Jane Doe 7 v. Rust College et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 31 Order on Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 3/18/2015. (llw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
JANE DOE 7
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV33-NBB-SAA
RUST COLLEGE, SYLVESTER
OLIVER, and DAVID BECKLEY,
in his official capacity as President
of Rust College
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court is a motion by Defendants Rust College and David Beckley to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon due consideration
of the motion and complaint, the court is ready to rule.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jane Doe 7, attended Rust College, a defendant in this action. Plaintiff alleges
that sometime in 2011, Defendant, Professor Sylvester Oliver, began making sexual advances
towards her. These advances made Plaintiff very uncomfortable, leading her to report Oliver’s
behavior to Rust College administration. Plaintiff and her mother subsequently met with several
members of the Rust College administration. At this meeting, the administrators, according to
Plaintiff, informed her that her complaints did not, in their opinion, “meet the criteria for
harassment.” Oliver, therefore, was never disciplined.
On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court against Defendants Rust
College, Sylvester Oliver, and David Beckley, the President of Rust College. Plaintiff asserts
claims of violation of Title IX; negligence; negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; premises
liability; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants Rust College and David
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Beckley filed this motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement… showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). For a plaintiff to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim tests both the legal and factual sufficiency of a plaintiff’s
complaint. Id. at 679. Though motions to dismiss are “viewed with disfavor and [are] rarely
granted,” the burden rests on the plaintiff to prove her claim should go forward. Collins v.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 2000). When deciding a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the court “must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including
attachments thereto.” Id. at 498.
To meet her burden, a plaintiff cannot rest merely on “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate that facts pleaded allow the court “to
draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556.
In deciding whether a plaintiff has met her burden, the court “must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint,” except for those allegations which are mere legal
conclusions. Ashcroft, at 678. Any legal conclusions in a complaint must be supported by
factual allegations. Id. Ultimately, plaintiff’s complaint must “nudge his claims… across the
line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). “A rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is the proper vehicle by which to assert a
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limitations defense where a plaintiff’s complaint shows affirmatively that his claims are time
barred.” Doe v. Linam, et al., 225 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Herron v.
Herron, 225 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1958)).
ANALYSIS
Defendants assert that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against them is appropriate because any such claim is time-barred. Plaintiff’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to a one-year limitations period. Miss. Code
Ann. § 15-1-35. See also Jones v. B.L. Development Corp., 940 So. 2d 961 (Miss. Ct. App.
2006) (applying § 15-1-35 to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
The conduct giving rise to this action occurred in 2011. In accordance with the
applicable limitations period for the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Plaintiff
must have brought such claim within a year, or by the year 2012. Plaintiff, however, did not file
her complaint until February 14, 2014. Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is, therefore, time-barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is well taken and should be granted. A
separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
This, the 18th day of March, 2015.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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