Great American Life Insurance Company v. Tanner et al

Filing 178

ORDER granting 175 Motion to Stay; that the final judgment 173 is stayed pending appeal.. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 2/27/18. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
GREAT AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY

PLAINTIFF

V.

NO. 3:16-CV-70-DMB-JMV

AVA MITCHELL TANNER,
ALITA MARGARET MITCHELL, and
CRAIG J. CHEATHAM

DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING STAY
This interpleader action is before the Court on Alita Margaret Mitchell and Craig J.
Cheatham’s motion to stay this Court’s February 8, 2018, judgment in Ava Mitchell Tanner’s
favor pending their appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Doc. #175.
I
Procedural History
On April 5, 2016, Great American Life Insurance Company filed an interpleader complaint
in this Court to determine whether Ava, Alita, Craig, or anyone else, is the proper recipient of two
annuities issued to Don Mitchell before his death. Doc. #1. On May 27, 2016, Alita and Craig
answered the complaint and Alita filed a crossclaim against Ava. Doc. #9. In her crossclaim,
Alita alleges that “[w]ithout a legal basis or right, Ava Mitchell Tanner has interfered with Alita
Margaret Mitchell’s right to the annuity death benefits by submitting a false and scandalous letter
to [Great American]” and “[a]s a result of her malicious interference,” Ava “is liable for the
damage Alita Margaret Mitchell has incurred ….” Id. at 4.
On June 9, 2016, Ava answered Great American’s complaint and Alita’s crossclaim. Doc.
#13; Doc. #14. Three weeks later, on June 30, 2016, Ava filed an amended answer to Alita’s
crossclaim and asserted undue influence and conversion crossclaims against Alita and Craig. Doc.

#24. On May 15, 2017, Alita and Craig filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. #120. Ava
filed a motion for summary judgment on May 21, 2017. Doc. #126. The next day, Ava filed a
“Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment by Ava Tanner,” which, in substance, supplements
her May 21 motion for summary judgment with her declaration. Doc. #128; Doc. #128-1.
On May 30, 2017, Ava filed a response opposing Alita and Craig’s motion for summary
judgment. Doc. #129. On June 5, 2017, Alita and Craig filed a response opposing Ava’s motion
for summary judgment. Doc. #132. The next day, Craig and Alita replied in support of their
motion. Doc. #134. One week after that, Ava replied in support of her motion. Doc. #135. On
August 7, 2017, the Court, on Great American’s motion, issued a Rule 54(b) judgment dismissing
Great American with prejudice. Doc. #137.
With leave of the Court, the parties, on January 4, 2018, submitted supplemental briefs
regarding their motions for summary judgment. Doc. #165; Doc. #166. On February 2, 2018, this
Court entered an order granting summary judgment in Ava’s favor on the underlying interpleader
action, on her crossclaim for undue influence,1 and on Alita’s crossclaim for unlawful interference.
Doc. #170. The Court based these rulings on a conclusion that Ava introduced sufficient evidence
to raise a presumption that Craig exerted undue influence over Don with regard to changes in
beneficiaries of the annuities and that Craig failed to rebut the presumption. Craig and Alita filed
a notice of appeal four days later. Doc. #172.
On February 8, 2018, this Court entered a final judgment in Ava’s favor in accordance with
its order granting summary judgment. Doc. #173. The same day, Craig and Alita filed a second
notice of appeal and a motion to stay this Court’s judgment pending appeal. Doc. #174; Doc.

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The Court found Ava abandoned her crossclaim for conversion.

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#175. Two weeks later, Ava filed a response to the motion to stay in which she represents that she
does not oppose the requested relief. Doc. #177.
II
Analysis
A district court has discretion to grant a stay pending appeal. Weingarten Realty Inv’rs v.
Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 910 (5th Cir. 2011). Generally, when considering a motion to stay pending
appeal, a court must consider four factors: (1) whether the party seeking the stay has shown a
likelihood of success on the merits on appeal; (2) whether the party seeking the stay would suffer
irreparable injury resulting from the denial of the requested stay; (3) whether the other parties
would be substantially harmed by the grant of the requested stay; and (4) whether the public
interest favors a stay. Id. However, if the case involves a “serious legal question … and the
balance of equities heavily favors a stay[,] … the movant only needs to present a substantial case
on the merits.” Id.
While this Court would not be inclined to grant a stay based on the relevant factors,2 Ava
has stated she does not oppose the requested stay. Accordingly, Craig and Alita’s motion to stay

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In the memorandum accompanying their motion to stay, Craig and Alita argue they are likely to succeed on appeal
because (1) this Court improperly relied on Ava’s supplementary declaration, which they objected to on the grounds
that the declaration conflicted with Ava’s deposition testimony and was not based on personal knowledge; (2) there
was no evidence that Alita, the ultimate beneficiary of the annuities (rather than Craig), exerted undue influence over
Don; and (3) the Court improperly weighed the relevant evidence.

First, as stated in the Court’s February 2 order, in the absence of a valid objection, a court does not err in considering
otherwise inadmissible evidence. BGHA, LLC v. City of Universal City, 340 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, the
objections to the declaration were improperly vague. Craig and Alita made no effort to identify which statements in
the seventy paragraphs in Ava’s declaration were either not based on personal knowledge or conflicted with her
previous depositions. As this Court has previously observed, a party must specifically identify allegedly improper
evidence because “a court is not required to review large quanta of evidence to ferret out inadmissible statements.”
Stuckey v. Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist., No. 4:16-cv-186, 2017 WL 4973201, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2017) (quoting
Tucker v. SAS Inst., Inc., 462 F.Supp.2d 715, 722 (N.D. Tex. 2006)). Even if the objection was properly asserted, it
would not have resulted in a change in this Court’s opinion on the summary judgment issues. The potentially
inadmissible statements cited in the opinion related to either background, or to Alita’s alleged undue influence which,
as described below, is immaterial to the Court’s ultimate conclusion. Accordingly, the Court’s reliance on the
declaration, which was not subject to a valid objection, was not improper.

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[175] is GRANTED as unopposed. The final judgment issued in this action [173] is STAYED
pending resolution of Craig and Alita’s appeal.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of February, 2018.
/s/Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Second, Craig and Alita cite no authority holding that undue influence may only exist where the alleged influencer is
a direct beneficiary of the challenged action. No such requirement appears in relevant Mississippi law and courts
throughout the country have rejected such a position where, as here, the direct beneficiary is closely related to the
person who exerted undue influence. See, e.g., In re Bixler’s Estate, 229 P. 704, 708 (Cal. 1924) (“It was not necessary
to allege that Hamilton profited by the will … or even that he was named therein as a legatee.”); Coghill v. Kennedy,
24 So. 459, 467 (Ala. 1898) (“The undue influence which will invalidate a will need not be exercised by all the the
[sic] beneficiaries, nor by any of them. If fraud or undue influence affects the whole will, though exercised by one
only of the beneficiaries, or by one not named therein, no part of it can stand.”); Schmidt v. Schwear, 424 N.E.2d 401,
408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (undue influence of husband imputed to wife); Nease v. Clark, 488 P.2d 1396, 1399 n.1 (Or.
Ct. App. 1971) (“Where the activity questioned is that of a close relative … of the beneficiary, the activity is imputed
to the beneficiary.”).
Finally, for the reasons stated in this Court’s order, the Court does not believe that the evidence was improperly
weighed.
Thus, the Court concludes that Craig and Alita do not have a likelihood of success on appeal. Furthermore, the Court
is skeptical of Craig and Alita’s argument that, in essence, the nature of an interpleader action always requires a finding
that the remaining factors favor a stay. Regardless, because the stay will be granted, the Court need not decide the
issue.

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