Rutledge et al v. Case

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER denying 10 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction OR TO TRANSFER TO EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE (KNOXVILLE DIVISION). Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 1/27/2025. (lld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION
STEWART RUTLEDGE,
BRITTON JONES, and
LEN REEVES

PLAINTIFFS

V.

NO. 3:24-CV-73-DMB-JMV

DAVID CASE

DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER

Stewart Rutledge, Britton Jones, and Len Reeves sued David Case alleging breach of
contract, fraud, and other state law claims arising from their agreement with Case regarding
Tennessee tax credit housing developments. Case moves to dismiss this case for lack of personal
jurisdiction or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Tennessee. Because the
Court concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over Case and that transfer is not appropriate,
Case’s motion will be denied.
I
Procedural History
On February 7, 2024, Stewart Rutledge, Britton Jones, and Len Reeves filed a “Verified
Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 65(a)” in the Circuit
Court of Lafayette County, Mississippi, against David Case. Doc. #2. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs allege claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud and misrepresentation,
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and alternatively, conversion, arising from a dispute
between them and Case regarding their partnership to develop low-income housing in Tennessee.
Id. at PageID 76–82. On March 29, 2024, Case, asserting diversity jurisdiction, removed the state
court case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. Doc. #1.

After the Court granted Case’s request for an extension to respond to the complaint, the plaintiffs
filed a “Verified Amended Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(a)” on April 18, 2024, alleging the same claims against Case. 1 Doc. #9.
On May 2, 2024, Case filed “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction or to Transfer to Eastern District of Tennessee (Knoxville Division)” “under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(2), or, alternatively, … 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” 2 Doc. #10. The plaintiffs responded
in opposition on May 16, 2024. Doc. #14. Case replied on May 31, 2024. Docs. #18, #19. 3
II
Standard
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a party to move for dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction. When dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction is sought, “the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, but need only present prima facie evidence.”
Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2016). In determining whether a prima
facie case has been shown, “uncontroverted, nonconclusional factual allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint must be taken as true and all controverted allegations must be resolved in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001).
“The district court is not obligated to consult only the assertions in the plaintiff's complaint in
determining whether a prima facie case for jurisdiction has been made. Rather, the district court

1

No leave of court was required for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1).

Case’s memorandum brief indicates his motion to dismiss is directed to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Doc. #11
at 1.

2

Case’s May 31 reply filings consist of “Defendant’s Rebuttal Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Transfer”
and “Defendant’s Supplement to Motion to Dismiss or Transfer.” Docs. #18, #19. Case erroneously docketed the
latter as a motion; however, the Clerk of Court modified the filing to reflect the correct filing event and link it to the
motion to dismiss.
3

2

may consider the contents of the record at the time of the motion, including affidavits.” Paz v.
Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Thompson v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985)).
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”
If a party establishes the action could have been properly brought “in the destination venue,” “[t]he
ultimate inquiry is whether the destination venue is ‘clearly more convenient than the venue chosen
by the plaintiff.’” In re Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 629–30 (5th Cir.
2022) (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008). This requires a
defendant to “establish good cause for transfer based on convenience and justice” rather than
merely citing reasons supporting why litigating in another forum is more convenient. Def.
Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 433 (5th Cir. 2022).
III
Relevant Factual Allegations
Stewart Rutledge, Britton Jones, and Len Reeves are experienced developers in tax credit
housing developments. Doc. #9 at PageID 154. In January 2020, David Case approached
Rutledge, Jones, and Reeves to request their assistance with a Tennessee tax credit housing
development (“THDA”). Doc. #9 at PageID 154. Case “had no experience in Tennessee 9% tax
credit housing development.” Id. at PageID 154–55. Case requested and Rutledge, Jones and
Reeves agreed to have “an in-person meeting in Lafayette County, Mississippi for the purposes of
introduction and exploration of a business relationship.” Id. at PageID 155. Case traveled to
Oxford, Mississippi to present a project and requested their assistance with the project. Id.
3

Case desired Rutledge, Jones, and Reeves to provide two distinct services as part of their
agreement—“Developer Experience” and “fee-for-work.” Id. at PageID 155–56. They verbally
agreed to the terms of both services in Lafayette County, Mississippi. Id. at PageID 159. Case
then left town. Id. The next day, on January 29, 2020, Rutledge, Jones, and Reeves sent an email
to Case for the purpose of confirming the verbal agreement they reached the day before. Id. The
agreement included a provision that Rutledge, Jones, and Reeves would assist Case in obtaining
tax credits for the Sanda Mills project, and Case would continue to try and work with them and
give them the first right of refusal on all Tennessee projects. Id. at PageID 155, 157–58. On
January 30, 2020, Case responded to the email by confirming the agreement, as-stated, except he
desired clarification regarding certain terms. Id. at PageID 159. On February 8, 2020, after
receiving clarification, Case confirmed his agreement to those terms. 4 Id.
On September 1, 2023, Rutledge, Jones, and Reeves learned that Case “submitted an
application for a projection referred to as Giffin School 2023, without contacting, considering, or
consulting [them] in any way whatsoever.” Id. at PageID 161.
IV
Analysis
In seeking to dismiss or transfer this case, Case argues that “[t]his Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over [him]” and the “United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
(Knoxville Division) provides a more convenient forum for the parties and witnesses to resolve
this dispute.” Doc. #10 at PageID 182. The plaintiffs counter that Case “has failed to satisfy the
burden required by Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure … and 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a).” Doc. #14 at PageID 232.

4
Case “desired clarification regarding ‘who might be developer’ and ‘p.’” Doc. #9 at PageID 159; Doc. #9-1 at
PageID 179.

4

A. Personal Jurisdiction
“A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the forum state creates personal jurisdiction over
the defendant; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process
guarantees of the United States Constitution.” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when (1) “that defendant has purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing ‘minimum
contacts’ with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 470 (quoting Mink v. AAAA
Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)). Consequently, an issue of personal jurisdiction
requires an analysis under both “applicable state law and the federal constitution.” Wyatt v.
Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2024).
1. Mississippi long-arm statute
“Mississippi’s long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant … if: the defendant (1) makes a contract with a resident of Mississippi to be performed
in whole or in part in Mississippi; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in Mississippi; or (3)
conducts any business or performs any character of work in Mississippi.” Pace v. Cirrus Design
Corp., 93 F.4th 879, 894 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57). Case does not
mention the long-arm statute in his initial brief. In their response, relying on a declaration by
Rutledge that they performed their part of the agreement with Case from their offices in
Mississippi, the plaintiffs submit that “this Court has personal jurisdiction of [sic] [Case] under
the long arm statute by virtue of [Case] making a contract … in Lafayette County, which was to

5

be performed … in Lafayette County, and because [he] committed a tort in Lafayette County.”
Doc. #15 at PageID 361; Doc. #14-2 at PageID 265–66. In his reply, Case acknowledges that the
plaintiffs “reside in Mississippi and performed some work in connection with the THDA
applications and low-income housing developments in Mississippi.” Doc. #19 at 3.
a. Contract
“A nonresident who makes a contract with a resident of the state to be performed in whole
or in part within the state is within the reach of the [Mississippi] long-arm statute.” Stripling v.
Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 2000). Since there is no dispute here that some
work under the parties’ contract was performed in Mississippi, the plaintiffs have “presented a
prima facie cause under the ‘contract prong’ of the Mississippi long-arm statute.” Id. at 870 n.9.
b. Tort
The plaintiffs contend that because Case “committed a tort in Lafayette County,
Mississippi, when he fraudulently misrepresented his intentions with regard to his obligations
under the contract,” 5 “personal jurisdiction under the tort prong of the long arm statute is even
clearer.” Doc. #15 at PageID 361, 365. Case replies that even if he “represented to Plaintiffs in
Mississippi that he would try to work with and give them rights of first refusal on future Tennessee
developments, such promise of future conduct cannot support a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation.” Doc. #19 at 12 (emphasis omitted).
“In construing the tort-prong of Mississippi’s long-arm statute, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has held that personal jurisdiction over a defendant who allegedly committed a tort is proper
if any of the elements of the tort—or any part of an element—takes place in Mississippi.” Jobe v.
In their response, relying on a declaration by Rutledge, the plaintiffs submit that “David Case fraudulently induced
[them] to enter into the agreement with him in Lafayette County, Mississippi, for the purpose of allowing him to gain
the valuable and necessary ‘Developer Experience Points’ and undertake projects without [them] and with no intention
of fulfilling obligations under the agreement.” Doc. #14-2 at PageID 268.
5

6

ATR Mktg., Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Under Mississippi law,
fraudulent misrepresentation requires “(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4)
the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of the truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted
on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its
falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and
proximate injury.” Pace, 93 F.4th at 889 (citing Elchos v. Haas, 178 So. 3d 1183, 1198 (Miss.
2015)); see Koegel v. Baugur Group, HF, No. 06-60255, 2007 WL 1454453, *1 (5th Cir. May 15,
2007) (“The law of Mississippi is that ‘not every spoken untruth is actionable as a fraud. It is only
if that untruth was designed to, and did, in fact, induce the hearer to change his position in
justifiable reliance on the untruth that it becomes potentially actionable.’”) (quoting Lacy v.
Morrison, 906 So. 2d 126, 130 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). So to satisfy the tort prong of their
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the plaintiffs must show one or more elements of the claim
occurred in Mississippi. See, e.g., Koegel, 2007 WL 1454453 at *1–2 (proof of reliance on
fraudulent misrepresentation required to meet tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute).
Here, the plaintiffs allege Case “made material misrepresentations and/or omitted material
facts from [them] regarding his intentions to pay for their services, his intentions to work with
them on [his] future TN 9% projects and his intentions to give the Plaintiffs rights of first refusal
on [his] future TN 9% projects” and that they “relied upon said promises and provided the agreed
upon services to [Case] in reliance thereon.” 6 Doc. #9 at PageID 166. Since the plaintiffs allege
they relied on Case’s misrepresentations by providing the agreed-upon services from Mississippi,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake.” See Strickland v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 838 Fed. App’x 815, 820
(5th Cir. 2020) (party asserting fraud must “specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the speaker,
state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent.”) (citation omitted).

6

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see Doc. #9 at PageID 166, Case’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim “falls within the aegis of
the [long-arm] statute,” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2006).
2. Due process
a. Minimum Contacts
Case contends that he “[does] not have contacts with or direct activities toward Mississippi
sufficient for this Court to exercise specific jurisdiction” over him and that “[his] single,
preliminary visit to Mississippi in January of 2020 is insufficient to create specific personal
jurisdiction over [him].” 7 Doc. #11 at 8. The plaintiffs respond that “it is beyond dispute that
[Case] had minimum contacts with Mississippi by initiating a meeting in Mississippi …, by
soliciting [them] to enter into an agreement while [he] was present in Mississippi, by actually
entering into an agreement in Mississippi, and by agreeing that the services to be provided …
would be performed … in Mississippi,” and because “all claims … arise out of the contract made
in Lafayette County, Mississippi and the tortious acts of [Case] related to the making of the
contract in Mississippi.” Doc. #15 at PageID 365–66. Citing a Mississippi Supreme Court
opinion, Case replies that he did not enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs in Mississippi
because he “ultimately accepted Plaintiffs’ proposed terms … in North Carolina.” Doc. #19 at 6–
7.
Specific jurisdiction exists “when a nonresident defendant has purposefully directed its
activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate

Case also argues that because he is “a North Carolina resident with virtually no contact of any nature with
Mississippi” and “does no business and has no assets in Mississippi,” the Court does not have general jurisdiction
over him either. Doc. #11 at 5. A party’s minimum contacts with the forum can give rise to “either specific or general
jurisdiction.” Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Private Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018). But the plaintiffs
do not contend the Court has general jurisdiction over Case; rather, they argue grounds only for the exercise of specific
jurisdiction. See generally Doc. #15. So the Court will discuss only specific jurisdiction. See Fernandez v. Jagger,
No. 23-30909, 2024 WL 3717264, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2024) (while jurisdiction can be general or specific, only
specific jurisdiction analysis is necessary because “this case only concerns the latter”).
7

8

to those activities.” Sangha, 882 F.3d at 101. It requires more than “random, fortuitous, or
attenuated contacts [the defendant] makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the
State” and must rely on “intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts
with the forum.” Tutus, L.L.C. v. JLG Indus., Inc., No. 21-20383, 2022 WL 1517044, at *1 (5th
Cir. May 12, 2022) (alteration in original). “[A] single act by the defendant directed at the forum
state can be enough to confer personal jurisdiction if that act gives rise to the claim being asserted”
though “contracting alone with a party located in the forum is not automatically enough to establish
sufficient minimum contacts.” Ancor Holdings, L.P. v. Landon Cap. Partners, L.L.C., 114 F.4th
382, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2024). Nor does the “unilateral activity of a plaintiff who claims some
relationship with a nonresident defendant alone … satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum state.” Cent. Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 382 n.6 (5th Cir.
2003) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 417 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)); see Barnstone v.
Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting Texas-based architect’s argument
that remotely providing from Texas services for construction of synagogue in Maine established
defendant’s necessary contact with Texas). However, when a nonresident defendant takes action
that “cause[s] business activity, foreseeable by the defendant, in the forum state, such action by
the defendant is considered a minimum contact for jurisdictional purposes.” Miss. Interstate Exp.,
Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1982). “The business activity is foreseeable
by the defendant if the forum state is ‘clearly the hub of the parties’ activities’” or, more
specifically, “where the work contemplated by the contract is to be done.” Conrad Shipyard,
L.L.C. v. Franco Marine 1 LLC, 431 F. Supp. 3d 839, 851 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2020) (quoting
Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2007)). In Mississippi
Interstate, specific jurisdiction was present because the defendant took affirmative action to

9

engage with the plaintiff in the forum state by initiating all the activity within the forum with
knowledge that the plaintiff would operate only in the forum, making it clear that the forum was
“the hub of the parties[’] activities.” Miss. Interstate, 681 F.2d 1007–10. Likewise, in Central
Freight Lines, specific jurisdiction was found where the defendant “specifically and deliberately
reached out to a Texas corporation … with the deliberate aim of entering into a long-standing
contractual relationship with [it]” such that the defendant was aware it was “affiliating itself with
an enterprise based primarily in Texas,” and although only the plaintiff performed in Texas, the
defendant “took purposeful and affirmative action by entering into [an agreement] that had the
clearly ‘foreseeable’ effect of ‘causing business activity in the forum state.” 8 Cent. Freight Lines,
322 F.3d at 382.
Here, Case intentionally sought the plaintiffs’ services—presumably because of their
expertise in tax credit housing developments—for the “exploration of a business relationship.”
Doc. #9 at 154–55. Even if he visited Mississippi only once and did not perform any work related
to the tax housing credit applications in Mississippi, Case was aware the plaintiffs would primarily,
if not wholly, perform their services under the agreement from their offices in Mississippi, see
Doc. #11 at 6–7 (Case’s acknowledgment of “preliminary meeting between [him] and Rutledge in
Mississippi” and “Plaintiffs’ performance of services from Mississippi”), thereby generating
business activity in the state. Consequently, Case should have anticipated that, although his
agreement with the plaintiffs concerned a development in Tennessee, he could be subject to
litigation in Mississippi if the agreement soured. 9
Central Freight held the defendant “should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Texas on … claims
related to [the] Agreement, notwithstanding [its] relatively brief physical presence in the state.” Cent. Freight Lines,
322 F.3d at 383 (emphasis in original).

8

This is particularly true since the agreement lacks a forum selection provision which excludes Mississippi as a forum
for litigation. See Cent. Freight Lines, 322 F.3d at 383 (lack of forum selection clause in agreement meant defendant
could not expect litigation in plaintiff’s choice of forum).
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10

Because the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against
Case arise from their agreement concerning the THDA applications, there is a clear causal link
between the business relationship between the plaintiffs. For these reasons, the Court concludes
Case has sufficient minimum contacts with Mississippi for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 10
b. Fairness
Once minimum contacts with the forum are established, the question becomes whether
jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Wien Air
Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 1999). Then, “the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that the assertion of jurisdiction is unfair and unreasonable,” and he must make
a “compelling case” to satisfy such burden. Sangha, 882 F.3d at 102. The court must balance “(1)
the burden on the nonresident defendant of having to defend itself in the forum, (2) the interests
of the forum state in the case, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,
(4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5)
the shared interests of the states in furthering fundamental social policies.” Id. These factors “may
not be employed in such a way as to make litigating so gravely difficult and inconvenient that a
party is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478.
Case argues this Court’s exercise of “personal jurisdiction over [him] … would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Doc. #11 at 8–9. The plaintiffs respond:
Mississippi has a significant interest in adjudicating matters arising out of tortious
conduct (i.e., fraudulent misrepresentation) committed inside Mississippi against
its residents, such as the Plaintiffs. It also has a significant interest in deciding
matters concerning contracts made, in whole or in part, in Mississippi. The
Plaintiffs are residents of Mississippi, this forum is convenient for the Plaintiffs and
Case states that “[e]ach [of the plaintiffs’] claim[s] must be analyzed for personal jurisdiction individually.” Doc.
#19 at 3. This separate analysis is required only where the plaintiff brings “multiple claims that arise out of different
forum contacts.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009). That is not the case here. Although the
plaintiffs assert multiple claims against Case, each claim relates to his visit to Mississippi and subsequent agreement
with the plaintiffs.
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11

may provide effective relief. Most of the witnesses who will testify as to the
formation of the contract, the misrepresentations made by the Defendant, and the
work performed by the Plaintiffs reside in Mississippi. Also, the documents
supporting the services provided by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant under the
agreement are located in Mississippi. Other than the final product of the Plaintiffs
work being submitted to the THDA in Tennessee and the Defendant residing in
North Carolina, basically everything else related to the claims brought in this case
are in Mississippi.
Doc. #15 at PageID 369. Case replies:
Other than Plaintiffs’ residence, this case has no Mississippi connection. Rather,
Tennessee lies at the center of this dispute which concerns applications to the
THDA (in Nashville) for tax credits to develop low-income housing in Tennessee.
All development and construction occurred in Tennessee. In addition to the THDA
employees, [he] has identified seven non-party witnesses. Each resides outside of
Mississippi and beyond this Court’s subpoena power. Travel to this District would
be time consuming and expensive for [him] and the non-party witnesses. Further,
[he], a North Carolina resident, conducts no business and has no assets in
Mississippi.
Doc. #19 at 14–15 (footnotes omitted).
The first factor “requires a court to consider the practical problems resulting from litigating
in the forum.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 263
(2017). Case’s implication that litigating in Mississippi is unduly burdensome is overcome by the
fact that he traveled to Mississippi to initiate a business relationship with the plaintiffs. See Ruston
Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1993) (nonresident defendant
defending action in Texas not an unreasonable burden since its employees traveled there in
connection with its business relationship with plaintiff). More, “once minimum contacts are
established, the interests of the forum and the plaintiff justify even large burdens on the defendant.”
Wien, 195 F.3d at 215. At most, Case “demonstrates an inconvenience which would be equally
felt by forcing the plaintiff to litigate [elsewhere].” Id. at 216.
Mississippi clearly has an interest in the suit because all three plaintiffs are residents of
Mississippi. Doc. #9 at PageID 153; see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
12

(state has “manifest interest in providing effective means of redress” for its resident plaintiffs); see
also Ruston, 9 F.3d at 421 (“Texas, as forum state, also has an interest in adjudicating a dispute
that involves a sale of goods to a Texas consumer.”).
The plaintiffs have a strong interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. The claims
they assert against Case arise directly from their Mississippi-based business relationship with him.
The Northern District of Mississippi and the Eastern District of Tennessee’s respective interests in
efficiently resolving this action and the advancement of social policies “will be best served by a
careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case, and an
unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests
on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano
Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1975). Because the Court determined the factors discussed above favor
personal jurisdiction over Case, it concludes that the Northern District of Mississippi is most suited
to resolve the dispute among the plaintiffs and Case. Accordingly, the Court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Case does not offend the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
3. Summary
Based on the conclusions above, Case’s request to dismiss this case for lack of personal
jurisdiction is denied.
B. Alternative Request to Transfer
Case argues that “even if personal jurisdiction exists, the Court should transfer this action
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (Knoxville Division) under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)” because it “offers a more convenient forum for the parties and non-party
witnesses and better serves the interests of justice;” “Plaintiffs could have brought this action in
Knoxville;” and the “private and public interest factors favor transferring this action to Knoxville.”

13

Doc. #11 at 1, 9–10, 14. The plaintiffs do not dispute that this action could have been properly
brought in the Knoxville Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee. 11 Instead, they focus on
why transfer is “an inconvenience to all except [Case] and … not in the interest of justice.” 12 Doc.
#15 at PageID 370.
In evaluating convenience, the Court should consider “(1) the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; (4) all other practical problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive; (5) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; (6) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (7) the familiarity
of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (8) the avoidance of unnecessary problems
of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law.” In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 288
(5th Cir. 2013). The first four factors are commonly described as “private interest factors” and the
remaining four as “public interest factors.” In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630.
As to the ease of accessibility to sources of proof, Case submits that the Court “should
consider the distance a party must transport documents, or other evidence, from their existing
location to the trial venue.” Doc. #11 at 12. The plaintiffs respond that the “majority of the
evidence is located in Mississippi.” Doc. #15 at PageID 370. There is nothing in the parties’
submissions on the motion (or in the record) suggesting the evidence and proof involved in this
case can only be accessed in the Northern District of Mississippi or the Eastern District of
Tennessee. The THDA applications and the parties’ written agreement constitute documentary
11
Since this action involves a low-income housing project, Giffin School, located in Knoxville, Tennessee, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2) allows a civil action to be brought in a district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.”

The plaintiffs draw a correlation between why transfer in not in the interest of justice and the Court having personal
jurisdiction over Case. See Doc. #15 at PageID 370. However, § 1404(a) “makes … no mention of personal
jurisdiction.” Conner v. Kelly, No. 23-11225, 2024 WL 3177782, at *3 (5th Cir. June 26, 2024).
12

14

evidence that can be shared, accessed, and managed in this Court as efficiently as in any other
forum. See In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630 (“The location of evidence bears much
more strongly on the transfer analysis when, … the evidence is physical in nature.”).
Consequently, this factor is neutral.
As to the availability of compulsory process, Case cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(b)(2)(B) 13 as authority for his argument that the various Tennessee and Arizona non-party
witnesses he references as “fact witnesses” are outside the Court’s 100-mile subpoena power. Doc.
#11 at 12–13. The plaintiffs counter that there are also non-party Mississippi witnesses. Doc. #15
at PageID 370. Under Rule 45(c)(1), the Mississippi non-party witnesses fall well beyond the 100mile subpoena power of the Eastern District of Tennessee, similar to how the Tennessee and
Arizona non-party witnesses are beyond this Court’s subpoena power. 14 More, this factor is given
less weight because there is no indication in the parties’ submissions on the motion that any
witnesses are unwilling to testify. See In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630 (district court
correctly found factor did not favor transfer, as petitioners failed to identify unwilling witnesses).
As to the cost of attendance for willing witnesses, Case relies on several Google Maps
excerpts depicting the various travel routes and flight options available to the various witnesses
residing in the Tennessee cities of Knoxville, Cleveland, and Nashville. Doc. #10-2 at PageID
191–212; Doc. #18-1 at PageID 380–99. These maps appear to illustrate what he asserts to be the
convenience of litigating in Knoxville. In response, the plaintiffs highlight the availability of
nearby airports that can accommodate Case’s travel to Mississippi if the case remains in this
federal district. Doc. #15 at PageID 370. In “giving particular attention to where the witnesses

13

There is no (b)(2)(B) subsection of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45.

14
According to Google Maps, there are at least 400 miles between the Knoxville Division courthouse in the Eastern
District of Tennessee and the Oxford Division courthouse in the Northern District of Mississippi.

15

that the parties would rely upon are located” and “how burdensome it would be for them to appear
in either the home or the foreign forum,” Nandjou v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 985 F.3d 135, 142 (5th
Cir. 2021), litigating in the Eastern District of Tennessee would be more cost-effective for the
several non-Mississippi witnesses Case relies on, including THDA employees.
As to the Eastern District of Tennessee’s caseload, the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged the
unreliability of docket efficiency and its speculativeness in a § 1404(a) analysis. In re Clarke, 94
F.4th 502, 515 (5th Cir. 2024). This Court will not make an “uniformed guess” regarding the
Knoxville division’s docket. See id. So this factor does not weigh in any party’s favor.
This Court is most suited to adjudicate this case because the desire to resolve a dispute
between Mississippi residents and a non-Mississippi resident is irrefutable especially when the
action is based on Mississippi law.
Finally, there is no indication that a conflict between the laws of Mississippi and Tennessee
will arise.
On balance, the Court concludes that transferring this case to the Knoxville Division of the
Eastern District of Tennessee is not more convenient than litigating in the Northern District of
Mississippi. See In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 632 (“[D]istrict courts have broad
discretion in deciding motions to transfer; they only need grant such a motion where the evidence
demonstrates that the destination venue is clearly more convenient than the chosen venue.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
V
Conclusion
Because the Court concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over Case and that the Eastern
District of Tennessee is not a more convenient forum, Case’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction or, alternatively, transfer to the Eastern District of Tennessee [10] is DENIED.
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SO ORDERED, this 27th day of January, 2025.
/s/Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17