Moore v. The City of Clarksdale, MS et al
Filing
87
OPINION AND ORDER granting 69 Motion to Dismiss; denying 77 Motion to Amend; denying 78 Motion to Correct. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 3/27/2024. (jtm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
LASHEA MOORE
PLAINTIFF
V.
NO. 4:22-CV-41-DMB-DAS
THE CITY OF CLARKSDALE,
MS, et al.
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
District Attorney Brenda F. Mitchell and Assistant District Attorney Stephanie A. Brown
move to dismiss Lashea Moore’s remaining federal and state law claims against them. Moore
moves to amend her complaint and to correct her proposed amended complaint. Because both
Moore’s original complaint and her proposed amended complaint fail to state a claim against
Mitchell and Brown, the motions to amend and to correct will be denied, and the motion to dismiss
will be granted.
I
Procedural History
On March 25, 2022, Lashea Moore filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi against the City of Clarksdale, Mississippi; Police Chief
Sandra Williams, in her individual and official capacities; Police Officer Fernando Harris, in his
individual and official capacities; District Attorney Brenda F. Mitchell, in her official capacity;
Assistant District Attorney Stephanie A. Brown, in her individual and official capacities; and “John
Does 1–5.” Doc. #1 at 1. The complaint alleges violations of Moore’s Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and related state law claims based on her
arrest and prosecution for simple assault on an educator. Id. at 7–13. In addition to monetary
damages, Moore “request[ed] injunctive relief against … Mitchell enjoining [Mitchell] from
continuing to prosecute [her] in the Coahoma County Circuit Court in violation of the 5th
Amendment.” 1 Id. at 11.
Mitchell and Brown moved to dismiss all Moore’s claims against them on May 23, 2022. 2
Doc. #21. The Court, granting the motion to dismiss in part, dismissed without prejudice Moore’s
injunctive relief claims and § 1983 claims against Mitchell and Brown in their official capacities,
and stayed the remaining claims pending resolution of the criminal charge against Moore. Doc.
#65 at 10. In doing so, the Court concluded:
(1) the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris bars Moore’s
injunctive relief claims, (2) Moore’s § 1983 claims against [Mitchell and Brown]
in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity [under the Eleventh
Amendment], and (3) Heck v. Humphrey prohibits Moore’s claims from moving
forward while her state criminal charges are pending.
Doc. #65 at 1.
On March 30, 2023, the Coahoma County Circuit Court dismissed with prejudice the
criminal charge against Moore. Doc. #67-3 at PageID 534. On May 4, 2023, Moore filed a status
report informing this Court that “[t]he criminal case involving [her] was dismissed with prejudice.”
Doc. #67 at 1. The next day, the stay of the case was lifted. Doc. #68.
Mitchell and Brown filed a motion to dismiss Moore’s remaining federal and state law
claims against them on May 11, 2023. Doc. #69. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. #70, #75,
#76.
On April 29, 2022, Moore moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining prosecution of the criminal case against her.
Doc. #6. Following a June 1, 2022, evidentiary hearing, the Court denied Moore’s preliminary injunction motion.
Docs. #28, #40.
1
Also on May 23, 2022, Harris and the City filed a motion to dismiss, which Williams joined on August 23, 2022.
Docs. #23, #62. On November 2, 2022, the Court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice the state law
claims against the City, Harris, and Williams. Doc. #63.
2
2
On June 30, 2023, Moore filed a motion to amend her complaint “in order to add claims
for civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DA Mitchell and
ADA Brown;” “to provide additional factual support for her original claims;” and “to assert her
claims against them in their individual capacities only.” 3 Doc. #77 at 1–2.
On July 14, 2023, Moore filed a motion to correct her proposed first amended complaint
“to make clear that she was no longer pursuing the state law claims against the City of Clarksdale
Defendants” and to “clarify that she is not seeking to pursue claims that the Court has already
disposed of.” Doc. #78 at 1. The same day, Mitchell and Brown responded to Moore’s June 30
motion to amend and Moore replied on July 21, 2023. Docs. #79, #81. Mitchell and Brown did
not respond to Moore’s motion to correct.
II
Standards
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive dismissal under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, “a complaint must present enough
facts to state a plausible claim to relief. A plaintiff need not provide exhaustive detail to avoid
dismissal, but the pleaded facts must allow a reasonable inference that the plaintiff should prevail.”
Mandawala v. Ne. Baptist Hosp., 16 F.4th 1144, 1150 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971
F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). However, the Court does not accept as true
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (citations
Rather than file a supporting memorandum brief as required by Local Rule 7(b)(4), Moore “requests to be relieved
from filing a corresponding memorandum of authorities due to the nature of this motion.” Doc. #77 at 2.
3
3
omitted). In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court’s review is limited to the
complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to
dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Serrano v. Customs &
Border Patrol, 975 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
B. Rule 15(a)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that a “court should freely give leave [to
amend pleadings] when justice so requires.” “The language of this rule evinces a bias in favor of
granting leave to amend.” SGIC Strategic Glob. Inv. Cap., Inc. v. Burger King Eur. GmbH, 839
F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). However, a “court need not grant a futile motion to
amend. Futility is determined under Rule 12(b)(6) standards, meaning an amendment is considered
futile if it would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Legate v. Livingston,
822 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
III
Motion to Dismiss
Moore’s remaining claims are (1) a § 1983 double jeopardy violation claim against Brown
in her individual capacity; (2) state law claims for negligence/gross negligence against Brown in
her official and individual capacities and against Mitchell in her official capacity; and (3) state law
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Brown in her official and individual
capacities and against Mitchell in her official capacity. Compare Doc. #1 at 7, 12, with Doc. #65
at 10. In requesting dismissal of these claims, Mitchell and Brown argue that they “are entitled to
prosecutorial and qualified immunities as to the remaining federal claims against them in their
4
individual capacities;” 4 and “Moore’s state law claims are barred due to sovereign immunity and
the immunities provided by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (‘MTCA’).” Doc. #69 at 3.
A. Relevant Factual Allegations
Following growing tension between Lashea Moore’s daughter and LaQwenia Simon’s son,
Moore and Simon were involved in a physical altercation on October 14, 2019. Doc. #1 at 4.
“Realizing the error of her ways, … Moore took responsibility for her involvement in the
altercation and pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of Simple Assault on October 15, 2019 in the
Clarksdale Municipal Court.” Id. “Having full knowledge of the facts surrounding the charge, the
Municipal Court Judge accepted [Moore]’s guilty plea and sentenced her accordingly.” Id.
Later the same day, officers arrived at Moore’s home “and barged into [her] home without
consent, [or a] warrant.” Id. at 5. “The officers explained to [her] that her name had came [sic]
up at the police station, and they were instructed to go to her home to arrest her for a charge that
she had previously pleaded guilty. However, this time the charge was being upgraded to a felony.”
Id. Moore was then “the subject of a subsequent criminal prosecution” initiated by District
Attorney Brenda Mitchell and Assistant District Attorney Stephanie Brown. Id. at 5–6.
B. Federal Claim
Regarding the § 1983 double jeopardy violation claim, Brown and Mitchell 5 argue they
“are absolutely immune from suit for any claims based on their role in obtaining indictments
against [Moore]” because “[a]ll of the alleged actions or inactions by [them] … in this matter have
In her original complaint, Moore sued Mitchell only in her official capacity. Doc. #1 at 1. In the Court’s December
22 order, “the § 1983 claims against Mitchell and Brown in their official capacities [were] dismissed.” Doc. #65 at
10. So regardless of any argument to the contrary, there are no remaining federal law claims against Mitchell.
4
Though Mitchell and Brown argue throughout that they are both immune to § 1983 claims, the Court acknowledges
that there are no remaining § 1983 claims against Mitchell. See Doc. #65 at 10.
5
5
occurred during [Moore]’s criminal proceedings.” Doc. #70 at 10. In the alternative, they argue
that they are entitled to a qualified immunity defense because “Moore’s constitutional claim lacks
merit” and even if it had merit, Moore did not point “to clearly established law that would put
[them] on notice.” 6 Id. at 10, 13. Moore responds that Brown does not have absolute immunity
for her investigative actions that led to the initiation of a second prosecution. 7 Doc. #75 at 4–5.
Regarding the alternative arguments, Moore contends that the qualified immunity argument fails
because her double jeopardy claim has merit. Id. at 6‒7. Mitchell and Brown reply that “Moore
does not make any factual allegations that could be construed as investigatory and those allegations
she does make all fall squarely inside the cloak of prosecutorial immunity.” Doc. #76 at 1.
“Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ‘on its face admits of no defense of official immunity,’ it has
long been recognized by the Supreme Court that Congress did not intend to abrogate immunities
‘well grounded in history and reason.’” Wearry v. Foster, 33 F.4th 260, 265 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
376 (1951)). In certain circumstances, prosecutors have absolute immunity, “which is analyzed
under the ‘functional approach.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269). Under the functional
approach, courts consider (1) “‘the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common
law,’” and (2) “the ‘functions’ of that historical official whose contemporary analogues should be
afforded the same immunity.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269).
They also argue that Moore’s § 1983 supervisory liability claim against Mitchell fails as a matter of law because
“[i]t is well-settled … that respondeat superior and other theories of vicarious liability do not apply to actions brought
under § 1983.” Doc. #70 at 14. There is no longer such a claim pending against Mitchell because Moore sued Mitchell
only in her official capacity, Doc. #1, and the Court dismissed all § 1983 claims against Mitchell in her official capacity
on December 22, 2022, Doc. #65 at 10.
6
Presumably because the Court dismissed all § 1983 claims against Mitchell, Doc. #65, Moore does not mention
Mitchell when responding to the absolute immunity arguments. See Doc. #75 at 4–6.
7
6
Historically, “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits in their individual
capacities for actions that are within the scope of their prosecutorial duties.” Quinn v. Roach, 326
F. App’x 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2009). Specifically, “prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability
under § 1983 for their conduct in ‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.’”
Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486
(1991)). Such immunity extends to “[t]he decision to file or not file criminal charges.” Quinn,
326 F. App’x at 292. “In contrast, a prosecutor’s investigative activities are not entitled to absolute
immunity because investigation was not part of a prosecutor’s traditional official functions.”
Wearry, 33 F.4th at 266 (cleaned up).
Moore’s § 1983 double jeopardy violation claim against Brown alleges that Brown
“initiat[ed] a subsequent criminal prosecution against [her] after knowing that the Municipal Court
had previously adjudicated the offense.” Doc. #1 at 8. But initiating a prosecutorial action against
Moore falls squarely within the scope of Brown’s duty to initiate and pursue a criminal
prosecution, for which she has absolute immunity. See Black v. Cox, 466 F. App’x 321, 321 (5th
Cir. 2012) (“A prosecutor is absolutely immune when he acts in his role as an advocate for the
state by initiating and pursuing prosecution.”) (cleaned up). Even if Brown violated Moore’s
constitutional right against double jeopardy while acting within the scope of her duty in initiating
and pursuing the prosecution, she is still absolutely immune to the § 1983 double jeopardy claim
in her individual capacity. See Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 956 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 2020) (in
analyzing whether a prosecutor is liable under § 1983 in an individual capacity, stating that “a state
prosecutor who acts ‘within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution’ is absolutely immune from § 1983 claims”) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 410 (1976)). And beyond the conclusory allegation that Brown is “liable to [her] concerning
7
[Brown’s] investigative and administrative roles,” Doc. #1 at 6, Moore does not allege any facts
which, if taken as true, show Brown was acting in an investigatory role—rather than in a traditional
prosecutorial role—when initiating the prosecution against her. See Singleton, 956 F.3d at 781,
783 (prosecutor acts in an investigative role when making decisions akin to those a police officer
makes, such as information gathering, fabricating evidence during investigation of a crime, and
ordering a search and seizure); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th
Cir. 2000) (“In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff must plead
specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.”).
Because Brown is absolutely immune from Moore’s § 1983 double jeopardy claim against
her in her individual capacity, 8 Moore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
the motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.
C. State Law Claims
Mitchell and Brown argue they are immune to Moore’s state law claims under the MTCA
because “there are no allegations that [they] acted outside of their duties during the relevant
period.” Doc. #70 at 16, 18, 19. 9 Moore responds that the MTCA “does not shield ADA Brown
from liability, in her individual capacity” because “it was not within the course and scope of ADA
Even if Brown was not entitled to absolute immunity based on an investigatory capacity argument, she still would
be entitled to qualified immunity as to Moore’s remaining § 1983 claim against her. See Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty.,
Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 2001) (“For ‘acts of investigation or administration,’ prosecutors are entitled to only
qualified immunity.”) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269). While qualified immunity does not shield state prosecutors
from money damages if “a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct,” Moore does not plead such facts.
Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 371 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
Regardless, Moore’s constitutional claim—a double jeopardy violation—lacks merit for the reasons explained in this
order. And Moore does not point to any clearly established law that would put Brown on notice that prosecuting a
felony criminal case after a defendant pled guilty in a court without jurisdiction violates the Constitution.
8
They also submit that they are immune to Moore’s state law claims because they have sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. Doc. #70 at 19. Moore does not dispute the Eleventh Amendment argument because
“Defendants’ argument concerning sovereign immunity has already been decided by this Court.” Doc. #75 at 11 n.3.
9
8
Brown’s employment” to intentionally violate Moore’s constitutional rights by charging her “with
a felony after she had already pled guilty in municipal court,” 10 an argument Moore does not make
as to Mitchell. Doc. #75 at 10. Moore “concede[s] that ADA Brown is immune from liability
under the MTCA” in her official capacity if it is established that Brown acted solely within the
scope of her duties with regard to Moore’s state law claims. Doc. #75 at 11 n.3. Mitchell and
Brown reply that the unconstitutional actions Moore alleges “involve the initiation of a felony
criminal case against her” and “a prosecutor is immune from civil suit in ‘initiating a prosecution
and in presenting the State’s case.’” Doc. #76 at 7 (citation omitted).
The “MTCA provides the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity or its employee
for the act or omission which gave rise to the suit.” Moss Point Sch. Dist. v. Stennis, 132 So. 3d
1047, 1050 (Miss. 2014). The MTCA provides in pertinent part:
(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of
their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:
…
(d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity
or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d). Under the MTCA, there is a “rebuttable presumption that any
act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of his employment is within the
course and scope of his employment.” Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-7(7). But “an employee shall not
be considered as acting within the course and scope of his employment … if the employee’s
Moore also responds that “the Court should refrain from dismissing this case at this stage in [the case] to allow [her]
to engage in discovery.” Doc. #75 at 10. The Court disagrees. Constitutional claims against defendants asserting
immunity must survive a motion a dismiss without discovery. In re Paxton, 60 F.4th 252, 256 (5th Cir. 2023).
10
9
conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense.” Miss. Code
Ann. §11-46-7(2).
Regarding the discretionary function exemption in § 11-46-9(1)(d), Mississippi courts
apply a two-part “public-policy function” test to determine whether an act is within the scope of a
government employee’s discretionary function. Bell v. Miss. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 126 So. 3d
999, 1004 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). The first inquiry is whether the “‘activity in question involved
an element of choice or judgment.’” Id. (quoting Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. Montgomery, 80 So.
3d 789, 795 (Miss. 2012)). If the activity did involve an element of judgment, the court must
decide “‘whether that choice or judgment involved social, economic, or political-policy
considerations.’” Id. (quoting Montgomery, 80 So. 3d at 795). Activities that involve both an
element of judgment and social, economic, or political-policy considerations are within the scope
of a government employee’s discretionary function. Id.
Moore’s state law claims for negligence/gross negligence and negligent infliction of
emotional distress against Mitchell and Brown are based on their actions relating to their initiation
of the prosecution against her. Doc. #1 at 12. Their initiation of the prosecution against Moore
falls squarely under the discretionary function exemption because it involves an element of
judgment (choosing to proceed with prosecution) and is grounded in policy considerations (social,
economic, and political-policy). See Burnett v. Pearl River Basin Narcotics Task Force, No. 2:10cv-267, 2011 WL 4036688, at *6-7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 12, 2011) (under Mississippi Code § 11-469(1)(d), seeking an indictment is plainly a “discretionary function” of state district attorney’s
office). Moore’s argument that Brown is not immune under the MTCA because Brown was acting
outside the scope of her prosecutor duties when she allegedly violated her federal constitutional
right against double jeopardy is without merit. Jeopardy did not attach when Moore entered a plea
10
in the Clarksdale Municipal Court “[b]ecause the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to
accept [her] plea [to simple assault], [such that] there [was] no bar to [Mitchell and Brown]
proceeding with the simple assault on an educator charge against her.” Doc. #40 at 9; see Butler
v. State, 489 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Miss. 1986) (“[A] court without jurisdiction to try the person for
the crime charged cannot place the accused in jeopardy, any judgment that might be rendered
would be absolutely void, and therefore would not bar subsequent prosecution for the same offense
in a court of competent jurisdiction.”). Consequently, Mitchell and Brown are immune to Moore’s
state law claims under the MTCA 11 and such claims will be dismissed. 12
D. Summary
Because Brown has absolute immunity against all § 1983 claims in her individual capacity
and because under the MTCA Mitchell and Brown have immunity against Moore’s state law
claims, the motion to dismiss the remaining claims will be granted.
IV
Motion to Correct Proposed Amended Complaint
Moore moves to “correct” the proposed amended complaint attached to her motion for
leave to amend for the sole purpose of “mak[ing] clear that she was no longer pursuing the state
Mitchell and Brown also argue they are immune to Moore’s state law claims under § 11-46-9(1)(a)—the judicial
action exemption—which shelters both judicial action and quasi-judicial action. Newton Cnty. v. State ex rel. Dukes,
133 So. 3d 819, 826 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 133 So. 3d 805 (Miss. 2014). Mississippi courts
turn to federal case law to ascertain whether certain conduct arises out of judicial action. Matlock v. Bramlett, No.
3:20-cv-381, 2021 WL 4434015, at *9 (S.D. Miss. 2021) (citing Newton Cnty., 133 So. 3d at 826). The Fifth Circuit
has held that initiating prosecutions and presenting the state’s case are quasi-judicial actions for which state
prosecutors are absolutely immune. See Singleton, 956 F.3d at 780. So to the extent Mississippi courts turn to federal
case law to interpret quasi-judicial action and such includes initiating a prosecution, Mitchell and Brown are also
immune under such exemption.
11
12
Mitchell and Brown raise for the first time in their reply that the state law claims against them as public employees
are not viable because “the Mississippi Supreme Court ‘has been consistent in rejecting the viability of claims against
public employees where their political subdivision employer has been eliminated as a defendant.’” Doc. #76 at 7
(quoting Conrod v. Holder, 825 So. 2d 16, 19 (Miss. 2002)). Because the Court “do[es] not entertain arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief,” Newman v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 23 F.4th 393, 402 n.47 (5th Cir. 2022)
(cleaned up), it will not address this argument.
11
law claims against the City of Clarksdale Defendants that the Court previously disposed of.” Doc.
#78 at 1. Regardless of Moore’s intent, the claims against Mitchell and Brown in the proposed
amended complaint attached to her July 14 motion to correct do not differ from the claims in the
proposed amended complaint attached to her June 30 motion to amend. Compare Doc. #77-1,
with Doc. #78-1. Because the proposed correction is intended only to omit claims this Court
previously disposed of, there is no need to clarify what claims remain. For this reason and because,
as explained below, Moore’s June 30 motion to amend is futile, Moore’s motion to correct will be
denied.
V
Motion to Amend Complaint
Moore requests leave to amend her complaint to (1) provide additional facts to support her
original claims; (2) add claims for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy under § 1983 against
Mitchell and Brown; and (3) “assert her claims against [Mitchell and Brown] in their individual
capacities only.” 13 Doc. #77 at 1–2. Mitchell and Brown argue that Moore’s motion to amend is
futile because they are immune to her claims. Doc. #80 at 1. Moore replies that they are not
immune and the amendment is not futile because Mitchell and Brown “are not entitled to
prosecutorial or qualified immunity;” and the “intentional torts, and the negligence-based claims
are based upon actions done outside the course and scope of [their] employment” so they are not
shielded by MTCA immunity. Doc. #82 at 2.
The caption of the proposed amended complaint reflects that Moore sues Mitchell and Brown in their individual
capacities. Doc. #77-1.
13
12
A. Additional Proposed Factual Allegations
Moore’s proposed amended complaint adds factual allegations regarding her § 1983 and
Mississippi state law claims. First, she includes the following portion of the Coahoma County
Circuit Court’s decision dismissing her felony criminal case with prejudice:
First, it is without dispute that the incident occurred in a public parking lot across
from the school. The State has even admitted that this is a city owned, public
parking lot…Second, it is without dispute that Defendant Moore’s children do not
attend the school where Lagwenia Simon worked. At the May 10, 2022 hearing,
Superintendent Joe Nelson testified that school had not started yet when the
incident occurred…Further, Mr. Nelson testified that the incident did not occur on
school property. It is clear that the matter was a personal dispute between Ms.
Moore and Ms. Simon, and it had obviously nothing to do with Ms. Simon’s job as
a teacher. The State conceded this in their May 9, 2022 Response when they
stated, ‘the matter that prompted the assault is immaterial to the elements of the
charge contained in the indictment and need not be a matter that was school
related.’…This was an altercation that took place between two women who had
personal animosity with each other that had nothing to with the victim’s job as a
school teacher.
Doc. #77-1 at 5–6 (emphasis in original). She next alleges:
DA Mitchell and ADA Brown knew that:
a. The incident between Plaintiff and Ms. Simon did not happen on school
property;
b. Plaintiff’s children did not attend the school where Ms. Simon worked;
c. School had not begun when the incident occurred; and
d. The dispute between Ms. Simon and Plaintiff had nothing to do with Ms.
Simon’s job as a teacher.
Id. at 6. Moore further alleges that Mitchell and Brown “knew that in order to charge [her] with
assault on an educator, … Ms. Simon had to be within the course and scope of her duties as an
educator.” Id.
B. Proposed Amended Claims
Mitchell and Brown argue amendment is futile because the additional factual allegations
do not change that they “are entitled to prosecutorial and qualified immunities as to the remaining
13
federal claims against them” and the “state law claims are barred due to immunities provided by
the MTCA.” Doc. #80 at 1. Moore replies that Mitchell and Brown are not entitled to prosecutorial
immunities or the immunities under the MTCA so the amendments are not futile. Doc. #82 at 3,
10.
As to the re-asserted § 1983 double jeopardy violation claims against Mitchell and Brown
in their individual capacities, 14 Moore fails to plead specific facts in her proposed amended
complaint that show Mitchell or Brown acting outside the scope of their duties as prosecutors. See
generally Doc. #77-1. Rather, the new facts alleged indicate what Mitchell and Brown allegedly
knew when making the decision to initiate and pursue a prosecution against Moore. Doc. #77-1
at 5–6, 8, 10. Such factual allegations only highlight Mitchell and Brown’s considerations when
deciding to initiate the prosecution, supporting the conclusion that they were acting within the
scope of their duties as prosecutors. See Cousin, 325 F.3d at 631 (“[P]rosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct ‘in initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State’s case.’”) (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 486). And though Moore contends these new
alleged facts show Mitchell and Brown “recklessly disregarded their investigative duties when …
institut[ing] a second prosecution,” Doc. #77-1 at 8, she still does not assert any factual allegations
to support the conclusion that Mitchell and Brown acted in an investigatory capacity. See
Singleton, 956 F.3d at 783. Consequently, Moore’s conclusory allegations that Mitchell and
Brown acted in an investigatory capacity do not destroy their absolute prosecutorial immunity.15
14
Moore asserts a § 1983 double jeopardy violation claim against Mitchell in her individual capacity for the first time
in the proposed amended complaint. Compare Doc. #1, with Doc. #77-1.
Even if Mitchell and Brown were not entitled to absolute immunity based on an investigatory capacity argument,
they would still be entitled to qualified immunity against Moore’s proposed amended § 1983 claims because (1) state
prosecutors are entitled to qualified immunity for investigative acts—as discussed above; and (2) Moore’s proposed
amended § 1983 claims are not supported by any new facts that would change the Court’s finding that she did not
sufficiently allege a violation of a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged
14
15
See Collins, 224 F.3d at 498 (“In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a
plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.”). Therefore, Mitchell and
Brown are absolutely immune to the amended § 1983 double jeopardy violation claims against
them in their individual capacities.
As to the proposed amended complaint’s state law claims for negligence/gross negligence
and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Mitchell and Brown in their individual
capacities, 16 Moore’s proposed factual allegations fail to show Mitchell or Brown acting in a
manner not shielded by the discretionary function exemption under the MTCA. See Doc. #77-1
at 5–6, 8, 13–14. As explained above, the proposed new factual allegations go to the merits of the
prosecution’s case against Moore, which only highlights that Mitchell and Brown were exercising
their discretion as prosecutors in choosing to seek indictment. See Burnett, 2011 WL 4036688, at
*7 (under § 11-46-9(1)(d), seeking an indictment is plainly a “discretionary function” of state
district attorney’s office). So nothing in the proposed amended complaint changes the fact that
Mitchell and Brown are shielded by the MTCA’s discretionary function exemption regarding the
negligence/gross negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against them in
their individual capacities. 17
In sum, as to the § 1983 claims and state law claims in the proposed amended complaint,
Moore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. So amending the complaint to add
conduct. Accordingly, even if Moore pled sufficient facts in her proposed amended complaint to support her allegation
that Mitchell and Brown were acting in an investigatory capacity, her proposed amended §1983 claims would still be
futile.
Moore asserts negligence/gross negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against Mitchell in
her individual capacity for the first time in the proposed amended complaint. Compare Doc. #1, with Doc. #77-1.
16
Mitchell and Brown also argue they are immune to Moore’s amended state law claims under Mississippi Code §
11-46-9(1)(a)—the judicial action exemption. Doc. #80 at 18–21. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court
agrees such exemption applies to the extent the judicial action exemption includes the quasi-judicial action of initiating
a prosecution.
17
15
the proposed factual allegations as support for these claims would be futile. Owens v. Mason, No.
3-18-cv-200, 2018 WL 6580509, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 13, 2018) (proposed claim futile because
the plaintiff “failed to plead specific facts” to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
C. Proposed Malicious Prosecution and Civil Conspiracy Claims
Moore’s proposed amended complaint adds § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution 18 and
civil conspiracy. Moore argues Mitchell and Brown acted maliciously when bringing a second
criminal proceeding because they “lacked probable cause to bring the second criminal case” and
“conspired with each other to institute a second prosecution against [her]” “with the goal of
violating [her] constitutional rights.” Doc. #77-1 at 14–15. Mitchell and Brown respond that their
absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to these new proposed claims and, even if they are not
absolutely immune, they have qualified immunity. Doc. #80 at 22. Moore replies that these
immunities do not apply because both Mitchell and Brown were acting in an administrative or
investigatory capacity. Doc. #82 at 3.
When asserting the malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy claims under § 1983, Moore
relies on the same factual allegations discussed above, 19 which the Court has already determined
fall within the scope of activity subject to absolute immunity. Therefore, Mitchell and Brown are
Mitchell and Brown addressed the merits of a malicious prosecution claim under state law in the memorandum brief
in support of their May 11 motion to dismiss. Doc. #70 at 14. Moore’s complaint did not contain this claim. See
generally Doc. #1. In her response to the motion to dismiss, Moore states, “Oddly enough, Defendants argue against
a malicious prosecution claim. However, Plaintiff has not yet asserted such a claim. Nevertheless, Plaintiff intends to
file a motion for leave to amend her complaint to assert a claim for malicious prosecution.” Doc. #75 at 10 n.2.
18
19
See Doc. #77-1 at 5–6, 8, 14–15.
16
absolutely immune to the new claims of malicious prosecution 20 and civil conspiracy. 21 See Loupe
v. O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016) (prosecutor absolutely immune from a suit for
money damages based on malicious prosecution because prosecutors have absolute immunity for
their role in initiating a prosecution). Moore’s proposed amended complaint then fails to state
claims for relief in that regard so amendment would be futile. See Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co.,
LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000) (amendment futile when “amended complaint would fail
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted”).
D. Summary
Because Moore’s proposed amended complaint does not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis,
Moore’s motion to amend her complaint will be denied as futile.
In the alternative, Mitchell and Brown argue they have qualified immunity against the malicious prosecution claim
because in order to defeat a qualified immunity argument, a cause of action must exist at the time of the violation.
Doc. #80 at 23. The Fifth Circuit did not recognize malicious prosecution as a “violation of the United States
Constitution” until 2022, when the United States Supreme Court recognized malicious prosecution as protected under
the Fourth Amendment. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 2003); see Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S.
36, 42 (2022) (recognizing malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment); Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th
262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023) (Thompson “overrul[ed] our precedent” that denied constitutional malicious prosecution
claims). To defeat qualified immunity, Moore would need to show that the right against malicious prosecution was
clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016). Because
such right was not clearly established at the time of Mitchell and Brown’s alleged conduct in 2019, Mitchell and
Brown would be entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim. See Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th
278, 289 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim based on defendant’s
pre-Thompson conduct because “this court’s caselaw explicitly disclaimed the existence [of such a claim] at the time
of [defendant’s] alleged conduct”).
20
In the alternative, Mitchell and Brown argue qualified immunity as to the civil conspiracy claim because Moore’s
underlying malicious prosecution claim is without merit. Doc. #80 at 24–25. As discussed above, a malicious
prosecution constitutional claim did not exist as a cause of action at the time of the alleged violation. So Moore does
not adequately allege a constitutional or statutory violation of a clearly established right. See Mowbray, 274 F.3d at
279; Smith v. Heap, 31 F.4th at 905, 911 (5th Cir. 2022).
21
17
VI
Conclusion
The motion to dismiss [69] is GRANTED. The remaining claims against Mitchell and
Brown are DISMISSED with prejudice. Moore’s motion to amend [77] and motion to correct
[78] are DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of March, 2024.
/s/Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?