Lee v. Goodlin et al
Filing
181
ORDER granting (130) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in case 3:18-cv-00124-MPM-JMV; granting (70) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in case 3:18-cv-00239-MPM-JMV. Signed by District Judge Michael P. Mills on 6/14/2019. Associated Cases: 3:18-cv-00124-MPM-JMV, 3:18-cv-00239-MPM-JMV (lpm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
DAVIAN LEE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF GERALD GLOVER,
DECEASED AND ON BEHALF OF ALL THOSE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE WRONGFUL
DEATH AND SURVIVAL STATUTE
v.
PLAINTIFF
NO: 3:18-CV-124
RAYMOND GOODLIN, BIG BINDER EXPRESS, LLC,
TRI STATE IDEALEASE, LLC, AND
DARLING INGREDIENTS, INC. D/B/A DAR PRO
DEFENDANTS
AND
KEITH GLOVER
PLAINTIFF
v.
NO: 3:18-CV-239
RAYMOND GOODLIN, BIG BINDER EXPRESS, LLC.,
TRI-STATE IDEALEASE, INC., AND
DARLING INTERNATIONAL, INC.
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Darling Ingredients, Inc.’s (“Darling”)
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (against Davian Lee’s Independent Liability and Punitive
Damages Claim), Doc. #130 in the Davian Lee case (3:18–cv–00124–MPM–JMV), and Darling’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (against Keith Glover’s Independent Liability and Punitive
Damages Claim), Doc. #70 in the Keith Glover case (3:18–cv–00239–MPM–JMV). The Court,
having reviewed the complaints, the parties’ submissions, and relevant authority is now prepared
to rule.
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I.
Factual Background
a. Davian Lee Case (3:18–cv–00124–MPM–JMV)
On or about May 14, 2018 Gerald Glover (“Mr. Glover”), father of Plaintiff Davian Lee
(“Lee”), was traveling North on US Highway 61 in Tunica County, Mississippi. Another motorist,
Raymond Goodlin (“Goodlin”), travelled in the same direction in a semi-truck with a trailer
attached. At some point during their travels, Goodlin crashed into the rear of Mr. Glover’s vehicle.
Mr. Glover died in the collision.
In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Lee asserts claims of negligence against Big Binder
Express, LLC., Tri State Idealease, Inc., and Darling International, Inc. Doc. #68. Lee alleges that
Goodlin was employed by all three companies, that Big Binder and Tri-State were “the owners of
the truck involved in the collision and … operated by … Goodlin,” and that Darling was “the
owner of the trailer being hauled by … Goodlin.” Doc. #68 at 3–4.
Darling filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. #130, and asks that the Court
dismiss Lee’s “independent liability and punitive damages claim Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Doc. #130 at 1.
b. Keith Glover Case (3:18–cv–00239–MPM–JMV)
On the day of the collision, Plaintiff Keith Glover (“Glover”) was the passenger of Mr.
Glover, deceased. Glover alleges that the collision caused him “serious and permanent personal
injuries.” Doc. #16.
In his Second Amended Complaint Glover asserts claims of negligence against all
defendants. In the complaint Glover alleges that Goodlin “was acting as agent, servant and/or
employee of” the defendant companies and that all acts of his negligence “are imputed to
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Defendants rendering them vicariously liable for all damages and injuries sustained by …
[Glover].” Id. at 3.
Darling filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. #70, and asks that the Court
dismiss Glover’s “independent negligence and punitive damages claim Under Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Doc. #70 at 1.
II.
Standard
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” In
a motion for a judgment on the pleadings “[t]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” Hughes c. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278
F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). Such a motion “is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues
of fact and only questions of law remain.” Id. (citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of
China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, “the district court is confined to the pleadings and must accept all allegations contained
therein as true.” Hughes, 278 F.3d at 420 (citing St. Paul Ins. Co. v. AFLA Worldwide Ins. Co.,
937 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991)). In considering Rule 12(c) motions the court relies on the same
standard as that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter &
Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002).
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To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim is facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. It is not necessary that a complaint
contain detailed factual allegations, but it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree
Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court
must liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all wellpleaded facts as true. Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir.2005).
III.
Discussion
In both motions, Darling concedes that Lee and Glover provided sufficient facts to support
their claims of negligence against Goodlin and vicarious liability against Darling. However,
Darling argues that both plaintiffs failed to provide enough facts in their complaints to support the
various claims of direct liability asserted against Darling.
a. Davian Lee Case (3:18–cv–00124–MPM–JMV)
In this action, Lee attached two exhibits to his response: Exhibit #1 is a portion of Goodlin’s
deposition discussing his use of cruise control and his application of the brakes to turn off the
cruise control; Exhibit 2 is a reconstruction report of the accident. In reply, Darling objects to the
exhibits and requests that they be disregarded at this juncture. In reviewing a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must limit its examination “to the complaint, any documents
attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to
the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC,
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594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). Because the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s response and
Defendant’s reply are not referenced by the complaint, the Court will only consider the complaint
and any documents attached thereto.
i. Independent Liability Claims
In the operative complaint, the Fourth Amended complaint, Doc. #68, Lee alleges the
following facts against Darling:
11.
… Goodlin was employed by … Darling. … Darling … was the owner of the trailer
being hauled by … Goodlin at the time and date of the collision and was responsible
for the maintenance and upkeep of the trailer.
Doc. #68 at 3–4.
The independent liability claims asserted against Darling read as follows:
NEGLIGENCE OF DARLING INGREDIENTS, INC.
D/B/A DAR-PRO
18.
DARLING INGREDIENTS, d/b/a DAR-PRO, before and at the time of the
collision herein, was guilty of intentional, willful, unlawful, wanton, reckless,
and/or negligent acts and/or omissions which include but are not necessarily limited
to the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Hiring and retaining RAYMOND GOODLIN;
Failing to properly train RAYMOND GOODLIN;
Failing to develop and maintain a fleet management program;
Violating state and federal laws and regulations as to the operation of tractortrailers;
Failing to develop, implement, and/or enforce reasonable and prudent safety
policies for the protection and safety of the public;
Failing to adhere to and abide by federal and state laws and regulations in regard
to the maximum number of driving hours and hours of work for drivers of
tractor-trailers;
Failing to maintain and/or properly complete forms and other documents
required by state and federal laws and regulations governing motor carriers;
Failing to perform an adequate pre-employment background check before
hiring RAYMOND GOODLIN;
Negligent entrustment of its commercial vehicle and equipment to RAYMOND
GOODLIN;
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j. Failure to properly maintain equipment; and
k. Other acts of negligence.
This is the extent of Lee’s Complaint as to Darling. With four amendments to his complaint, the
Court opines that the limited factual basis and the claims asserted against Darling, without more,
do not satisfy the standard.
The Court agrees with Darling that Cecil v. Smith, No. 1:13CV201-SA-DAS, 2014 WL
1394360 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 2014) is similar to this case. In Cecil, the Plaintiff, a motorist who
was rear-ended by Smith, the driver of a semi-truck, alleged that the defendant trucking company,
DLT Trucking, was “liable for negligence … ‘in the hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision
of the drivers chosen to operate it,’” and that the company “committed a series of reckless and/or
negligent acts” with regard to federal carrier regulations and overall training, hiring, retention, and
supervision. Cecil, 2014 WL 1394360, at *1. In Cecil, the operative complaint upon which the
court issued its ruling listed several allegations which the court summarized as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that DLT Trucking did not require Smith to comply with
the duties and prohibitions of driver regulations under the FMCSRs,
encouraged Smith to violate those regulations, failed to maintain or
improperly maintained records and documents pursuant to those
regulations, permitted Smith to operate his vehicle while impaired, failed
to adequately train Smith, did not investigate the competence of Smith, and
failed to take Smith “out of service,” among other claims.
Id. at *3. Having reviewed the complaint the court stated that “[t]hese statements [were] not
followed by or made pursuant to any factual basis supporting that claim.” Id. Ultimately, the court
held that the plaintiff had failed to plead any factual content to allow the court to draw any
reasonable inference that the defendant was liable for a violation of federal carrier regulations and
for negligent hiring, training, retention and/or supervision of Smith. Id. In discussing the reasoning
for its holding, the court stated:
The only factual basis noted in the entire Complaint is that “[o]n or about
November 13, 2012, Defendant Cullen T. Smith owned and operated a
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tractor-trailer in a eastbound direction on Interstate 40, in Shelby County,
Tennessee.” Further, “Smith was DLT’s employee/agent acting within the
scope of his employment duties as a professional truck driver and pursuant
to DLT’s motor carrier operating authority.” “Cecil was the owner and
operator of 2009 Dodge Caravan which was traveling eastbound on
Interstate 40 when he began to slow down due to a previous crash scene
that had occurred.” “At said time and place, Smith recklessly and/or
negligent drove his 2006 tractor-trailer crashing into the rear of Cecil’s
vehicle.”
There is no factual basis evidencing a reason that DLT failed to exercise
due care in the hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of Smith, or
that DLT Trucking breached any duty pursuant to the Federal Motor
Carrier Regulations other than Plaintiff’s bald assertions.
Id. The same is true for this case. The extent of the facts provided in Lee’s complaint that mention
Darling are: that Goodlin was employed by Darling, that Darling owned the trailer being hauled
by Goodlin, and that Darling was responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the trailer. The
Court does not seek extremely detailed facts within the complaint, but it does look for just enough
facts to support the claims asserted. It is not necessary that a complaint contain detailed factual
allegations, but it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d
248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nowhere within his Complaint does
Lee provide facts to support any of the claims asserted against Darling or to allow the court to
reasonably infer that Darling is liable for the alleged misconduct. Lee has failed to meet his burden
as to the claims asserted against Darling in Paragraph 18 of his Complaint. Accordingly, Darling’s
motion, Doc. #130 in the Lee case, is granted in this regard.
ii. Punitive Damages Claim
Lee cannot recover punitive damages as to Darling. Under Mississippi law, punitive
damages may be awarded if the claimant can “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence
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which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed
actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11–1–65(1)(a).
Plaintiff relies on Paragraphs 18 and 20 of his Complaint and argues that both paragraphs
provide sufficient facts to support his claim of punitive damages against Darling. The punitive
damages allegations against Darling are as follows:
DAMAGES
…
20.
The aforesaid acts and omissions of … Darling Ingredients, Inc.,
constitute intentional, willful, unlawful, reckless conduct and wanton
disregard for the rights of Plaintiff, and for other members of the public
utilizing the highways and roads and/or constitute gross negligence and
recklessness as to show a total lack of regard for the rights of Plaintiff,
and for other members of the public utilizing the highways and roads
which entitles Plaintiff to recover punitive and exemplary damages
against … Darling … in an amount to be assessed by the Court and/or
jury.
Following the above standard, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to support the
punitive damages claim asserted against Darling. The limited facts do not allow the Court to
reasonably infer that Darling acted with actual malice, gross negligence, willfulness, wantonness,
or reckless disregard for the safety of others.
Additionally, to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims against Darling
arise under vicarious liability, such damages are not available under Mississippi law—“punitive
damages are not available in Mississippi on the basis of vicarious liability.” Bell v. Coleman, No.
4:17–CV–47–SA–JMV, 2018 WL 3118614, at *4 (N.D. Miss. June 25, 2018) (citing Littlejohn v.
Werner Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:14–CV–44–SA–DAS, 2015 WL 3484651 (N.D. Miss. June 2,
2015)).
Therefore, Darling’s motion, Doc. #130 in the Lee case, is granted on this issue.
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b. Keith Glover Case (3:18–cv–00239–MPM–JMV)
The same result applies to Glover’s independent negligence and punitive damages claims.
In his operative complaint, the Second Amended Complaint, Doc. #16, Glover alleges the
following facts against Darling:
10. … Goodlin was acting as agent, servant and/or employee of …
Darling, and all acts of negligence of Goodlin are imputed to [Darling]
rending [it] vicariously liable for all damages and injuries sustained by
… [Glover].
Doc. #16 at 3.
The independent negligence claims asserted against Darling are as follows:
12. [Glover] charges and alleges that … Darling [is] guilty of one, some,
or all of the acts and/or omissions which constitute common law
negligence, to wit:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
Failing to properly train Goodlin;
Failing to properly examine the driving record of Goodlin;
Hiring untrained or unqualified personnel, namely Goodlin;
Failing to perform an adequate pre-employment background
check before hiring Goodlin;
Failing to develop and maintain a fleet management program;
Violating state and federal laws and regulations as to the
operation of tractor-trailers;
Failing to develop, implement, and/or enforce reasonable and
prudent safety policies for the protection and safety of the
public;
Failing to adhere to and abide by federal and state laws and
regulations in regard to the maximum number of driving hours
and hours of work for drivers of tractor-trailers;
Failing to maintain and/or properly complete forms and other
documents required by state and federal laws and regulations
governing motor carriers;
Negligent entrustment of its commercial vehicle to Goodlin;
Failure to properly maintain equipment; and
Other additional acts of negligence proved at trial.
This is the extent of Glover’s Complaint as to Darling. As for punitive damages, Glover merely
makes a request for such relief, without more. As previously discussed, it is not necessary that a
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complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it must set forth “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Colony
Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Nowhere within his Complaint does Glover provide facts to support any of the independent
negligence claims asserted against Darling or to support his request for punitive damages. In no
way can the Court, relying on Glover’s Complaint, reasonably infer that Darling is liable for the
alleged misconduct listed in paragraph 12 of the complaint or that it acted with actual malice, gross
negligence, willfulness, wantonness, or reckless disregard for the safety of others.
In his response, Glover requested that “he be given leave to amend his complaint to correct
any deficiencies” should the Court be “inclined to grant Defendant Darling[’s] [R]ule 12(c) motion
to dismiss.” Doc. #75 at 8. Having reviewed Glover’s request, the Court finds that his request to
amend should be denied. Pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3)(c) of the Local Uniform Civil Rules, “[a]
response to a motion may not include a counter-motion in the same document. Any motion must
be an item docketed separately from a response.” Here, Glover included his request to amend
within his response to Darling’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; such action is improper.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to consider Glover’s request to amend, he failed to supply the
Court with a proposed amendment. See L.U. Civ. R. 7(b)(2) (“If leave of court is required under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, a proposed amended pleading must be an exhibit to a motion for leave to file
the pleading….”). Without a proposed amendment the Court lacks the ability to determine what
additional facts Glover intends to allege in his amended complaint and whether
“the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” See
Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872–73 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Glover’s request
is denied.
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IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Darling’s Motions for Judgment on the
Pleadings, Doc. #130 in the Lee case and Doc. #70 in the Glover case, are GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this the 14th day of June, 2019.
/s/ MICHAEL P. MILLS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
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