Cartwright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 28 Order on Motion to Remand to State Court,. Signed by Senior Judge Glen H. Davidson on 12/8/14. (tab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
NAKENYA CARTWRIGHT
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-cv-000S7-GHD-JMV
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY; STATE FARM
INSURANCE COMPANIES; and
VALERIE SPROULL
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND
Presently before this Court is Plaintiffs motion to remand the case to state court [11].
Upon due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied in part and
granted in part based on the following reasoning.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On March 26, 2014, Plaintiff Nakenkya Cartwright ("Plaintiff') filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, First Judicial District, against Defendants State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Insurance Companies ("State
Farm"), 1 as well as Defendant Valerie Sproull ("Defendant Sproull") (collectively,
"Defendants") to recover for injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained as the result of an automobile
accident. Plaintiff alleges that she was a guest passenger in an automobile driven by Defendant
Sproull when Defendant Sproull proximately caused an accident by "'traveling at excessive
speed, fai1[ing] to keep a proper look out, and fail[ing] to control her vehic1e[,] among related
1 State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance Company maintains that it and State Fann Insurance
Companies are one and the same and that it is properly named "State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company." See State Fann's Answer & Aff. Defenses [3] ,-r 3.
1
acts of negligence." PL's State-Ct. CompI. [2]
~~
7, 9. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct
and proximate result of the subject accident she suffered serious and pennanent bodily injuries,
which required extensive medical treatment. Id.
~
10. In addition, Plaintiffs complaint presents
claims for breach of contract, negligence, breach of legal duties, and related liability against
State Fann, her under-insured motorist insurance carrier. See id. 4jMf 13, 17. Plaintiff avers that
despite notifying State Fann of the subject accident and her claims for damages and injuries
suffered as a result, State Fann failed to pay Plaintiff benefits owed under her insurance policy,
failed to promptly and adequately investigate the claims made by Plaintiff and perfonn duties
under the policy/contract, failed to comply with the terms of the subject policy/contract, and
committed other breaches of contract and failure to perfonn. Id. 4jMf 12-17. Plaintiff seeks relief
from Defendants "in no amount less than $200,000.00." Id.
~
17.
On April 21, 2014, State Fann filed a notice of removal [1] on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.
Defendant Sproull did not join in the notice of removal.
Subsequently, all
Defendants filed answers to the complaint. On May 7, 2014, State Fann filed a motion to sever
[9] Plaintiffs claims against State Fann from those against Defendant Sproull; remand the case
against Defendant Sproull, if necessary; and pennit the claims against State Fann to go forward
in federal district court. On May 8,2014, Plaintiff filed the present motion to remand the entire
case to state court on the basis of lack of diversity jurisdiction. State Fann filed a response.
Plaintifffiled a reply. The matter is now ripe for review.
B. Standard ofReview
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Epps v. Bexar-Medina-Atascosa enties.
Water Improvement Dist. No.1, 665 F.2d 594, 595 (5th Cir. 1982). A case may be remanded
upon a motion filed within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal on any defect
2
except subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time by any party or sua sponte by
the district court. Wachovia Bank, NA. v. PICC Prop. & Cas. Co., 328 F. App'x 946, 947 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
The removal statute provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The "removal statutes are to be construed strictly against removal and for
remand." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09,61 S. Ct. 868,85 L. Ed.
1214 (1941); Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1996). The party
who seeks to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of showing that federal
jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th
Cir. 2000».
C. Discussion
Federal diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all
defendants and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000.
See 28 U.S.c. § 1332(a).
Plaintiff contends that removal is improper and remand is warranted because the amount in
controversy is less than $75,000 and complete diversity of citizenship does not exist between
Plaintiff and Defendants.
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1. Amount in Controversy
First, Plaintiff contends that removal is not appropriate because the jurisdictional amount
in controversy is likely not met. State Farm argues in ,response that the amount-in-controversy
requirement is met by Plaintiffs prayer for relief, including her specific prayer for damages for
"willful conduct and reckless [dis]regard for the rights of Plaintiff," see Pl.'s State-Ct. Compi.
[2]
~
17, which State Farm maintains would provide grounds for an award of punitive damages
under state law. In addition, State Farm maintains that Plaintiff has failed either to admit or
stipulate that she will not accept more than $75,000 in damages and that the amount-in
controversy requirement is met by the $150,000 in stacked uninsured motorist coverage provided
by the six automobile policies under which Plaintiff seeks recovery.
Removing defendants who seek to establish diversity jurisdiction must allege that the
jurisdictional amount in controversy is met, that is, that "the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs[.]" See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The
amount in controversy is determined at the time of removal. Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000).
If a defendant establishes "by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount," a plaintiff
may defeat removal only by establishing to a legal certainty that his or her recovery will not
exceed the statutory threshold. In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378,387 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs "who want to prevent removal must file a
binding stipulation or affidavit with their complaints ...." De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d
1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Courts generally begin the amount-in-controversy analysis by " 'look[ing] only to the
face of the complaint and ask[ing] whether the amount in controversy exceeds' the jurisdictional
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threshold." Ervin v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 364 F. App'x 114, 117 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(quoting S. W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. In/ax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1996». Pertinent to the
amount-in-controversy analysis, Plaintiff's complaint asserts that the amount of relief sought,
with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees, costs and expenses, would be "in
no event an amount less than $200,000.00." Pl.'s State-Ct. Compl. [2]
~
17. Keeping in mind
that interest, attorney's fees, and costs are not to be considered in the jurisdictional amount-in
controversy analysis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the Court notes that Plaintiff has not parsed her
prayer for relief to specify the amount of damages sought exclusive of interest and costs.
Nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, it is "facially apparent" from Plaintiffs complaint that
her claims exceed the jurisdictional amount.
In her complaint, Plaintiff seeks the following relief from Defendants:
[f]ull and complete payment, reimbursement, compensation[,] and
satisfaction for any and all injuries, losses[,] and damages suffered
as the result of the subject accident with [Defendant] Sproull and
payments under any and all insurance policies/contracts with [State
Farm] and all related damages which resulted from any breach of
legal duty, breach of contract, negligence, willful conduct[,] and
reckless [dis]regard for the rights of Plaintiff.
Pl.'s State-Ct. Compl. [2]
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17. Plaintiff specifically seeks "[p]ast, present[,] and future medical
expenses; [plast, present[,] and future lost wages and loss of wager -]earning capacity; [plast,
present[,] and future emotional distress; [plast, present[,] and future pain and suffering; and
[o]ther damages which will [be] fully proven at trial." Id.
~
11. In addition, although Plaintiff's
complaint does not explicitly state that she seeks "punitive damages" or that State Farm acted
with "bad faith," the complaint does assert that State Farm "wrongfully, negligently[,] and
carelessly failed to honor [its] obligations under their insurance policies/contracts and failed to
pay Plaintiff benefits owed to her," id.
~
12; "wrongfully, negligently[,] and recklessly failed to
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pay [Plaintiff's] medical expenses incurred" which is "a clear disregard for the rights of
[Plaintiff]," id. ~ 15 (emphases added); and that Plaintiff seeks damages for "willful conduct and
reckless [dis]regard for the rights of Plaintiff," id.
~
17 (emphasis added). These allegations
support a punitive damages claim under Mississippi law. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-6S(1)(a)
(b) (punitive damages may be awarded if compensatory damages are awarded and claimant
proves by clear and convincing evidence that defendant "acted with actual malice, gross
negligence which evidences a willful, wanton[,] or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or
committed actual fraud"); Kincaid v. Minact-Yates, LLC, No. 3:0S-CV-SSO-HTW-LRA, 2008
WL 4187050, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 3, 2008) (complaint's allegations that defendants "acted in
willful, malicious[,] and reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights" constituted "the plaintiffs
attempt to bolster a punitive damages claim").
Further, federal courts in Mississippi have consistently held that a claim for an
unspecified amount of punitive damages under Mississippi law is deemed to exceed the amount
necessary for federal jurisdiction. Walker v. Scales, No. No. 1:13-CV--00227-SA-DAS, 2014
WL 670216, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 20, 2014) (citing Brasell v. Unumprovident Corp., No.
2:01CV202-D-B, 2001 WL 1530342, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2001) (in tum citing St. Paul
Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1255 (5th Cir. 1998))); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hilbun, 692 F. Supp. 698, 701 (S.D. Miss. 1988). For all of these reasons, the Court finds that
the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied on the face of Plaintiffs complaint.
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the amount in controversy was ambiguous on
the face of her complaint, Plaintiff has failed to file a binding stipulation or affidavit that would
have sufficiently clarified the issue for the Court. Although it is true that "the jurisdictional facts
that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal, ... post-removal affidavits may
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be considered in determining the amount in controversy at the time of removal ... if the basis for
jurisdiction is ambiguous at the time of removal." Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883. "[A]ny post-petition
affidavits are allowable only if relevant to [the time of removal]." Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co.,
63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff requests discovery on the amount in controversy in
this case and contends that if discovery is allowed, she may be able to admit that the amount in
controversy does not exceed $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 2 "When a plaintiff fails to
admit or stipulate that he will not accept more than $75,000.00 in damages, a federal court may
deem that failure to be sufficient proof that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00."
Walker, 2014 WL 670216, at *3; Easley v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 1:06CV291-D-D, 2007
WL 2127281, at *2 (N.D. Miss. July 23,2007); Blount v. Hardcastle, No. 2:04CV203-P-A, 2006
WL 278567, at *1-2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 5,2006); Holmes v. Citifinancial Mortg. Co., 436 F. Supp.
2d 829 (N.D. Miss. 2006). Merely allowing the possibility that the amount in controversy may
prove not to exceed the jurisdictional threshold is insufficient.
Further, "events occurring
subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable, whether beyond the plaintiff's
control or the result of his volition, do not oust the district court's jurisdiction once it has
attached." St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293, 58 S. Ct. 586, 82 L.
Ed. 845 (1938).
Finally, State Farm has presented to the Court "summary judgment-type" evidence that
further supports the conclusion that the amount in controversy is met. See Garcia v. Koch Oil
Co. of Tex., Inc., 351 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2003); St. Paul Reinsurance Co., 134 F.3d at
2 The Court notes that the United States Magistrate Judge stated in her May 19,2014 Order [14] that "all
discovery not relevant to the remand" would be stayed pending the Court's ruling on the motion for remand.
Discovery related to the jurisdictional amount in controversy was relevant to whether remand is appropriate and thus
was permitted in the case even while the present motion for remand was pending.
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1253; De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55,57-58 (5th Cir. 1993). As stated above, State Fann
maintains that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met by the $150,000 in stacked
uninsured motorist coverage provided by the six automobile policies under which Plaintiff seeks
recovery. In support of its position, State Farm attaches to its response to the motion for remand
a letter from State Fann's counsel to Plaintiffs counsel and confirmations of coverage for six
separate automobile policies, each providing coverage of $25,000 per person and each listing
Plaintiff as an insured. See State Fann's Letter & Confirmations of Coverage [16-1] at 2-7.
The Court finds that considering all of the following, State Fann has met its burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded the
jurisdictional amount at the time of removal. Therefore, remand is not appropriate on this basis.
2. Complete Diversity of Citizenship
Next, Plaintiff contends that removal is not appropriate because there is lack of complete
diversity of citizenship among the parties. It is undisputed that complete diversity exists between
Plaintiff, a citizen of Mississippi, and State Fann, a citizen of Illinois. 3 It is also undisputed that
if Defendant Sproull's presence is considered in the jurisdictional analysis, diversity of
citizenship is destroyed, because Plaintiff and Defendant Sproull are citizens of Mississippi. The
question before the Court is whether Defendant Sproull's presence should be considered in the
jurisdictional analysis.
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Sproull is properly joined as a Defendant; that she
should be considered in the jurisdictional analysis; that when she is considered, no complete
diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiff and Defendants; and thus, that remand is proper.
3 It is undisputed that State Fann was incorporated in Illinois and has its principal place of business in
Illinois. Thus, for jurisdictional purposes, State Fann is a citizen of Illinois.
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Plaintiff maintains that the joinder of Defendant Sproull and State Farm as Defendants is proper,
because Plaintiff s claims against each Defendant arise out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and involve common questions of law or fact bearing on
Defendants' alleged liability for Plaintiffs damages as a result of the subject automobile
accident.
Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that this case involves a distinct litigable event
because the claims against the defendant tortfeasor, Defendant Sproull, and the defendant
insurance company, State Farm, arise from the same distinct litigable event: the subject
automobile accident. Plaintiff maintains that the Mississippi Supreme Court decision cited by
State Farm in support of a finding of fraudulent misjoinder, Hegwood v. Williamson, 949 So. 2d
728 (Miss. 2007), is distinguished from the case sub judice in that the plaintiff in that case
asserted a claim for bad faith denial of insurance benefits and sought punitive damages, a claim
Plaintiff maintains she has not pursued against State Farm in this case. Finally, in this respect,
Plaintiff maintains that joinder of the claims against both Defendant Sproull and State Farm
would promote judicial economy, as the issue of coverage would go forward with and be
resolved by the underlying lawsuit. Therefore, Plaintiff maintains that complete diversity of
citizenship is not present, removal is improper, and remand is warranted.
On the other hand, State Farm argues that Defendant Sproull is fraudulently or
egregiously joined as a Defendant; that she should not be considered in the jurisdictional
analysis; that the claims against her should be severed from the claims against State Farm; and
that removal is proper on the remaining claims against State Farm. State Farm argues that
Defendant Sproull's Mississippi citizenship should be disregarded in the jurisdictional analysis,
because the claims against Defendant Sproull neither involve a distinct litigable event nor share
common questions of law and fact; thus, State Farm maintains that those claims are fraudulently
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or egregiously misjoined. State Farm further argues that no reasonable probability exists that the
state court would find joinder proper pursuant to Rille 20(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Specifically, State Farm maintains that Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant
Sproull raise "fact issues of how the accident occurred and legal issues of simple negligence
(duty, breach of duty, proximate causation, and damages)," while her allegations against State
Farm relate to the handling of her claim "and legal issues of interpretation of insurance policies
and bad faith under which an award of punitive damages mayor may not be appropriate." See
Hegwood, 949 So. 2d at 731. State Farm requests that this Court sever Defendant Sproull from
the case and retain jurisdiction of the remaining claims based on the complete diversity of the
parties.
Fraudulent misjoinder of defendants is not permissible to circumvent diversity
jurisdiction. See In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626,630-31 (5th Cir. 2002). See also
Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that failure to
meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 will result in "joinder [being]
improper even if there is no fraud in the pleadings and the plaintiff does have the ability to
recover against each of the defendants").
Where the joinder of defendants constitutes an
"improper and fraudulent joinder, bordering on a sham," the presence of such non-diverse
defendants does not destroy federal jurisdiction. See Sullivan v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co. ofMiss.,
No. 4:l2-CV-97-SA-JMV, 2013 WL 5427992, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting
Tapscott v. Miss. Dealer Servo Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other
grounds, Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000)). In other words, "a
defendant's 'right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant
having no real connection with the controversy.''' Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Wilson v.
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Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S. Ct. 35, 66 L. Ed. 144 (1921». The United
States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi have adopted the
theory of fraudulent misjoinder. See Palermo v. Letourneau Techs., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 499,
515 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (collecting cases).
"To determine whether a party has been fraudulently misjoined, the Court applies Rule
20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure." Tri-Miss Servs., Inc. v. Fairley, No. 2:12-CV
152-KS-MTP, 2012 WL 5611058, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 15, 2012) (citing Palermo, 542 F.
Supp. 2d at 517); accord Willingham v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 2:09-CV-59-SA-SAA, 2009
WL 2767679, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 27, 2009). Rule 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure provides in pertinent part:
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.
MISS. R. CIV. P. 20{a). The comment to Rule 20 states in pertinent part:
The phrase "transaction or occurrence" requires that there be a
distinct litigable event linking the parties. Rule 20(a) simply
establishes a procedure under which several parties' demands
arising out of the same litigable event may be tried together,
thereby avoiding the unnecessary loss of time and money to the
court and the parties that the duplicate presentation of the evidence
relating to facts common to more than one demand for relief would
entaiL
MISS. R. CIV. P. 20 cmt.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has historically "given broad discretion to the trial court
to allow joinder of claims." Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1094
1095 (Miss. 2004); see Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Travis, 808 So. 2d 928, 931 (Miss. 2002) {"The general
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philosophy of the joinder provisions of these Rules is to allow virtually unlimited joinder at the
pleading stage, but to give the Court discretion to shape the trial to the necessities of the
particular case."). However, in the Hegwood case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
"[b]oth prongs of Rule 20(a) must be met" and that "[b]efore an alleged 'occurrence' will be
sufficient to meet Rule 20(a)'s two factors, there must be a distinct litigable event linking the
parties." See Hegwood, 949 So. 2d at 730 (internal citations omitted).
The Mississippi Supreme Court explained in Hegwood that in determining whether a
distinct litigable event exists, courts should consider "whether a finding of liability for one
plaintiff essentially establishes a finding for all plaintiffs, indicating that proof common to all
plaintiffs is significant." Id. Hegwood was a two-automobile accident case involving claims
brought by one driver against the other driver, the other driver's liability insurer, and the
plaintiff's own insurer, whereas the case sub judice involves claims brought by the passenger of
the wrecked automobile against the driver and the passenger's under-insured motorist insurance
carrier. However, in the opinion of this Court, this distinction is immaterial to the joinder
analysis. See Walker, 2014 WL 670216, at *5. The Mississippi Supreme Court explained in
Hegwood that negligence claims against a defendant driver and breach of contract and bad faith
claims against a liability insurer, while arising out of the same accident, "involve different
factual issues and different legal issues." Hegwood, 949 So. 2d at 731 ("The car accident raises
fact issues of how the accident occurred and legal issues of simple negligence . . .. The breach
of contract and bad faith claims raise fact issues of ... how [the insurance adjusters] made their
decisions and legal issues of interpretation of insurance policies and bad faith under which an
award of punitive damages mayor may not be appropriate."). Further, the Hegwood Court
explained that a claim for negligence would require "different witnesses (the two drivers,
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eyewitnesses to the accident, law enforcement, and accident re-enactment experts) from that of
the bad faith claim (insurance agents and management)." See id.
The Court finds the reasoning and holding of Hegwood directly analogous to the case at
bar. In prosecuting her negligence claim against Defendant Sproull, Plaintiff will be required to
present different proof than will be required to support her claims against State Farm. As in the
Hegwood case, the instant case involves "separate allegations of wrongdoing occurring at
separate times." See id. Although both sets of claims arguably "arose" from the subject motor
vehicle accident, they implicate distinct factual and legal issues. Because "there is no reasonable
probability that the state court would find [Defendant Sproull's] joinder proper," see Palermo,
542 F. Supp. 2d at 524, the Court finds that Defendant Sproull was fraudulently joined as a
Defendant in this action. Accordingly, the Court turns to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which has "a primary concern" of "cur[ing] misjoinder of parties." United States v.
O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361,369 (5th Cir. 1983).
Rule 21 allows a district court "on motion or on its own, ... [to] at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party" and "also sever any claim against a party." FED. R. CN. P. 21. The
Fifth Circuit has stated:
Severance under Rule 21 creates two separate actions or suits
where previously there was but one. Where a single claim is
severed out of a suit, it proceeds as a discrete, independent action,
and a court may render a final, appealable judgment in either one
of the resulting two actions notwithstanding the continued
existence of unresolved claims in the other.
United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 368 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Vander Zee v. Reno, 73
F.3d 1365, 1368 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996). In the case sub judice, Plaintiff and Defendant Sproull are
not completely diverse, and accordingly, this Court would not have federal diversity jurisdiction
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over those claims. Therefore, merely severing Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Sproull in
this Court would be futile. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, Plaintiffs claims against
Defendant Sproull must be severed from those against State Farm, and Plaintiffs motion for
remand [II] must be granted insofar as it concerns the claims against Defendant Sproull and
denied insofar as it concerns the claims against State Farm.
D. Conclusion
Based on all of the foregoing, this Court's diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims
against State Farm was established at the time of removal, because complete diversity of
citizenship was present between Plaintiff, a Mississippi citizen, and State Farm, an Illinois
citizen, and the jurisdictional amount in controversy was satisfied on the face of Plaintiffs statecourt complaint and is further supported by summary-type evidence. Accordingly, removal of
the claims against State Farm is proper, and remand of these claims is not warranted. However,
because the claims against Defendant Sproull were fraudulently misjoined, those claims are
properly severed from the claims against State Farm and remanded to the Circuit Court of
Bolivar County, First Judicial District.
In sum, Plaintiff Nakenya Cartwright's motion for remand [11] is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART, as follows: (1) Plaintiff Nakenya Cartwright's claims against
Defendant Valerie Sproull are SEVERED from her claims against Defendants State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Insurance Companies, thus creating two
separate cases; (2) Plaintiff Nakenya Cartwright's motion for remand [11] is GRANTED insofar
as it pertains to the claims against Defendant Valerie Sproull, and those claims are REMANDED
to the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, First Judicial District; (3) Defendant Valerie Sproull is
DISMISSED as a party to this action; (4) PlaintiffNakenya Cartwright's motion to remand to
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state court [11] is DENIED insofar as it pertains to the claims against Defendants State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insuran.ce Company and State Farm Insurance Companies, as those claims
are properly before this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction; (5) Defendants State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Insurance Companies remain parties to
the action; and (6) the claims brought against Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company and State Farm Insurance Companies remain viable.
An order in ac~rdance with this opinion shall issue this day.
THIS, the
S
;:y of December, 2014.
SEN OR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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