Hoskins v. Droder et al

Filing 63

ORDER granting (37) Motion to Dismiss; granting (39) Motion to Dismiss; granting (48) Motion to Dismiss; granting (50) Motion to Dismiss in case 3:17-cv-00224-MPM-JMV. Signed by District Judge Michael P. Mills on 11/5/2018. Associated Cases: 3:17-cv-00224-MPM-JMV, 3:18-cv-00099-MPM-JMV (lpm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
LALANGIE HOSKINS

PLAINTIFF

V.

NO. 3:17cv224-M

EUGENE DRODER, III, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss with
Prejudice [37][39] [48][50]. The Court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the
parties, along with relevant case law and evidence, is now prepared to rule.
Background
On November 09, 2017, Lalangie Hoskins (Plaintiff) filed her complaints, pro se, against
Eugene Droder, III, Angel Contreras, and GE Aviation (collectively Defendants) alleging claims
of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In her complaint,
Plaintiff describes Defendant Contreras as the “Lead Human Resources Rep.” for GE Aviation
and Defendant Droder as “Counsel, Labor and Employment” for GE Aviation.
In June 2018, Defendant Angel Contreras and Defendant Eugene Droder, III, moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against them under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants ask this court to dismiss all Title VII claims, any claims under the American
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and any claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA). Defendants also made alternative motions to dismiss; however, because this Court finds
that dismissal of both cases is proper pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) it will not discuss the Defendants’
alternative arguments.

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Standard
Before the Court can grant a motion to dismiss, a Defendant must show that Plaintiff has
not met the relevant pleading standard to state a claim. Specifically, a Defendant must show that
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Discussion
a. Title VII
“[R]elief under Title VII is available only against an employer, not an individual supervisor
or fellow employee.” Foley v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340 (5th Cir. 2003). “Individuals
are not liable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities.” Ackel v. Nat’l.
Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2003).
Here, because Defendants Droder and Contreras are agents of GE Aviation, Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Droder and Conteras, in their individual capacity, fail as a matter of
law. Therefore, Defendant Droder’s and Defendant Contreras’s motions to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) are GRANTED.
b. ADA
Like her Title VII claims, Plaintiff’s ADA claims against Defendants Droder and Contreras
in their individual capacity fail as a matter of law. Pursuant to district court holdings within the
Fifth Circuit, as well as holdings by and within other circuits, there is no individual liability under
the ADA. See Franklin v. City of Slidell, 928 F.Supp.2d 874, 882 (E.D. La. 2013); Lefort v.

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Lafourche Parish Fire Protection Dist. No. 3, 39 F.Supp.3d 820 (E.D. La. 2014); see also Jones
v. Steinheimer, 387 F.App’x. 766 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Purcell v. Am. Legion, 44 F.Supp.3d
1051 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (collecting cases among various district courts finding that there is no
individual liability under the ADA – “the consensus view among the district courts in this as well
as the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits is there is no individual liability. . .under the ADA.”).
Thus, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss any ADA claims asserted
by Plaintiff against Defendants Droder and Contreras.
c. FMLA
Defendants argue that they are not liable for any FMLA violations because neither one of
them are Plaintiff’s “employer” as defined by the FMLA. This Court agrees. To the extent that
Plaintiff is attempting to assert FMLA claims against Defendant Droder and Defendant Contreras,
this court finds that such claims also fail and must be dismissed.
The FMLA and the FLSA define “employer” in a “substantially identical” manner, and
“accordingly, courts look to FLSA precedent when applying the FMLA.” Crane v. Gore Design
Completion, Ltd., 21 F.Supp.3d 769, 782 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d
174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006)). In the Fifth Circuit, to determine whether an individual is an employer
under the FLSA the court relies on a four-part “economics reality test.” Williams v. Henagen, 595
F.3d 610, 620 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81
S.Ct. 933, 6 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1961)); see also Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2012).
Under the economics reality test, the court considers whether the individual alleged to be an
employer: “(1) possessed the power to hire and fire the employees; (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of
payment; and (4) maintained employment records.” Gray, 673 F.3d at 355. Because determining

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whether Defendant Droder and Defendant Contreras were Plaintiff’s employers is the same under
the FLSA and the FMLA, the Court will apply the same economic reality test to Plaintiff’s FMLA
claims against Defendant Droder and Defendant Contreras.
Here, Plaintiff fails to provide facts to suggest to this Court that Defendant Contreras and
Defendant Droder were her employers under the FMLA. Record facts do not establish that
Defendants Contreras and Droder had the power to hire or fire individuals of GE Aviation; that
they supervised employee work schedules or the conditions of employment; that they determined
rates and methods of payment; or that they maintained employment records. Thus, to the extent
that Plaintiff asserts FMLA claims against Defendant Droder and Defendant Contreras, such
claims are dismissed. This Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss any FMLA claims
asserted against Defendant Contreras and Defendant Droder.
Conclusion
Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’
Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice [37][39] [48][50] are GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this the 5th day of November, 2018.

/s/ MICHAEL P. MILLS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

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