Woods v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

ORDER granting 18 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden on 10/30/18. (ncb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
STEPHANIE WOODS

PLAINTIFF

V.

NO. 3:16CV00044-JMV

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

DEFENDANT

O R D E R AUTHORIZING AWARD OF FEES
Stephanie Woods filed this civil action on March 2, 2016, to appeal the Commissioner's
denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. This court entered a Judgment [17],
dated October 20, 2016, that remanded the case to the Social Security Administration (the “Agency”)
for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Before the court is
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees [18] pursuant to §206(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), wherein she requests authorization of a fee award of “$4,044.25 for work
performed before the court.
Counsel for Plaintiff reports that after remand by this court, the Administrative Law Judge
assigned to the case issued a favorable decision on December 8, 2017. A “status letter” was
subsequently sent to Plaintiff’s counsel by the Agency on September 1, 2018, stating that $10,
044.25 had been withheld from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in anticipation of a direct payment of
authorized attorney fees. The letter further stated that counsel had previously been paid $6,000 by
the Agency for work performed before the Agency. As further support for the motion, counsel has
provided a copy of a fee contract, wherein Plaintiff has agreed that her counsel has the right to seek
as much as twenty-five percent of her past-due benefits for representing her in court.
In her response [19], the Acting Commissioner “declines to assert a position on the
reasonableness of counsel’s request because the Commissioner is not a true party in interest.”

Fees under § 406 are limited to reasonableness and may be no more than twenty-five
percent of the claimant’s past-due benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 406. Fees under § 406(b) satisfy a
client's obligation to her counsel and, accordingly, are paid out of the plaintiff's social security
benefits. See Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir.1994). A contingency fee agreement
to pay twenty-five percent of any past-due benefits awarded may set the amount of the § 406(b)
award so long as the amount is reasonable under the facts of the case. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
535 U.S. 789, 807-08 (2002).1 The combined fees under §§ 406(a) (administrative fees) and 406(b)
(federal court fees) may not exceed twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. Dawson v. Finch, 425
F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1970).
Having fully considered the record and the applicable law, the court finds that given the
contingent nature of the representation in this case; Plaintiff’s consent to an award of fees; and the
absence of any indication that counsel is not entitled to the requested award, the requested fee of
$4,044.25 is reasonable and should be authorized pursuant to § 406(b).
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED.
This, the 30th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Jane M. Virden
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2

See also Jeter v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 371, 379 & n. 9 (5th Cir. 2010).