Hughey v. Tippah County, Mississippi et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 38 Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 09/17/2018. (bds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
JAMES ALLEN HUGHEY
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-00004-NBB-RP
TIPPAH COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
TOMMY MASON, in his individual capacity,
and “X” Bonding Company
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court is Defendant Tommy Mason’s second motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Upon due consideration of the motion, response, pleadings and applicable
authority, the court is ready to rule.
Factual and Procedural Background
The instant action arises out of Plaintiff James Allen Hughey’s arrest. Hughey alleges
that on June 7, 2017, he went and knocked on the door of the home of his ex-girlfriend to visit
her step-father, Denver Crumpton. Hughey asserts that Defendant Mason, a deputy sheriff of
Tippah County, Mississippi, answered, opened the door and “began beating Hughey savagely
with his fists.” Hughey further alleges that he was unarmed and posed no danger to anyone.
Hughey also contends that he “has no substantive memory of the events after the beating.”
Following the alleged beating, Hughey was arrested by a different deputy, on charges not
identified in the pleadings. According to Hughey, he recently learned that he was indicted for
the felony offense of burglary. Hughey asserts that the alleged beating caused him to suffer
injuries including rib fractures, transverse process fractures, and a splenic laceration, and that,
because of these injuries, he was hospitalized for several weeks at The Med in Memphis,
Tennessee.
On January 4, 2018, Hughey filed the instant suit. He asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Mason, alleging that his actions constituted an unreasonable or excessive use of
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Hughey additionally asserts state law claims for
assault and battery against Mason. Mason recently raised a defense of qualified immunity to
which Hughey responded by filing a Schultea reply. Mason now moves for judgment on the
pleadings as to Hughey’s §1983 claim.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay
trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In considering a
12(c) motion, courts employ the same standard as that of deciding a motion to dismiss under rule
12(b)(6). Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.2d 305, 313 (5th
Cir. 2002). Accordingly, “[t]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” Hughes v. Tobacco Institute, Inc., 278
F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). Pleadings, therefore, are to be construed liberally, and “judgment
on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of
law remain.” Id. (citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891
(5th Cir. 1998)).
Analysis
In moving for judgment on the pleadings, Mason asserts that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. When qualified immunity is asserted at this stage, the court utilizes a two-prong
analysis. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right. Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312-313(5th Cir. 2016). The
court must also decide whether the defendant’s actions were “objectively unreasonable” in light
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of the law that was clearly established at the time of the incident. Id. The court may conduct this
inquiry in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
To succeed on an excessive-force claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) an injury that
(2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need, and that (3)
the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.
2016) (citing Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 734 (5th Cir. 2013)). The reasonableness of
an official’s conduct depends upon “the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Mason does not dispute that the right to be free from unreasonable or excessive force is a
clearly established constitutional right. Rather, Mason simply argues that Hughey has failed to
provide specific, particular factual allegations sufficient to meet the Fifth Circuit’s heightened
pleading standard for such claims.
Turning to the pleadings, Hughey asserts that on the evening of June 7, 2017, he went to
the home of his ex-girlfriend to visit her step-father. According to Hughey, he was unarmed and
posed no danger to anyone. Hughey alleges that he knocked on the door of the residence and
that Mason answered, opened the door and that, for unknown reasons, “Mason began beating
Hughey savagely with his fists.”
According to Hughey, he did nothing to provoke the alleged beating. Hughey
additionally asserts that he has no substantive memory of what happened after the alleged
beating. Hughey’s alleged injuries include a splenic laceration, rib fractures and transverse
process fractures. Moreover, Hughey’s medical records demonstrate that he was hospitalized for
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more than a month following the alleged beating, and that he underwent various medical
procedures before he was deemed well enough to go home.1 Hughey also contends that he
recently learned that he has been indicted for burglary as a result of the incident.
Accepting the allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, as the court must do, the court finds that Hughey has sufficiently pleaded facts
indicating a violation of his right to be free from unreasonable or excessive force. If the court
accepts as true that Hughey’s conduct leading up to the alleged beating was limited to knocking
on a door and that Hughey was unarmed and posed no danger, it must also accept as true the
logical inference that Mason’s alleged beating of Hughey, which left Hughey hospitalized for
several weeks, constituted an intentional and unreasonable use of force.
The court is mindful that discovery may reveal that Hughey’s version of the underlying
incident is not entirely accurate. But, at this stage, “it is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in
the [pleadings] that is scrutinized for ‘objective legal reasonableness.’” McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309
(1996)).
The court is also cognizant of Hughey’s failure to plead certain factual particulars of the
incident, specifically what transpired immediately after the alleged beating. A plaintiff,
however, will not be penalized for failing to plead the factual particulars of the alleged actions
when such facts are unknown to the plaintiff or are “peculiarly within the knowledge of
defendants.” Floyd v. City of Kenner, La., 351 F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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Hughey included his medical records as an exhibit to his Schultea reply. Consequently, the court may consider them
in deciding the instant motion. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
that Rule 12(b)(6) permits courts to consider documents attached to the pleadings in ruling on motions to dismiss).
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In sum, the court finds that Hughey has sufficiently alleged facts to support a claim for
excessive force and to overcome Mason’s assertion of qualified immunity. Hughey’s §1983
claim, therefore, may proceed to discovery.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Defendant Mason’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings is not well-taken and should be denied. A separate order in accord with this
opinion shall issue this day.
This, the 17th day of September, 2018.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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