Teamsters Local Union 667 v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc.
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 9/21/15. (jww)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
TEAMSERS LOCAL UNION 667
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO: 4:14-cv-00038-NBB-JMV
COAHOMA OPPORTUNITIES, INC.
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court upon the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Upon due consideration of the motion, its responses, and precedent, the court is ready to rule.
Plaintiff Teamsters Local Union 667 (“Union”) and defendant Coahoma Opportunities,
Inc. (“Coahoma”) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) from December
2010 to December 2013. The CBA governed the interest of the employer Coahoma, and its
employees, the Union members.
In May of 2011, Coahoma terminated a Union member, Ms. Sandra Jones. Jones filed a
grievance contesting her termination, in accord with the CBA. Coahoma refused to arbitrate the
grievance, as the CBA requires. The Union filed suit to compel arbitration in this court.1 The
court ordered the parties to arbitrate in July of 2013.2 The parties did so, and the arbitrator found
for the Union, ordering reinstatement of Ms. Jones with back pay from the date of termination.
To date, Coahoma has not complied with the arbitrator’s opinion and award.
The Union has again filed suit in this court. The summary judgment motion before this
court requests enforcement of the arbitrator’s opinion and award. This court, once more, has
proper jurisdiction based on 29 U.S.C.A § 185(a):
1
Teamsters Local Union 667 v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc., No: 2:12-cv-000158-SA-JMV (N.D. Miss. Aug. 8,
2012).
2
Id.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The parties agree the facts in this case are not contested. The record
consists of the arbitrator’s opinion, the CBA, the court’s previous opinion of July 2013, and the
parties’ various motions. The motions are ripe. Summary judgment is appropriate.
When an “arbitration decision arises from the terms of a CBA, judicial review is
narrowly limited. Courts should afford great deference to arbitral awards.” Beaird Indus., Inc. v.
Local 2297, Int'l Union, 404 F.3d 942, 944 (5th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Int'l Chem. Workers Union
v. Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir.2003). “[A] court must affirm an arbitral
award ‘as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority. . . .’” United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29, 38 (1987). “Courts likewise should not overrule the arbitrator's decision simply because they
might interpret the contract differently.” Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 331 F.3d at 495. “As long
as the arbitrator's decision ‘draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement’ and the
arbitrator is not fashioning ‘his own brand of industrial justice,’ the award cannot be set aside.”
Weber Aircraft Inc. v. Gen. Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767, 253 F.3d 821, 824 (5th
Cir. 2001) (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
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Analysis
As discussed in its briefs, Coahoma accepts the dispute was arbitrable and recognizes this
court’s limited authority to vacate the arbitrator’s award. Coahoma argues however, the
arbitrator’s award does not draw its “essence” from the CBA and should therefore be set aside.
Specifically, Coahoma contends the arbitrator’s award of back pay to Jones from the date of
termination does not draw from the “essence” of the CBA. In light of the deference afforded
arbitral decisions and this court’s limited authority to review the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
CBA, Coahoma’s argument must fail.
The CBA’s terms regarding back pay in the event of wrongful termination limit “[b]ack
pay [to no more] than a three (3) month period.” The arbitrator’s award of full back pay from the
date of termination to the date of the arbitration award well exceeds this three month limitation.
In finding for full back pay, the arbitrator applied the CBA provision governing the scope of his
authority to grant relief. This term states: “[t]he only relief the arbitrator may award is to place
the party back in to the position he or she would have been but for the contractual violation.”
(emphasis added). The arbitrator reasoned Ms. Jones was due complete salary from termination,
as to place her in the position she would have been, but for Coahoma’s violation of the CBA.
The arbitrator further supported his position by finding Coahoma approached the
grievance procedure lacking good faith, by “purposefully orchestrat[ing] an inordinate delay in
proceedings. . . .” He found, because of Coahoma’s willful delay, adherence to the three month
back pay limitation would result in an unjust forfeiture for the grievant, Ms. Jones.
The question before this court is whether the arbitrator’s award of back pay to the date of
termination drew its “essence” from the CBA. As stated before, judicial review of an arbitration
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award arising from the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is narrowly limited. Beaird
Indus., Inc. v. Local 2297, Int’l Union, 404 F.3d 942, 944 (5th Cir. 2005). Reviewing courts
should award great deference to arbitral awards. Int’l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbia
Chems. Co. 331 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 2003).
“It is the province of the arbitrator to interpret
contractual provisions and a reviewing court may not substitute its interpretation for that of the
arbitrator.” Albemarle Corp. v. United Steel Workers ex rel. AOWU Local 103, 703 F.3d 821,
827 (5th Cir. 2013). ”[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. When the CBA
contemplates that the arbitrator shall determine the remedies for contract violations, “courts have
no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that respect.” Id.
Herein, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority by granting full back pay to
the grievant. The CBA referenced the authority granted an arbitrator when crafting a remedy for
a contractual violation, stating, “the only relief the arbitrator may award is to place the party back
in the place it would have been but for the contractual violation.” A reward of full back pay
from the date of termination does so. The arbitrator weighed the reward of full back pay against
the three month limitation and determined the circumscribed award would unjustly enrich the
violating party. The arbitrator’s application of one conflicting provision over another does not
place the arbitrator outside the scope of the authority granted to him by the CBA, and this court
is without the authority to disagree with his interpretation and application of the CBA to the
present grievance.
This court finds the arbitrator’s award within the essence of the CBA because the award
places the grievant “back in the place it would have been but for the contractual violation,” a
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direct application of the agreed upon provision governing the scope of authority given to an
arbitrator under the present CBA. Further analysis weighing the arbitrator’s finding of a lack of
good faith by the defendant is unnecessary.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court finds the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is well taken and should be granted. The arbitrator’s award is to be enforced as
written. Also pending before this court is defendant Coahoma’s motion for sur-rebuttal, which is
now moot. A separate order in accord with this opinion shall issue this day.
SO ORDERED, this, the 21st day of September, 2015.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR.
SENIOR U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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