Griffin v. HSBC Mortgage Services Inc. et al

Filing 72

ORDER denying as moot 24 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 30 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying as moot 51 Motion to Strike. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 7/1/15. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION

LAKISHA ROCHELLE GRIFFIN
V.

PLAINTIFF
NO. 4:14-CV-00132-DMB-JMV

HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
HSBC FINANCE CORPORATION,
AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE,
CO., ASSURANT, INC., LSI REAL
ESTATE TAX, CORELOGIC SERVICES,
CORESTAR FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC,
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., JOHN
DOES AFFILIATES FOR CORESTAR
FINANCIAL GROUP 1-5, JOHN DOES
INSURANCE DEFENDANTS 6-10, FEES
AND CHARGES DEFENDANTS 16-20,
HSBC JOHN DOES 21-25, OTHER JOHN
DOES 26-30, CALIBER HOME LOANS,
INC., AMERIPRISE INSURANCE
COMPANY, IDS PROPERTY CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, TRUCK
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, AND JOHN
DOES SERVICES

DEFENDANTS

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
This multi-count action arises from a dispute concerning the servicing of a debt
consolidation loan. Plaintiff Lakisha Rochelle Griffin contends that the loan originator and
servicer (along with their agents, assigns and successors), and various insurance companies
mishandled her loan payments in breach of the deed of trust and in violation of other state and
federal laws. Defendant Assurant, Inc. (“Assurant”); Defendant American Security Insurance

Company (“American Security”); and Defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc., and Merscorp. Holdings, Inc. (collectively, “MERS”); have moved to dismiss Griffin’s
Second Amended Complaint. Docs. #30, #32, #24. Griffin has moved to strike much of the
evidence submitted by American Security in support of its motion to dismiss. Doc. #51.
I
Relevant Allegations
In early 2006, Griffin “sought out a debt consolidation loan [that] would cover the debt
on her home, her property taxes, her hazard insurance, and her flood insurance with one
predictable monthly payment to a single entity.” Doc. #2 at ¶ 23. Griffin secured a loan and
executed a promissory note and deed of trust, using her home as collateral. Id. at ¶ 25; Doc. #321. The deed of trust identifies Corestar Financial Group, LLC, as “Lender,” and Mortgage
Electronic Systems, Inc., as the “nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.”1
Doc. #32-1 at ¶¶ (C), (E).
“HSBC” serviced the loan.2 Doc. #2 at ¶¶ 25–26. Griffin claims that “HSBC employed a
number of different service providers to perform or exercise various parts of the lender’s duties,
obligations and rights as well as its duties, obligations and rights as the loan servicer.” Id. at ¶
26. “HSBC” purportedly hired American Security and the John Doe insurance companies to
handle all of its obligations related to insurance. Id. at ¶ 26(a)–(c). These obligations included
force placing flood and hazard insurance upon the occurrence of certain events to protect the
collateral property against catastrophic loss. Id. at ¶¶ 26(a), 52–54, 74.

1

American Security attached the deed of trust to its motion to dismiss. Doc. #32-1. The Court considers the deed of
trust in evaluating the motions to dismiss because it is “referred to in [Griffin’s] complaint and [is] central to her
claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); Doc. #2 at ¶ 25. Griffin concedes that the “Deed of Trust meets the criteria for consideration on a Motion
to Dismiss.” Doc. #51 at ¶ 4; Doc. #52 at 2.
2

As explained in section III(B) below, “HSBC” could refer to any one of several defendants.

2

In April of 2013, a fire destroyed the collateral property—Griffin’s home. Id. at ¶ 68. A
few months later, Griffin discovered that “HSBC” had farmed out many of its obligations to
other entities. Id. at ¶ 25. She also learned that her home was not insured despite charges for
force placed hazard insurance appearing on both the March and April 2013 loan account
statements. Id. at ¶ 74. These revelations prompted a series of communications between Griffin,
“HSBC,” and many of the other defendants regarding Griffin’s loan payments and the
defendants’ handling of those funds. Id. at ¶¶ 72–109. After receiving many delayed and
inadequate responses to her queries, Griffin filed this suit in the Circuit Court of Washington
County, Mississippi. Defendant HSBC Finance Corporation removed the action to this federal
court,3 with the consent or joinder of the other defendants.
Griffin alleges ten causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of escrow fiduciary
duties; (3) fraud or misrepresentation; (4) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act;
(5) violation of Mississippi consumer protection statutes; (6) civil conspiracy regarding
insurance; (7) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (8) accounting; (9)
declaratory judgment; and (10) unjust enrichment.
II
Assurant’s Motion to Dismiss
On October 8, 2014, Assurant filed a motion to dismiss challenging this Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction and this Court’s personal jurisdiction over it, and alleging that Griffin’s
complaint “fails to state a claim against Assurant under federal pleading standards.” Doc. #30 at
2. The next day, in compliance with the Court’s local rules, Magistrate Judge Jane Virden stayed
the attorney conference and disclosure requirements, and all discovery not related to the

3

The case was removed based on the assertion of “original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question)
and § 1332 (diversity).” Doc. #1.

3

jurisdictional issue pending resolution of Assurant’s motion. Doc. #35. On December 19, 2014,
before Assurant filed an answer or motion for summary judgment, Assurant’s counsel, on behalf
of Assurant and Griffin, filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice purporting to dismiss
Assurant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Doc. #50.
The joint stipulation does not constitute a stipulation of dismissal under Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it is not “signed by all parties
who have appeared.”4 But, it does substantially satisfy the requirements for dismissal under Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i), which “allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action without a court order by
filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for
summary judgment.” See In re Amerijet Int’l, Inc., 785 F.3d 967, 973 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The joint stipulation is signed by Griffin’s counsel, was
filed before Assurant filed either an answer or motion for summary judgment, and expresses
Griffin’s clear intent to dismiss Assurant with prejudice.5 That it is titled, “Joint Stipulation of
Dismissal of Defendant Assurant, Inc. with Prejudice” rather than “Notice of Dismissal” is not
controlling. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that in
interpreting Rule 41, this Circuit does not “countenance a mechanistic view of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure [that] exalt[s] form over substance”); see also Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d
1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1976) (“That it was styled a ‘Motion for Dismissal’ rather than a ‘Notice of
Dismissal’ is, in our opinion, a distinction without a difference.”).

4

Several months after filing the joint stipulation, Griffin’s counsel and Assurant’s counsel e-mailed a proposed
order to the Court granting Assurant’s dismissal. The proposed order, unlike the actual filing, is signed by all of the
attorneys who have appeared in this matter.
5

Assurant’s motion to dismiss, filed before the self-styled joint stipulation of dismissal, is not equivalent to a motion
for summary judgment. Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, Int. Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 452 F.2d 794
(5th Cir. 1972) (motions to dismiss based on insufficiency of service of process, lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
failure to state claim, and res judicata are not equivalent of motion for summary judgment for purposes of Rule 41).

4

Because the substance of the joint stipulation satisfies Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Assurant’s
dismissal with prejudice was effectuated. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. ex rel. Plains Growers v. IckesBraun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[R]eading the rules governing
dismissal by notice and dismissal by motion together, we conclude that it was intended by the
rule-makers to permit dismissal against such of the defendants as have not served an answer or
motion for summary judgment, despite the fact that the case might remain pending against other
defendants.”); Kay v. Online Vacation Ctr. Holdings Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 n.1
(S.D. Fla. 2008) (“[B]y filing his notice of dismissal [with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)],
Plaintiff … has dismissed all of his claims against Defendant with prejudice.”).
Consequently, Assurant’s motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.6
III
American Security’s Motion to Dismiss
American Security moves to dismiss Griffin’s Second Amended Complaint under both
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. #32. American
Security makes two primary arguments.7 First, it “challenges [Griffin’s] Article III standing” by
arguing that because the filed rate doctrine bars Griffin’s claims, she cannot demonstrate an
injury in fact. Doc. #33 at 10, 12 n.10, 13–14. Next, it argues that Griffin’s complaint is a
“shotgun pleading,” which fails to meet the pleading standards set forth in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 2–4.

6

In the order staying the case based on Assurant’s jurisdictional challenge, Plaintiff was instructed to “submit a
proposed order lifting the stay within 7 days of any ruling denying the motion to dismiss.” Doc. #35. Because
Assurant’s motion has now been denied as moot, the grounds for the stay no longer exist.
7

American Security also makes several other arguments concerning the merit of Griffin’s claims under Rule
12(b)(6). Doc. #33. Because the Court concludes that Griffin has failed to comply with federal pleading standards,
those arguments need not be addressed at this time.

5

A
Filed Rate Doctrine
Before discussing the adequacy of Griffin’s pleadings, the Court first addresses American
Security’s contention that the filed rate doctrine somehow “challenges [Griffin’s] Article III
standing.”8 Doc. #33 at 12 n.10.
“The filed rate doctrine bars suit against regulated entities, like insurance companies,
grounded on the allegation that the rate charged is unreasonable.” Kirksey v. Am. Bankers Ins.
Co. of Fla., 114 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (citation omitted). “Simply stated, the
doctrine holds that any ‘filed rate’—that is, one approved by the governing regulatory agency—
is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.” Wegoland
Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Willmut Gas &
Oil Co., 97 So. 2d 530, 535 (Miss. 1957) (Plaintiff “can claim no rate as a legal rate that is other
than the filed rate.”).
American Security argues that many of Griffin’s claims “are premised on an allegation
that the rates she was charged for [force placed insurance] were excessive or inflated,” and thus,
the filed rate doctrine bars Griffin’s claims. Doc. #33 at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
American Security concludes that because Griffin cannot demonstrate a cognizable injury (due to
the filed rate doctrine), she also lacks standing to bring the suit. Doc. #33 at 13–14.
This Court finds at least one court’s treatment of this exact argument persuasive. In
Curtis v. Cenlar FSB, the court explained:

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The Court must dismiss a cause for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “when the court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” See Home Builders Assn. of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143
F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998). “A motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing is properly considered under
Rule 12(b)(1).” Higgins v. Texas Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Harold
H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011)). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed
in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

6

All of the defendants’ contentions [about the filed rate doctrine] concern
the legal merits of Curtis's complaint. They reason that because Curtis
loses on the merits, he has not suffered any “cognizable injury that is
traceable to the acts of the Assurant defendants and he lacks standing to
sue them.” But this reasoning would allow any Rule 12(b)(6) motion to be
restyled as a Rule 12(b)(1) standing motion. While standing and merits
questions frequently overlap, standing is fundamentally about the
propriety of the individual litigating a claim irrespective of its legal merits,
while a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry is concerned with the legal merits of the
claim itself.
No. 13 CIV. 3007 DLC, 2013 WL 5995582, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2013) (internal quotation
omitted). Several other courts have also declined to consider the filed rate argument under Rule
12(b)(1), explaining “that a filed rate argument is a defense on the merits, rather than a challenge
to subject matter jurisdiction.” See Hoover v. HSBC Mortgage Corp. (USA), 9 F. Supp. 3d 223,
237 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases).
In light of this persuasive authority, the Court finds that the filed rate argument is not
properly raised here as a standing or jurisdictional argument under Rule 12(b)(1) and should
instead be decided under Rule 12(b)(6).9 See Singleton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-CV216, 2013 WL 5423917, at *1–3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013) (analyzing filed rate argument
under rule 12(b)(6)). Given, however, that Griffin will be provided the opportunity to re-plead
her claims for the reasons that follow, the evaluation of American Security’s filed rate argument
under Rule 12(b)(6) will not be reached at this time.

9

On June 2, 2015, American Security filed a supplement to its motion to dismiss. Doc. #69. In the supplement,
American Security cites a recent Northern District of Mississippi decision involving the filed rate doctrine. Id. at 1
(citing Johnson v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 3:15-CV-18, 2015 WL 2452680 (N.D. Miss. May 22, 2015)).
Notably, the Johnson Court analyzed the filed rate doctrine pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1). 2015 WL
2452680, at *2. To the extent that American Security now seeks to have its filed rate argument considered under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will not entertain this new argument for purposes of evaluating American Security’s
pending motion to dismiss. Gillaspy v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 278 Fed. App’x 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, the briefing window closed several months ago, and American Security did not seek leave to file its
untimely supplement. Consequently, American Security’s supplemental brief, Doc. #69, will be stricken.

7

B
Shot Gun Pleading
American Security argues that Griffin’s complaint violates the mandate of Rule 8 insofar
as it: “names 13 defendants (not including five groups of ‘John Doe’ defendants)” without
“specify[ing] which cause of action is alleged against which defendant(s)”; “fails to distinguish
between the actions of named defendants”; and “incorporates by reference every one of its
numerous allegations into each count.” Doc. #33 at 2–3. In other words, American Security
contends that dismissal is warranted because the complaint is a shotgun pleading.
As a general matter, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain … a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). When a complaint falls short of this directive, a defendant may move to dismiss the
claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
considering the interplay between Rule 8 and Rule 12, the United States Supreme Court has
explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim], a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and punctuation omitted) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–58 (2007)). Under this standard, a “court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the

8

plaintiff.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 803 n.44 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citation, internal quotation marks, and punctuation omitted).
Shotgun pleadings, which run afoul of Rule 8, are characterized as complaints
“contain[ing] several counts, each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its
predecessors, leading to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain
irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear,
Leeds & Kellog Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Bates v. Laminack, 938 F.
Supp. 2d 649, 666 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“shotgun pleadings ... incorporate antecedent allegations by
reference into new allegations”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[Q]uintessential” shotgun
pleadings also fail to distinguish between the actions of named defendants. Magluta v. Samples,
256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). “What makes a pleading an objectionable ‘shotgun’
pleading is the inclusion of irrelevant and unrelated facts not tied to specific causes of action
such that the claims made are indeterminate and the defendant’s task in defending against them
is significantly impaired.”

Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., No. 2:13-CV-178, 2013 WL

6190519, at * 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2013) (citation omitted). Such a pleading forces a “trial
court [to] sift out the irrelevancies, a task that can be quite onerous.” Strategic Income Fund,
305 F.3d at 1295. Shotgun complaints are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Paylor
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1126–27 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant served with a
shotgun complaint should move the district court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) or for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) on the ground that the complaint
provides it with insufficient notice to enable it to file an answer.”) (footnotes omitted).
Here, each count of Griffin’s 61-page complaint purports to incorporate by reference
“[a]ll the other allegations of this Complaint … as if fully set forth in this count.” Doc. #2 at ¶¶

9

117, 138, 143, 155, 175, 180, 189, 195, 198, 202. This broad language incorporates both
antecedent and subsequent allegations contained in the complaint, meaning every count
necessarily implicates every fact and defendant.

Additionally, numerous allegations in the

complaint attribute conduct to “HSBC” and agents of “HSBC” (including American Security)
without identifying to which entity “HSBC” refers, or distinguishing between the conduct of the
individual HSBC corporate entities.10 See id. at ¶¶ 26, 41–49, 52–56, 58–64, 67, 71–72, 74–75,
78–79, 81, 84–92, 94–95, 97, 99, 103–105, 108–109, 111, 113–114, 130–135, 141, 147–151,
153–154, 157–173, 186, 189. Moreover, several of the allegations refer to all of the defendants
without explaining the basis for such grouping. See id. at ¶ 177 (“the Defendants”), ¶ 178
(“unlawful practices of Defendants”), ¶ 192 (“conduct of the defendants”).
Because Griffin’s complaint is a quintessential shotgun pleading, which frustrates the
very purpose of Rule 8, it is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Sahlein v. Red Oak
Capital, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00067, 2014 WL 3046477, at *4 (N.D. Miss. July 3, 2014); Strategic
Income Fund, L.L.C., 305 F.3d at 1295; Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1979)
(The purpose of Rule 8 is “to [e]liminate prolixity in pleading and to achieve brevity, simplicity,
and clarity.”); Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (“By lumping
all the defendants together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their
conduct, [the] complaint failed to satisfy [Rule 8].”). Griffin’s complaint will suffer such a fate
and be dismissed.
10

Griffin has sued HSBC Finance Corporation, HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., and one set of HSBC John Does.
Doc. #2 at ¶¶ 2, 3, 14. Griffin alleges that HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., is a subsidiary of HSBC Finance
Corporation. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. She defines “HSBC group” to include HSBC Holdings, plc (a nonparty), HSBC Finance
Corporation, HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., and their “various subsidiaries and affiliates and their subsidiaries.”
Id. at ¶ 4. She also alleges that American Security and several other defendants may be agents of “HSBC.” Id. at ¶
26. To the extent that many of Griffin’s claims against American Security are based on an agency theory, her failure
to distinguish between the conduct of the corporate entities is particularly problematic. In Mississippi, “two or more
corporations are separate and distinct entities,” which are responsible for their own conduct unless circumstances
justify the piercing of the corporate veil. Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc., 957 So. 2d 969, 978 (Miss.
2007).

10

Consequently, Griffin’s motion to strike, which asks the Court to exclude and not
consider “most of the material submitted by American Security … as exhibits to its Motion to
Dismiss,” will be denied as moot. Doc. #51 at 1.
C
Leave to Amend
When a court finds that a motion to dismiss should be granted on the basis of a failure to
comply with Rule 8, it is generally appropriate to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy
the pleading deficiencies through the filing of an amended complaint. See Gordon, 602 F.2d at
745 (“We think the Trial Court should have dismissed the complaints with leave to amend.”); see
also Atascocita Realty Inc. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., No. H–10–4519, 2012 WL 423395, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2012) (“The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend its original petition so as
to comply with the standards of Rules 8 and 9(b).”). The Court concludes that such relief is
warranted here.11
D
Remaining Arguments
Defendants’ remaining arguments, including American Security’s filed rate argument and
MERS’s arguments in its motion to dismiss, relate to the adequacy of the allegations of Griffin’s
complaint.12

Insofar as this Court has determined that the complaint must be re-pled, the

substantive arguments of both American Security and MERS will be deemed moot. See Center
11

Griffin’s complaint is 61 pages long—which demonstrates that detail alone cannot be utilized to prevent dismissal
for noncompliance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In complex cases involving multiple
defendants and multiple counts, it is imperative that litigants ensure compliance with basic pleading requirements.
This is especially true when due to the sophisticated nature of the parties and uncertainty regarding the facts, many
of the defendants are John Does or best-guess named defendants. In light of Twombly and Iqbal, a party faced with
this scenario unnecessarily gambles when it names defendants before obtaining sufficient facts to allege a facially
plausible claim. Here, it is apparent that Griffin likely included every fact at her disposal, but these facts are not
consistently precise regarding the conduct of the named defendants.
12

MERS argues that Griffin fails to state a claim against it for both accounting and rescission, and that Griffin
concedes in her Second Amended Complaint that accounting and rescission are the only claims involving MERS.
Doc. #25 at 1 (citing Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 13).

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for Reconstructive Breast Surgery, LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana, No. 11–806,
2013 WL 5519320, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sep. 30, 2013) (“[I]n light of Plaintiffs’ need to re-plead, the
other pending motions to dismiss are dismissed as moot.”) (emphasis omitted); Family
Watchdog, LLC v. Schweiss, No. 609-CV-296-ORL-28GJK, 2009 WL 2151152, at *7 (M.D. Fla.
July 13, 2009) (dismissing shotgun complaint and denying defendants’ motion to dismiss as
moot).
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above: (1) Assurant’s motion [30] to dismiss is DENIED as
moot; (2) American Security’s supplemental brief [69] in support of dismissal is STRICKEN;
(3) American Security’s motion [32] to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It
is GRANTED as to the shotgun pleading argument and DENIED as moot in all others respects;
(4) MERS’s motion [24] to dismiss is DENIED as moot; and (5) Griffin’s motion [51] to strike
is DENIED as moot. Griffin shall have twenty-one (21) days from the entry of this order to file
an amended complaint that complies with the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED, this 1st day of July, 2015.
/s/ Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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