Cooper et al v. Meritor, Inc. et al

Filing 274

ORDER granting (268) Motion to Quash in case 4:16-cv-00052-DMB-JMV; granting (209) Motion to Quash in case 4:16-cv-00053-DMB-JMV; granting (211) Motion to Quash in case 4:16-cv-00054-DMB-JMV; granting (213) Motion to Quash in case 4:16-cv-00055-D MB-JMV; granting (211) Motion to Quash in case 4:16-cv-00056-DMB-JMV. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden on 8/14/2017. Associated Cases: 4:16-cv-00052-DMB-JMV, 4:16-cv-00053-DMB-JMV, 4:16-cv-00054-DMB-JMV, 4:16-cv-00055-DMB-JMV, 4:16-cv-00056-DMB-JMV (ncb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
BRENDA J. COOPER, ET AL.
versus
MERITOR, INC., ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS
Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-52-DMB-JMV
DEFENDANTS
- Consolidated With –

JOE E. SLEDGE, ET AL.
versus
MERITOR, INC., ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS
Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-53-DMB- JMV
DEFENDANTS

- and KATHERINE LONGSTREET COOKE, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS
versus
Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-54-DMB-JMV
MERITOR, INC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
- and SRA INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL.
versus
MERITOR, INC., ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS
Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-55-DMB-JMV
DEFENDANTS
- and -

FELICIA WILLIS, ET AL.
versus
MERITOR, INC., ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS
Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-56-DMB-JMV
DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This matter is before the court in these consolidated cases on the Environmental
Protection Agency's (“EPA”) motion to quash three deposition subpoenas issued by the plaintiffs
to certain EPA employees. For the reasons discussed by the EPA (a non-party to this action) in
its briefing in support of the motion and the reasons discussed below, the motion to quash is
GRANTED.

According to plaintiffs and the movant here, the EPA, the issue for the court is whether
the EPA's decision that it is not clearly in its interests to permit its employees to testify in
response to the aforementioned subpoenas is arbitrary and capricious.1

A decision is arbitrary and capricious where it has no substantial relationship to a
legitimate government interest. See Greene v. Texas Comm’n For The Blind, No. 95-20081,
1995 WL 783377, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1995). The standard is highly deferential to the
governmental agency. Bobreski v.U.S. E.P.A., 284 F. Supp. 2d 67, 73 (D. D.C. 2003); see also,
Louisiana Dep’t of Transportation & Dev. v. United States Dep’t of Transportation, 2015 WL
7313876, at *3-4 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015).

In the instant case, the plaintiffs themselves note that the EPA's decision not to permit its
employees to testify as subpoenaed is based on the relevant Touhy2 factors and further that that
consideration alone supports the decision's lack of arbitrariness or capriciousness. In short,
though the plaintiffs explain that they desire to take the EPA employees’ depositions primarily
(as appears from the briefing) to discover the deliberative processes employed by the EPA in its
decision-making so that they can stop “harbor[ing] doubts regarding the trustworthiness of the[]
government’s acts” the movants have wholly failed to establish either that the reasons articulated
by the EPA in opposition are arbitrary or capricious or that the areas of inquiry generally
described by them, are even relevant and necessary to any claim they have asserted in this case.

1

Because plaintiffs and the EPA all assert the same applicable legal standard, the court will adopt the same
without undertaking an independent legal review
2
See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467-69 (1951).

2

In conclusion, while this court will not rubberstamp an agency determination that its
employees may not testify in a case such as this, the party seeking such testimony must, at a
minimum, clearly and with specificity identify the areas of inquiry; explain why the information
sought is not otherwise and/or already available to it; to the extent the information sought is other
than factual (such as questions about deliberative processes), be prepared to explain why such
information is discoverable in the face of asserted privilege or other protective claims; and
articulate a basis for concluding that the decision of the agency not to permit the deposition(s) is
arbitrary and capricious when examined in light of the established relevant factors to be
considered.

ORDERED this the 14th day of August, 2017.

/s/ Jane M. Virden
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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