Davis v. Siemens

Filing 53

ORDER denying (46) Motion for Summary Judgment; granting (52) Motion to Continue in case 3:23-cv-00163-MPM-RP; denying (41) Motion for Summary Judgment; granting (47) Motion to Continue in case 3:23-cv-00360-MPM-RP. Signed by Senior Judge Michael P. Mills on 03/10/2025. Associated Cases: 3:23-cv-00163-MPM-RP, 3:23-cv-00360-MPM-RP (rmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
REGINALD ALAN DAVIS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL NO.: 3:23-cv-00163-MPM-RP
3:23-cv-00360-MPM-RP

SIEMENS INDUSTRY INC.

DEFENDANT
ORDER

This cause comes before the court on the motion of defendant Siemens Industry, Inc. for
summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiff Reginald Alan Davis has responded
in opposition to the motion, and the court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of
the parties, is prepared to rule.
This is a retaliation and disability discrimination action arising out of mistreatment
which, plaintiff alleges, he suffered at the hands of a Siemens supervisor. Plaintiff served with
the U.S. Marine Corps, and he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of
his having served in combat. Siemens has employed Davis at its Southaven facility since 2019,
when he was hired as a Senior Lead of Training. [Davis Depo. at 34-36]. In August 2020, Davis
accepted a position as a Zero Harm Culture Champion reporting to Environmental Health and
Safety Manager Joseph Lampkins, and he has worked in this position at all times relevant to this
action. [Davis Depo. pp. 38-40.]
In February 2021, Davis was interviewed as part of an internal investigation into a sexual
harassment complaint brought by a female employee, Tequila McKinney, against Lampkins. See
Exhibit F. Plaintiff asserts that he offered truthful testimony that he had witnessed Lampkins

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inappropriately touching McKinney, and that, almost immediately after doing so, Lampkins
began a lengthy campaign of retaliation against him which involved, among other things, greatly
increasing his work duties. Plaintiff seeks recovery under Title VII as a result of this alleged
retaliation, and he also seeks recovery under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), based
on, inter alia, defendant’s failure to offer reasonable accommodations for his PTSD. Defendant
has presently moved for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issue of fact exists
regarding its liability under either statute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In addressing the summary judgment issues in this case, this court will begin with
plaintiff’s retaliation claim, since the legal issues in this context seem relatively clear. A Title
VII retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. Saketkoo v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1000 (5th
Cir. 2020). Under that framework, the plaintiff “carries the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of retaliation.” Id. (quoting Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir.
2003)). To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) he engaged
in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.’” Cabral v. Brennan,
853 F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 784
F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2015)).
“If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the employer has the burden of
production to provide ‘a legitimate, non-[retaliatory] reason’ for the adverse employment
action.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020)). “If
the employer meets this burden, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the proffered
reason is pretextual.” Id. (quoting Brown, 969 F.3d at 577). This court notes that protected

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activity under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision “can consist of either: (1) ‘oppos[ing] any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter’ or (2) ‘mak[ing] a charge,
testif[ying], assist[ing], or participat[ing] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.’ ” E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir.
2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The first is known as the “opposition clause,” and the
second is known as the “participation clause.” Id.
It seems clear that this case involves an “opposition” retaliation case, since, in his
complaint and summary judgment submissions, plaintiff makes what this court regards as quite
plausible allegations that he suffered retaliation at the hands of Lampkins after he testified that
he had witnessed him committing acts of sexual harassment. For example, plaintiff alleges that,
while Lampkins had previously treated him as his “golden boy,” he began treating him in a
“sarcastic and condescending” manner and began altering his workplace conditions. [Affidavit
at 2]. More specifically, plaintiff alleges in his brief that:
6. On March 8, 2021, unknown to Plaintiff, Joseph Lampkins began closely scrutinizing
the Plaintiff’s work. Ex. 8, Lampkins Secret document.
7. Joseph Lampkins called it the "Reggie Log," and he testified that Plaintiff was his only
employee documented in this way. Ex. 4, Lampkins Dep. 56:19-57:13; 60:6-8. * * *
9. Lampkins assigned Plaintiff parking lot duties, where Lampkins gave Plaintiff the
responsibility to ensure that employees were parking properly. Plaintiff performed this
function every day for 1.5 hours. James Calhoun later testified that the parking lot duty
assigned to Plaintiff was not a job function at Siemens. Ex. 3, Calhoun Dep. 66:6-20; Ex.
1, Davis Aff. § 17.
10. Lampkins continued to escalate Plaintiff's workload while denying him the ability to
work overtime to keep up with the increased duties. Davis Aff. §§ 10, 11, Ex. 8,
?Lampkins’ Reggie log.?
11. From August 2021 through 2022, Lampkins assigned Plaintiff to locate a missing Jhook. The project proved a wild goose chase because Lampkins rejected all finished
products for trivial reasons, such as the color wasn't right, the size was stamped on the
left side rather than the right, and the eye bolt wasn't large enough. The motors
department accepted the hook as perfect, but Lampkins rejected it. Davis Aff. § 15,
12. In September 2021, Lampkins increased Plaintiff’s job duties to include cleaning the
facility, dusting, rearranging pallets, and garbage pickup. Davis Aff. § 13, Amended
Comp. D.E. 7, PageID #28, ¶ 25.

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13. In October 2021, James Calhoun took a 6-month leave of absence for shoulder
surgery. In his absence, the Plaintiff performed his duties and Calhoun's duties. When the
Plaintiff returned after a 6-month mental health leave on March 8, 2023, Lampkins, in
addition to the Plaintiff's regular duties, gave him a Task list with imminent due dates.
Ex. 9, Reggie Davis Task List.
14. James Calhoun testified that when he returned from his 6-month leave, Lampkins
only required him to watch videos with no specific completion date. Lampkins assigned
Plaintiff duties that were not true functions of the safety team. Ex. 3, Calhoun Dep. 30:919; 55:21-57:2; Ex. 9, Reggie Davis Task List ¶ 6.
15. In November 2021, the Plaintiff spoke to Human Resources about his increased
workload. In addition to his regular duties, Lampkins required him to conduct off-site
recruiting through job fairs, conduct COVID-19 testing, and complete all the training for
every shift. Davis Aff. § 11.
16. In early 2022, Lampkins assigned Plaintiff the new hire orientation without
decreasing existing duties. Lampkins imposed additional duties and deadlines on
Plaintiff. Plaintiff was told, through written counseling, that unless improvement was
immediate, marked, and sustained, he was subject to termination. Exh. 10, Written
Counseling from J. Lampkins, Ex. 4, Lampkins Dep. 35:23-36-2.
17. In March 2022, Lampkins appointed Plaintiff to spearhead an emissions reduction
program called "Degree." Plaintiff was the only non-management employee assigned to
this program. Plaintiff had no training concerning the program, and at the first meeting,
before a room full of executives, Lampkins turned to Plaintiff and said, "Okay, Reggie,
why are we here?" The ambush was intended and did publicly embarrass the Plaintiff.
Ex. 3, Calhoun Dep. 77:14-78:4; Ex. 4, Lampkins Dep. 35:4-37:15, DE 7, Amended
Comp. PageID 28-29, ¶¶ 26-28.
18. On August 18, 2022, Lampkins gave Plaintiff a written reprimand for violating the
Code of Business Conduct. Plaintiff vehemently denied the statement. Exh. 11, written
reprimand; Davis Aff. § 20.
[Brief at 3-5].
Plaintiff maintains that, on August 18, 2022, Lampkins tacitly conceded that he was
retaliating against him, asserting in his affidavit that:
In my frustration and in tears, I asked him “why are you doing me like this?” I told him
“you’re trying to trigger my PTSD.” He said “you know why.” We began to talk loudly.
Marlon Richards came and closed the door. HR diffused the situation and placed us both
on a 30-day cooling-off period.
[Affidavit at 4-5]. In his affidavit, plaintiff asserts that Lampkins’ retaliation became so
unbearable that he was forced to seek medical treatment, writing that:
After completing the cooling-off period, Lampkins demanded that the volunteer Safety
Team assume responsibilities outside their job description. I knew the added work would

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cause them to quit. Lampkins threatened to disband the team that I had labored to
construct. My stress level became unbearable. I went to Baptist Desoto Hospital for
dizziness and feelings of oncoming PTSD. My blood pressure was elevated to stroke
levels. I re-engaged the VA’s PTSD treatment program for assistance.
[Id. at 5].
This court regards these as quite powerful allegations of retaliation, but defendant notes
that plaintiff faces a significant obstacle in seeking to recover for them. Specifically, defendant
notes that a plaintiff seeking to recover under either the ADA or Title VII is required to file a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days
of the alleged adverse action. See Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (noting that the ADA incorporates by reference Title VII's administrative
procedures). The 180-day period acts as a statute of limitations, barring any actions seeking
recovery for events which fall outside of the 180-day period. Hood v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168
F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102
S. Ct. 1127, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1982)).
It seems clear that the 180-day limitations period is an even greater obstacle to plaintiff’s
retaliation claim than to his ADA claim, since he filed two separate charges with the EEOC and
only raised his retaliation claim in the second charge. In light of this fact, defendant argues that:
As with his ADA claim, a claim of retaliation under Title VII requires a plaintiff to first
exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged adverse employment action. As explained below, no
alleged adverse action occurring prior to November 12, 2022 or after June 20, 2023
would be timely for purposes of Davis’s Title VII retaliation claim.
Davis filed his second charge of discrimination – and the only charge alleging Title VII
retaliation – on May 11, 2023. Therefore, no alleged adverse actions occurring more than
180 days before this date, or November 12, 2022, can support Davis’s Title VII
retaliation claim. The EEOC dismissed Davis’s charge on June 20, 2023. Therefore, no
alleged adverse actions occurring after that date can support Davis’s retaliation claim.

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[Brief at 11]. In his responsive brief, plaintiff does not take serious issue with defendant’s
description of the applicable limitations period in this case, nor does he offer this court any basis
for tolling the statute of limitations.
In light of the foregoing, this court might well be compelled to dismiss plaintiff’s
retaliation claim as untimely if he had failed to properly allege an act of “materially adverse”
retaliation which he suffered during the November 12, 2022 to June 20, 2023 time period.
Fortunately for plaintiff, however, that is not the case. In its brief, defendant concedes that
plaintiff does offer at least one allegation of retaliation which falls within the actionable time
period, writing that:
Davis claims only one alleged adverse action which falls within the time period
actionable for his Title VII retaliation claim. Specifically, Davis claims that when he
returned to work on March 8, 2023, Lampkins presented him with a “to do” list, which
contained numerous items with due dates, some of which had already expired. Amended
Complaint, ¶35. This is insufficient to support Davis’s claim. In the retaliation context, an
adverse action must be “materially adverse” meaning that “it well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Welsh v. Fort
Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 941 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting BNSF Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006)). For example, “[a] reassignment that requires additional tasks
is not materially adverse if it is not accompanied by any other change in the employee’s
status.” Paul v. Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., 666 F. App’x 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2016).
[Brief at 11-12].
In the court’s view, defendant’s assertion that plaintiff was merely “presented with a ‘to
do’ list” is a gross understatement of what he alleges took place after he returned from medical
leave. Indeed, plaintiff testified in his deposition that Lampkins essentially picked up where he
had left off before his medical leave, namely by imposing requirements upon him which were
not placed upon other employees and, in the case of the “to do” list, included tasks which he was
simply unable to perform. [Deposition at 155]. This court notes that the “to do” list was not a
list of minor tasks which could be quickly completed, but, rather, included difficult tasks which,

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for the first time in plaintiff’s experience at Siemens, were accompanied by due dates when they
had to be completed. [Id.] Plaintiff testified that Lampkins warned him that, if the due dates
were not met, he would face unspecified “consequences.” [Id.]
Most compellingly, in this court’s view, plaintiff alleges that the “to do” list included
items which required him to use a computer to which he lacked access and which he accordingly
could not perform within the stated deadline. [Id. at 156]. Indeed, plaintiff testified that he told
Lampkins that “the ones that required me to use a computer, you know good and damn well I’m
not going to meet that deadline.” [Id.] In his deposition, plaintiff testified that the fact that he
had been given the assignment sheet by Lampkins was quickly picked up on the company rumor
mill, and he asserts that he received sympathetic remarks from co-workers expressing their belief
that his supervisor was attempting to manufacture a basis to fire him. For example, plaintiff
testified that one co-worker asked him about the assignment sheet, and, when asked how he
knew about it, replied:
Darrell told me. How does he know about that? He found out from, you know, the front
office that Jospeh [Lampkins] gave you some bullshit, you know, assignment sheet. I’m
like “Wow.” So Darrell wants me to help you to keep you from getting fired. He’s like
“that’s what they are trying to do. They’re trying to fire you.”
[Deposition at 158].
This is merely a portion of the testimony offered by plaintiff with regard to the
assignment sheet given to him by Lampkins, but it is sufficient to reveal the disingenuousness of
defendant’s characterization of it as a mere “to do” list. Moreover, while plaintiff was not, in
fact, fired over failing to complete the assignment sheet (perhaps due to the aforementioned
assistance from friends), it seems clear to this court that any reasonable employee would regard
being given difficult-to-impossible tasks in order to manufacture a basis to fire him as a
“materially adverse” employment action.

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As quoted above, defendant concedes that this assignment sheet incident falls within the
180-day limitations period for plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and this court therefore has little
difficulty in concluding that the motion for summary judgment should be denied as to plaintiff’s
retaliation claim arising out of the assignment sheet episode. Moreover, while plaintiff will
likely not be able to recover for the (quite plausible) acts of alleged retaliation which fall outside
of the limitations period, it seems entirely proper that he be able to produce evidence at trial
regarding those prior acts of alleged retaliation in order to demonstrate that, by giving him the
assignment sheet, Lampkins was, in fact, intentionally committing an act of retaliation against
him. This court therefore concludes that triable jury issues exist regarding plaintiff’s Title VII
retaliation claim, and defendant’s motion to dismiss that claim will be denied.
This court now turns to Siemens’ motion to dismiss the ADA claim against it, and, as to
this claim, defendant concedes that a more forgiving period of limitations applies. This is
because plaintiff raised ADA claims in the first charge of discrimination which he filed with the
EEOC, and, that being the case, defendant argues that “Davis cannot use any alleged adverse
action which occurred prior to August 11, 2022 or after February 17, 2023 to support his ADA
claim.” [Brief at 7]. However, even assuming that defendant’s description of the applicable
limitations period is accurate, this court disagrees with its contention that no evidence exists to
support a claim arising during the actionable time period.
In so stating, this court notes that, within the meaning of the ADA, “discrimination”
includes, among other things, “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an

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undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A).
In this vein, this court notes once again plaintiff’s contention that, on August 18, 2022,
the following exchange between himself and Lampkins took place:
In my frustration and in tears, I asked him “why are you doing me like this?” I told him
“you’re trying to trigger my PTSD.” He said “you know why.” We began to talk loudly.
Marlon Richards came and closed the door. HR diffused the situation and placed us both
on a 30-day cooling-off period.
[Affidavit at 4-5]. This court believes that, considered in the light most favorable to Davis, this
testimony essentially involves plaintiff informing Lampkins that he suffered from the disability
of PTSD and asking that he be given the reasonable accommodation of not being singled out for
negative treatment which triggers that condition. Of course, this request is most likely not
properly regarded as an accommodation at all, but simply a request that he be treated with the
minimum level of respect and dignity which any employee would expect. Moreover, this court
believes that, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a jury could interpret Lampkin’s
alleged “you know why” response as both a confession that he had, in fact, been trying to trigger
plaintiff’s PTSD and that he intended to continue doing so, plaintiff’s request for an
accommodation notwithstanding.
This court also notes that, in its brief, defendant argues that certain negative treatment
which plaintiff alleges he received did not constitute an “adverse employment action” within the
meaning of federal employment discrimination law, and it seeks dismissal of his ADA claim on
this basis. Once again, however, the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement
constitutes an additional basis for liability under the Act, above and beyond its prohibition
against subjecting an employee to an adverse employment action because of his disability. That
aside, the ADA’s anti-discrimination provision prohibits a wide range of conduct, providing that:

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No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112.
The ADA thus prohibits disability discrimination with respect to, inter alia, “other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment,” and, in its brief, defendant fails to acknowledge that
the Fifth Circuit recently interpreted such language in a manner which is quite favorable to
plaintiffs. Specifically, in Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 496 (5th Cir. 2023), the en
banc Fifth Circuit overruled prior circuit precedent which had held that only Title VII
discrimination with regard to “ultimate employment decisions” was compensable. Instead, the
Fifth Circuit in Hamilton adopted a much more lenient standard, pursuant to which a plaintiff
need only show “that [he] was discriminated against, because of a protected characteristic, with
respect to ... the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’—just as the statute says.” 79
F.4th at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
This court notes that, while Hamilton was not a disability discrimination case, the
relevant language of Title VII and the ADA in this context is virtually identical, and it thus
seems highly likely that the Fifth Circuit would apply its holding in Hamilton to ADA cases as
well. In its brief, defendant repeatedly relies upon pre-Hamilton Fifth Circuit precedent, and it is
far from clear to this court that this precedent remains good law. Moreover, there are clearly at
least some triable fact issues regarding whether plaintiff was discriminated against in this case,
and, as such, this court concludes that it should wait until after the presentation of evidence of
trial to decide exactly which provisions of the ADA might be implicated by the facts of this case.
This approach will allow this court to not only consider the viability of plaintiff’s ADA claims
after having viewed the evidence at trial, but it will also allow both sides to frame their legal

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arguments within the context of post-Hamilton Fifth Circuit law. With this understanding,
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claims will be denied.
This court notes that the parties have also filed a joint motion for trial continuance, noting
scheduling conflicts involving counsel. Given that no prior motion for continuance has been
filed in this case, and considering also that the parties agree that a continuance is in order, their
joint motion will be granted.
It is therefore ordered that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and the
parties’ joint motion for continuance is granted. The trial in this matter is hereby continued until
a date to be determined later.
This, the 10th day of March, 2025.

/s/ Michael P. Mills
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

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