Easley v. Smith
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 11/23/16. (cr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
CHARLES J. EASLEY
PLAINTIFF
v.
No. 3:15CV150-SA-SAA
P. SMITH
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Charles J. Easley, who
challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The
plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of action
against “[e]very person” who under color of state authority causes the “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff
alleges that the defendant denied him meaningful access to the court and has retaliated against him for
seeking access. The defendant has moved [37] for summary judgment. The plaintiff has also moved
[34] for summary judgment, and the defendant has responded. The matter is ripe for resolution. For
the reasons set forth below, the motion [37] by the defendant for summary judgment will be granted;
the motion [34] by the plaintiff for summary judgment will be denied, and judgment will be entered
for the defendant.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show
that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (c)(1). “The moving party must show that if the evidentiary
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the
nonmoving party to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629,
633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts
in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
“Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th
Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management
Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187,
1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is “an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the absence of
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proof, the court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
Undisputed Material Facts1
Easley is currently serving a fifteen year sentence for burglarizing an occupied residence in
Santa Monica, California and stealing a guitar. Easley entered a plea agreement in which he pled no
contest to first degree burglary. Easley was sentenced to four years on the burglary conviction, but
prior felonies and prison sentences increased his total sentence to fifteen years. See Easley Criminal
Court File Opinion February 26, 2015, Calif. App. Exhibit B at CCA-0041.
On or about March 28, 2014, Easley filed a notice of appeal from this conviction. See Easley
Criminal Court File Opinion February 26, 2015 Calif. App. Exhibit B at CCA-0023. Easley was
appointed an attorney to handle his appeal. On October 24, 2014, Easley’s attorney, Athena Shudde,
Esq., sent him a letter advising him that there was no legitimate ground for an appeal of his conviction.
See A. Shudde October 24, 2014. Letter Exhibit C. Attorney Shudde filed a brief on October 28,
2014, that set forth the issues but did not argue any substantive basis to overturn the conviction. See
Easley Criminal Court File Wende Brief Exhibit B at CCA-0027. The appellate brief was filed in
accordance with People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (Calif. 1979) which allows an attorney to file a brief
explaining the facts and issues with no substantive arguments after a conscientious examination of the
record reveals that there is no arguable basis for the appeal. Under Wende the attorney is not required
to include a statement of the attorney’s efforts or conclusions but must file a brief stating facts and
issues, after which the court must review the entire record before determining there is no arguable
basis for appeal.
1
The exhibits referenced in this memorandum opinion can be found in the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
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Ms. Shudde advised Easley that “[i]f you have anything you would particularly like the court
to look for, you may raise that issue in your brief . . . [s]ince the court will review the entire record,
you do not have to do much more than let it know what issues you think I should have raised on your
behalf.” See A. Shudde October 24, 2014, Letter, Exhibit C. In her appellate brief, Attorney Shudde
requested to be relieved as appointed counsel but only “if appellant so requests.” See Easley Criminal
Court File, Wende Brief, Exhibit B at CCA-0030. The appellate file does not reflect that Easley ever
requested Attorney Shudde be relieved.
During the time Easley was appealing his criminal conviction, he had access to the law library
a minimum of two hours a week to work on his criminal appeal. See P. Smith Declaration ¶ 4, Exhibit
A. Easley first submitted a request for PLU status on November 3, 2014. See P. Smith Declaration ¶
5, Exhibit A. Patricia Smith did not have the power to grant or deny Easley’s PLU application
because all such decisions are made by the prison library at TCCF or by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. See P. Smith Declaration ¶ 5, Exhibit A. Smith only became
involved in Inmate Easley’s request for PLU status after appealed the initial denial in the
administrative grievance process, which occurred on February 11, 2015, the date he filed a CDCR 602
and 602A. See P. Smith Declaration ¶ 5, Exhibit A.
Denial of Access to the Courts
As the plaintiff had adequate access to the courts through counsel appointed to prosecute his
criminal appeal – and as he has alleged no harm from limited access to a legal library – his claim for
denial of access to the courts will be denied. Under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977),
prisoners possess a constitutional right of access to courts, including having the “ability . . . to prepare
and transmit a necessary legal document to court.” Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir.
1996), quoting Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123
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(1994). The right of access to the courts is limited to allow prisoners opportunity to file nonfrivolous
claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322,
325 (5th Cir. 1999). “Interference with a prisoner’s right to access to the courts, such as delay, may
result in a constitutional deprivation.” Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
However, “[a] denial-of-access-to-the-courts claim is not valid if a litigant’s position is not
prejudiced by the alleged violation.” Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998);
Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 988 (1992), citing
Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1988). It is only when a prisoner suffers some
sort of actual prejudice or detriment from denial of access to the courts that the allegation becomes one
of constitutional magnitude. Walker v. Navarro County Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1993); see
Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1987). To prove his claim, a plaintiff must show real
detriment – a true denial of access – such as the loss of a motion, the loss of a right to commence,
prosecute or appeal in a court, or substantial delay in obtaining a judicial determination in a
proceeding. See Oaks v. Wainwright, 430 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1970).
An inmate’s right of access to the courts may be fulfilled in ways other than access to a law
library. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351,116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996). The right of access to the
courts is not “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance[;] an inmate cannot
establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance
program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. In this case, the plaintiff’s access to the courts is
through the counsel appointed him, “[f]or, once the State has provided a petitioner with an attorney in
postconviction proceedings, it has provided him with the ‘capability of bringing contemplated
challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.’” Lamp v. Iowa, 122 F.3d
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1100, 1106 (8th Cir.1997), quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996); see also Schrier v.
Halford, 60 F.3d 1309, 1313-1314 (8th Cir.1995) (having appointed counsel is one way in which state
can shoulder its burden of assuring access to the courts); Sanders v. Rockland County Correctional
Facility, No. 94 Civ. 3691, 1995 WL 479445 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1995) (“By the appointment of
counsel, plaintiff was afforded meaningful access to the courts in his trial.”) When a state provides
adequate legal assistance to a prisoner, the state has fulfilled its obligation to provide him access to the
courts – and need not provide access to a law library. “Inmates are entitled to either adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, but certainly not both.” Meeks v.
California Dep't of Corrections, 1993 WL 330724 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1993), citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at
828.
The plaintiff had counsel appointed to prosecute an appeal of his criminal charges, and he also
had two hours of access to the legal library each week. Counsel submitted a brief to the appellate
court, which, under California law, had the duty to conduct a de novo review of the record to
determine whether any appealable issues existed. Though Mr. Easley had the opportunity to terminate
appellate counsel’s services, he did not do so. As such, Mr. Easley had adequate access to the courts
through his attorney, and his allegations to the contrary will be dismissed for failure to state a
constitutional claim.
Retaliation
In his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Easley argues that Ms. Smith retaliated against him
because he sought to amend a grievance to include a claim for money damages against another staff
member (Ellington) and a claim that his criminal appeal had been dismissed while he was waiting to
be placed on Priority Legal User (“PLU”) status. Ms. Smith terminated the new grievance (which Mr.
Easley wished to be filed as an amendment), noting that the ultimate issue was the same: Mr. Easley’s
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request to be placed on PLU status. Easley also argues that Ms. Smith retaliated against him by
stating in a final report of her investigation of the matter that Easley had been represented by counsel
during the direct appeal of his criminal conviction.
Prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for exercising their constitutional rights.
Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, courts must view such claims
with skepticism to keep from getting bogged down in every act of discipline prison officials impose.
Id. The elements of a claim under a retaliation theory are the plaintiff’s invocation of “a specific
constitutional right,” the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the plaintiff for his or her exercise of
that right, a retaliatory adverse act, and causation, i.e., “but for the retaliatory motive the complained
of incident . . . would not have occurred.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995)
(citations omitted ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084, 116 S. Ct. 800, 133 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1996). A
prisoner seeking to establish a retaliation claim must also show that the prison official's conduct was
sufficiently adverse so that it would be capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights in the future. Winding v. Grimes, 4:08CV99-FKB, 2010 WL
706515 at 3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 22, 2010); citing Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684–85 (5th Cir. 2006)
at 685. A single incident involving a minor sanction is insufficient to prove retaliation. Davis v.
Kelly, 2:10CV271-KS-MTP (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999),
2:10CV271-KS-MTP, 2012 WL 3544865 Id.). Similarly, inconsequential (de minimis) acts by prison
officials do not give rise to an actionable retaliation claim. See Morris at 685. Mere participation in
the grievance process does not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dehghani v.
Vogelgesang, 226 Fed.Appx. 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2007).
In this case, Mr. Easley must prove that he engaged in constitutionally protected activity
(seeking redress for grievances), faced significant adverse consequences, and that such action was
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taken “in an effort to chill [his] access to the courts or to punish [him]for having brought suit.”
Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1296 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 926, 115 S. Ct. 312, 130
L. Ed. 2d 275 (1994); see also Serio v. Members of Louisiana State Board of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112,
1114 (5th Cir.1987). The showing in such cases must be more than the prisoner’s “personal belief that
he is the victim of retaliation.” Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995). Johnson v.
Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997).
The Fifth Circuit has made clear the dangers of permitting retaliation claims to proceed in the
absence of factual allegations to support an inference of a retaliatory motive. In Whittington v.
Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff, Daniel Johnson, had filed numerous
lawsuits against administrators and staff within the Texas prison system. The defendants then
denied Johnson’s request to have his custody status upgraded, and Johnson alleged that the
denial was in retaliation for filing his previous suits. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected Johnson’s
claim – and explained why courts must insist upon specific factual allegations to support an
inference of retaliation:
If we were to hold that [Johnson] by his allegations in this case had established a case
which was entitled to the full panoply of discovery, appointment of counsel, jury trial
and the like, we would be establishing a proposition that would play havoc with every
penal system in the country. Prison administrators must classify and move prisoners.
It is a virtual truism that any prisoner who is the subject of an administrative decision
that he does not like feels that he is being discriminated against for one reason or
another, such as the past filing of a grievance, a complaint about food or a cellmate, or
a prior complaint that he was not being treated equally with other prisoners. If we
were to uphold the further pursuit of [Johnson’s] complaint in this case we would be
opening the door to every disgruntled prisoner denied the next level of trustyship,
reassigned to another prison job, moved to another cell, [or] claiming his shoes were
uncomfortable, to bring such a suit.
Whittington v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1988). Prisoners routinely file grievances
against prison staff on an ongoing basis, for any number of reasons. As such, it is not
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uncommon for a prisoner to file a grievance, then receive a Rule Violation Report sometime
thereafter. Thus, to avoid turning nearly every charge of prison rule violations against a prisoner
into a claim of retaliation, courts insist upon additional allegations or evidence to substantiate a
retaliation claim, such as prison staff issuing threats of disciplinary action if an inmate files
further grievances, staff members pulling an inmate aside to threaten him, members of prison
staff perpetrating unprovoked acts of violence against an inmate, or prison staff members wholly
fabricating charges of prison rule violations against an inmate. See Decker v. McDonald, 2010
WL 1424322 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation) (unpublished),
adopted by the District Court, 2010 WL 1424292 (E.D. Tex.) (unpublished).
Easley engaged in constitutionally protected activity (seeking redress for grievances), but
he did not face a significant adverse consequence. Ms. Smith merely rejected a second grievance
that she perceived to be the same as the first (though Mr. Easley argues that he was actually
trying to amend the first grievance ). As discussed above, she stated (correctly) during the
grievance process that Easley was represented by counsel on direct appeal (and thus did not
qualify for Priority Legal User status). Mr. Easley then filed a new, separate, grievance
challenging Ms. Smith’s handling of the previous grievance, though it appears the process for
challenging the resolution of a grievance is through the appeals process for the original
grievance, not by filing a new grievance. In any event, Ms. Smith’s participation in the events of
this case is limited to her role as a reviewer during the grievance process, and a § 1983 plaintiff
cannot proceed against a prison official based solely on the official’s participation in the prison
grievance process. Dehghani v. Vogelgesang, 226 Fed.Appx. 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2007). In addition,
“[t]here is no constitutionally protected interest in the processing of an inmate’s grievances.”
Bell v. Woods, 382 F. App’x 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371,
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373-74 (5th Cir.2005). For these reasons, the plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a claim under
§ 1983 for retaliation, and those allegations will be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion [34] by the plaintiff for summary judgment will be
denied; the defendant’s motion [37] for summary judgment will be granted, and judgment will be
entered for the defendants. A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion will issue
today.
SO ORDERED, this, the 23rd day of November, 2016.
/s/ Sharion Aycock________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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