Walker v. Corrections Corporation of America

Filing 178

ORDER denying 155 Motion for Reconsideration ; finding as moot 157 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 3/4/2016. (psk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
JAMES WALKER, ET AL.
V.

PLAINTIFFS
CAUSE NO.: 4:14CV142-SA-SAA

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, and
CCA OF TENNESSEE, LLC

DEFENDANTS

ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Defendants contend that the Court misapplied Fifth Circuit binding precedent in refusing
to grant partial summary judgment as to the “half-time” damages approach [155]. Defendants
reflect that Fifth Circuit precedent directs that when an employee’s wages provide compensation
for all hours worked, courts must instead rely on the half-time approach endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 1216, 86 L.
Ed. 1682 (1942).
The Memorandum Opinion that the Defendants ask the Court to reconsider was filed on
February 4. The Motion to Reconsider was not filed until February 24, 2014, twelve days before
trial was to commence. The Plaintiffs have requested an extension of time to respond to the
reconsideration and ask to serve their response ten business days following the completion of
trial. Defendants contend that they are entitled to a reconsidered ruling based on the summary
judgment record.

Unfortunately, the untimeliness of the Motion to Reconsider precludes

Plaintiffs from responding prior to trial. The motion to reconsider could not possibly be ripe until
after the trial of this matter. Because of the fact issues cited below, there is no need for Plaintiffs
to respond. The Motion for Extension of Time [157] is denied.
In that Memorandum Opinion, the Court cited the elements of the fluctuating workweek
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 778.114, and found genuine issues of material fact as to the whether the

“employee clearly understands that the straight-salary covers whatever hours he or she is
required to work.” Indeed, the Court found confusion among the then-existing Plaintiffs as to
why money was deducted from their check when they exhausted their paid time off, along with
their averments that they understood the salary would compensate them for all hours worked.
The Fifth Circuit in Ransom v. M. Patel Enters., Inc., 734 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2013),
rejected that approach to determining damages and instead held that the appropriate inquiry was
whether “the overwhelming evidence shows that the plaintiffs’ salary was intended to
compensate all hours worked, and that those hours would fluctuate.” 734 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing Missel, 316 U.S. at 574-76). Indeed, as admitted by the Defendants, “[t]he only
fact question pertinent to the methodology for calculating overtime in a misclassification case is
whether the plaintiff’s wages were intended to compensate the employee for all hours worked.
Ransom, 734 F.3d at 381.” The “course of conduct, along with the parties’ initial understanding
of the employment arrangement,” is examined to determine how many hours the salary is
“intended to compensate.” Id. at 386 (citing Singer v. City of Waco, Tex., 324 F.3d 813, 824-25
(5th Cir. 2003)).
Because the inquiry under which the Court held there to be genuine disputes of material
fact, “whether the employee clearly understands that the straight-salary covers whatever hours he
or she is required to work,” is similar enough to the Ransom inquiry, “whether those wages were
intended to compensate the employee for all hours worked” based on the parties’ understanding
of the employment arrangement and course of conduct under the contract, the Court finds
reconsideration is unnecessary. A review of the facts and evidence as they were at the time of
the partial summary judgment reveal that the same decision would have been made. The
depositions of the original twenty-five Plaintiffs expose that many were unclear as to whether the

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wages were intended to compensate them for all hours worked. Indeed, numerous Plaintiffs
made mention of their paycheck referencing an hourly wage, and that their biweekly check was
for eighty hours. The same is true looking at the record as it stands as to the remaining Plaintiffs
even under the Missel standard.
Regardless, “[e]ven in cases where the movant has technically discharged his burden, the
trial court in the exercise of a sound discretion may decline to grant summary judgment.”
National Screen Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., 305 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 1962)
(citing Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed. P56.23, p. 2340). “It is the movant’s burden to exclude
any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Lloyd v. Lawrence, 472
F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1973). Indeed, the Defendants as the movants had the burden of
“positively and clearly demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact here
presented” and that, consequently, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nat’l Screen
Serv. Corp., 305 F.2d at 651. Defendants failed to execute that burden initially, as well as under
the reconsideration standard.
Conclusion
The effect of considering the fluctuating work week regulation and the appropriate caselaw approved “half-time” damages calculation method are in this instance, the same -- whether
plaintiffs’ salary was intended to compensate for all hours worked is a jury question.
The Motion to Reconsider [155] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of March, 2016.
/s/ Sharion Aycock_________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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