Ross v. Epps et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 27 Order Adopting Report and Recommendations. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 9/30/2015. (psk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
JOHN A. ROSS, JR.
PETITIONER
V.
CAUSE NO.: 4:14CV087-SA-JMV
CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] in February, which the Magistrate Judge has
recently issued a Report and Recommendation [23] to grant that motion. Petitioner filed an
Objection [24], and Respondents thereafter responded [26].
After considering the motion,
responses, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and the objection and response thereto, the
Court finds that the Report and Recommendations should be ADOPTED and APPROVED as the
order of this Court, that Petitioner’s Objections are unfounded, and the Motion to Dismiss should
be GRANTED.
Factual and Procedural Background
John Ross was convicted of murder in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County,
Mississippi. He was sentenced on May 10, 2002, to life in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections.
Ross appealed his conviction and sentence to the Mississippi
Supreme Court. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2004.
Ross v. State, 883 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied (Aug. 3, 2004), cert. denied
(Oct. 14, 2004). After the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Ross’s Motion for Post-Conviction
Collateral Relief, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the federal court. Ross v.
State, No. 4:05cv121-WAP (May 18, 2005). The district court denied all seven of Ross’s claims,
finding them to be without merit. Ross, No. 4:05cv121-WAP [32] (Sept. 25, 2008).
Thereafter, Ross moved for authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254
application with the Fifth Circuit. In re: John A. Ross, Jr., No. 13-60909 (Mar. 13, 2014). In a
per curiam opinion, the panel of three Fifth Circuit judges granted his request to file a second §
2254 application.
Ross then filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. Ross v. Epps,
No. 4:14cv087-SA-JMV [1] (June 19, 2014). The Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that Ross could not satisfy the initial requirements of § 2244(b) prior to considering the
merits of the claims. After extensive briefing and a hearing, the Magistrate Judge entered a
Report and Recommendations [23] suggesting that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as
Petitioner failed to meet his burden. Ross filed an Objection within the proscribed period of time
[24], and Respondents filed a Response [26]. The matter is now ripe for review.
Discussion and Analysis
a. Standard of Review
Because Petitioner filed written Objections [24] to the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendations [23], the Court applies a de novo standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
see Rule 8(b) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases In The United States District Courts.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) “greatly restricts the
power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second or successive habeas
corpus applications. If the prisoner asserts a claim that he has already presented in a previous
federal habeas petition, the claim must be dismissed in all cases.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,
661, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 150 L. Ed. 2d 632 (2001). Under the AEDPA, the decision to allow a
successive application must be made by a court of appeals. In re Smith, 142 F.3d 832, 833-34
(5th Cir. 1998). As specified in § 2244(b)(3)(C), the Fifth Circuit may grant authorization only if
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“the application makes a prima facie showing that the applicant satisfies the requirements” of §
2244(b).
In this case, Ross secured the requisite authorization before filing this successive action
by presenting his Petition and exhibits in support to the Fifth Circuit. That Court found that he
had prima facie shown that [1] the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and [2] the facts underlying the claim, if proven
and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
After such showing, the district court must then engage in a “fuller exploration by the
district court.” In re Morris, 328 F.3d at 740 (quotation omitted). Pursuant to Section 2244, the
Court is limited to analysis of the factual predicates underlying each successive petition claim
put forth by the Petitioner.
b. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations
The Magistrate Judge initially noted that under the un-discoverability requirement of §
2244(b)(2)(B)(i), any factual predicate that could have been, with due diligence, discovered by
Ross prior to March 2005 (the date his prior habeas petition was filed), or October 2005 (the last
date the prior habeas petition was amended), could not serve as a foundation for the successive
petition.
Because the Magistrate Judge researched and found that the satisfaction of §
2244(b)(2)(B)(i) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to considering the merits of a successive
petition’s constitutional claims, the Petitioner had to satisfy the due diligence obligations
pursuant to that statute instead of collapsing it into a merits review of his Brady claims. The
Magistrate Judge additionally held that the allegedly newly discovered factual predicates must be
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“tethered or linked to the asserted constitutional claims” and must bear upon the constitutionality
of the Petitioner’s detention, not guilt.
The Magistrate Judge then painstakingly analyzed each of the twelve asserted factual
predicates presented by the Petitioner in 3000 pages of documentation submitted, and sixty-eight
exhibits.
Factual Predicate 1: The alleged unethical business relationship between Hayne and the State
After reviewing the Letter from the Mississippi Department of Public Safety and the
Advisory Opinion from the Mississippi Ethics Commission, both dated in July of 1992, the
Magistrate Judge found that the evidence did not reveal anything nefarious concerning the
relationship between Hayne and the State. In fact, the proposed business relationship which the
Mississippi Ethics Commission objected to was never consummated.
Furthermore, the
Magistrate Judge noted that it was uncontested that the details of Hayne’s actual relationship
with the State were well-known both at the time of Ross’s trial and available to him prior to
filing his first habeas petition.
In discussing the newspaper articles from 1998, 1999, 2006, and 2008, the Magistrate
Judge found that articles would not impact Ross’s guilt. While the Magistrate Judge did not
discuss the discoverability of the newspaper articles, the Court finds that because these articles
were from the state newspaper, Clarion Ledger, as well as the main newspaper published in
Memphis, Tennessee, Commercial Appeal, and all published prior to or during the pendency of
Ross’s initial habeas request, these articles are unavailable as the basis for the factual predicate
of a second successive habeas petition.
The Magistrate Judge also considered a 2008 letter from the College of American
Pathologists Inquiry Committee to the President of the College of American Pathologists, which
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she commented failed to address any particulars about the alleged business relationship between
Hayne and the State. Likewise, the Magistrate Judge mentioned a letter from Michael West to
“fellow coroners” dated January 25, 1995, detailing complaints of the then-State Medical
Examiner, which was not Hayne. The Magistrate Judge noted no impeaching or exculpatory
evidence in either the letter or petition attached. Another letter from Michael West dated June
15, 2006, but addressed to the American Board of Forensic Odontology was reviewed by the
Magistrate Judge but found to be devoid of any reference to Hayne’s relationship with the State
other than to identify him as a state-designated pathologist.
Other evidence painstakingly reviewed by the Magistrate Judge for inclusion under this
factual basis includes: The Joint Legislative Committee Report “An Evaluation of Mississippi’s
Medicolegal Death Investigation Process” prepared in 2008; “Forensic Autopsy Performance
Standards” by the National Association of Medical Examiners dated August 12, 2005; Autopsy
Report of Randy Cheney dated August 30, 2007, and Randy Cheney’s attendant medical records
from December 15, 2003; Hayne’s trial testimony in State v. Brown, No. 2006-KA-00717-CO
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007), State v. Bennett, No. 2003-DP-00765-SCT (Miss. 2006), and a deposition
of Hayne in Cause No. 63:09cv218-KS-LRA, dated April 26, 2012; an Affidavit from W. Tucker
Carrington, Director of the Mississippi Innocence Project, dated September 27, 2012; the
deposition of Cecil McCrory in Cause No. 3:09cv218-KS-LRA (S.D. Miss.), dated April 24,
2012; and a calendar dated April 26, 2012, that reflects the number of autopsies performed by
Hayne in 2007-2008.
The Magistrate Judge found no link between all the presented evidence underlying this
first factual predicate and Ross’s Brady, Napue, or Confrontation Clause challenges. As much of
this evidence was produced or prepared after Ross’s trial, the Magistrate Judge noted that it
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could not form the basis of a successive petition because it could not have been suppressed prior
to its creation. Thus, the Magistrate Judge found that Ross could not establish that, but for the
evidence’s suppression, no reasonable juror could have found him guilty.
Factual Predicate 2: Hayne testified falsely at Ross’s trial to being board certified in forensic
pathology
The Magistrate Judge additionally reviewed a multitude of exhibits Ross claims supports
his second factual predicate regarding Hayne’s credentials. The Magistrate Judge noted that the
information produced was not new information appropriate for a successive habeas petition and
was the type of information that Ross, “with his own expert in forensic pathology – could have
learned with due diligence before his trial in 2002 or before he filed or amended his initial
habeas petition in 2005.” Report and Recommendation [23], p. 28 (July 30, 2015). Accordingly,
the Magistrate Judge found that the “asserted distinctions of one certifying board over another do
not amount to clear and convincing proof, when viewed against the whole of the proof, that but
for a constitutional violation arising from non-disclosure of the subject information, no
reasonable juror could have found Ross guilty.” Id. at 30.
Factual Predicate 3: Prior to Ross’s trial, Hayne testified falsely about the circumstances
surrounding the fact that he failed the American Board of Pathology (ABP) certification exam in
1989
Despite Ross’s production of Hayne’s testimony from several other cases and a Clarion
Ledger article highlighting same, the fact of the matter is that testimony regarding Hayne’s
taking the American Board of Pathology certification exam was never addressed at Ross’s trial.
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found that it was not tethered to Ross’s alleged Brady, Napue, or
Confrontation Clause claims. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge found Ross could not establish
that but for such a constitutional violation occasioned by its non-disclosure, no reasonable juror
could have found him guilty.
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Factual Predicate 4: Hayne testified falsely at Ross’s trial that he was board certified or had the
equivalent of board certification in forensic medicine (as distinct from forensic pathology
Ross cited three exhibits to support this fourth factual predicate. The Magistrate Judge
examined an article by Leah Bartos from ProPublica dated April 17, 2012, which was critical of
the organization on which Hayne relies to support his claim that he is board certified in forensic
medicine (as opposed to forensic pathology). The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that the
certifying board was listed on Hayne’s C.V., which Ross, his attorney, and his forensic
pathology expert were provided prior to his testimony at Ross’s 2002 trial.
In addition, the Magistrate Judge reviewed an Attorney General’s Opinion dated May 6,
2010, which recited and included a copy of Hayne’s certificate from ACFEI, and an email
exchange between John Lechliter and Radley Balko dated March 26, 2008 regarding standards of
certification for pathology in the ACFEI organization. Both these documents were insufficient to
show clear and convincing evidence that Ross’s guilty verdict would have been affected by this
information.
Factual Predicate 5: Hayne testified falsely prior to Ross’s trial that he had undertaken certain
professional and scholarly activities
Ross produced the C.V.s of both Hayne and Dr. Michael West to show that both
physicians claim credit for many of the same publications. The Magistrate Judge noted that an
actual review of the publications would have revealed that information prior to Ross’s trial.
Moreover, the Magistrate Judge focused on an affidavit West gave in 2001, put forth by Ross, in
which West acknowledges that even though he appears as the only author/presenter on the
various publications and presentations, Hayne could properly take credit for them on his C.V. as
well.
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Factual Predicate 6: Hayne testified falsely prior to Ross’s trial to certain educational
accomplishments
Ross contends that a review of Hayne’s undergraduate academic record shows that some
testimony he gave in other trials as to his “maintaining a straight-A average” while performing a
certain caseload on the side was inaccurate. The Magistrate Judge stated that all academic
records were not produced, “[o]f more importance, Hayne was not questioned at Ross’s trial
about his undergraduate work (predating Ross’s trial by 30 years).” Further, Ross simply cannot
with any credibility assert that Hayne’s undergraduate record was either exculpatory or
suppressed by the State in Ross’s trial. The Magistrate Judge further noted that if he could
obtain those records in 2012, he certainly could have obtained those records prior to his original
habeas petition with due diligence.
Factual Predicate 7: Hayne testified prior to Ross’s trial that, based on an autopsy alone, he
would only be able to speculate as to the angle between a shooter and a victim, but he
unqualifiedly testified at Ross’s trial to his ability to determine the precise angle of a gun relative
to Deidre’s head when she was shot
The Magistrate Judge held that despite the production of Hayne’s testimony given in an
earlier trial regarding bullet trajectory, there was no explanation as to why Ross or his counsel
could not, in due diligence, have discovered this testimony. Further, the Magistrate Judge held
that the testimony in the Young v. State, No 97-CP-00162-SCT (Miss. 1999), did not contradict
Hayne’s ballistic testimony in Ross’s case.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge found that
disclosure of the prior testimony would not clearly and convincingly have resulted in no
reasonable juror being able to find Ross guilty.
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Factual Predicate 8: Hayne testified prior to Ross’s trial that he was only able to speculate as to a
bullet’s trajectory through a person’s body, but nevertheless testified unqualifiedly at Ross’s trial
that he was able to ascertain the actual trajectory of the bullet that killed Deidre Ross
Ross, citing a portion of the above-cited trial testimony, Young v. State, to support this
factual predicate. The Magistrate Judge reviewed the actual testimony in both the Young case
and Ross’s trial regarding the bullet trajectory and the deviation resulting from contacting human
tissue and bone. She held that the evidence presented “does not suggest, much less clearly
establish, that but for an unconstitutional non-disclosure of [his prior testimony regarding the
possibility that bullets could deviate past the first inch to inch and a half of a wound], at Ross’s
trial, no reasonable juror could have found Ross guilty.” Moreover, the Magistrate Judge noted
that had Ross exercised due diligence prior to his trial or when his initial habeas petition was
filed, he could have obtained that evidence.
Ross additionally relies on excerpt from a book on gunshot wounds, published in 1999,
noting that “[e]xact calculation of the angle that the bullet travelled through the body is not
possible and is misleading . . . .” The Magistrate Judge noted that either the writing was the
opinion of a forensic expert’s view on the subject, or reflective of a widely-held belief among
forensic pathologists.
However, the Magistrate Judge held that the non-disclosure of that
singular opinion would not support a Brady, Napue, or Confrontation Clause violation. The
Magistrate Judge further held that if the opinion regarding the inability to properly calculate the
angle of the bullet was indeed a widely-held belief by pathologists, such an opinion was
indisputably discoverable with due diligence.
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Factual Predicate 9: Hayne testified falsely at Ross’s trial that, in his opinion, the gun that killed
Deidre Ross was pointed at a certain angle relative to the entrance wound; that the gun that killed
Deidre was a certain distance from her body when she was shot; and that the bullet traveled a
certain trajectory on entering her body
The Magistrate Judge analyzed Ross’s other ballistic opinions and held them to be
opinions expressed by an expert, as opposed to facts. At a hearing held on the matter, the
Magistrate Judge noted that Ross’s attorney acknowledged such as well. Out of an abundance of
caution, however, the Magistrate Judge further reviewed Hayne’s C.V.; Hayne’s trial testimony
in Dudley v. State, No. 97-KA-00601-SCT (Miss. Aug. 20, 2008), Boyd v. State, No. 2006-KA00562-SCT (Miss. 2008), Jones v. State, No. 2006-KA-00134-SCT (Miss. 2007), and Maye v.
State, No. 2007-CT-02147-SCT (Miss. 2010); a prepublication copy of “Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward”; an excerpt from “Medico-legal Investigations of
Death”; and an excerpt from Malcolm J. Dodd’s publication, “Terminal Ballistics: A Text and
Atlas of Gunshot Wounds 37”.
When viewing the context of the provided evidence, the
Magistrate Judge did not find that but for a constitutional violation occasioned by the nondisclosure of the texts and testimony cited, no reasonable juror could have found Ross guilty.
Factual Predicate 10: Hayne testified falsely at Ross’s trial that Deidre’s bruises were consistent
with blunt force trauma from a hand or foot
The Magistrate Judge noted that as this factual predicate is based on the testimony
elicited from Hayne at trial, it could not possibly be newly discovered.
Factual Predicate 11: Hayne testified falsely at Ross’s trial that women shoot themselves in the
chest more often than the head at a ratio of 4 to 5 to 1
The Magistrate Judge reviewed the trial testimony and stated that Hayne testified that in
his experience, women commit suicide by gunshot to the chest four to five times more often than
they do so by gunshot to the head. As Ross’s own expert in pathology could have easily
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discovered the actual statistical data on that subject for Ross, the Magistrate Judge held that with
due diligence, that information was discoverable.
Factual Predicate 12: Hayne testified falsely at Ross’s trial that he was “a state pathologist” for
the Department of Public Safety Medical Examiner’s Office for the State of Mississippi
The Magistrate Judge held that Hayne’s testimony could not possibly advance this
successive petition as it is not newly discovered.
The Evidence as a Whole
After reviewing each individual exhibit, the Magistrate Judge held that viewing the
evidence as a whole, even if Hayne did not testify at Ross’s trial, there was an abundance of
evidence and testimony that Ross was guilty of the crime.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court grant Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the successive petition as Ross failed to make the requisite showing that [1]
the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the
exercise of due diligence; and [2] the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that,
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
c. Petitioner’s Objections and the Court’s Discussion
Ross filed his Objections to the Report and Recommendations within the fourteen day
period allowed. In particular, Ross raised four objections to the Magistrate Judge’s consideration
of the evidence:
(1) Misapplication of the due diligence standard
Ross asserts that the Magistrate Judge applied an “incorrect and overwhelmingly
burdensome due diligence standard.” In particular, Ross contends that the Report and
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Recommendations fails to take into account the particular circumstances of an objective prisoner,
“including the limitations of physical confinement.” The Petitioner claims that because the
Magistrate Judge applied the wrong standard, all its findings about due diligence are flawed.
Indeed, Ross claims that the Magistrate Judge analyzed his due diligence based on the findings
of a “full time legal fellow, a criminal defense attorney, even an expert in forensic pathology.”
The first requirement Petitioner must meet in order to have his second habeas petition
considered is that the factual basis for the constitutional claim must not have been discoverable
at the time the first federal petition was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). “[D]ue diligence is
measured against an objective standard, as opposed to the subjective diligence of the particular
petitioner of record.” Johnson v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 901, 908 (5th Cir. 2006). The burden to make
a showing of due diligence remains with the petitioner. Id. (citing Eleventh Circuit which
“consistently required successive petitioners stating Brady claims to first show that the factual
predicate could not have been discovered previously before ever reaching whether the
prosecution failed to disclose Brady material.”) (citing In re Buenoano, 137 F.3d 1445 (11th Cir.
1998); In re Jones, 137 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Boshears, 110 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir.
1997)). Moreover, in a successive petition where a Brady claim is urged, as is the case here, the
Petitioner may not rely solely upon the ultimate merits of the Brady claim in order to
demonstrate due diligence under §2244(b)(2)(B). Id. at 911(merits of Brady cannot be collapsed
with the due diligence requirements of 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)). Regardless of possible prosecutorial
misconduct, petitioner must still show that the facts underlying his Brady claim could not have
been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Id. at 910-11.
The Court overrules the objection. Even though it took many persons to gather the
material and look through trial transcripts does not mean that with due diligence, Ross could not
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have made similar findings. Further, the material presented for the factual predicates is not
condemning or particularly hard to find. Not only did Ross have the benefit of counsel at his
trial, he also had the benefit of an expert in forensic pathology. As noted by the Magistrate
Judge, counselors often review prior trial transcripts in preparation for an opposing expert
witness. Moreover, a retained expert is also often tasked with reviewing the opposing expert’s
findings or credentials. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge applied the correct standard
and those approves of her findings.
(2) Items appended to Ross’s petition mistakenly considered as standalone factual predicates
Ross contends that the items appended to the Petition were only offered as “general
evidence of Dr. Hayne’s incompetence and lack of credibility . . . .” Ross further acknowledges
that while the State could not suppress letters and documentation that was not produced until
after Ross’s trial, he claims that the information contained therein was suppressed and forms the
basis of his constitutional violations.
Pursuant to Section 2244, the Court is tasked with analyzing the factual predicates
underlying each successive petition claim put forth by the Petitioner. The Magistrate Judge
conducted the proper inquiry and further, acknowledged that reviewing the evidence as a whole
yielded the same result. This objection is overruled.
(3) Dr. Hayne’s knowledge should have been imputed to the State
Ross next objects that the Magistrate Judge failed to consider that Hayne was a state actor
for purposes of imputing to the State Dr. Hayne’s own knowledge of impeachment material
under Brady and false testimony under Napue.
The Magistrate Judge required separate briefing by the parties as to this specific issue.
The Court defers to the findings of the Magistrate Judge in the Report and Recommendations on
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this issue. Petitioner has failed to show that the factual predicates and attached evidence even if
imputed to the State would make this successive petition successful.
(4) Misassessment of the evidence as a whole.
Last, Ross contends that the Magistrate Judge misassessed the evidence as a whole based
on her final finding that Ross would have been convicted even without Dr. Hayne’s testimony.
Ross objects and claims that as Dr. Hayne provided the principal evidence supporting the State’s
theory that Deidre Ross’s death was a murder instead of a suicide, without which, the evidence
was inconclusive as to the cause of death.
In her analysis, the Magistrate Judge highlighted the eyewitness testimony regarding the
bruises and cuts to Deidre’s body, and mentioned Ross’s verbal assault at a party and in their
home earlier that evening. The Report and Recommendation also analyzed the position of the
firearm on Deidre’s body, the lack of identifiable fingerprints on the gun, and the fact that Deidre
was able to grab a firearm from some unknown location and shoot herself with her non-dominant
hand, all while remaining under the bedclothes without garnering her husband’s attention who
was, admittedly, in the same room. Finally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no
evidence presented that Deidre was suicidal, despite her prescription for anti-anxiety medication.
For his claims to survive, the Petitioner is required to establish “by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him]
guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
The Magistrate Judge
determined that Petitioner had not met this burden. A reevaluation of the evidence by this Court
leads to the same conclusion.
In addition to the testimony and evidence highlighted by the Magistrate Judge which
supported Ross’s murder conviction, this Court specifically mentions Ross’s defense pathology
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expert’s testimony that at the time death, Deidre’s blood alcohol content was between .22 and
.31. Therefore, while Ross apparently had his back turned in his own bedroom, Deidre, who was
“good and drunk” according to Ross’s expert, reached out, grabbed a gun with her non-dominant
hand, and was able to pull the trigger all without rousing the attention of Ross.
The Petitioner is unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence that even without
Steven Hayne’s testimony, a reasonable jury could not have found him guilty. The Magistrate
Judge assigned to this case conducted a thorough review of the evidence presented and did not
misinterpret or “misassess” the evidence presented.
The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden as to this successive petition.
Conclusion
After thoroughly reviewing the record and the findings in the Report and
Recommendations [23], in addition to the positions advanced in Petitioner’s Objections [24], and
for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Petitioner’s Objections [24] should be
OVERRULED, and that the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendations [23] entered on July 30,
2015, should be ADOPTED as the findings of the Court.
Accordingly, the Court finds the Petitioner has failed to make the showing necessary to
support a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus as directed under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and
(ii). Thus, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [8] is GRANTED, the claims are DISMISSED, and
this case is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED, this the 30th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Sharion Aycock_________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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