Bryant v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid et al
Filing
28
ORDER denying 21 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 26 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 11/25/2014. (kdw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
SAMANTHA BRYANT
V.
PLAINTIFF
NO. 4:13-CV-00123-DMB-SAA
MISSISSIPPI DIVISION OF MEDICAID, and
DEBORAH CARTER WOODS,
in Her Individual Capacity
DEFENDANTS
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
By order dated July 29, 2014, the Court dismissed Defendant Deborah Carter Woods, in
her individual capacity, from this lawsuit based on Plaintiff Samantha Bryant’s failure to state a
claim against Woods under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.
Specifically, in granting the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court found that: (1) individual employees cannot be held
liable under Title VII; (2) Plaintiff abandoned her claim under § 1981; (3) Plaintiff did not state a
First Amendment retaliation claim against Woods under § 1983 because she failed to allege
causation as to Woods; and (4) Plaintiff did not state a claim against Woods under § 1983 for
race discrimination and/or equal protection violation because she failed to allege that Woods
singled out a particular group for disparate treatment.
On August 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration, challenging the
Court’s findings and arguing that Woods should not have been dismissed from the case. Woods
opposes the motion and argues that it should be denied because Plaintiff fails to establish
adequate grounds for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for
decision. Upon due consideration and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
I
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
explicitly provide for motions to reconsider a district court’s rulings. However, the Fifth Circuit
has held that a district court may entertain a motion to reconsider and should treat one as either a
motion to “alter or amend” under Rule 59(e) or a motion for “relief from judgment” under Rule
60(b). Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1991); Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d
510, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). If a motion to reconsider is filed within twenty-eight days after entry
of the judgment upon which reconsideration is sought, the motion falls under Rule 59(e); if it is
filed after that time, the motion falls under Rule 60(b). Fletcher, 210 F.3d at 511; Towns v.
Northeast Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, No. 3:09-cv-136-M-A, 2011 WL 3267887, at *1 (N.D. Miss.
July 29, 2011). Plaintiff filed the instant motion1 within twenty-eight days after entry of the
order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss; therefore, the Court treats Plaintiff’s motion as a
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.
Under Rule 59(e), a court should only reconsider its ruling in a case if there is: (1) new
evidence not previously available; (2) an intervening change in controlling law; or (3) a need to
prevent manifest injustice. See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir.
2012); In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002); Molina v. Equistar
Chems. LP, 261 F. App’x 729, 733 (5th Cir. 2008); Brown v. Miss. Co-op Extension Serv., 89 F.
App’x 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2004); Towns, 2011 WL 3267887, at *1 (citing Atkins v. Marathon
LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Miss. 1990)). Rule 59(e) motions are “not the
1
Plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration on August 26, 2014. Mot. [21]. Plaintiff filed her supporting
memorandum brief with the motion rather than as a separate document as required by the local rules of this Court.
Realizing her mistake, Plaintiff moved for leave to file her memorandum brief separately. Mot. [23]. The Court
granted her request for leave, and Plaintiff re-filed her motion for reconsideration separately from her memorandum
brief in support of the motion. Order [25]; Mot. [26]. The same arguments are asserted in both motions for
reconsideration. Compare Mot. [21] with Mot. [26] and Pl.’s Mem. Brief [27]. Therefore, the Court deems both
motions filed on August 26, 2014.
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proper vehicle[s] for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been
offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). Rather,
such motions “are used to ‘call[] into question the correctness of a judgment’ and are ‘properly
invoked to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’” In re
Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 371 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d
571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002)).
II
Plaintiff does not argue that there is new evidence or that there has been an intervening
change in case law. Instead, Plaintiff focuses on what she perceives as manifest injustice. In
support of her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that: (1) she spoke as a private citizen
on a matter of public concern in her letter to Woods; (2) the Court applied the wrong standard of
review in ruling on the motion to dismiss; (3) she sufficiently pleaded the cat’s paw exception
such that she stated a valid claim for First Amendment retaliation; (4) the Court should have
allowed discovery before ruling on the motion to dismiss; and (5) use of the term “monkey” is an
intentional discriminatory term that supports her equal protection claim. The Court will address
each of these arguments to determine whether reconsideration is appropriate.
A
Plaintiff first challenges the Court’s findings on the capacity in which she spoke when
she sent Woods a letter complaining about discrimination, retaliation, and threatening remarks to
which she had allegedly been subjected during her employment with Mississippi Division of
Medicaid (“MSDM”). Plaintiff argues that she spoke as a private citizen expressing a matter of
public concern rather than as an employee expressing personal grievances when she sent the
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letter to Woods, the EEOC, and two attorneys. Pl.’s Mem. Brief [27] at 6-7. Plaintiff contends
that her “act of reporting Defendant Wood’s [sic] actions out to an independent agency and
independent officials was not a part of her official task … and said speech constitutes speech as a
citizen protected under the First Amendment.” Id. at 7.
While Plaintiff argues that the Court found that she spoke as an employee rather than a
citizen in her complaint letter, the Court made no such finding in its order. Instead, the Court
considered “for purposes of its analysis that Plaintiff spoke to Woods as a citizen rather than an
employee[.]” Order [20] at 12. The Court assumed that “because the letter put Woods on notice
that Plaintiff intended to contact ‘government controlled Civil Rights agencies’ and giving such
notice was not part of Plaintiff’s job responsibilities,” she spoke as a citizen. Id. at 11. Since the
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration on a finding the Court never made, her motion on this issue lacks
merit and is denied.
B
Plaintiff next argues that the Court did not “accept all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true and
[] draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor” when ruling on the motion to dismiss. Pl.’s
Mem. Brief [27] at 4. Plaintiff specifically argues that the Court drew an inference from her
letter to Woods in isolation rather than drawing all inferences in her favor from the complaint
and letter collectively. Id. at 11. The portion of the order upon which Plaintiff bases her
argument provides:
Although, in her letter, Plaintiff states that Woods subjected her to discrimination
and retaliation, she does not state in the letter that the alleged conduct was based
on race. Therefore, it does not appear that the speech at issue reported racial
discrimination.
Order [20] at 11. Plaintiff contends that the Court concluded “in a vacuum” that her speech did
not report racial discrimination because the letter to Woods failed to state that the alleged
4
discriminatory conduct was based on race. Pl.’s Mem. Brief [27] at 10. Plaintiff argues that had
the Court considered the letter and complaint together, it would have inferred that Plaintiff
referred to race in the letter. Id. at 11.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court is only required to accept all “well-pleaded”
facts as true. See Breton Energy, LLC v. Mariner Energy Res., Inc., 764 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir.
2014) (quoting Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2013)). “The ultimate question in a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts
are assumed true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lone Star Fund V
(U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
“However, those facts, ‘taken as true, [must] state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Bowlby
v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Amacker v. Renaissance Asset
Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011)).
The Court accepted all well-pleaded facts as true and drew all reasonable inferences in
favor of Plaintiff when it ruled on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The specific portion of the
order that Plaintiff challenges was not the reason the Court dismissed her retaliation claim.
Despite noting that Plaintiff’s letter did not appear to report racial discrimination, the Court did
not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff’s speech in the letter involved a matter of public concern.
Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the Court reached a conclusion regarding her speech “in a
vacuum,” is simply not true. See Pl.’s Mem. Brief [27] at 10. Indeed, the Court found that
Plaintiff failed to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation because Plaintiff did not allege
that Woods made the final decision to terminate her or that an exception applies to hold Woods
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liable for the termination.2
Because the Court applied the proper standard of review to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration on this ground is denied.
C
Next, Plaintiff challenges the Court’s finding that she failed to allege causation as to
Woods to state a claim against her for First Amendment retaliation. Plaintiff argues that she
sufficiently pleaded the cat’s paw exception such that Woods can be held liable for First
Amendment retaliation. Plaintiff also argues that the proximity in time between her complaint
letter and her termination support causation as to Woods, and the Court should have denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to this claim.
In finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Woods for retaliation, the Court
adhered to Fifth Circuit precedent which provides that “only final decision-makers may be held
liable for First Amendment retaliation employment discrimination under § 1983.” Johnson v.
Louisiana, 369 F.3d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 2004). Typically, statements and/or actions of “ordinary
employees or co-workers” are not imputed to an employer. DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282,
288 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)). However,
“when the person conducting the final review serves as the ‘cat’s paw’ of those who were acting
from retaliatory motives, the causal link between the protected activity and adverse employment
action remains intact.” Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2002). In DePree v.
Saunders, the Fifth Circuit appeared to recognize that individuals exerting influence over a final
decision-maker may be held liable for First Amendment retaliation under the cat’s paw
exception. 588 F.3d at 288-89. To do so, however, the individual must exert influence over the
decision-maker “in such a way as to co-opt [the] decision making.” Id. at 288.
2
See Order [20] at 12 (“[E]ven if Plaintiff’s speech involved a matter of public concern and her interest in speaking
outweighed that of the defendants, Plaintiff nevertheless fails to state a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim
against Woods because Woods was not a final decision-maker”) (internal footnote omitted).
6
Although Plaintiff claims she sufficiently pleaded the cat’s paw exception, the current
pleadings do not reflect that. In the facts section of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
11. On or about November 1, 2011, Plaintiff was called to the front office to assist
an African American female client because there was a verbal disagreement
between the client and Defendant Carter Woods.
12. When Plaintiff reached the front office, Defendant Carter Woods stated to
Plaintiff that “You need to come get your client, an old monkey.”
13. Later that same day, Plaintiff informed Defendant Carter Woods that her
statement was racially offensive.
14. On November 7, 2011, as a result of Defendant Carter Woods’ statement and
previous consistent behavior of retaliation and making racially discriminatory and
threatening statements, Plaintiff hand-delivered a letter to Defendant Carter
Woods complaining about her discriminative behavior. Exhibit “1.” Plaintiff
informed Defendant Carter Woods via the letter that she would be engaging in
protected activity ….
15. Approximately twenty-eight (28) days later, on December 5, 2011, Plaintiff
received a hand-delivered “Pre-Termination” letter from Defendant Division of
Medicaid stating that she was being cited for three (3) Group III, No. 4
Offenses[.]
…
17. On February 16, 2012, approximately three (3) months after engaging in
protected activity, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Division of Medicaid
stating that her employment was being “terminated at the close of business
Friday, February 17, 2012.”
Compl. [1] at 2-3. Under Count One of the Complaint, Plaintiff states:
25. At all times relevant to the allegations contained herein, Defendants
discriminated against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and for exercising free speech on a matter of
public concern.
26. Defendants unlawfully terminated Plaintiff because she opposed practices
made unlawful by Title VII…. Defendant Division of Medicaid actions [sic]
violated Plaintiff’s rights under Title VII …. Defendant Carter Woods’ actions
violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be free from
retaliation for making complaints of discrimination.
27. Defendants’ proffered reason for Plaintiff’s termination is pretext for
retaliation.
Id. at 4.
Based on the language in the complaint, it does not appear that Woods made the final
decision to terminate Plaintiff or that Woods exerted influence or had leverage over the final
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decision-maker. According to the complaint, Woods began treating Plaintiff adversely after
Plaintiff told her that referring to a client as “an old monkey” was racially offensive. Also from
the complaint, Plaintiff received a disciplinary letter from MSDM four weeks after she sent
Woods a letter complaining about her alleged discriminatory conduct. MSDM sent Plaintiff the
pre-termination and termination letters, not Woods. See Doc. [1-2][1-3]. Thus, it appears an
MSDM official other than Woods was the final decision-maker with regard to the termination.
Plaintiff does not allege anywhere in the complaint that Woods was responsible for the
termination. As such, the Court properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege causation as to
Woods and, therefore, failed to state a claim against Woods under § 1983 for First Amendment
retaliation.3 The request for reconsideration on this issue is denied.
D
Plaintiff also argues that the Court erred by not allowing discovery before ruling on the
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argues that she “needed discovery to further development [sic] her
argument regarding Defendant Woods’ racial, discriminatory intent and her role in the ‘cat’s
paw’ exception.” Pl.’s Mem. Brief. [27] at 16. She contends that Defendants’ motion was
premature because discovery has not been conducted regarding the qualified immunity defense.
For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider its ruling and allow discovery to
proceed so that she can develop her case against Woods.
Although Plaintiff argues that the Court prematurely ruled on the motion to dismiss, she
does not show what discovery could have revealed to allow her to defeat Defendants’ motion.
Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that courts may preclude discovery
3
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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where nothing that the party seeking discovery “could have learned through discovery could
have affected the resolution of the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion”). Rule 12(b)(6) motions test the
sufficiency of the complaint and do not include consideration of evidentiary materials outside the
pleadings. See Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that “a
12(b)(6) inquiry focuses on the allegations in the pleadings, not whether a plaintiff actually has
sufficient evidence to succeed on the merits”) (citation omitted); Gardner v. Swedish Match N.
Am., Inc., No. 2:04-cv-337, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44680, at *8, 2006 WL 1468944 (S.D. Miss.
Apr. 17, 2006) (“The plaintiff is not entitled to Rule 56(f) discovery in the context of a motion to
dismiss because the motion to dismiss is limited solely to testing the sufficiency of the
allegations of the complaint while the summary judgment motion tests the actual merits of the
case in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact is present.”); Sides v. Carfax, No.
1:13-cv-11, 2013 WL 6626937, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2013) (denying plaintiff’s motion to
delay consideration of defendant’s motion to dismiss because there had been no discovery in the
case). Thus, the Court was not required to allow the parties to engage in discovery prior to ruling
on the motion to dismiss.4
Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that discovery was essential to determine the qualified
immunity defense lacks merit. According to the Fifth Circuit, a district court may defer ruling on
a qualified immunity defense “if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the
availability of that defense.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). “[A] plaintiff
seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that
4
In responding to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff did not explicitly request that the Court allow discovery
before ruling on the motion. Instead, Plaintiff argued that the motion was premature. See Pl.’s Response [10] at 2
(“Finally, Plaintiff would submit to the Court that Defendant Woods’ Motion to Dismiss is premature as discovery
has not been conducted in relations to her defense of qualified immunity against the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and 1983.”) (emphasis in original).
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defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Id. Only after the court finds that
the plaintiff has done so and the court remains “unable to rule on the immunity defense without
further clarification of the facts” may it order discovery “‘narrowly tailored to uncover only
those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.’” Id. (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d
504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987)).
In this case, the Court did not need additional evidence or further clarification of the facts
to rule on the qualified immunity defense. Indeed, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to
state a claim under § 1983 and that she abandoned her claim under § 1981. See Order [20] at 1415. Because Plaintiff failed to allege violation of a constitutional right, she could not overcome
the qualified immunity defense.5 Discovery was therefore unnecessary, and Plaintiff’s request
for reconsideration on this ground is denied.
E
As her final ground for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that use of the term “monkey” is
intentionally discriminatory and supports her claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
She argues that the Court’s ruling “calls into question whether the use of the term ‘monkey’ is
intentionally, racially discriminatory.” Pl.’s Mem. Brief [27] at 16. Plaintiff contends that
Woods’ reference to a black woman as a “monkey” indicates discriminatory intent and shows
that she classified between two or more groups.
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in
dismissing her equal protection claim because she pleaded sufficient facts to show that Woods
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite Plaintiff’s argument, the Court never called into question whether the term
“monkey” is an intentionally discriminatory term. The Court did not make any finding as to
5
See Linbrugger v. Abercia, 363 F.3d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 2004) (“If no constitutional right has been violated, the
inquiry ends and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”) (citation omitted).
10
whether the term is “racially offensive,” although it is couched as such by Plaintiff. With regard
to the equal protection claim, the Court stated that:
In the complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Woods singled out a particular
group for disparate treatment or that she selected a course of action for the
purpose of causing an adverse effect on a particular group. Rather, Plaintiff
alleges that Woods made a “racially offensive” comment regarding a client and
that Woods possibly was involved in initiating the review of Plaintiff’s
employment applications…. Nowhere in the complaint is it alleged that Woods
classified or distinguished between two or more groups. From the complaint, it
appears that any alleged inappropriate remarks and/or discriminatory conduct
taken by Woods was directed towards Plaintiff and not a singled out group.
Because Plaintiff fails to identify “two or more relevant groups or persons” that
Woods classified and/or treated differently, she has not stated a valid claim for
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Order [20] at 13-14 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff “must allege and
prove that [she] received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals
and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 227
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is an African
American, was qualified for her position with MSDM, “was terminated by Defendants and
replaced by white/Caucasian employees.” Compl. [1] at 5. These allegations, however, are
insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bowlby, 681 F.3d at
227 (stating that allegations in complaint were insufficient to state an equal protection claim).
Plaintiff does not assert that Woods treated her differently from or less favorably than similarly
situated individuals outside her protected group. See Rolf v. City of San Antonio, 77 F.3d 823,
828 (5th Cir. 1996) (equal protection inquiry is triggered only “if the challenged government
action classifies or distinguishes between two or more relevant groups”) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto are devoid of allegations regarding the
treatment of similarly situated individuals.
In her motion, Plaintiff does not point to any
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allegations in the complaint that sufficiently show classification between two or more persons or
groups.6 As such, she does not show that the Court erred in finding that she failed to state a valid
equal protection claim. Reconsideration is not warranted.
III
In light of the above analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to establish adequate
grounds for reconsideration. Accordingly, the motions for reconsideration are DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 25th day of November 2014.
/s/Debra M. Brown
.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
Plaintiff argues in support of her motion that:
Plaintiff would point out to the Court that, contrary to its finding, Plaintiff alleged in her
Complaint that the remark was made against Plaintiff’s client, a Black woman, and the adverse
action resulting from the remark was taken against Plaintiff; resulting in a classification of two or
more persons. Thus, this Court was in error to conclude that the discriminatory remark was only
directed towards Plaintiff.
Pl.’s Mem. Brief [27] at 18 (internal footnote omitted). Plaintiff does not allege that Woods classified between two
persons or groups. As such, this argument does not support a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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