Coleman v. Wilson et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 11 Order Dismissing Case. Signed by Senior Judge Glen H. Davidson on 5/15/14. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

OXFORD DIVISION

JOHNNY LEE COLEMAN

PLAINTIFF

v.

No. 3: 14CV56-GHD-DAS

SGT. WILSON, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Johnny Lee Coleman,
who challenges the conditions of his confinement Wlder 42 U.S.c. § 1983. For the purposes ofthe
Prison Litigation Refonn Act, the court notes that the plaintiffwas incarcerated when he filed this suit.
For the reasons set forth below, the instant case will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
Allegations

On January 8, 2014,just before 7:00 p.m. Corrections Officers Watson, Jones, and McKinnie
conducted a search of the beds in Johnny Lee Coleman's unit. Coleman had been in his cell a mere 10
minutes before the search, and there was no contraband in or aroWld his bed. However, during the
search, CO Watson fOWld a cellular phone in Coleman's bed. Coleman received a Rule Violation
Report that same day. Though he requested an investigation and witnesses for his disciplinary
hearing, he received neither. He was fOWld guilty ofthe infraction and was punished by loss ofall
privileges for 30 days and loss of 180 days ofearned time.
Sandin

Under the ruling Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995),
the plaintiff has not set forth a valid claim for violation ofthe Due Process Clause or any other
constitutional protection. Though "[s]tates may Wlder certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause, ... these interests will be generally limited to freedom
from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force ... nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id 115 S. Ct. at 2300
(citations omitted). In Sandin, the discipline administered the prisoner was confinement in isolation.
This discipline fell "within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court oflaw," id. at
2301, and "did not present the type ofatypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. Therefore, neither the Due Process Clause itself nor State
law or regulations gave rise to a liberty interest providing the procedural protections set forth in Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). See also Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958
(5 th Cir. 2000) (holding prisoner's thirty-day loss ofcommissary privileges and cell restriction due to
disciplinary action failed to give rise to due process claim).

In the present case, the plaintiff's punishment was loss ofall privileges for 30 days and loss of
180 days ofearned time. 1 Such punishment clearly "within the expected parameters of the sentence
imposed by a court of law," id. at 2301, and "did not present the type ofatypical, significant
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. As such, the plaintiff's
allegations regarding violation of his right to due process are without merit, and this claim will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
EamedTime

Coleman contends that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by stripping him of
earned time credits which count toward his early release from confinement. Section 1983 is an
inappropriate vehicle for an inmate to seek recovery of lost earned time credits, Preiser v. Rodriguez,
The present discussion relates only to the loss of privileges. For the reasons set forth in the following
section, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the proper vehicle to bring a claim for loss of earned time.
I

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411 U.S. 475,93 S. Ct. 1827,36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), and it is likewise improper for an inmate to sue
for damages under § 1983 where success on the merits of the inmate's claim would "necessarily
imply" invalidity ofconfinement. Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d
383 (1994). In both cases, the inmate's available remedy is to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court has applied Heck to inmates challenging the loss ofearned time credits through prison
disciplinary proceedings resulting in a change oftheir sentences. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641
(1997). The rule which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals follows in determining whether a prisoner
must first obtain habeas corpus relief before bringing a § 1983 action is: "if a favorable determination
would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release, the proper vehicle for suit is §
1983. !fit would so entitle him, he must first get a habeas judgment." Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d
222,226 (5 th Cir.), reh 'g denied, 133 F.3d 940 (1997) (citing Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29,31 (5 th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1059,116 S. Ct. 736, 133 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1996)). Because Coleman, if
successful in this case, would be entitled to accelerated release, he must first obtain habeas corpus
reliefbefore bringing suit under § 1983. This allegation must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
In sum, all of the plaintiff's claims are without merit, and this case will be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

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SO ORDERED, this, the

15

day ofMay, 2014.

lsi Glen H. Davidson
SENIOR JUDGE

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