Spearman v. Epps et al

Filing 34

ORDER denying 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 3/24/16. (tab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
DUANE W. SPEARMAN

PLAINTIFF

V.

NO. 4:14-CV-00173-DMB-SAA

CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Duane Spearman, who
challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, the Court notes that Spearman was incarcerated when he filed this suit.
Spearman has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of
action against “[e]very person” who under color of state authority causes the “deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Spearman alleges that
Defendants denied him access to the courts by denying his requests for access to legal materials
regarding Arkansas state law. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons
below, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Summary Judgment Standard
When a party moves for summary judgment, the reviewing court shall grant the motion “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts on questions of fact must be
resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344,
348 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “When a party moving for summary judgment does not meet
its initial summary judgment burden, the court must deny its motion even if the nonmoving party did

not file a response.” Clark v. Gonzalez, 129 F.3d 612, at *2 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added and
citation omitted).
Undisputed Material Facts
On September 26, 2011, Spearman was convicted of two counts of armed robbery in
Washington County, Mississippi. Doc. #23-1.1 He was remanded to the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) to serve his ten-year sentence. During his incarceration in
Mississippi, on May 31, 2012, Spearman was convicted for aggravated robbery, theft of property, and
illegal possession of a firearm in Chicot County, Arkansas. Doc. #23-2. The Arkansas court
sentenced Spearman to life in prison. Spearman alleges that Defendants, who are all MDOC
employees, violated his right to seek redress for grievances by repeatedly denying his access to
Arkansas statutes, cases, and other legal materials necessary to challenge his Arkansas convictions.
Doc. #1 at 3.
Discussion
The sole issue in this case is whether MDOC is required to provide Spearman with legal
materials and assistance necessary to challenge his Arkansas convictions, when the Arkansas
convictions occurred while Spearman was confined to a MDOC facility based on a Mississippi
conviction.
Defendants, relying on Clayton v. Tansy, 26 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1993), and Trujillo v.
Williams, 465 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2006), argue that Mississippi is not required to provide Spearman
with Arkansas legal materials because “Arkansas [is] the ‘sending state,’ and Mississippi [is] the
“receiving state.”2 Doc. #24 at 5 (citing Clayton, 26 F.3d at 981) (“citation omitted); Trujillo, 465

1

All exhibits referenced herein were submitted in conjunction with Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

2

The significance of the “sending state” and “receiving state” classification is less than clear. Defendants assert that only the
sending state is responsible for providing legal materials. But, in Lehn v. Holmes, which Defendants cite for a different
proposition, the court explained that both the sending and receiving state “might … be a proper defendant in an access-tocourts claim.” 364 F. 3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 2004).

2

F.3d at 1218). This argument is unpersuasive because Clayton and Trujillo, decisions not binding on
this Court, are factually distinguishable from this case.
Clayton and Trujillo both involve the Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”). See Clayton,
26 F.3d at 981 (“Plaintiff was serving time in the Oklahoma State Prison when he was transferred to
the New Mexico state prison system pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC).”); Trujillo,
465 F.3d at 1218 (“Mr. Trujillo was transferred from New Mexico to Virginia pursuant to the Interstate
Corrections Compact (ICC), which provides for the exchange of inmates between states.”). The ICC
allows for the exchange of inmates between sending and receiving member states. Trujillo, 465 F.3d
at 1218. Thus, the ICC is implicated when a convicting state transfers a prisoner to serve his term in
an out-of-state facility. Such is not the situation here. Spearman was convicted in Mississippi and is
confined in Mississippi.

While serving his Mississippi sentence, Spearman was convicted in

Arkansas. The record presently before the Court does not indicate that Arkansas sent Spearman to
serve his sentence in Mississippi. To the contrary, in a letter to MDOC, the Sheriff of Chicot County
states, “Place a detainer on [Spearman]; [w]hen he has served his sentence in Mississippi please call
our office. We will transport him.” Doc. #23-2. This letter suggests that Spearman has not yet begun
to serve his Arkansas sentence. Consequently, Defendants have not established that the ICC is
implicated in this case.3
Defendants also cite the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lehn for the proposition that:
In most cases where prisoners seek out-of-state materials, they are trying to attack,
either directly or collaterally, a conviction from that state. The proper defendant in
those cases is the state in which the prisoner was convicted.
Doc. #24 at 5 (citing Lehn, 364 F. 3d at 866) (citation omitted); Clayton, 26 F.3d 980; Demps v.
Florida, 696 So.2d 1296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Salstrom v. Arizona, 714 P.2d 875 (Ariz. Ct. App.

3

Defendants have not provided any facts affirmatively demonstrating that Arkansas is the “sending state” and Mississippi is
the “receiving state.” Defendants simply state that this is so in their motion.

3

1986)). This language in Lehn is dicta which appears to have never been relied on for the asserted
proposition and which itself cites inapposite authority.4
There is, however, a Fifth Circuit case which, though not precisely on point, tends to support
Spearman’s argument. In Anderson v. Bureau of Prisons, 265 F. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2008), the
plaintiff, a federal prisoner, alleged that the United States Bureau of Prisons violated his right of access
to the courts by failing to provide access to state legal materials. The district court in Anderson
dismissed the allegation for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court, however, finding that “Anderson sufficiently alleged that the BOP
deprived him of the ability to file a non-frivolous challenge to his prior convictions.” Anderson, 265
F. App’x at 327. Anderson brought his case under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which permits suits against federal government actors,
rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits suits against state government actors. Anderson is
a useful case because “a Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials
under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 255 (2006).
Based on Anderson, and the authority and arguments presently before the Court, Defendants
have failed to demonstrate that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 Consequently, the
motion for summary judgment will be denied. However, given that the material facts are not disputed
regarding Spearman’s claim, the denial will be without prejudice, and the Court will allow the parties
4

As discussed above, Clayton involved the ICC, which is not applicable in this case. Similarly, Boyd and Salstrom also
involved the ICC. See Boyd v. Wood, 52 F.3d 820, 821 (“because Kansas state authorities, not Washington state authorities
acting under the ICC, were responsible for providing required Kansas legal materials”); Salstrom, 714 P.2d at 877-78 (“We
have jurisdiction to address this claim because the WICC provides the prisoner with the same legal rights in the receiving
state as he had in the sending state.”). The Demps court also relied on inapposite authority in noting that “when one state
sends a prisoner to another state to serve his sentence, it is the sending state that has the responsibility to ensure that the
prisoner has adequate access to the sending state’s courts.” Demps, 696 So. 2d at 1299 (citing Boyd, 52 F.3d 820; Clayton,
26 F.3d 980; Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1981)). Again, Boyd and Clayton are not analogous to the facts presented
here. Rich is also distinguishable because it dealt with a state prisoner transferred to federal prison, which also is not the
situation here. See 644 F.2d at 41 (prisoner “determined to be security risks at the Maine prison and transferred in 1978 to
the federal prison”).
5

Defendants also argue that MDOC’s Inmate Legal Assistance Program would be unduly burdened if required to provide
inmates with legal materials and assistance from other jurisdictions. Doc. #24 at 5–6. While this is an interesting argument,
Defendants have not provided any authority indicating why this consideration should be dispositive in this case.

4

to submit supplemental briefs on the sole issue raised in this case – specifically, as stated above,
whether MDOC is required to provide Spearman with legal materials and assistance necessary to
challenge his Arkansas convictions.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the motion [23] for summary judgment is DENIED without
prejudice. The parties are to submit supplemental briefs within sixty (60) days of the entry of this
order on the sole issue raised in this case. Though the Court does not preclude comprehensive
briefing on the issue, the parties should focus on the following:
1.

Whether Spearman requested access to Arkansas legal authority before the deadline

for filing an application for post-conviction collateral relief as to his Arkansas conviction; in other
words, whether Spearman suffered actual prejudice to his legal position due to the acts, or failure to
act, of Defendants;
2.

Additional authority regarding whether Mississippi has the obligation under the

United States Constitution to provide out-of-state legal materials or assistance to Spearman in order
for him to pursue his claims in Arkansas;
3.

As a practical matter, the form such legal assistance might take if provided; and

4.

Whether such legal assistance is required under the Inmate Legal Assistance Program

in its current form.
SO ORDERED, this 24th day of March, 2016.
/s/ Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5