Hughey v. Tippah County, Mississippi et al

Filing 56

ORDER denying 44 Motion to Stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy Percy on 11/20/18. (bnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
JAMES ALLEN HUGHEY
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18cv4-NBB-RP

TIPPAH COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
TOMMY MASON, in his Individual
Capacity, and “X” BONDING COMPANY

DEFENDANTS

ORDER DENYING STAY OF DISCOVERY
This matter is before the court on the defendant Tommy Mason’s Motion for Stay
requesting a stay of all discovery not related to his qualified immunity defense. Docket 44.
The court finds the motion is not well taken and should be denied.
The court previously stayed all discovery pursuant to Local Uniform Civil Rule
16(b)(3)(B) after Mason filed his first motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting a qualified
immunity defense. The plaintiff James Allen Hughey sought leave to conduct qualified
immunity-related discovery, which Mason opposed, and which the court denied. The court also
denied Mason’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as presented and required Hughey to file a
Schultea reply. After Hughey did so, Mason again moved for judgment on the pleadings based
on qualified immunity. The court found that Hughey sufficiently alleged facts to overcome
Mason’s claim of qualified immunity, denied Mason’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
and stated, “Hughey’s § 1983 claim, therefore, may proceed to discovery.” Docket 39.
Mason now seeks a stay of all discovery not related to his qualified immunity defense.
Although Mason brings his motion under the auspices of Local Rule 16(b)(3)(B), that
rule provides him no support. It states that a motion asserting a qualified immunity defense
stays all discovery pending a ruling on the motion, including any appeal. In this case, Mason’s

second motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, after which the stay was lifted, and
there is no pending motion asserting a qualified immunity defense that would trigger a discovery
stay under the rule.
Mason argues that Fifth Circuit jurisprudence mandates limited qualified immunityrelated discovery when the court finds a plaintiff has met the heightened pleading standard
required to overcome qualified immunity and the court is nonetheless unable to rule on the
asserted qualified immunity defense pending development of related facts. However, that is not
the case here, where Mason’s motion asserting qualified immunity was denied. The Fifth
Circuit established the limited discovery procedure for those cases where the court defers ruling
on the claim of qualified immunity. The very cases cited by Mason bear this out. See
Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2015) (trial court deferred ruling on motion to
dismiss asserting qualified immunity); Webb v. Livingston, 618 Fed.Appx. 201, 204 (5th Cir.
2015) (trial court deferred and carried motion to dismiss asserting qualified immunity); Backe v.
LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 647 (5th Cir. 2012) (trial court refused to rule on motion to dismiss
asserting qualified immunity pending discovery); Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment
Services, 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995) (motion to dismiss asserting qualified immunity
remained pending); Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1987) (trial court did not
rule on motion asserting qualified immunity).
Mason argues that the limited discovery procedure is required because the court found
only that Hughey alleged sufficient facts to support an excessive force claim and did not make a
final ruling on the applicability of Mason’s qualified immunity defense. Mason emphasizes the
court’s statement that it “is mindful that discovery may reveal that Hughey’s version of the
underlying facts is not entirely accurate.” To the extent Mason suggests this means the court

deferred ruling on Mason’s claim of qualified immunity, Mason is mistaken. The court denied
Mason’s motion. The court’s reference to what discovery may reveal -- and to the court’s
limited inquiry “at this stage” -- was merely an acknowledgment that Mason may raise the
qualified immunity defense again at a successive stage, i.e., in a motion for summary judgment.
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996) (stating Supreme Court precedent “clearly
contemplated that [defendant] could raise the [qualified immunity] defense at successive stages”)
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
Mason argues the court’s denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings in no way
negates his right to a stay, even in the absence of a pending motion asserting qualified immunity.
Mason is again mistaken. This court’s discovery procedure when qualified immunity is
asserted is governed by the local rule, which states “a motion asserting an immunity defense . . .
must be raised by a separate motion.” L.U.Civ.R. 16(b)(3)(A). This rule “requires that
immunity defenses be asserted in a motion separate from the answer.” Salcido v. University of
Southern Mississippi, No. 2:11-CV-173-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 1837850, *1 (S.D. Miss. May 1,
2013). The filing of such a motion stays all discovery “pending the court’s ruling on the
motion, including any appeal.” L.U.Civ.R. 16(b)(3)(B). The court having denied Mason’s
motion, which he did not appeal, under the rule discovery may proceed as the court ordered
when denying the motion. Unless and until Mason files a motion asserting qualified immunity
at a successive stage, he has no right to a stay.
Mason complains that in response to a motion for summary judgment Hughey would
simply argue that discovery is necessary to respond to the same. That is precisely what the rule
contemplates. “Whether to permit discovery on issues related to the motion and whether to
permit any portion of the case to proceed pending resolution of the motion are decisions

committed to the discretion of the court, upon a motion by any party seeking relief.” L.U.Civ.R.
16(b)(3)(B). A motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity would stay
discovery, whereupon the court could permit discovery on issues related to the motion if a party
were to move for that relief. Mason’s argument that this procedure would render his potential
summary judgment motion futile is unpersuasive.
Tommy Mason’s Motion for Stay is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this, the 20th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Roy Percy
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE