Goliday v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

JUDGMENT in favor of Commissioner of Social Security against Lekesha Goliday. CASE CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roy Percy on 9/25/24. (rrh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
GREENVILLE DIVISION
LEKESHA GOLIDAY

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL CASE NO. 4:24-CV-30-RP

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY

DEFENDANT
OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the plaintiff Lekesha Goliday brought this action for
judicial review of an unfavorable decision of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding an
application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, as well as an application
for supplemental security income. The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF #13. The undersigned held a
hearing on September 25, 2024. Having considered the record, the administrative transcript, the
briefs of the parties, the oral arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the court finds the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
Standard of Review
In determining disability, the Commissioner, through the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”), works through a five-step sequential evaluation process.1 The burden rests upon
plaintiff throughout the first four steps of this five-step process to prove disability, and if plaintiff
is successful in sustaining his burden at each of the first four levels, then the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five.2 First, plaintiff must prove [she] is not currently engaged in

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2010).
2
Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1999).
1

substantial gainful activity.3 Second, plaintiff must prove her impairment is “severe” in that it
“significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities . . . .”4 At step
three the ALJ must conclude plaintiff is disabled if he proves that his impairments meet or are
medically equivalent to one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1,
§§ 1.00-114.09 (2010).5 If plaintiff does not meet this burden, at step four he must prove that he
is incapable of meeting the physical and mental demands of his past relevant work.6 At step five,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove, considering plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity, age, education and past work experience, that he is capable of performing other work.7
If the Commissioner proves other work exists which plaintiff can perform, plaintiff is given the
chance to prove that he cannot, in fact, perform that work.8
The court considers on appeal whether the Commissioner’s final decision is supported by
substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner used the correct legal standard. Crowley v.
Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1993);
Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). The court has the responsibility to
scrutinize the entire record to determine whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied in reviewing the claim. Ransom v.
Heckler, 715 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1983). The court has limited power of review and may not
reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner,9 even if it finds

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b) (2010).
4
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (2010).
5
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (2010). If a claimant’s impairment meets certain criteria, that
claimant’s impairments are “severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.925 (2003).
6
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2010).
7
20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (2010).
8
Muse, 925 F.2d at 789.
9
Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). 
3

that the evidence leans against the Commissioner’s decision.10 The Fifth Circuit has held that
substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crowley v.
Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Conflicts in the evidence are for the
Commissioner to decide, and if there is substantial evidence to support the decision, it must be
affirmed even if there is evidence on the other side. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th
Cir. 1990). The court’s inquiry is whether the record, as a whole, provides sufficient evidence
that would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions of the ALJ. Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). “If supported by substantial evidence, the decision of the
[Commissioner] is conclusive and must be affirmed.” Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir.
1994), citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
Commissioner’s Decision
At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that the plaintiff has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of March 1, 2020. At step
two, he found that the plaintiff had the severe impairments of disorder of the right knee, diabetes
mellitus (DM) with loss of sensation of the right toes, cough variant asthma, reduced vision, and
obesity. At step three, he found that the plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. The ALJ then
determined that the plaintiff has the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work,
except:
[S]he cannot work at heights or around unprotected work hazards; she cannot perform
jobs requiring fine distance vision; and she must avoid concentrated exposure to dust
chemicals and other pulmonary irritants.

10

Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994); Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988). 

At step four, the ALJ found that the plaintiff is not capable of performing any of her past
relevant work. Finally, at step five, the ALJ found that considering the plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the plaintiff can perform, such as the representative light, unskilled jobs of bench
assembler, wire worker, and press machine operator. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the
plaintiff is not disabled.
Discussion
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have ordered a visual consultative examination
in light of her primary care physician Harold Wheeler’s notation on a prescription form that the
plaintiff “appears legally blind, please evaluate.” “The ALJ’s duty to undertake a full inquiry,
however, ‘does not require a consultative examination at government expense unless the record
establishes that such an examination is necessary to enable the administrative law j
udge to make the disability decision.’” Pierre v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 802 (1989) (quoting
Turner v. Califano, 563 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original)). Whether to require such
an examination is within the ALJ’s discretion. Pierre, 884 F.2d at 802. Even where an ALJ has failed
to develop an adequate record, reversal is not warranted unless the claimant shows he was prejudiced
as a result. Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir. 1984). “[He] must show that, had the ALJ
done his duty, [he] could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result.” Kane,
731 F.2d at 1220.
As the ALJ explained in his decision in this case, Dr. Wheeler is unauthorized to determine
statutory blindness, and there is no competent record evidence indicating that the plaintiff’s reduced
vision meets the statutory definition of blindness, which is defined as central visual acuity of 20/200 or
less in the better eye with the use of a corrective lens. To the contrary, the physician who performed

the plaintiff’s internal medicine CE performed a visual acuity test and noted that although the
plaintiff’s vision was impaired despite glasses, with glasses she had visual acuity of 20/40 in the right
eye and 20/30 in the left eye. Although the definition of statutory blindness may also be met by a
visual field limitation such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater
than 20 degrees, there is no record evidence of any such limitation.
As the ALJ pointed out, there is no support for Dr. Wheeler’s suggestion of legal
blindness in his own treatment notes, which document normal eye exams, no complaints of
vision or other eye problems, and no testing, diagnosis, or treatment related to any visual
condition. The court finds that notwithstanding Dr. Wheeler’s isolated, unexplained, and
unsupported notation that the plaintiff “appears legally blind,” the record does not establish that a
visual CE was necessary to enable the ALJ to make the disability determination, and the ALJ did
not abuse his discretion in not ordering one. Further, the plaintiff has not shown what evidence
such a CE would have adduced that might have altered the result.
For these reasons and for those announced on the record at the conclusion of oral arguments in
this case, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
This, the 25th day of September, 2024.
/s/ Roy Percy
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE