Hillie v. Williams et al

Filing 41

ORDER denying 37 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 1/3/18. (jtm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
GREGORY MARQUE HILLIE

PLAINTIFF

V.

NO. 4:17-CV-69-DMB-DAS

SHERIFF KELVIN WILLIAMS, et al.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This civil rights action is before the Court on Gregory Marque Hillie’s motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s November 3, 2017, order adopting United States Magistrate Judge
David A. Sanders’ August 11, 2017, Report and Recommendation. Doc. #37.
I
Procedural History
On or about May 24, 2017, Gregory Marque Hillie, an inmate at Bolivar County Regional
Correctional Facility, filed a pro se complaint in this Court against “Sheriff Kelvin William,”
“Government Phil Bryant” and the “Federal Government.” Doc. #1. On August 11, 2017,
following a Spears hearing, United Stated Magistrate Judge David A. Sanders issued a Report and
Recommendation construing Hillie’s complaint as requesting that criminal charges be instituted
against the defendants and asserting claims sounding under § 1983, the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act (“HCPA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Doc. #14. The Report and
Recommendation recommended that (1) the Federal Government and Bryant be dismissed; (2) the
HCPA claim be dismissed; (3) the § 1983 claim be dismissed to the extent it is premised on an
alleged violation of the right to speedy trial; (4) the request to procure criminal charges be
dismissed; (5) the ADA individual capacity claim against Williams be dismissed; and (6) process
issue against Williams on Hillie’s remaining claims.

On November 3, 2017, this Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. Doc. #35.
Approximately one week later, Hillie filed a “Motion Comparison,” which is in substance a motion
for reconsideration of the Court’s November 3 order. Doc. #37.
II
Analysis
As a general rule, requests for reconsideration of interlocutory orders, such as the one at
issue here, are properly treated as motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b). See Helena Labs. Corp. v. Alpha Sci. Corp., 483 F.Supp.2d 538, 538 n.1 (E.D.
Tex. 2007) (“Alpha’s motion was improperly filed under [Rule] 59(e) because no final judgment
has been entered. However, it is undisputed that the court has discretion to treat the motion as one
for reconsideration under [Rule] 54(b).”).
Although the source of the court’s authority to revise or amend an order or
judgment is different for interlocutory orders than for final orders or judgments,
many of the same policy considerations apply both to motions for reconsideration
under Rule 54(b) and to motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Accordingly,
district courts … frequently apply the same standards to the two.
eTool Dev., Inc. v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 881 F.Supp.2d 745, 748 (E.D. Tex. 2012)
(collecting cases).
Under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence:
A Rule 59(e) motion “calls into question the correctness of a judgment.” This Court
has held that such a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of
judgment. Rather, Rule 59(e) “serve[s] the narrow purpose of allowing a party to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”
Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should
be used sparingly.
Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). “A
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) must clearly establish either a manifest
error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence and cannot be used to raise
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arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Schiller v.
Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Relief under Rule 59(e) is also appropriate when there has been an intervening change in the
controlling law.” Id. Additionally, “a trial court is free to reconsider and reverse interlocutory
orders for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening
change or in clarification of the new law.” Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC
Commc’ns, Inc., 677 F.3d 720, 727–28 (5th Cir. 2012).
Hillie’s motion for reconsideration is a single paragraph and, beyond conclusory assertions
of error, offers absolutely no argument as to why reconsideration is warranted. Accordingly, the
motion [37] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of January, 2018.
/s/ Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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