual battery in the Circuit Court of Tunica County,
Mississippi. (See Resp’ts Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A). By Order filed September 28, 2011,
Petitioner was sentenced to serve a term of seven years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections.1 (See id., Ex. B). Petitioner filed for federal habeas relief on or
about August 6, 2013, and the Court ordered Respondents to file a response to the petition. On
October 1, 2013, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the instant action, arguing that the
petition is untimely under the federal statute of limitations. The time for Petitioner to respond
has passed, and Petitioner has failed to reply to Respondents’ motion to dismiss. This matter is
1
Two years of Petitioner’s sentence was suspended, leaving her five years to serve in
custody. (See Resp’ts Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B).
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now ripe for consideration.
Legal Standard
The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is subject to the statute of limitations of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Egerton v. Cockrell, 334
F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). The issue of whether Respondents’ motion should be granted turns
on the statue’s limitation period, which provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S. C. § 2244(d)(1). The federal limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2). Further, in “rare and exceptional circumstances,” the limitations period may be
equitably tolled. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Analysis
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Under Mississippi law, there is no direct appeal from a guilty plea. See Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-35-101. Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction became final, and the federal statute of
limitations began to run, on September 28, 2011, when she was sentenced on her guilty plea. See
Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2003). Absent statutory or equitable tolling,
Petitioner’s petition for federal habeas relief was due on or before September 28, 2012, to be
deemed timely.2
Respondents maintain that Petitioner has not attempted to challenge her plea and
sentence to sexual battery through a motion for post-conviction collateral relief in the Circuit
Court of Tunica County, and they report that the Circuit Court Clerk confirms that Petitioner has
not filed a petition in that court. Petitioner concedes that she has not filed a motion for State
post-conviction relief. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (tolling the federal statute of limitations while a “properly filed” application
is pending).
Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was “filed” sometime between when it was signed on
July 16, 2013, and when it was stamped “filed” in this Court on August 6, 2013. See Coleman v.
Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the “mailbox rule” deems a pro se
prisoner’s petition filed on the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing). As her federal
habeas petition was filed beyond the statute’s deadline, federal habeas relief is available to her
only if she can demonstrate that her case involves “rare and exceptional circumstances” that
would warrant an equitable tolling of the limitations period. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168,
170-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
2
The exceptions of § 2244(d)(1)(B-D) are inapplicable in this case.
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Petitioner maintains that she was unaware at the time of her sentencing that she had the
opportunity to file for state post-conviction or federal habeas relief. However, equitable tolling
is only available if the petitioner demonstrates “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
h[er] way and prevented timely filing” despite a diligent pursuit of her rights. Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (citation omitted). Attorney error or
ignorance of the law is insufficient to establish an “extraordinary circumstance” that warrants
equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d
168, 171-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that ignorance of the law and lack of knowledge of filing
deadlines are insufficient to toll statute). Therefore, the Court finds equitable tolling is not
warranted in this case, and the instant petition is untimely.
Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, this Court must issue or
deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) upon the entry of a final order adverse to the
petitioner. Petitioner must obtain a COA before appealing this Court’s decision denying federal
habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Because Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus is rejected on procedural grounds, Petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added).
Applying this standard, the Court concludes that a COA should be denied in this case.
Conclusion
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For the reasons stated by the Court, the Court GRANTS Respondents’ “Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to § 2244(d)” (doc. entry no. 5) and DISMISSES with prejudice the petition
filed in this cause. The Court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be DENIED,
as Petitioner failed to show her petition timely and make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
SO ORDERED this the 20th day of November, 2013.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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