Hurd v. Stanciel et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 33 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Sharion Aycock on 11/15/16. (jlm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
ROCKY C. HURD
PLAINTIFF
v.
No. 4:15CV73-SA-JMV
WARDEN SONJA STANCIEL, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Rocky C. Hurd, who
challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The
plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of action
against “[e]very person” who under color of state authority causes the “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff
alleges that he suffered a variety of unsanitary conditions during his stay in Unit 30 of the Mississippi
State Penitentiary. The defendants seek [30] summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as to these claims. Hurd has not responded to the motion, and the
deadline to do so has expired. The matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the
defendants’ motion [30] for summary judgment will be granted, and the instant case will be dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show
that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (c)(1). “The moving party must show that if the evidentiary
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the
nonmoving party to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629,
633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts
in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
“Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th
Cir. 1992).
The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist.,
177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198
(5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is “an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the absence of
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proof, the court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
Undisputed Material Facts
The court has ruled that only one of the plaintiff’s allegations remains: that he was exposed to
unsanitary conditions of confinement in Unit 30 B-Building at the Mississippi State Penitentiary –
leaking plumbing, standing water smelling of sewage, chemical fumes in the living area, and poor
ventilation. The defendants involved in these allegations are Superintendent Earnest Lee, Warden
Sonja Stanciel, Unit Administrator Lt. Michael Weeks, and Commissioner Marshal Fisher. In their
motion for summary judgment, the defendants included the affidavit of Richard Pennington, Director
of the Administrative Remedy Program at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, stating that “the
Administrative Remedy Program has no record of Offender Rocky Hurd #97140, filing a grievance
concerning living in unsanitary conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary.”
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e et seq.
– including its requirement that inmates exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit
– in an effort to address the large number of prisoner complaints filed in federal courts. See
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). Congress meant for the exhaustion requirement to be
an effective tool to help weed out the frivolous claims from the colorable ones:
Prisoner litigation continues to ‘account for an outsized share of filings’ in federal
district courts. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006) (slip op.,
at 12, n.4). In 2005, nearly 10 percent of all civil cases filed in federal courts
nationwide were prisoner complaints challenging prison conditions or claiming civil
rights violations. Most of these cases have no merit; many are frivolous. Our legal
system, however, remains committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal
conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to law. The challenge lies in
ensuring that the flood of non-meritorious claims does not submerge and effectively
preclude consideration of the allegations with merit. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
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Congress addressed that challenge in the PLRA. What this country needs, Congress
decided, is fewer and better prisoner suits. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524,
122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (PLRA intended to “reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits”). To that end, Congress enacted a variety of
reforms designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.
Key among these was the requirement that inmates complaining about prison
conditions exhaust prison grievance remedies before initiating a lawsuit.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a), requires prisoners to
exhaust any available administrative remedies prior to filing suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The
exhaustion requirement protects administrative agency authority, promotes efficiency, and
produces “a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.81,
89 (2006). A prisoner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement “by filing an untimely or
otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” because “proper exhaustion
of administrative remedies is necessary.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006); see also
Johnson v. Ford, 261 F. App’x 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2008)( the Fifth Circuit takes “a strict
approach” to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement)(citing Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 866 (5th
Cir. 2003)); Lane v. Harris Cty.Med.Dep’t, No. 06-20935, 2008 WL 116333, at *1 (5th Cir.
Jan.11,2008)( under the PLRA, “the prisoner must not only pursue all available avenues of relief;
he must also comply with all administrative deadlines and procedural rules”). Indeed, “a
prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought – monetary
damages – cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
739 (2001).
The requirement that claims be exhausted prior to the filing of a lawsuit is mandatory and
non-discretionary. Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2012). “Whether a prisoner has
exhausted administrative remedies is a mixed question of law and fact.” Dillon v. Rogers, 596
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F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). As “exhaustion is a threshold issue that courts must address to
determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time, . . . judges
may resolve factual disputes concerning exhaustion without the participation of a jury.” Id. at
272. The Supreme Court has also recognized the need for a prisoner to face a significant
consequence for deviating from the prison grievance procedural rules:
The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is given
a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not
have such an opportunity unless the grievance complies with the system’s critical
procedural rules. A prisoner who does not want to participate in the prison grievance
system will have little incentive to comply with the system’s procedural rules unless
noncompliance carries a sanction . . . .
Woodford at 95.
Mississippi Code Annotated § 47-5-801 grants the Mississippi Department of Corrections
the authority to adopt an administrative review procedure at each of its correctional facilities.
Under this statutory authority, the Mississippi Department of Corrections has set up an
Administrative Remedy Program (“ARP”) through which an inmate may seek formal review of a
complaint or grievance relating to any aspect of his incarceration. This court approved the
Administrative Remedy Program in Gates v. Collier, GC 71-6-S-D (N.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 1994).
See also Marshall v. Price, 239 F.3d 365, 2000 WL 1741549, at *1 (5th Cir.Nov. 6, 2000). On
September 19, 2010, the ARP process was changed from a three steps to two. See Gates v.
Barbour, No. 4:71CV6-JAD, Doc. 1242 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2010); Threadgill v. Moore, No.
3:10CV378-TSL-MTP, 2011 WL 4388832, at *3 n.6 (S.D. Miss. July 25, 2011).
The two-step ARP process begins when an inmate first submits his grievance in writing
to the prison’s legal claims adjudicator within thirty days of the incident. Howard v. Epps, No.
5:12CV61-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 2367880, at *2 (S.D. Miss., May 29, 2013). The adjudicator
screens the grievance and determines whether to accept it into the ARP process. Id. If accepted,
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the grievance is forwarded to the appropriate official who then issues a First Step Response to
the complaining inmate. Id. If the inmate is unsatisfied with the first response, he may continue
to the Second Step by completing an appropriate ARP form and sending it to the legal claims
adjudicator. Id. The Superintendent, Warden or Community Corrections Director will then issue
a final ruling, or Second Step Response – which completes the ARP process. Id. If the inmate is
unsatisfied with that response, he may file suit in state or federal court. Id.
In this case, there is no record that the plaintiff initiated the grievance process as to his claims
of unsanitary and unhealthy general conditions of confinement. Pennington Affidavit, p. 1. As such,
the defendants’ motion [30] for summary judgment will be granted, and the instant case will be
dismissed.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the instant motion [30] for summary judgment will be granted,
and the instant case will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion will issue today.
SO ORDERED, this, the 15th day of November, 2016.
/s/ Sharion Aycock_________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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