McPhail v. Lynchard
Filing
22
ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE. CASE CLOSED. Signed by District Judge Debra M. Brown on 1/27/2025. (zdg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
BEAU MCPHAIL
PLAINTIFF
V.
NO. 4:24-CV-2-DMB-JMV
HONORABLE PERCY L.
LYNCHARD
DEFENDANT
ORDER
This Court ordered Beau McPhail, a minor, to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed due to his lack of capacity to sue. Because McPhail fails to show cause, this case will
be dismissed without prejudice.
I
Procedural History
On January 9, 2024, Beau McPhail filed a pro se “Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief” against “Honorable State Court Judge Percy L. Lynchard,” alleging various claims related
to state court child custody and child support determinations associated with his parents’ divorce. 1
Doc. #1. In an affidavit attached to his complaint, McPhail avers that he is seventeen years old at
the time of filing. Doc. #1-1 at PageID 69.
On June 20, 2024, McPhail filed as a pro se motion a document titled, “Special Provisional
Appearance of Ronald Palmer as Next Friend or Non-Attorney Counsel for Beau McPhail.” 2 Doc.
1
McPhail previously filed suit against Lynchard in this federal district regarding the same matters but that case was
dismissed without prejudice due to McPhail’s lack of capacity to sue and failure to sue through a next friend or
guardian ad litem. See McPhail v. Lynchard, No. 4:23-cv-174, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179850 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 5,
2023).
2
As noted in this Court’s July 30 order, “[t]he document, including its certificate of service, is purported to be signed
by ‘/s/ Ronald Palmer,’ but based on the handwriting ‘RP Beau McPhail’ or ‘RP’ beside such signature (and because
it appears there is no one named Ronald Palmer with credentials to electronically file documents in this Court’s
CM/ECF system), the document was signed only by McPhail.” Doc. #16 at PageID 153, 154.
#16. United States Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden denied the June 20 pro se motion on July 29,
2024, for failure to establish a significant relationship between McPhail and Palmer, and because
non-attorneys may not litigate the interests of others. Doc. #17 at 4.
The next day, this Court ordered McPhail to show cause within fourteen days why this case
should not be dismissed without prejudice for his lack of capacity to sue. 3 Doc. #18. On August
12, 2024, McPhail filed “Plaintiff’s Challenges to Orders [17, 18],” Doc. #21, which the Court
construes as his response to the show cause order.
II
Discussion
In his show cause response, McPhail argues:
Federal Rule of Federal Procedure 17(b) is unconstitutional as applied by this court
to [him] in this case because it grants the state legislature of Mississippi illegitimate
authority to define [his] fundamental right of access to a federal court and his First
Amendment protected right to petition this court in a manner that impermissibly
classifies him as a being without the same fundamental right to access to federal
courts and the same fundamental right to petition federal courts as 18-year-olds in
other states.
Doc. #21 at 2. Fundamentally, it seems McPhail contends an equal protection violation would
occur if the Court enforced Rule 17(b) against him. 4 Id. at 3, 21, 28.
To establish an equal protection claim, McPhail must show, among other things, that he is
a member of a suspect class treated differently from other similarly situated persons such that he
is denied a fundamental right. Big Tyme Invs., L.L.C. v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 468 (5th Cir.
2021). Being under the age of majority is not a suspect class and McPhail cites no authority that
it is. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (“In this case, no one has argued,
3
The Court also denied McPhail’s motion for default judgment without prejudice “[g]iven the pending capacity issue.”
Doc. #18 at 2.
4
McPhail also seems to raise a due process argument. See, e.g., Doc. #21 at PageID 165. However, this Court has
provided McPhail with numerous opportunities to address his lack of capacity to sue.
2
and correctly so, that a classification based on age is a suspect classification.”). Nor does McPhail
cite any authority that the difference between Mississippi residents and residents of other states
who construe the age of majority as eighteen creates a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (suspect class is one “saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.”). So while a federal court should not apply a federal rule of civil
procedure if such application violates the Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act, Douglas v.
NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 979 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir. 1992), McPhail has not shown that applying
Rule 17(b) to him results in such. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) advisory committee’s note to 1937
amendment (referencing Charles E. Clarke & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure,
II. Pleadings and Parties, 44 Yale L.J. 1291, 1312–313 (1935) (Subsection b of Rule 17 furthers
a legitimate state interest of ensuring procedural uniformity in federal courts as an independent
forum by aligning practice with the law of a litigant’s domicile)). Consequently, McPhail has not
shown cause to avoid the dismissal of his complaint for lack of capacity to sue.
III
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of January, 2025.
/s/Debra M. Brown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?