Giles v. Shaw School District et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 54 Order on Motion to Abstain and Stay. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 03/12/2015. (geb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
SHARITA GILES
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-00024-SA-JMV
SHAW SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sharita Giles initiated this lawsuit against her former employer Shaw School
District (“SSD”) and members of its School Board, alleging gender discrimination, deprivations
of substantive and procedural due process, and violations of the Equal Protection Clause. In a
related and ongoing action in the Chancery Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Giles has
appealed SSD’s decision not to renew her employment. In view of these parallel proceedings,
SSD has filed a Motion to Abstain and to Stay [8]. Upon consideration of the motion, responses,
rules, and authorities, the Court finds as follows:
Facts and Procedural History
Giles began her employment as Principal of McEvans School in the Shaw County,
Mississippi School District in 2008. Giles alleges that, in November 2012, the District
Superintendent, Dr. Cederick Ellis, recommended to the School Board that all of the District’s
administrators receive pay raises for the upcoming year. According to Giles, the School Board
approved a raise for a male principal within the District, but declined to authorize a raise for her.
Based on this decision, Giles filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), alleging sex-based discrimination. The following February, according to
Giles, Ellis recommended that the Board renew Giles’ employment as Principal of McEvans.
However, the School Board again declined to adopt Ellis’s recommendation and voted by a
count of three to two not to renew Giles’ employment. She then filed another charge with the
EEOC, alleging that her non-renewal was effectuated in retaliation for her initial charge of sex
discrimination.
Following the non-renewal, Giles requested and received a hearing before the School
Board, pursuant to Mississippi’s School Employment Procedures Law. See MISS. CODE ANN. §
37-9-111. The Board voted (again three to two) to uphold its original non-renewal decision, at
which time Giles filed a third charge with the EEOC, reiterating allegations of sex discrimination
and retaliation. Giles also timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Bolivar County Chancery
Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 37-9-13 to determine whether
the School Board’s non-renewal should be overturned. Oral arguments were heard in the
Chancery Court on March 21, 2014, and a resolution is pending.
After her appeal to the Chancery Court, Giles initiated this action against SSD and the
Board Members involved in the decisions not to give her a raise and not to renew her
employment. She seeks compensation and equitable relief from SSD under Title VII on the basis
of sex discrimination and retaliation; declaratory relief and injunctive relief against the Board
Members in their official capacities to remedy alleged violations of due process and equal
protection; and damages from the Board Members in their individual capacities pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. SSD has filed the pending motion, requesting the Court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over Giles’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under to Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), and to stay Giles’ claims for
damages.
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Abstention Standard
A federal court should abstain under Younger when “assumption of jurisdiction by a
federal court would interfere with pending state proceedings . . . .” La. Debating & Literary
Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1489 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation
omitted). Although the Younger doctrine originally only required courts to abstain from
interfering with state criminal prosecutions, it now applies to civil proceedings as well “if the
State’s interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power
would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.” Health Net, Inc.
v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1,
10-11, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987)). In cases to which Younger applies, the Court
must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over claims of declaratory or injunctive relief. La.
Debating & Literary Ass’n, 42 F.3d at 1489. The Fifth Circuit has held, however, that Younger is
not applicable to requests for monetary relief, although the Court may have discretion to stay the
damage claims when abstention would otherwise be appropriate. Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d
123, 125 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Floyd v. Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 2d 693, 697
(S.D. Miss. 2005).
Discussion and Analysis
In its most recent published opinion arising under the Younger doctrine, the Fifth Circuit
stated that abstention is generally required if three conditions are met: (1) the related state action
must qualify as an “ongoing judicial proceeding”; (2) the state must have an important regulatory
interest in the subject matter of the federal claim, and (3) the plaintiff must be afforded “an
adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La.
Public Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
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Comm’n. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116
(1982)).
The United States Supreme Court, however, has since had occasion to clarify the
applicability of these three “Middlesex conditions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, --- U.S. ---,
134 S. Ct. 584, 593, 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (2013). The Supreme Court in Sprint explained that “[t]he
three Middlesex conditions . . . were not dispositive; they were, instead, additional factors
appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger.” Id. at 593, 187 L. Ed.
2d 505 (emphasis in original). The Court shifted the focus by instructing lower courts to only
employ Younger abstention when state proceedings present one of three “exceptional
circumstances.” Id., 187 L. Ed. 2d 505. These circumstances are (1) “ongoing criminal
prosecutions[,]” (2) “civil enforcement proceedings[,]” and (3) “civil proceedings involving
certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.” Id., 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (alteration in original). Thus, in light of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Sprint, the Court must consider whether Giles’ non-renewal appeal fits into one of
these three enumerated categories. Because this question is easily resolved as to the first and
third categories, the Court will address them briefly before proceeding to discussion of the
second category.
The first category that requires abstention is reserved for cases in which there is a related
pending state criminal proceeding like in Younger itself. Id., 187 L. Ed. 2d 505. Giles has been
subject to no criminal prosecution or threat of prosecution. Rather, the Chancery Court
proceeding is civil in nature. Thus, the first category from Sprint is clearly inapplicable.
The third category is limited to cases where the federal plaintiff’s challenge implicates
the judicial function, such as the issuing of orders or the rendering of judgments. See id., 187 L.
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Ed. 2d 505; see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336-38 & n.12, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 51 L. Ed. 2d
376 (1977) (requiring abstention when a civil litigant petitioned the federal court to enjoin a
state-court contempt order); Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13-14, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (holding abstention
appropriate when a state-court judgment debtor sought a federal injunction to prohibit the statecourt creditor from enforcing its judgment). In this case, Giles has challenged the School Board’s
conduct, not a judicial order, judgment, or anything else related to the state court’s judicial
function. The Court therefore finds the third category to be inapplicable.
Thus, for abstention to be appropriate, this case must fall within the second exceptional
circumstance from the three enumerated in Sprint. Within this category, Younger abstention is
generally appropriate if there is a state civil enforcement proceeding that is “‘akin to a criminal
prosecution’ in ‘important respects.’” Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592, 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (quoting
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 598, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1975)). The
Supreme Court has provided three hallmarks that characterize such enforcement proceedings. Id.,
187 L. Ed. 2d 505. First, “a state actor is routinely a party to the state proceeding and often
initiates the action.” Id., 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (citations omitted). Second, “[i]nvestigations are
commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.” Id., 187 L.
Ed. 2d 505. Third, such a proceeding is “characteristically initiated to sanction the federal
plaintiff.” Id., 187 L. Ed. 2d 505.
Applying these hallmarks to the present case, a state actor, SSD, is named as the
defendant in the Bolivar County Chancery Court, but it was Giles who initiated the action by
seeking a hearing with the School Board pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 37-9-111, and by
appealing the Board’s decision to Chancery Court under Section 37-9-113. Additionally, Giles
has not been the target of an investigation, nor have there been any charges levied against her.
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And third, the purpose of the Chancery proceeding is not to punish or sanction Giles. Rather,
Giles is the party seeking recourse. Therefore, of the traits that identify whether a civil
enforcement proceeding is “akin to a criminal prosecution,” the Court finds none to be present
here. See Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592, 187 L. Ed. 2d 505.
Indeed, the absence of these traits creates a stark contrast between Giles’ non-renewal
appeal and the state proceedings involved in cases in which the Supreme Court has held that civil
enforcement proceedings warranted abstention. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 427-28, 433-34, 102
S. Ct. 2515 (finding abstention appropriate when a municipal attorney-ethics committee
investigated the conduct of the federal plaintiff and served him with a formal statement of
charges); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 624-25, 628,
106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986) (requiring abstention when a state civil rights agency
initiated an investigation into the hiring practices of the federal plaintiff and filed a complaint
against it); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-20, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979)
(requiring the federal court to abstain from hearing a parents’ challenge to state initiated custody
proceedings involving the parents’ allegedly abused children); Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598, 95 S.
Ct. 1200 (finding abstention to be proper when the state had instituted an action to enforce its
obscenity laws against a federal plaintiff). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the present
action does not constitute a civil enforcement proceeding akin to a criminal prosecution or
otherwise present one of the exceptional circumstances for which Younger abstention is
reserved.
Nonetheless, SSD directs the Court to a case from the Southern District of Mississippi,
decided before Sprint and involving a similar factual scenario to that in the present action. Floyd,
376 F. Supp. 2d 693. In Floyd, the federal plaintiff was terminated from his position as principal
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of a Mississippi public high school; he was unsuccessful in his subsequent due process hearing;
and he ultimately appealed to the state level.1 Id. at 694. He then initiated a parallel proceeding in
federal court, seeking declaratory relief and damages arising out of his termination. Id. In
deciding whether to abstain from the non-monetary claims, the court relied exclusively on the
three Middlesex conditions. Id. at 695-96. It found the first two easily satisfied, holding that the
state proceeding was judicial in nature and involved important state interests in education and
ensuring fair handling of school district employee matters. Id. at 696. It found that the third
condition was likewise met, as the School Employment Procedures Law gives the Chancery
Court jurisdiction “to determine whether the School Board’s decision violated the employee’s
constitutional or statutory rights.” Id. (citing MISS CODE ANN. § 37-9-101, et seq.) (additional
citations omitted). And as to the damage claims, the Court recognized that abstention was
unavailable, but held that a stay was warranted due to the Court’s abstention from deciding the
non-monetary claims. Id. at 697.
Defendants argue the facts of this case are virtually identical to those in Floyd and that
the Court should reach the same result. Indeed, the Bolivar County Chancery proceeding is
undoubtedly judicial in nature. Additionally, the same statute, the School Employment
Procedures Law, is involved here, and thus the state interests in education and ensuring fair
handling of employment decisions are no less than they were in Floyd. Further, the procedure for
review under the statute has not been amended since Floyd was decided; the Chancery Court
retains jurisdiction to consider whether Giles’ constitutional and statutory rights have been
violated. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-113. Thus, the Court is persuaded that the Middlesex
1
Unlike in Giles’ non-renewal appeal, the Chancery proceeding in Floyd had already been resolved in the plaintiff’s
favor, and the School District had appealed that decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court, where it was pending at
the time of the Southern District’s opinion. Id. at 694. The Court finds this distinction immaterial for the present
purposes.
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conditions, if controlling, would require abstention in this case. However, in light of Sprint, it
would be errant to rely exclusively on these conditions. See Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593-94, 187 L.
Ed. 2d 505. The Supreme Court clearly held the Middlesex conditions were not dispositive, but
were merely additional considerations the Court should employ before abstaining under
Younger. Id., 187 L. Ed. 2d 505.
Notably, in an unpublished decision issued subsequent to Sprint, a Fifth Circuit panel
held that abstention was appropriate when the three conditions from Middlesex were satisfied.
Perez v. Tex. Med. Bd., 556 F. App’x 341, 342 (5th Cir. 2014). However, Sprint had not yet
been decided when the briefs were filed in Perez; the Court did not cite to Sprint in its opinion;
and the case involved the type of civil enforcement proceeding to which Sprint explicitly
prescribes abstention. See id. at 341-42. The Court is therefore persuaded that the continuing
validity of the Middlesex conditions in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sprint has
not been addressed by the Fifth Circuit.2
The Court has determined that the state proceeding below is not a criminal prosecution, a
civil enforcement proceeding, or a civil proceeding involving an order uniquely in furtherance of
Mississippi’s judicial function. Therefore, like in Sprint, “this case presents none of the
circumstances the Court has ranked as ‘exceptional,”’ and “the general rule governs: [T]he
pendency of an action in [a] state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in
2
The Circuits that have addressed the issue, the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh, have all revised their
Younger precedent following Sprint. Mir v. Shah, 569 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that the analysis
of the district court, which relied on the Middlesex conditions, was “no longer applicable” in light of Sprint);
Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Sprint explicitly eschewed
exclusive reliance on the three Middlesex factors.”); Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 816
(7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court rephrased the question, at least to some extent, in Sprint”); ReadyLink
Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Sprint involved these interpretive
dilemmas, squarely holding that Younger abstention is limited to the ‘three exceptional categories’ of cases . . . .”);
Dandar v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., 551 F. App’x 965, 966-67 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing the three
categories from Sprint and remanding to the district court for a redetermination of the appropriateness of abstention).
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the Federal court having jurisdiction.” 134 S. Ct. at 588, 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (quotation omitted)
(alterations in original). Accordingly, the Court finds that Younger is inapposite, and that it
should neither abstain from Giles’ claims of declaratory and injunctive relief, nor stay her
damage claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, SSD’s Motion to Abstain and Stay [8] is DENIED. Giles’
pending non-renewal appeal in Bolivar County Chancery Court is not the type of state
proceeding that would require the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. A separate order
to that effect shall be issued this day.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of March, 2015.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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