Cooper v. Morris et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENIED 8 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; REJECTING as moot 10 Report and Recommendations. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 9/26/17. (cr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
JONATHAN D. COOPER

PETITIONER

V.

NO. 4:16-CV-195-DMB-JMV

TIMOTHY MORRIS; and ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This habeas petition is before the Court sua sponte for consideration of Jonathan D.
Cooper’s motion for preliminary injunction. Doc. #8.
I
Relevant Procedural History
On or about September 27, 2016, Jonathan D. Cooper, acting pro se, filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Doc. #1. In his petition, Cooper alleges that, on March 21,
2016, after having been out of prison for approximately eighteen months on Earned Release
Supervision (“ERS”),1 the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) revoked his ERS
for absconding the geographic area of his authorized release, a violation of the terms of his
release. Cooper complains that he did not receive timely hearings required under state law
regarding his removal from ERS status – and that MDOC has failed to properly calculate his
release date under state statutory and procedural law. Of relevance here, Cooper alleges that,
after raising the claims at issue here with MDOC’s Administrative Remedy Program, he came
“straight to US Northern District.” Id. at 6.
1

Earned Release Supervision is a form of supervised release that is conducted, according to statute, in the same
manner as a period of supervised parole. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-138(6). The statute provides that the Mississippi
Department of Corrections shall “develop rules, terms and conditions for the earned release-supervision program.”
Id. Under the ERS statute, a prisoner remains in inmate status while out on earned release; as such, time served
while on ERS counts as time served toward completion of his sentence. Id.

On or about December 17, 2016, Cooper filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Doc.
#8. On July 18, 2017, United States Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that the motion for preliminary injunction be denied. Doc.
#10.
II
Analysis
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should only issue if the
movant establishes:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if
the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is
granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013).
It is axiomatic that, before a plaintiff can pursue a matter through habeas corpus in
federal court, he must exhaust his available state remedies.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

“Exhaustion requires that the prisoner have fairly presented the substance of his claim to the state
courts.” Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 790 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]hether a petition exhausted his claim in state court is a case – and fact – specific inquiry.”
Id.
Here, Cooper’s petition concedes that he has not presented his claims to the Mississippi
courts. Accordingly, he is unlikely to succeed on the merits, and his motion for a preliminary
injunction must be denied. See Jones v. Epps, No. 3:13-cv-354, 2013 WL 5447877, at *3 (N.D.
Miss. Sep. 30, 2013) (dismissing as unexhausted habeas claim based on improper calculation of
earned time); Jamison v. MDOC State of Miss., No. 2:09-cv-219, 2010 WL 3037496, at *1 (N.D.
Miss. June 22, 2010) (same).

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III
Conclusion
For the reasons above, Cooper’s motion for a preliminary injunction [8] is DENIED.
Therefore, Judge Virden’s Report and Recommendation [10] is REJECTED as moot.
SO ORDERED, this 26th day of September, 2017.
/s/Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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