Chatman v. Washington County et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 9 Judgment. Signed by Glen H. Davidson on 12/20/11. (jtm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
DERRICK CHATMAN
PLAINTIFF
V.
NO.4:l1CVI28-D-S
WASHINGTON COUNTY, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court sua sponte for consideration of dismissaL See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915(A). The Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated, filed this complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attempting to challenge his incarceration and conviction for aggravated assault
and burglary of a dwelling in Washington County Circuit Court.
After carefully considering the contents of the pro se complaint and giving it the liberal
construction required by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), this
court has come to the following conclusion.
Section 1983 is not Appropriate Method to Challenge a Conviction
Any challenge to the fact or duration of a prisoner's confinement is properly treated as a
habeas corpus matter, whereas challenges to conditions of confinement may proceed under § 1983.
Jackson v. Torres, 720 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1983). The relief sought by the prisoner or the label
he places upon the actionisnotthe governing factor. Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1979). The rule which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit follows in determining whether a
prisoner must first obtain habeas corpus relief before bringing a § 1983 action is simple: "if a
favorable determination would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release, the
proper vehicle for suit is § 1983. If it would so entitle him, he must first get a habeas corpus
judgment." Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 133 F.3d 940 (1997)
(citing Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 736, 133 L. Ed. 2d
686 (1996».
The Plaintiff must first obtain habeas corpus relief before pursuing damages in a § 1983
action. See Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). A cause
ofaction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not accrue until the plaintiffs conviction or sentence has been
invalidated. Id at 489-91. The plaintiff makes no allegation that his conviction has been called into
question. The § 1983 complaint is, thus, premature.
Even if the court were to construe this as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, he must first exhaust
remedies available to him in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Miss. Code Ann. §§
99-39-1 et seq.
There is no proof or allegation that the plaintiff has exhausted his claims.
Accordingly, in either case, the plaintiffs complaint is premature and would be subject to dismissal
for these reasons. The complaint will be dismissed.
A;:/
A final judgment in accordance with this opinion will be entered.
THIS the
~[) £!:: day ofDecember, 2011.
~~
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
2
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