McNair v. State of Mississippi et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 12 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Glen H. Davidson on 7/2/13. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

GREENVILLE DIVISION

DR. SAMUEL L. McNAIR
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12-CV-00070-GHD-SAA

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER LEARNING; MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE
UNIVERSITY; DR. DONNA H. OLIVER, in Her Official
Capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of Mississippi
Valley State University; and FRANK SOWELL, in His Official
Capacity as Director of Human Resources for MVSU

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment [8]. Upon due
consideration, the Court finds the motion is well taken and should be granted.

A. Factual and Procedural Background
On July 26, 2012, Plaintiff Dr. Samuel L. McNair ("Plaintiff"), then a tenured professor
at Mississippi Valley State University ("MVSU"), filed this declaratory judgment action against
Defendants in the Chancery Court of LeFlore County, Mississippi. Plaintiff alleges that the dean
of the College of Education recommended termination of his employment as a tenured faculty
member at MVSU. The parties agree that Plaintiff was informed by letter that he could bring an
advisor with him to the 'pre-termination hearing, I but that the attorney could not present evidence
or examine witnesses at the hearing. Plaintiff alleges that he was also informed that the attorney
would not be permitted to speak on Plaintiffs behalf at the hearing.

1 Although in his complaint Plaintiff refers to the hearing as a "post-termination hearing," it is clear to the
Court that the hearing he refers to is properly called a "pre-termination hearing." Throughout Plaintiffs complaint,
he refers to the hearing set for July 27,2012, which was a pre-termination hearing.

Plaintiff claims that not allowing an attorney to speak on his behalf, present evidence, or
examine witnesses at the pre-termination hearing is a violation of his constitutional due process
rights. He requests that the Court enter a declaratory judgment that the policies and bylaws of
the Institutions of Higher Learning and the MVSU handbook both afford him a right to have his
attorney fully participate at the hearing.

Plaintiff also requests a mandatory injunction

compelling Defendants to conduct the hearing as declared by the Court.
One day after Plaintiff filed the state-court complaint, Defendants removed the case to
this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction due to Plaintiffs constitutional violation
claim.

That same day, the pre-termination hearing took place.

Subsequently, Defendants

answered the complaint and filed the motion for summary judgment that is presently before this
Court. Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion, despite being granted an extension of time
to do so by Order [11] of United States Magistrate Judge S. Allan Alexander.

B. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Weaver v.

CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). The rule "mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.
Ct. 2548.

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The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. !d. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
Under Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by
. . . affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'
designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct.
2548; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5 th Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche
Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313,315 (5th Cir. 1995).

"When the defendant moves for summary judgment because of lack of standing, ... the
plaintiff must submit affidavits and comparable evidence that indicate that a genuine issue of fact
exists on the standing issue." Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 1991 ) (citing
Lujan v. Nat 'I Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 879, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990)).

C. Analysis and Discussion
Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiffs case is
moot: On July 26,2012, Plaintiff filed his complaint wherein the sole issue raised was an alleged
constitutional due process violation if his attorney was not allowed to fully participate in the
scheduled pre-termination hearing; on July 27,2012, Defendants removed the case to this Court;
and on July 27,2012, that same day, the pre-termination hearing also took place. Consequently,
Defendants contend that the case is moot, the Plaintiff lacks standing, and this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under Article III of the United States Constitution. Defendants further
contend that Plaintiff cannot rely on an exception to the mootness doctrine to sustain his case,
because the scenario is not likely to be repeated, nor is it likely to evade judicial review.
Defendants maintain that any judgment in this matter would be merely an advisory opinion over

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which the Court does not have jurisdiction. Defendants further maintain that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the case because Plaintiff s claim of a right to
have his attorney participate in the pre-tennination hearing fails as a matter of law. As stated
above, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion for summary judgment.
The Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing, as the case is moot. Thus, the Court must
dismiss the case on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "The doctrines of mootness,
ripeness, and political question all originate in Article Ill's 'case' or 'controversy' language."
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,352, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 164 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2006).

"In order for a plaintiff to have sufficient standing under Article III, that plaintiff must show that:
he has suffered or will suffer an injury, his injury is traceable to the defendant's conduct, and a
favorable federal court decision will likely redress the injury." Samnorwood lndep. Sch. Dist. v.
Tex. Educ. Ag., 533 F.3d 258,264-65 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117

S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997) (footnote omitted». Federal courts may not "decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them" or give "opinion[s]
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." ld. (quoting North Carolina
v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S. Ct. 402, 30 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1971) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted». The "case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of
federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477,
110 S. Ct. 1249, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1990). "[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much
alive when suit was filed"; the parties must "continue to have a 'personal stake' " in the ultimate
disposition of the lawsuit. ld. at 477-78, 110 S. Ct. 1249 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (some internal quotation marks omitted».
The Court finds that this case does not present an actual injury likely to be redressed by a

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favorable judicial decision, as Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that would affect the
procedure of a particular pre-tennination hearing that has already been held. Because there is no
"case" or "controversy" under Article III, the case is moot, and this Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the case unless an exception to mootness applies.
Disputes that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review" are exceptions to the
mootness doctrine. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49, 96 S. Ct. 347, 46 L. Ed. 2d
350 (1975) (per curiam). This exception applies only where "(1) the challenged action [is] in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action
again." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Even if Plaintiff could satisfy the first requirement, he cannot satisfy
the second requirement. He does not have a reasonable expectation that he will be subject to
similar conditions in another pre-tennination hearing. The capable-of-repetition exception to
mootness thus does not apply, and this Court lacks the authority under Article III to decide this
case on the merits.
D. Conclusion

,.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [8]
shall be GRANTED, as the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
Accordingly, this case shall be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.

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THIS, the~dayofJuly, 2013.

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SENIOR JUDGE

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