Wallace v. Lee et al

Filing 17

ORDER denying 16 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. Signed by District Judge Michael P. Mills on 10/6/16. (cr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION

SAM WEBSTER WALLACE
V.

PETITIONER
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16CV135-MPM-SAA

SUPT. EARNEST LEE and
ATTORNEY GENERAL JIM HOOD

RESPONDENTS

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Sam Wallace’s motion for rehearing of the Court’s
September 14, 2016, judgment denying his petition for federal habeas relief. The Court
construes the instant motion as one to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). An order granting Rule 59(e) relief is appropriate (1) when there has been an
intervening change in the controlling law, (2) where the movant presents newly discovered
evidence that was previously unavailable, or (3) to correct a manifest error of law or fact.
Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003).
Wallace’s petition was dismissed by this Court as untimely. See docs. # 13 and #14. In
the instant motion, he argues that his access to legal materials is insufficient for him to
adequately present his claims and defenses. He also complains that it appears as though the
memorandum in support of his petition was not received by either the Court or the respondents.
He additionally appears to argue that this Court improperly penalized him for failing to seek
certiorari review with the United States Supreme Court, and he maintains that his counsel was
paid to complete an appeal but abandoned his duty to do so. See doc. #16. He claims that these
failures, combined with the constitutional errors alleged in his petition, should constitute an
exception to the federal statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
The Court finds that none of Wallace’s arguments warrant relief under Rule 59. First, the

Court received Wallace’s amended petition (presumably the memorandum he references in the
instant motion) on July 8, 2016. See doc. #5. It also received his response to the respondents’
motion to dismiss the petition as untimely on September 6, 2016. See doc. #12. Therefore,
Wallace had ample opportunity to explain to the Court why his petition should not be deemed
untimely, and any alleged failures of the prison mailing system or legal assistance program is
insufficient to warrant relief. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5
(2008) (“Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, but it ‘may not be used to
relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.’”) (citation omitted). Second, the Court notes that it did not penalize
Wallace for failing to seek certiorari review with the Supreme Court. Rather, it explained that
Wallace’s state-court judgment did not become final for federal limitations purposes until the
time to seek certiorari review had expired. See doc. #13 (citing Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct.
641, 653-54 (2012)). Finally, although it has no impact on the calculation of the federal
imitations period, the Court notes that Wallace did have the assistance of counsel in fully
exhausting his direct appeal. Wallace v. State, 139 So. 3d 75 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) reh’g denied
February 11, 2014 cert. denied May 29, 2014 (Cause No. 2012-KA-00310-COA).
In sum, because he has not proven any justification that would warrant amendment of the
judgment in this case, Wallace’s motion [16] is DENIED. A certificate of appealability
(“COA”) is likewise DENIED, because reasonable jurists would not disagree with the Court’s
resolution of these matters. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
SO ORDERED this the 6th day of October, 2016.

/s/ Michael P. Mills
MICHAEL P. MILLS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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