Carroll v. King et al

Filing 79

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 78 Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 3/21/13. (cr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
WILEY ZACHARY CARROLL
v.

PLAINTIFF
No. 4:10CV78-A-A

LIEUTENANT EARNEST KING, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Wiley Zachary
Carroll, who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed
this suit. Carroll alleges that the defendants used excessive force against him by spraying him with
a chemical agent and then refused to provide him medical treatment for the pepper spray on his face
and body. The defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the use of chemical
agent was reasonable under the circumstances, or in the alternative, that the defendants are protected
under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The defendants also argue that Carroll’s injuries were de
minimis and he thus does not meet the standard of deliberate indifference necessary to sustain his
claim of denial of medical care. Carroll has responded to the motion, and the matter is ripe for
resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the motion by the defendants for summary judgment will
be granted and judgment entered for the defendants.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c). “The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced

to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its
burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a proper
motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish
School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d
455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or

unnecessary will not be counted.” Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support
of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Where
the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir.
1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist.,
177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198
(5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is “an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the
absence of proof, the court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the

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necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
Undisputed Material Facts
The facts in this case are not in legitimate dispute. On February 12, 2010, at 2:00 a.m., the
plaintiff was sprayed with chemical spray by Lt. Earnest King for disobeying King’s order, turning
his back on King, and tearing up a detention notice. Carroll states that as a result he suffered burning
and irritation from the chemical spray lasting two weeks. Carroll was examined and treated by
medical staff within thirty minutes of the incident. He washed his eyes and body with running water
forty-five minutes after being sprayed and fell asleep fifteen minutes later. By 5:00 a.m., he refused
medical and psychiatric treatment and demanded to be taken back to his cell. At 5:30 a.m., while still
in the clinic, he complained that his skin was burning, and washed his chest and back with soap. He
did not have a rash. He was discharged from the clinic by 7:00 a.m. The burning sensation was the
only physical malady he complained of at the time.
On February 16, 2010, and February 23, 2010, Carroll complained that he still felt a burning
sensation and itching from the chemical agent, but medical personnel could find no physical cause
for the sensation (no redness, irritation, lesion, or sore). No objective medical evidence supports more
that the initial burning sensation from the chemical agent, which Carroll washed off just after being
sprayed. Carroll received two rule violation reports arising out of the incident – one for failing to
obey an order and the second for destruction of state property valued at or more than $100.00 (though
the value attributed to the paper form could not possibly be more than a few cents). The Mississippi

Department of Corrections later determined that the use of chemical agent in this case was not
justified and recommended that Lt. King face disciplinary action.

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Denial of Medical Treatment
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must allege
facts which demonstrate “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners [which]
constitutes ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . . .
whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors or prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care . . . .” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251,
260 (1976); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992). The test for establishing deliberate
indifference is one of “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 unless plaintiff alleges facts which, if true, would establish that the official “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Id. at 838. Only in exceptional circumstances may knowledge of substantial
risk of serious harm be inferred by a court from the obviousness of the substantial risk. Id.
Negligent conduct by prison officials does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668
(1986). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with medical treatment provided by prison officials does
not state a claim against the prison for violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs. Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545 (5th Cir.2001), Norton v. Dimazana,
122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).

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The plaintiff’s allegations and the evidence before the court simply do not rise to the level
of a constitutional claim. Carroll was examined and treated within thirty minutes of being sprayed
with the chemical agent. No medical evidence supports his claim of lingering burning, itchy skin.
He was treated each time he requested medical attention. His allegations suggest, at most, that he
would like to have received different treatment, but his desire for such treatment, without more, does
not state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These allegations will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Excessive Force
Carroll claims that a prison official used excessive force against him in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. A court must balance the constitutional rights of convicted prisoners with the
needs of prison officials to effectively use force to maintain prison order. To prove this claim,
Carroll must show that the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” and not
“in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7,
112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S. Ct.
1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)); see Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 1993). Factors
which are relevant to this issue include “(1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the
application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the
threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and, (5) any efforts made to temper the
severity of the forceful response.” Rankin, 5 F.3d at 107 n.5 (citation omitted).
A prisoner need not prove “significant” or “serious injury” in order to prevail in an Eighth
Amendment claim of excessive force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. “The absence of serious injury is
therefore relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. A de minimis use of
force, however, is insufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Jackson v.

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Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993). “Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives
rise to a federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citation omitted). “The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment necessarily excludes from
constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of
a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[i]n
cases post-Hudson, ‘certainly some injury is still required.’” Rankin, 5 F.3d at 108; see also Knight
v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 926, 113 S. Ct. 1298, 122 L. Ed.
2d 688 (1993). A single incident of force or a single blow is de minimis and thus does not violate
the Eighth Amendment. Jackson v. Colbertson, 984 F. 2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993).
The court agrees with the institution’s finding that the use of chemical agent was not justified
in the present case. Carroll posed no immediate threat, and a lesser means of gaining his compliance
would have been the appropriate response to his actions. However, the force applied and the
resulting injury were de minimis. Carroll suffered discomfort for a short time – and was asleep an
hour after being sprayed. He had no lasting injury and received medical treatment each time he
asked – and no objective proof exists to support his few claims of lingering burning sensations on
his skin.
In addition, Carroll (who is a psychiatric patient) is an extremely disruptive inmate who has
fashioned shanks, used cellular phones, passed contraband to other inmates, masturbated through
the bars of his cell, defeated the security mechanism on his cell door, and has caused many other
problems during his stay with the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Carroll has been enough
of a security threat to cause the guards on his tier to act with extreme caution in dealing with him.
Though King’s use of the spray was misguided, it was clearly a “good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline” rather than a malicious and sadistic act designed to cause harm. Carroll’s claim

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of excessive force will therefore be denied.
In sum, the motion by the defendants for summary judgment will be granted and judgment
entered for the defendants. A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion will issue
today.
SO ORDERED, this the 21st day of March, 2013.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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