Boddie et al v. Walker et al

Filing 54

ORDER dismissing 42 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Michael P. Mills on 11/21/2017. (rmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION

CLAUD E. BODDIE, JR. and BEVERLY BODDIE

VS.

PLAINTIFFS

CAUSE NO: 4:16-CV-209-MPM-JMV

CEDRIC WALKER, MARY HAYWOOD
and STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Defendant State Farm has filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the aboveentitled action, arguing that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive damages against it.
Plaintiffs Claud and Beverly Boddie have responded in opposition to the motion, and the court,
having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes that the issue of
punitive damages would be best addressed at trial, in the event that the jury renders a
compensatory damages verdict against State Farm. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
will thus be dismissed without prejudice to the arguments therein being asserted at trial.
This is, inter alia, an uninsured motorist (“UM”) action arising out of a September 3,
2013, automobile accident between Plaintiff Claud E. Boddie, Jr. and Defendant Cedric Walker
which occurred on Highway 61 in Cleveland. Following the accident, Mr. Boddie made a claim
for UM benefits with his auto insurance carrier State Farm, and the handling of his claim was
assigned to State Farm Claim Specialist Gina Robertson. Robertson initially confirmed
coverage, then she focused on determining who should be considered at fault for the accident. In

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contending that Robertson failed to timely investigate the accident, plaintiffs argue that:
Further, on September 27, 2013 at 12:44 p.m., Ms. Robertson, made note of the
existence of two (2) witness statements provided to her by Plaintiff, BODDIE.
Ms. Robertson notes that she would follow up with both witnesses. As of the
present date, Defendant, STATE FARM INSURANCE, have made no effort to
reasonably and adequately investigate Plaintiffs’, CLAUD E. BODDIE’s and
BEVERLY BODDIE’s, claim. Defendant, STATE FARM INSURANCE, did not
contact or attempt to contact witnesses that were mentioned, provided and/or
witnesses and information that was easily accessible to Defendants.
[Plaintiff’s brief at 3].
In their brief, plaintiffs takes particular issue with Robertson’s failure to interview
Kwame Cleveland, an eyewitness to the accident, writing that:
Defendant, STATE FARM INSURANCE, had various sources of information
readily available to its adjuster, Gina Robertson. Plaintiff, CLAUD E. BODDIE,
provided the name of two (2) witnesses. One of those witnesses, Kwame
Cleveland, was actually employed at the gas station where the incident took place.
Mr. Cleveland was an eye witness to the accident and saw the events that took
place. As stated in his attached affidavit, Mr. Cleveland, gives the same account
of the events as stated by Plaintiff, CLAUD E. BODDIE. Mr. Cleveland notes that
the red car driven by Defendant, CEDRIC WALKER, was driving at an excessive
rate of speed and switched from the left lane to the right lane and hit Plaintiff,
CLAUD E. BODDIE, in the rear of his vehicle. Further Mr. Cleveland states that
he provided his information as a witness, but was never contacted to give a
statement.
[Plaintiff’s brief at 8].
In rebuttal, State Farm notes that Robertson made a number of inquiries vis a vis the
claim, and it argues that the possibility that she might have “left some stones unturned” is
insufficient to establish a claim for punitive damages. Specifically, State Farm argues that:
Plaintiffs’ real complaint is not that State Farm failed to investigate but that it left
some stones unturned. Plaintiffs argue State Farm should have accepted the
written account of Mr. Cleveland then taken the additional step of taking his
recorded statement. In support, they offer an affidavit executed by Mr. Cleveland
in which he attests that no one from State Farm contacted him to take his
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statement. What Plaintiffs fail to recognize is that an insurer is “not required to
disprove all possible allegations made by a claimant. They are simply required to
perform a prompt and adequate investigation and make a reasonable, good faith
decision based on that investigation.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKneely, 862
So.2d 530, 535 (Miss. 2003). Furthermore, Mr. Cleveland’s testimony is
irrelevant for purposes of the present motion since it fails to shed light on whether
State Farm had an “arguable reason” for its decision. At best, Mr. Cleveland’s
initial written account and subsequent affidavit of represent some “evidence to the
contrary” and are therefore insufficient to forestall summary judgment on the issue
of bad faith.
[State Farm reply brief at 4-5 (some citations omitted)].
In considering these issues, this court emphasizes that Mississippi’s punitive damages
statute provides for mandatory bifurcation of punitive damages issues at trial. Specifically, Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c) provides that “[i]f, but only if, an award of compensatory damages
has been made against a party, the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether punitive damages may be considered by the same trier of fact.” This court
notes that one arguable interpretation of this statute is that the “shall” language requires an
evidentiary hearing on punitive damages to be held in the event that such damages are sought and
an award of compensatory damages is entered against the defendant at trial. And, indeed, the
Mississippi Supreme Court concluded in a 2006 decision that the § 11-1-65 procedure must be
“meticulously” followed, writing that:
Importantly, our punitive damages statute mandates the bifurcation of the issues
of liability/compensatory damages and punitive damages. The statute requires that
evidence concerning punitive damages be presented separately at a subsequent
evidentiary hearing to take place, if and only if, the jury has awarded some
measure of compensatory damages. Thus, the detailed procedure which is outlined
above must be meticulously followed because, without an evidentiary buffer at
trial, juries will ultimately confuse the basic issue of fault or liability and
compensatory damages with the contingent issue of wanton and reckless conduct
which may or may not ultimately justify an award of punitive damages.

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Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So. 2d 931, 938 (Miss. 2006).
Bradfield has not been overruled, but it is unclear to this court just how stringently the
Mississippi Supreme Court would apply it. For example, it is unclear to this court whether the
Supreme Court would reverse a trial court’s pretrial grant of summary judgment on the punitive
damages issue, as being a violation of § 11-1-65 as interpreted in Bradfield. This court has some
doubts whether Bradfield would be enforced as strictly as that, and it is of the view that resolving
these issues at the summary judgment stage can be of benefit, in certain cases where the issues
are particularly clear. As a general matter, however, this court concludes that the most prudent
course of action is to strictly follow the procedure outlined in § 11-1-65(1)(c) and leave the issue
of punitive damages for trial, in the event that an award of compensatory damages is entered
against the defendant. This court will follow this general approach in this case, and it will
therefore dismiss State Farm’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice to the arguments
therein being raised at an evidentiary hearing at trial, should such a hearing prove necessary.
It is therefore ordered that State Farm’s motion for partial summary judgment is
dismissed without prejudice.
So ordered, this, the 21st day of November, 2017.

/s/ Michael P. Mills
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

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