Sellers v. US Beverage Packers, LLC
Filing
163
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 94 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 1/28/25. (sko)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
SHANNON SELLERS
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-432-SA-JMV
US BEVERAGE PACKERS, LLC
DEFENDANTS
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 1, 2023, Shannon Sellers initiated this lawsuit by filing her Complaint [2]
asserting claims for negligence, products liability, and breach of warranties against US Beverage
in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Mississippi. US Beverage removed the case to this Court,
premising federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity. Sellers has since filed an Amended
Complaint [29], but she still asserts the same three causes of action.
Now before the Court is the US Beverage’s Motion for Summary Judgment [94]. The
Motion [94] is ripe for review.
Relevant Background
On April 30, 2023, Sellers’ then-boyfriend (now husband) Luis Ortiz purchased a can of
Arizona Arnold Palmer Lite from a gas station in Oxford, Mississippi. Ortiz placed the can in
Sellers’ refrigerator so that she could take it to work with her the next day.
The following morning, Sellers took the can with her to her job on campus at the University
of Mississippi. At the start of her weekly department meeting, Sellers opened the can. After
consuming the beverage, Sellers discovered two dead mice in the bottom of the can. Sellers became
sick, exited the meeting, and immediately sought medical attention. Other individuals attending
the meeting looked inside the can and saw the mice, and one of Sellers’ co-workers, Brad Noel,
took a video of the mice in the can.
US Beverage is engaged in the business of manufacturing, bottling, packaging, and
distributing Arizona Arnold Palmer Lite. In her Amended Complaint [28], Sellers seeks to hold
US Beverage liable on claims of negligence, products liability, and breach of warranties.
In the present Motion [94], US Beverage seeks dismissal of all claims based on Sellers’
failure to designate an expert to support her claims. US Beverage contends that this failure is fatal
to Sellers’ claims.
Standard
Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Nabors v. Malone, 2019 WL 2617240, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 26, 2019) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).
“The moving party ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct.
2548). “The nonmoving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings’ and ‘designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct.
2548). Importantly, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the
affidavits, depositions, and exhibits of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 964 (5th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir. 1997)). However,
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“[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not
an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Nabors, 2019 WL
2617240 at *1 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgewick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.
2002)) (additional citations omitted).
Analysis and Discussion
At the outset, the Court clarifies the applicable law. Although Sellers has alleged three
different causes of action, they are subsumed by the Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”),
which by its own terms applies “in any action for damages caused by a product, with deviation
defects, warnings or instruction defects, design defects, and where a product breached an express
warranty.” Elliott v. El Paso Corp., 181 So. 3d 263, 268 (Miss. 2015) (quoting MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-63) (emphasis previously added; internal quotation marks omitted). The Mississippi
Supreme Court has made clear that the MPLA “provides the exclusive remedy for productsliability claims[.]” Id. at 268 (quoting Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, 75 So. 3d 1024, 1027 (Miss.
2011)).
The MPLA “requires a plaintiff to establish four elements: (1) a defect in the product’s
manufacturing, design, or warnings, or that the product breached an express warranty; (2) the
defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous; (3) the defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which
recovery is sought; and (4) the defective condition existed at the time the product left the control
of the manufacturer, designer or seller.” Smith v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2024 WL 2701699, at *2
(S.D. Miss. May 24, 2024) (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)).
In seeking summary judgment, US Beverage’s premise is straightforward—it contends that
Sellers’ claims must be dismissed because she has not designated an expert to substantiate them.
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As US Beverage phrases it, “Mississippi state and federal courts have uniformly granted summary
judgment against product liability plaintiffs for failing to present expert testimony.” [95] at p. 5.
US Beverage places significant weight on this Court’s decision in Taggert v. FCA US LLC,
2018 WL 493479 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 19, 2018). There, the plaintiff, Linda Taggert, was driving her
2008 Chrysler 300 when she “lost control of her vehicle and veered off the highway into a ditch.
Taggert attempted to apply the brakes, but could not stop the car. The vehicle eventually stopped
after hitting a sign and a tree. The airbags did not deploy during the accident.” Id. at *1. Taggert
filed suit against the vehicle manufacturer and the dealership that sold her the car, averring that
design and manufacturing defects caused the accident. Id. The manufacturer and dealership both
sought dismissal, and, notably, Tagger did not respond to either motion. Id.
The Court dismissed the dealership pursuant to the “innocent seller” exception contained
within the MPLA. Id. at *3. As to the manufacturer, this Court accepted its argument that Taggert’s
claims were doomed to fail since she had not designated an expert witness. Id. In particular, this
Court noted that “[f]ederal courts in this state have repeatedly held that expert testimony is required
in product liabilities claims brought under the MPLA.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court continued
on: “[w]ithout this expert testimony, there exists only the two recall notices identified in Taggert’s
complaint as evidence of a defect in her vehicle. Such recall notices, however, are not admissible
evidence that can establish liability. Even assuming that these notices were admissible, they do not
establish that Taggert’s vehicle was defective, or that those defects caused Taggert’s accident and
injuries.” Id. at *4.
In US Beverage’s view, Taggert forecloses any possibility of recovery for Sellers since she
did not designate an expert to testify on her behalf as to the existence of a manufacturing defect.
Sellers concedes that courts often require expert testimony in cases brought under the MPLA, but
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she argues that it is not mandated, particularly in cases that are non-technical such as the case at
bar. She also emphasizes one of US Beverage’s written discovery responses, wherein it admitted
that “if the can did contain a rodent, which is denied, then it is admitted that that can was materially
different.” [114], Ex. 2 at p. 2.
Sellers additionally directs the Court’s attention to the language contained in a 2024 case
from the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. See Smith, 2024 WL 2701699. In
Smith, the plaintiff, Shavontae Smith, filed a lawsuit asserting MPLA claims after the steering
wheel on her vehicle “allegedly ‘locked up’ and caused Smith to lose control of the vehicle.” Id.
at *1. Smith did not retain an expert, and the district court granted judgment in favor of the vehicle
manufacturer. Id. In its opinion, the district court noted that “it is well-established than an MPLA
claim requires expert testimony.” Id. at *4 (collecting cases; emphasis added). However, the
district court also included in the opinion a footnote providing as follows:
Although the MPLA’s plain language does not state expert
testimony is required per se to prove a defect, federal courts in this
state often impose such a requirement in technical cases. The Court
concludes that expert testimony is necessary in Smith’s case, given
the highly technical facts underlying her MPLA claims.
Id. at *4 n. 2 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
The case at bar is distinguishable from Smith (and Taggert). Unlike a case involving a
malfunction in a vehicle—something that would typically be outside of the scope of lay juror’s
knowledge—this case is not highly technical. Although recognizing that courts (including this
Court) often require a plaintiff to come forward with expert testimony to prove an MPLA claim,
the Court is unaware of a mandate that expert testimony must be utilized in all cases without any
regard to the underlying facts. The Court declines US Beverage’s invitation to impose such a
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bright-line rule in the absence of any statutory language or binding case law mandating that it do
so.
Sellers has come forward with sworn testimony—of herself and others—that she opened
the can, consumed the beverage, and discovered two dead mice inside the can. Furthermore, US
Beverage has admitted that, if the can left its facility with two mice inside of it, then the product
materially deviated from other cans that the company manufacturers, bottles, packages, and seals.
The Court also notes the report of US Beverage’s expert, Laura K. Bryan, Ph. D., who
reached the conclusion that “the mice were not processed and/or sealed inside the can at the
bottling plant. The mice entered or were introduced into the product after [the] can was opened.”
[94], Ex. 2 at p. 3. However, in her deposition, Bryan testified that when she inspected the can she
did not discover anything indicative of the can having been tampered with.
Ultimately, the Court finds that Sellers has come forward with sufficient evidence to create
a question of fact. Given the non-technical nature of this case and considering the other evidence
contained in the record, the Court rejects US Beverage’s contention that Sellers must present expert
testimony as to the material deviation aspect of her claim. Stated simply, this case is
distinguishable from the highly-technical cases for which expert testimony is necessary. Summary
judgment is not warranted.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, US Beverage’s Motion for Summary Judgment [94] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 28th day of January, 2025.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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