Hollins v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Neal B. Biggers on 6/8/18. (cr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
WILLIAM HOLLINS

PETITIONER

v.

No. 4:15CV57-NBB-JMV

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS , ET AL.

RESPONDENTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the pro se petition of William Hollis for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State has responded to the petition, and the matter is ripe
for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be
dismissed with prejudice as procedurally defaulted.
Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may
be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar
Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St.
John's L.Rev. 55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law
of England,” Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923), and it is
equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or
invasion, public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56.
Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

Habeas

corpus principles developed over time in both English and American common law have since
been codified:

The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as sections 2241 to 2255 of the
1948 Judicial Code. The recodification of that year set out important procedural
limitations and additional procedural changes were added in 1966. The scope of the
writ, insofar as the statutory language is concerned, remained essentially the same,
however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners
and setting out special, new habeas corpus procedures for capital cases. The changes
made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about habeas
corpus.
Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may issue the writ when a person is held in violation of
the federal Constitution or laws, permitting a federal court to order the discharge of any person held
by a state in violation of the supreme law of the land. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311, 35 S. Ct.
582, 588, 59 L. Ed. 969 (1915).
Facts and Procedural Posture
William Hollins, is in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and was
housed at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi, at the time he filed the
instant petition. Mr. Hollins entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault in the
Circuit Court of Yazoo County, Mississippi. On March 25, 2011, he was sentenced to serve
fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), with ten
years to serve and five years suspended (supervised probation). Id.
On September 19, 2014, Hollins received a Rule Violation Report (“RVR”) after he was
found in possession of a cell phone. ECF, Doc. 7. Hollins challenged this RVR through the
MDOC Administrative Remedies Program (“ARP”). According to the grievance forms provided
by Hollins (ECF, Doc. 7, p. 11), the disciplinary staff heard Hollins’ RVR and found him guilty
of the specific charge. Id.

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Hollins filed a Motion for Judicial Review, appealing the ARP decision to the Sunflower
County Circuit Court. On January 16, 2015, that court denied his motion and held that the ARP
decision was proper. ECF, Doc. 7-2. After the completion of the ARP process, a petitioner may
appeal the decision to the circuit court, and thereafter to the Mississippi Supreme Court. The
official website of the Mississippi Supreme Court reflects that Mr. Hollins never filed an appeal
or other pleading there.
Hollins filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 6, 2015,
raising the following ground for relief, pro se:
Ground One. I wasn’t present when shakedown took place.
In paragraph 13 of his petition, Mr. Hollins states that the issue has been presented to the highest
state court. ECF, Doc. 1. However, as set forth above, Mr. Hollins has not filed any pleadings
with the Mississippi Supreme Court as to any matter.
The Doctrines of Procedural Default and Procedural Bar
If an inmate seeking habeas corpus relief fails to exhaust an issue in state court – and no
more avenues exist to do so – under the doctrine of procedural default that issue cannot be raised
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1995).
Similarly, federal courts have no jurisdiction to review a habeas corpus claim “if the last state
court to consider that claim expressly relied on a state ground for denial of relief that is both
independent of the merits of the federal claim and an adequate basis for the court's decision.”
Roberts v. Thaler, 681 F.3d 597, 604 (5th Cir.2012). Thus, a federal court may not consider a
habeas corpus claim when, “(1) a state court [has] declined to address [those] claims because the
prisoner [has] failed to meet a state procedural requirement, and (2) the state judgment rests on
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independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Maples v. Thomas, ––– U.S. ––––, 132
S.Ct. 912, 922, 181 L.Ed.2d 807 (2012) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This doctrine is known as procedural bar. To determine the adequacy of the state
procedural bar, this court must examine whether the state’s highest court “has strictly or
regularly applied it.” Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Lott v.
Hargett, 80 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1996)). The petitioner, however, “bears the burden of
showing that the state did not strictly or regularly follow a procedural bar around the time of his
appeal” – and “must demonstrate that the state has failed to apply the procedural bar rule to
claims identical or similar to those raised by the petitioner himself.” Id.
Cause and Prejudice – and Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice –
As Ways to Overcome Procedural Default or Bar
Whether a petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted or procedurally barred, the way he
may overcome these barriers is the same. First he can overcome the procedural default or bar by
showing cause for it – and actual prejudice from its application. To show cause, a petitioner must
prove that an external impediment (one that could not be attributed to him) existed to prevent him
from raising and discussing the claims as grounds for relief in state court. See United States v. Flores,
981 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that, but for the alleged
error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Pickney v. Cain, 337 F.3d 542 (5th
Cir. 2003). Even if a petitioner fails to establish cause for his default and prejudice from its
application, he may still overcome a procedural default or bar by showing that application of the bar
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To show that such a miscarriage of justice
would occur, a petitioner must prove that, “as a factual matter, that he did not commit the crime of
conviction.” Fairman v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635, 644 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Ward v. Cain, 53 F.3d
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106, 108 (5th Cir. 1995)). Further, he must support his allegations with new, reliable evidence – that
was not presented at trial – and must show that it was “more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Fairman, 188 F.3d at 644 (citations
omitted).
Mr. Hollins never exhausted his habeas corpus claims by presenting them to the Mississippi
Supreme Court, and the deadline for doing so has expired. As such, his claims are procedurally
defaulted. Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2001)(“If a petitioner fails to exhaust
state remedies, but the court to which he would be required to return to meet the exhaustion
requirement would now find the claim procedurally barred, then there has been a procedural
default for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief.”) Mr. Hollins has shown neither cause for
his default, prejudice from application of the default, nor that he is actually innocent of the rule
infraction. As such, he cannot overcome the default, and the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be dismissed for that reason.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be
dismissed with prejudice as procedurally defaulted. A final judgment consistent with this
memorandum opinion will issue today.
SO ORDERED, this, the 8th day of June, 2018.
/s/ Neal Biggers
NEAL B. BIGGERS
SENIOR U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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