Dobbs v. Epps et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 7 Judgment. Signed by Michael P. Mills on 5/30/13. (cr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
CARL DOBBS

PLAINTIFF

v.

No. 4:13CV29-M-A

CHRISTOPHER EPPS, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Carl Dobbs, who
challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed
this suit. Dobbs argues that the defendants violated his right to the free exercise of his religion
by refusing to permit him to attend the services of his faith on a single occasion. For the reasons
set forth below, the instant case will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Factual Allegations
The plaintiff alleges that on September 8, 2012, defendant James Gwin would not permit
him to ride the bus from the plaintiff’s Unit to another in order to attend the KAIROS religious
service. The reason for this single refusal was that Gwin did not want Dobbs to denigrate the
Chaplain’s Department.
Free Exercise and RLUIPA Claims
The First Amendment free exercise claim is governed by standards that are much more
deferential to prison authorities than those governing claims under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). In order to establish either claim, Dobbs must prove
that a substantial burden has been placed on his ability to practice his religion. In order to

defend a First Amendment claim, the prison authorities need only prove that the policies and
procedures in place are rationally related to legitimate penological goals under Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64(1987) (Where a prison regulation burdens a
fundamental constitutional right, it must be reasonably related to legitimate penological
objectives and may not be an exaggerated response to those concerns) and O'Lone v. Shabazz.,
482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed2d 282(1987)(Work regulations that required inmates to
work outside of the main building and prohibited their return, for security reasons during the
day, prevented Muslim inmates from attending their weekly religious services. The regulation
was constitutionally valid.)
RLUIPA does not say who bears the burden of proving the applicability of the act.
RLUIPA explicitly assigns the burden of persuasion to the ‘government’ on all elements of the
claim, except that the plaintiff must first show that the ‘government’ has imposed a substantial
burden on the plaintiff's religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). A challenged regulation or
program might well pass constitutional muster under traditional First Amendment analysis, but
run afoul of RLUIPA or its sister act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C.A §
2000bb (RFRA). A policy or program cannot meet the stringent standards of RLUIPA and yet
run afoul of Turner v. Safley and O'Lone v Shabazz. In this case if the plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim
fails, then so does the First Amendment Free Exercise claim.
First, the Dobbs does not challenge a prison regulation, only the way defendant Gwin
applied (or ignored) the regulation on a single occasion. Second, and decisive in this case, is the
fact that Gwin’s actions did not place a substantial burden on Dobbs’ right to the free exercise of
his religion. Dobbs alleges that he missed a religious service one time. The court holds that
missing a single observance does not constitute a substantial burden on Dobbs’ free exercise

rights. As such, the allegations fail to state a claim under the First Amendment or RLUIPA, and
the instant case will be dismissed for that reason. A final judgment consistent with this
memorandum opinion will issue today.
SO ORDERED, this the 30th day of May, 2013.

/s/ MICHAEL P. MILLS
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI