Ingram v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. et al

Filing 135

ORDER denying 131 Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff's Complaint Dismissed. Case Closed. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 04/27/2018. (bds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
KRYSTAL INGRAM
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-00210-NBB-RP

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.;
UNITED STUDENT AID FUNDS, INC.;
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, fka SALLIE MAE, INC.;
and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCAITON

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This cause comes before the court upon the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the
court’s order granting the defendants’ joint motion to enforce settlement agreements. Upon due
consideration of the motion, response and applicable authority, the court finds as follows:
Plaintiff Krystal Ingram asserts claims against Defendants for alleged violations of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.. During discovery, Ingram began settlement
negotiations with Defendants. Specifically, Ingram offered to dismiss all claims with prejudice
in exchange for Defendants’ promise that they would not pursue any claims against her in
connection with the instant litigation. Ingram, however, refused to file the agreed upon
stipulations of dismissal. Instead, Ingram attempted to rescind her counsel’s authority to settle
after the agreements had been reached. Defendants subsequently filed a joint motion to compel
enforcement of the settlement agreements which the court granted. Ingram now moves, pro se,
for the court to reconsider its order granting the aforementioned motion to compel.
A district court may alter or amend a final judgment under Rule 59(e) upon one of four
grounds: “(1) new evidence has become available; (2) it is necessary to correct manifest errors
of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (3) it is necessary to prevent manifest injustice;
or (4) the existence of an intervening change in the controlling law.” Johnson v. Buentello, 2010

WL 727752, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010) (citing In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626,
629 (5th Cir. 2002)). “A party may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate issues that ‘should
have been urged earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant’s dissatisfaction.’” Id.
(quoting Peterson v. Cigna Group. Ins., 2002 WL 1268404, at *2 (E.D. La. Jun. 5, 2002)).
In moving to reconsider, Ingram expresses significant dissatisfaction with her
representation in this matter. Complaints regarding one’s representation do not satisfy the
above-articulated standard for reconsideration. Ingram additionally argues that “the terms of the
agreement . . . should be reconsidered.” Motions to reconsider, however, may not be used as a
means for a dissatisfied party to renegotiate mutually agreed upon terms. The court further notes
that Ingram not dispute that she entered into settlement agreements with Defendants nor does she
deny the substance of those agreements. In fact, Ingram’s sworn deposition testimony confirms
the terms and existence of the agreements.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Ingram’s motion for reconsideration of the
court’s order granting Defendants’ joint motion to compel enforcement of settlement agreements
is not well-taken and is, therefore, DENIED. In accordance with the terms of the parties’ valid
and enforceable settlement agreements, Ingram’s claims are hereby DISMISSED with
prejudice. This case is closed.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this, the 27th day of April, 2018.

/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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