Bright v. Tunica County School District et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 38 Order on Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 7/25/2016. (llw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
MATTIE BRIGHT, as Guardian and
Next Kin of Her Daughter, Jane Doe
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15CV00149-NBB-JMV

TUNICA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
MILTON HARDRICT, Principal, in His
Official and Individual Capacities; and
STANLEY ELLIS, Assistant Principal and
Title IX Coordinator, in his Official and
Individual Capacities

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court upon the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). The defendants oppose the
motion and request that the case be dismissed with prejudice. Upon due consideration of the
motion, response, exhibits, and applicable authority, the court is ready to rule.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Mattie Bright, alleges that her daughter, “Jane Doe,” was a fifteen year old
freshman at Rosa Fort High School in Tunica County, Mississippi, when, on November 3, 2014,
at approximately 1:00 p.m., a male student came to her classroom and requested that her teacher,
Brittany Brown,1 allow Doe to accompany him to another area of the school. Brown allegedly
allowed Doe, a student receiving Special Education Services, to leave the classroom with the
male student who then escorted her to the school’s computer lab where the plaintiff alleges Doe

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Brown and Bernard Stephen Chandler, Superintendent, were dismissed from this action without
prejudice on May 2, 2016, based on the plaintiff’s failure to effect proper service within the time allowed
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

was violently and forcibly sexually assaulted by three male students. Doe immediately notified
the principal, defendant Milton Hardrict, of the assault. Hardrict interviewed Doe and then
called her parents to the school. The plaintiff alleges that the principal then instructed the
custodial staff to clean the area in the computer lab where the sexual assault had occurred.
According to the plaintiff, only after the computer lab was cleaned did the principal call the
Tunica County Sheriff’s Department and emergency medical services. The sheriff’s department
conducted an investigation, collected evidence, and took Doe’s three attackers into custody. The
plaintiff alleges Doe was taken to a hospital where a “rape kit” was performed, and the medical
findings were consistent with rape.
All three attackers allegedly returned to school within two school days after Doe’s
assault, and one attacker continued to ride the same school bus as Doe for the following three
months. The plaintiff alleges that it was not until late February 2015, after the media exposed
Doe’s rape, that the alleged attackers were placed in alternative school, which is located on the
same campus as Doe’s high school. The plaintiff asserts that Doe was verbally harassed and
frightened by her attackers and their friends throughout the rest of the 2014-2015 school year.
The plaintiff alleges she reported the continuing harassment to school officials on at least three
separate occasions after Doe’s rape, but the officials made no changes to the educational
environment and took no remedial measures.
The plaintiff filed the present action on August 28, 2015, against Tunica County School
District, Hardrict, and the District’s Assistant Superintendent and Title IX Coordinator, Stanley
Ellis, asserting claims pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, as well as Section 1983. As mentioned above, Jane Doe’s teacher,

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Brittany Brown, and the District’s Superintendent, Bernard Stephen Chandler, were also sued
but have been dismissed without prejudice for the plaintiff’s failure to effect timely service.
In lieu of an answer, the properly served defendants filed motions to dismiss on October
25, 2015, and November 4, 2015. The plaintiff asserts that her attorney contacted counsel for
defendants on November 18, 2015, to request that she join an agreed stipulation to dismiss
plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. The defendants’ counsel declined and later the same day
amended the defendants’ motions to dismiss to include motions for summary judgment. The
plaintiff has now moved to dismiss her complaint without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).
Standard of Review
It is axiomatic that “motions for voluntary dismissal should be freely granted unless the
non-moving party will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second
lawsuit.” Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2002). “The primary
purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to ‘prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly affect the other side,
and to permit the imposition of curative conditions.’” Id. (citing 9 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2364, at 165 (1971)). Thus, in ruling on a Rule 41(a)(2)
motion for voluntary dismissal, the court should first determine whether a dismissal will cause
the defendant to suffer plain legal prejudice. Id. If it will not, the court should grant the motion.
Id. If a dismissal will cause prejudice to the defendant, the court may deny the motion outright
or craft conditions that will cure any prejudice. Id. at 317-18.

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Analysis
The defendants assert that they will suffer plain legal prejudice if the court grants the
plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal primarily because they will be stripped of the defense
of Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fifth Circuit has held
that plain legal prejudice does indeed occur when the grant of a motion for voluntary dismissal
strips the defendant of an otherwise available defense. Essex Ins. Co. v. Massey Land & Timber,
LLC, No. 5:04CV102-DCB-JMR, 2007 WL 571027, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 20, 2007) (citing
Elbaor, 279 F.3d at 318-19).
The defendants argue that a voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice will strip
them of an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because such a defense will not be available
to them if the plaintiff re-files her action in state court. They argue that defendant Tunica
County School District and Hardrict and Ellis in their official capacities should be afforded
Eleventh Amendment immunity because the district has been “taken over” by the State
Department of Education and is now an “arm of the state.” While the governor has declared a
state of emergency in the Tunica County School District and has appointed a conservator
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 37-17-6 and -13, the court is unconvinced, in the absence of any
binding authority directly on point, that a school district under conservatorship becomes an arm
of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes. The court has examined the factors set
forth in McDonald v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs, 832 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1987),2 and does not
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To determine whether a particular entity is an arm of the state, the court looks to a number of
factors, including:
(1) whether state statutes and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state; (2)
the source of funds for the entity; (3) the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys;
(4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide,

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find that the circumstances in Tunica County operate to transform the school district from a local
entity which may be sued under Section 1983 to an arm of the state which is entitled to immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. Further, the events giving rise to this action occurred prior to
the State Department of Education’s intervention with the school district, and the defendants
have cited no authority for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment immunity they assert
would be retroactive – even if applicable at all. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a
viable defense available to the defendants, the court finds that the defendants will not suffer plain
legal prejudice in this regard from a grant of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without prejudice.
The court also takes into consideration that no discovery has taken place in this case and
that no substantial costs should have been incurred by the defendants at this point. While the
defendants filed motions to dismiss early in the litigation, the court will not consider any costs
incurred in doing so since the filing of motions to dismiss do not preclude the plaintiff from
dismissing the action of her own accord without the court’s permission pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1). “Regardless of the amount of effort a defendant expends in preparing their motion to
dismiss, defendants who desire to prevent plaintiffs from invoking their unfettered right to
dismiss actions under Rule 41(a)(1) may do so by taking the simple step of filing an answer.”
Taylor v. Carl E. Woodward, LLC, No. 11-3176, 2012 WL 3901627, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 7,
2012) (quoting Carter v. U.S., 547 F.2d 258, 259 (5th. Cir. 1977)). The defendants later
amended these motions to dismiss to include motions for summary judgment and subsequently

problems; (5) whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6)
whether the entity has the right to hold and use property.
McDonald, 832 F.2d at 906.

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re-filed them, but the alterations, and presumably the expenses involved, were minimal. This
effort therefore has no bearing on the court’s decision.
Conclusion
The court finds that the defendants will not suffer plain legal prejudice if the plaintiff is
allowed to dismiss her claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The plaintiff’s motion is well
taken and will be granted. A separate order in accord with this opinion shall issue this day.
This, the 25th day of July, 2016.

/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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