Davis v. United States Marshals Service et al
Filing
77
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 71 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 4/23/2020. (jtm)
Case: 3:16-cv-00300-LG-RHW Doc #: 77 Filed: 04/23/20 1 of 7 PageID #: 1089
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
JEFFREY K. DAVIS
PLAINTIFF
v.
CAUSE NO. 3:16CV300-LG-RHW
U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL SESSIONS,
METROPOLITAN SECURITY
SERVICES, INC., d/b/a WALDEN SECURITY,
THOMAS WIGHT, and DAVID HARLOW
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE THE COURT is the [71] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Metropolitan Security Services, Inc., d/b/a Walden Security, the sole remaining
defendant in this case. The Motion has been fully briefed. After due consideration
of the parties’ submissions and the relevant law, it is the Court’s opinion that there
is no question of material fact for the jury. Accordingly, the Motion will be granted
and the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jeffrey Davis complains that within days of being hired by Walden
Security as District Supervisor (“DS”) for the Northern District of Mississippi, he
was suspended from the contract and terminated. He alleges that the Marshals
Service failed to approve his employment as a DS, which was a condition of the
position with Walden Security. Davis complains that he did not receive written
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notification from the Marshals Service that it had found a lack of qualifications or
unsuitability for the position, or the information regarding his right to appeal or
challenge the suitability determination under 5 C.F.R. § 731. He had been
previously employed by the Marshals Service, and contends that his employment
with Walden Security was not approved in retaliation for his whistleblowing
activity during his tenure at the Marshals Service. The Amended Complaint
includes denial of due process, breach of contract, and reprisal/whistleblower claims.
The Court previously dismissed all of these claims against the federal agency and
employee defendants. Only the breach of contract claim against Walden Security
remains.
The contract at issue is between Walden Security and the Marshals Service.
It requires the Marshals Service to determine if an applicant for a DS position with
Walden is
suitable to perform under this contract in accordance with the criteria
outlined in 5 CFR 731 Suitability and the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard
for Federal Employees and Contractors. The Government’s primary
concern is to determine whether the individual’s presence or
performance under this contract could pose a potential threat or risk to
the U.S. Courts, the Government, or the public. Derogatory
information discovered during the investigation process may render
the individual unsuitable to perform under this contract.
(Am. Compl. Ex. A, at C-15, ECF No. 31-1).
In its Order granting the federal defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court
determined that Davis’s breach of contract claim against the federal defendants
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should be dismissed because the Marshals Service was not Davis’s joint employer,
reasoning that
[t]he Marshals Service required that Walden Security provide specific
personnel and services, but it was Walden Security that extended the
offer of employment to Davis, determined pay, and would have trained
and supervised Davis. (Am. Compl. Ex. A, B, ECF No. 31-1, 31-2). The
bare allegation that the Marshals Service was Davis’ joint employer
because it retained a veto over Davis’ employment is implausible under
these circumstances. See Urgent v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 704 F. App’x
107, 109 (3d Cir. 2017) (CSO applicant was not employee of Marshals
Service simply because background check gave Marshals Service
control of decision to hire or reject contractor’s applicants).
(Order Granting Mots. to Dism. 7-8, ECF No. 46.) The Court also concluded
that even if the Marshals Service and Walden Security were Davis’s joint
employers, Davis was not a party or a third-party beneficiary of the contract
he sought to enforce. (Id.) Walden Security now requests summary judgment
as to Davis’s breach of contract claim against it.1
DISCUSSION
In order to establish a breach of contract claim in Mississippi, “‘the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the existence of a valid and
binding contract, (2) the defendant has breached the contract, and (3) the plaintiff
has been damaged monetarily.’” Kelley, LLC v. Corinth Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 200 So.
3d 1107, 1123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Suddith v. Univ. of S. Miss., 977 So. 2d
1 Walden Security addressed all of the claims in the Amended Complaint out of an
abundance of caution. However, Walden Security is only included in the breach of
contract claim, and Davis did not respond to any arguments other than those
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1158, 1175 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)).
Davis claims that the defendants were “contractually obligated to undertake
a background investigation for the purpose of determining the plaintiff’s ‘suitability’
for the position of district supervisor in accordance with the limited criteria set forth
in 5 CFR Section 731.202.” (Am. Compl. 14, ECF No. 31). Davis alleges that the
defendants breached the contract by: 1) making an inappropriate suitability
determination; 2) denying Davis’s continued employment by making an
inappropriate suitability determination; 3) failing to provide written notice of the
reasons for the unsuitability determination; 4) failing to advise Davis of his right to
contest the unsuitability determination; and 5) terminating Davis’s employment.
(Id., at 14-15).
Walden Security argues that Davis cannot establish a breach of contract
claim because, as the Court has already determined, Davis did not have a written
contract with Walden and was not a third-party beneficiary of the Contract.
Davis asserts in response that the obligations of the Contract modified his atwill employment relationship with Walden Security in that the Contract gave him a
right to notice of adverse suitability determinations and an opportunity to be heard.
He contends that Walden Security breached this contractual obligation “by failing
to pursue an explanation of the Marshals Service’s decision to terminate Davis’s
employment and by otherwise not affording Davis an opportunity to contest his
regarding breach of contract.
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termination.” (Pl. Resp. Mem. 13, ECF No. 75.)
Davis’s argument is not supported by the facts in evidence or applicable law.
The Court has already determined that Davis is not a party to the Contract or a
third-party beneficiary to the Contract. Under these circumstances, it is not
possible for the Contract to give him rights that modify his at-will employment
relationship with Walden Security.
Furthermore, Davis cites to section H.9 of the Contract, and contends that it
“made particular reference to Walden’s applicants and employees and their rights to
notice of adverse suitability determinations and an opportunity to be heard.” (Pl.
Resp. Mem. 13, ECF No. 75.) Section H.9 governs “Removal of CSOs And Other
Contractor Personnel For Violations of the CSO Performance Standard.” (Def. Mot.
Ex. D, at H-4, ECF No. 71-4.) Davis does not specify, but it appears he refers to
section H.9(d), which reads,
If requested by the Contracting Officer or a designated representative,
the Contractor shall provide a written explanation to the Contracting
Officer, providing the facts and argument regarding the proposed
removal of an individual. In the event that the Contracting Officer or
designated representative has requested the removal, a written
response from the individual subject to the removal, if any, and a
written statement of the Contractor’s position on the removal of an
individual must be forwarded to the Office of Court Security, through
the Contracting Officer, within 15 days of the initial removal notice for
a final decision.
(Id.)
This provision is not applicable to Davis. He does not contend he was
removed for violating a performance standard; he alleges that although Walden
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Security found him to be qualified for the DS position, the Marshals Service did not
approve his employment application. (Am. Compl. 14, ECF No. 31; Def. Mot. Ex. B,
at 56-63, ECF No. 71-2.) He alleges the Marshals Service made an “inappropriate
determination that [he] was not the most qualified applicant for the position.” (Am.
Compl. 14, ECF No. 31.) Nevertheless, this was the Marshals Service’s call to
make: “[t]he Government will review and approve the Contractor’s recommendation
for all DS and CM positions.” (Def. Mot. Ex. D, at C-12 (§ C.4.2.3), ECF No. 71-4.).
Davis next argues that the Marshals Service and Walden Security were his
joint employers, and therefore “the retaliatory actions and the breach by the
Marshals Service, its failure to provide any form of notice of the bases of its unsuitability determination, and [its] failure to provide Davis with a meaningful
opportunity to be heard may be imputed to Walden Security.” (Pl. Resp. Mem. 14,
ECF No. 75.)
Davis cites Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222 (5th Cir.
2015) in support of his argument, but in that case the Fifth Circuit held that joint
employers can only be liable to an employee for their own actions, not for each
other’s actions. (Id. at 229.) Thus, the Marshals Service’s actions cannot be
imputed to Walden Security even if they are joint employers. More importantly,
even if the Marshals Service and Walden Security are joint employers, that status
has no effect on Davis’ ability to enforce the Contract. He remains unable to do so
because he is not a party or a third-party beneficiary of the Contract.
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Finally, Davis’s argument that Walden Security was complicit in the
Marshals Service’s retaliation because Walden did not seek an explanation from the
Marshals Service under section H.9 of the Contract does not show a question of
material fact for the jury. Davis did not bring a retaliation claim against Walden
Security, and therefore this attempt to impute retaliation is simply not before the
Court. Furthermore, as the Court determined above, section H.9 did not apply to
Davis. Walden Security would have had no cause under that provision to seek an
explanation for the Marshals Service’s disapproval of Davis’ employment.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court finds no question of material
fact for the jury regarding Davis’s breach of contract claim against Walden Security.
Accordingly, the claim will be dismissed. Because this Order resolves all remaining
claims between the parties, a final judgment in favor of the defendants will issue.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED the [71] Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Metropolitan Security Services, Inc., d/b/a Walden
Security is GRANTED. The plaintiff’s claims against Metropolitan Security
Services, Inc., d/b/a Walden Security are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 23rd day of April, 2020.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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