Carr v. Gaston et al
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 2/9/15. (jtm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
MAURICE WILLIAMS CARR, SR.
V.
PLAINTIFF
NO. 4:14-CV-00027-DMB-JMV
MILTON GASTON, Sheriff; PERCY
MILES, Major; MARY L PIPPINS,
Warden; CHIEF WILLIAM CLAY; LT.
DARREN ADDISON
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Maurice Williams Carr, Sr., proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants subjected him to conditions of confinement constituting
cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Doc. #35.
Having reviewed the submissions and arguments of the parties, as well as the applicable law, the
Court finds that Defendants’ motion should be granted.
I
Background and Procedural History
On July 30, 2013, Carr was admitted to the Washington County Regional Correctional
Facility (“WCRCF”) as a pretrial detainee. On or about February 26, 2014, Carr filed suit
against Sheriff Milton Gaston, Major Percy Miles, and Warden Brian K. Payne (hereinafter
“Defendants”), claiming that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him
adequate clothing and hygienic materials while he was housed at WCRCF.1 Defendants have
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Carr has failed to state a constitutional claim, and
that he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing this action. Despite
being provided an opportunity to do so, Carr has not responded to Defendants’ motion.
1
Carr initially presented additional claims against these and other individuals, but the additional claims and other
defendants were dismissed following a hearing held pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
See Docs. #10, #11, and #17.
II
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, illustrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is deemed “material” if “its resolution in favor of
one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Sossamon v. Lone Star
State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Once the motion is properly
supported with competent evidence, the nonmovant must show that summary judgment is
inappropriate. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The nonmovant cannot rely upon “conclusory allegations,
speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions” to satisfy his burden, but rather, must set forth
specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue as to every essential element of his claim.
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); Morris, 144 F.3d at
380.
Because Carr is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are construed liberally. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
III
Discussion
A. Conditions of Confinement
Carr claims that, upon his arrival at WCRCF in July 2013, he had to wait several days to
obtain a mat, toothpaste, towels, and clothes. Carr alleged at the time of his Spears hearing that
he had not been provided toilet paper for two weeks prior to the hearing, although he admitted
that, through rationing, he had not yet exhausted his supply of toilet paper. He also complained
that WCRCF refused to provide inmates with deodorant.
Defendants maintain that Carr’s
allegations fail to state a constitutional claim under § 1983, as he has not demonstrated a
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sufficiently serious deprivation of a minimum of life’s necessities, and he has not alleged that
Defendants acted with the requisite deliberate indifference to Carr’s health and/or safety.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment
“imposes minimum requirements on prison officials in the treatment received by and facilities
available to prisoners.” Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995). Jails must provide
inmates with “humane conditions of confinement,” which include adequate clothing and “basic
elements of hygiene.”
Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351–52 (5th Cir. 1999).
To
demonstrate a constitutional violation due to the conditions of confinement, a prisoner must
show (1) the alleged deprivation was “objectively, sufficiently serious,” such as would “result in
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and that (2) the responsible
prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).2
According to Major Percy Miles, the Assistant Chief of the Washington County Sheriff’s
Department, an inmate entering WCRCF who is expected to be confined there longer than fortyeight hours is issued an intake package containing clothing and hygiene supplies. Doc. #35-2 at
¶¶ 7–9. This package includes: two t-shirts, two pairs of boxers, two pairs of socks, one-half of
a bar of soap, one full roll of toilet paper, one tube of toothpaste, and one small toothbrush. Id.
The initial hygiene supply is supplemented with one-half of a bar of soap and one full roll of
toilet paper each week. Id. at ¶ 9. Defendant Miles also states that WCRCF has a policy of
issuing additional clothing to inmates upon inmate request, preferring that the offender use an
MDOC Offender Clothing Request and Issue Form to make their requests. Id. at ¶ 8.
Defendants have produced Carr’s intake form, dated July 30, 2013. Doc. #35-3 at Ex. A.
Carr’s intake form shows that he received the following items the day he entered WCRCF: one
2
The Court notes that, although Carr was a pretrial detainee at the time he initiated this action and was, therefore,
protected by the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the provisions of the Eighth
Amendment, see Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996), the same standards apply under both
amendments when considering issues of basic human needs. See Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir.
2001).
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face towel, one body towel, one half-bar of soap, one full roll of toilet paper, one small
toothbrush, one twin blanket, and one twin sheet. Id. Also before the Court is an “MDOC
Offender Clothing Request and Issue Form,” which shows that Carr utilized the procedure
outlined by Defendant Miles to obtain additional clothing from the facility on March 19, 2014.
Id.3 The evidence produced by Defendants demonstrates that Carr was provided basic hygienic
and clothing supplies upon his entry into the facility, that he was able to access additional
clothing, and that his supply of toilet paper and soap is supplemented weekly. His allegation that
he has not been provided enough items, or that the items were not provided quickly enough, does
not state a constitutional claim under these facts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas Bd. of Criminal
Justice, 281 Fed. App’x 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that inmate who was provided daily
change of clothes, even if those clothes were allegedly unclean, did not state a violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights where he was provided with soap and allowed to shower daily); see
also Thomas v. Owens, 345 Fed. App’x 892, 895 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding prisoner’s claimed
deprivation of toilet paper, toothbrush, clothing, sheets, and eating utensils “for days” without
merit under Eighth Amendment).
Accordingly, the Court finds that, in light of the competent summary judgment evidence,
Carr’s allegations do not constitute sufficiently serious deprivations of the minimal measures of
life’s necessities. Moreover, Carr has not alleged that the alleged deprivations were due to the
deliberate indifference of any Defendant. He has, therefore, failed to demonstrate a cognizable
constitutional violation under § 1983, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants additionally maintain that Carr failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to filing the instant action, which makes dismissal of this lawsuit mandatory. Because Carr
was incarcerated at the time he filed this § 1983 action, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
3
The Court notes that the documents provided by Defendants reflect that Carr used the same procedure on June 11,
2013, during an earlier stay at the facility to obtain additional clothing. Doc. #35-3 at Ex. A.
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(“PLRA”) applies to this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The PLRA requires prisoners to
exhaust any available administrative remedies before filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2012). There is no futility exception
to the exhaustion requirement, and an inmate must exhaust even where the relief sought is
unavailable through the administrative process. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739–41 &
n.6 (2001); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006). As failure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense, the burden of proving that failure is on a defendant in a PLRA case. See Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
Carr maintains that he spoke with Major Percy Miles and Mary L, Pippins, the former
Warden of WCRCF, concerning his lack of hygiene items prior to filing the instant action. Doc.
#1 at 3. He claims that he followed the facility’s grievance procedure by filing a formal
grievance on January 13, 2014, and that he subsequently sent Defendants a “Good Faith
Correspondence” letter. Id. He contends that he received no response from Defendants. Id.
Defendants maintain that there is a specific grievance procedure employed at WCRCF,
which requires an inmate to fill out a grievance form, provided by the facility, when he wishes to
bring a complaint to the attention of the staff. Doc. #35-3 at ¶¶ 4–5. The grievance form must
then be submitted by placing it in the designated box inside the facility, which inmates have
access to when they are not locked in their cells. Id. at ¶ 4. Once a day, Daphne Gallion, the
Inmate Services Coordinator for WCRCF, collects all the grievances in the box, photocopies
them, stamps the photocopy with the word “Copy,” and places the original in the inmate’s file.
Id. at ¶ 5. Ms. Gallion then forwards the copies of the grievance to the Warden and any
individual named within the document. Id.
Daphne Gallion has submitted an affidavit stating that no grievance form was found
following a search of Carr’s inmate file, indicating that he has never filed a grievance form with
WCRCF. Doc. #35-3 at ¶ 6. Mary L. Pippins and Defendants Gaston and Miles have each
submitted affidavits denying that they ever received a copy of a grievance from Carr concerning
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the allegations in the instant action. Doc. #35-1 at ¶ 5; Doc. #35-2 at ¶ 5; Doc. #35-4 at ¶ 4.
These individuals also deny receipt of a copy of Carr’s claimed “Good Faith Correspondence
Letter.” Doc. #35-1 at ¶ 6; Doc. #35-2 at ¶ 6; Doc. #35-4 at ¶ 5.
Carr has not presented the Court with any evidence to refute Defendants’ allegations and
proof. The Court determines that the competent evidence demonstrates that Defendants have
shown that Carr failed to follow WCRCF’s grievance procedure. By filing the instant action
without providing Defendants with an opportunity to investigate and potentially remedy Carr’s
grievances, he deprived them of a fair opportunity to address his claims. Because he failed to
follow the mandatory grievance procedure prior to filing the instant action, Carr’s claims against
Defendants should be dismissed.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons herein, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Doc. #35, is
GRANTED, and the instant action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate judgment
in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will enter today.
SO ORDERED this the 9th day of February, 2015.
/s/ Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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