Williams v. The State of Mississippi et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 1/4/18. (jtm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION

DILLON WILLIAMS

PETITIONER

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:17CV118-NBB-DAS

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI and
JEFFREY A. KLINFUSS

RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the pro se petition of inmate Dillon Williams for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents have moved to dismiss the petition
as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, and Williams has filed a response in opposition to
the motion. For the reasons set forth below, Respondents’ motion will be granted, and the
instant petition will be dismissed with prejudice.
Factual and Procedural History
On or about January 26, 2010, Dillon1Williams burglarized the home of Pat Crum,
assaulting the ninety-one-year-old woman during the home invasion. See, e.g., Doc. #16-1 at
27. During the assault, Ms. Crum sustained injuries that included a fractured shoulder and
permanent nerve damage to her face. Williams v. State, 126 So. 3d 992, 994 (Miss. Ct. App.
2013). Williams was indicted for two counts of burglary and one count of aggravated assault,
with notice of enhanced punishment due to the victim’s age. See, e.g., Doc. #16-1 at 1; Doc.
#16-5 at 3. Williams subsequently pleaded guilty to burglary (home invasion) and aggravated
assault in the Marshall County Circuit Court in Cause No. CR2010-194.2 By Order dated

1 Petitioner’s first name is spelled both “Dillon” and “Dillion” throughout state and federal court proceedings.
2 An order to retire an additional count of burglary was entered on November 10, 2010. Doc. #16-1 at 8-9. That
same day, the circuit court retired to file a charge of possession of a cell phone in a correctional facility in Cause No.

December 16, 2010, the Marshall County Circuit Court sentenced Williams to consecutive terms
of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for the burglary conviction and to an enhanced punishment
of forty years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction. Doc. #16-1 at 30-31; see
also Williams v. State, 218 So. 3d 1190, 1191 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016); Williams v. State, 126 So.
3d 992, 994-95 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
On December 17, 2010, Williams, through counsel, filed a “Motion to Reconsider” in the
circuit court asking the court to decrease the sentence imposed or, alternatively, to run the
sentences concurrently. Doc. #16-2. The circuit court denied the motion on August 27, 2010.
Id. at 3. On December 2, 2011, Williams, acting pro se, submitted a post-conviction motion to
the Marshall County Circuit Court (Cause No. CV2011-503). Doc. #16-3. This motion was
denied on its merits on August 27, 2012. Id. at 7. Williams did not appeal this decision to the
Mississippi Supreme Court.
Williams did, however, submit a second post-conviction motion in the Marshall County
Circuit Court that was signed on December 10, 2012 (Cause No. CV2012-448). Doc. #16-4.
The circuit court denied the motion by order entered on January 11, 2013, finding the motion
was barred as a successive writ under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6). Id. at 21. Williams
appealed, and on December 3, 2013, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court’s decision. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 126 So. 3d 992 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (Cause
No. 2013-CP-00199-COA). Williams did not file a motion for rehearing with the Mississippi
Court of Appeals nor a certiorari petition with the Mississippi Supreme Court. The mandate of
the Mississippi Court of Appeals issued on December 26, 2013. Id. at 28.

2010-195. Id. at 77.

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On November 21, 2013, Williams, with the assistance of counsel, submitted yet another
post-conviction motion in the Marshall County Circuit Court (Cause No. CV2013-423) alleging
that he was illegally sentenced because he was deprived of his statutory right to be sentenced by
a jury for the sentencing enhancement. Doc. #16-5. The court denied the motion by order
entered on July 14, 2014, finding the claim waived under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) and the
motion barred as a successive writ pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6). Id. at 8-9.
Williams appealed. Doc. #16-5. On March 22, 2016, the Mississippi Court of Appeals
affirmed the circuit court’s decision. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 218 So. 3d 1190 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2016), reh’g denied, August 9, 2016 (Cause No. 2014-CA-01170-COA).
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Williams’ subsequent petition for writ of
certiorari. However, on May 11, 2017, that court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions denying
Williams’ application for post-conviction relief. Doc. #16-5; see also Williams v. State, 222 So.
3d 265 (Miss. 2017) (Cause No. 2014-CT-01170-SCT). The mandate issued June 1, 2017.
Doc. #16-5 at 28.
Thereafter, Williams sought federal habeas relief. Williams signed the instant petition
on May 30, 2017, and it was stamped “filed” in this Court on June 26, 2017. Doc. #1.
Legal Standard
The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is subject to the statute of limitations of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AAEDPA@). Egerton v. Cockrell, 334
F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). The issue of whether Respondents= motion should be granted
turns on the statute=s limitation period, which provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
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The limitation period shall run from the latest of B
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S. C. § 2244(d)(1). The federal limitations period is tolled while a Aproperly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review@ is pending. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2). In Arare and exceptional circumstances,@ the limitations period may be equitably
tolled. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Analysis
By statute, there is no appeal from any guilty plea taken after July 1, 2008. Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-35-101 (“[W]here the defendant enters a plea of guilty and is sentenced, then no
appeal from the circuit court to the Supreme Court shall be allowed.”); Seal v. State, 38 So. 3d
635, 638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Therefore, Williams’ judgments of conviction became final on
December 16, 2010, the date on which he was sentenced.3 Accordingly, absent statutory or
equitable tolling, Williams’ petition for federal habeas relief was due on or before December 16,

3 The exceptions of § 2244(d)(1)(B-D) are inapplicable in this case.

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2011, to be deemed timely.
Williams filed several post-judgment filings, but not all of those filings serve to
statutorily toll the limitations period. For instance, Williams’ December 17, 2010, motion for
reconsideration did not collaterally attack the merits of his plea or sentence or raise any grounds
for post-conviction relief. Therefore, it is not a post-conviction motion that would toll the
AEDPA statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2). See Frith v. Epps, 392 F. App’x 342, 346
(5th Cir. 2010) (holding that where motion for reconsideration does not request post-conviction
relief under Mississippi law, the motion cannot serve to statutorily toll the federal statute of
limitations); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1) (setting forth grounds for post-conviction
relief under Mississippi law).
Williams is, however, entitled to 269 days of statutory tolling for the pendency of his
post-conviction action filed December 2, 2011, in the Marshall County Circuit Court (December
2, 2011, through August 27, 2012). Therefore, absent additional tolling, Williams’ habeas
petition became due in this Court on or before Monday, September 10, 2012 (December 16,
2011, plus 269 days).
Williams’ second and third motions for post-conviction relief were filed, at the earliest, in
December 2012, after the expiration of the federal limitations deadline. Therefore, these
motions do not serve to toll the federal limitations deadline. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260,
263 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding state habeas application did not toll federal imitations period where
state application was not filed until after expiration of federal deadline).4

4 The Court notes that Williams also filed a “Petition of Eligibility of Parole” in the Marshall County Circuit Court
in Cause No. CV2017-219 on or about May 22, 2017. See Doc. #16-6. Because Williams does not challenge his
current parole eligibility in the instant action, but rather, his convictions and sentences, the motion related to parole
eligibility bears no relevance to the Court’s analysis. The Court otherwise finds that it is not a properly filed post-

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Williams federal habeas petition was Afiled@ sometime between the date it was signed on
May 30, 2017, and the date it was filed by this Court on June 26, 2017. See Coleman v.
Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Amailbox rule@ deems a pro se
prisoner=s petition filed on the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing). Therefore,
Williams’ federal habeas petition was filed almost five years after the AEDPA deadline.
Accordingly, federal habeas relief is available to Williams only if he can demonstrate that his
case involves Arare and exceptional circumstances@ that would warrant an equitable tolling of the
limitations period. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
This exception Aapplies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about
the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.@ Ott v.
Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999).
Williams asserts that the one-year statute of limitations period is inapplicable because he
is serving an illegal sentence due to trial errors that have affected his fundamental constitutional
rights.

However, there is no “illegal sentence” exception to the federal limitations period.

O’Neal v. Banks, No. 1:17CV22-SA-RP, 2017 WL 1483298, at *3 (N.D. Miss. April 25, 2017).
see also Jackson v. Brewer, et al, No. 2:10CV85-WAP-JAD, 2010 WL 4531386, at *1 (N.D.
Miss. Oct. 14, 2010) (finding there is no illegal-sentence exception to the federal habeas statute
of limitations), adopted as final judgment in Jackson v. Brewer, 2010 WL 4531385, at *1 (N.D.
Miss. Nov. 2, 2010). Accordingly, the Court finds equitable tolling is not warranted in this case,
and that the instant petition is barred by the federal statute of limitations.

conviction motion, and it was filed after the federal limitation period had expired. Therefore, this motion does not
further toll the statutory tolling period.

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Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, this Court must issue or
deny a certificate of appealability (ACOA@) upon the entry of a final order adverse to the
petitioner. Williams must obtain a COA before appealing this Court=s decision denying federal
habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).

Because his petition for writ of habeas corpus is

rejected on procedural grounds, Williams must demonstrate Athat jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling@ in order for a COA to issue. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying
this standard, the Court concludes that a COA should be denied in this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons as set forth herein, Respondents= AMotion to Dismiss@ [16] is
GRANTED, and the petition filed in this cause is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A
certificate of appealability is DENIED.

A separate judgment in accordance with this opinion

and order will enter today.
SO ORDERED this 4th day of January, 2018.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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