Brown v. Wesley et al
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re 41 Final Judgment. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 9/4/14. (cr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
CHARLES BROWN
PLAINTIFF
V.
NO. 4:13-CV-154-DMB-DAS
GLORIA WESLEY, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Charles Brown, who
challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, the Court notes that Brown was incarcerated when he filed this suit.
Defendants have filed a motion [35] for summary judgment. Brown has not responded to the motion,
and the deadline to do so has expired. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment will be granted, and judgment will be entered in their favor.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
“The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible
evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden.” Beck v.
Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden
shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides
Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company,
136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines whether a fact is material. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248 (stating that “materiality determination rests on substantive law”). “Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”
Id.
If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a
genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, ‘there is no genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted);
Federal Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA
Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cnty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One
Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only
when there is “an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v.
Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not
“assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
(emphasis omitted) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
Undisputed Material Facts
The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Cleveland Mississippi Police Department arrested
Brown on June 14, 2013, for failing to pay a fine for driving without a license. He was booked into the
Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility (“BCRCF”). An unknown employee of the jail, following
BCRCF policy, ran a search for Brown with the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”). The query
revealed that Brown was a convicted sex offender with an outstanding warrant for a parole violation in
Wisconsin. A notation on the report indicated Wisconsin’s desire to extradite Brown and asked that he not
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be released. As a result, Lillie Pates contacted the authorities in Wisconsin and confirmed their intent to
extradite Brown. Pates then asked Brown to sign a waiver of his right to challenge extradition, which he
refused to do. As a result, he remained in jail until the State of Wisconsin obtained a “governor’s warrant”
or “rendition warrant.” Wisconsin authorities arrived at the BCRCF on October 20, 2013, and transported
Brown back to Wisconsin.
Extradition
Brown alleges that Defendants should have arranged for him to be brought before a judge so
he could challenge his extradition rather than simply turning him over to the State of Wisconsin after
its officials had obtained the proper documentation. This allegation is wholly without merit. As for
Pates, she contacted Wisconsin due to the “hold” in the NCIC report – an action which probably
comports with the policy of every jail in America – because the Extradition Clause contained in the
United States Constitution requires states to cooperate in the transport of fugitives. Under the
Extradition Clause:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony or other Crime, who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 2, cl. 2. In addition, federal law sets forth the extradition procedure in 18
U.S.C. § 3182. Brown’s extradition records reveal that Pates obtained the correct documentation and
followed the prescribed procedure.
Brown’s remedy in the present case was a writ of habeas corpus, rather than an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See e.g. Good v. Allain, 823 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Although there is a federal right to
challenge extradition, and denial of that right can be the basis of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, …
challenges to extradition must be made by petition for a writ of habeas corpus where the permissible scope
of the challenge is very narrow.”) . His decision to proceed through § 1983 was a poor one, but it is not the
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fault of the defendants in this case. Finally, in an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit has held that a
legally indistinguishable allegation was subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. Ellis v. Hargrove, 75 F. App’x 229, 230 (5th Cir. 2003) (there is no federal or state right to
hearing prior to extradition). For these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [35] will be
granted, and judgment will be entered in their favor.
SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of September, 2014.
/s/ Debra M. Brown
.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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