Rigsby et al v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company et al
Filing
1128
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Relators' 1104 Motion to Initiate Discovery, Impose Maximum Penalty, Award Maximum Relators' Share, and Award Relators Their Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Costs. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 2/21/2014. (ENW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
CORI RIGSBY and KERRI RIGSBY
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY CO., et al.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
RELATORS
Civil No. 1:06CV433-HSO-RHW
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART RELATORS’ MOTION TO INITIATE DISCOVERY,
IMPOSE MAXIMUM PENALTY, AWARD MAXIMUM
RELATORS’ SHARE, AND AWARD RELATORS THEIR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES, EXPENSES, AND COSTS
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion to Initiate Discovery, Impose Maximum
Penalty, Award Maximum Relators’ Share, and Award Relators Their Attorneys’
Fees, Expenses, and Costs [1104], filed by Relators Cori Rigsby and Kerri Rigsby.
Both the United States of America1 and Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company [“State Farm”] have filed Responses [1106], [1107] to the Motion [1104],
and Relators have filed a Reply [1112]. After consideration of the Motion, the
related pleadings, the record in this case, and relevant legal authorities, and for the
reasons that follow, the Court finds that Relators’ Motion [1104] should be granted
in part and denied in part. Relators’ request to award the maximum Relators’ share
will be granted, their request to initiate expanded discovery will be denied, and
their requests for an award of the maximum civil penalty and for attorneys’ fees,
1
The Government responded only to that portion of Relators’ Motion [1104]
addressing the share of the recovery. Govt.’s Resp. [1106] at 1. The Government takes no
position on the remainder of Relators’ Motion. Id. at 1 n.1.
expenses, and costs will be granted in part and denied in part. In accordance with
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), the United States Government will be awarded treble damages
in the amount of $750,000.00, plus a civil penalty in the amount of $8,250.00, for a
total sum of $758,250.00. Relators will be awarded 30 percent of this amount
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2), with 15 percent being awarded to each Relator.
Relators are also entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$2,610,149.80 and expenses in the amount of $303,078.89, for a total award of
$2,913,228.69 in fees and expenses, as well as their costs upon submission of an
appropriate bill of costs.
I. BACKGROUND
Relators Cori Rigsby and Kerri Rigsby filed their initial Complaint [2] in this
case on April 26, 2006, in camera and under seal, pursuant to the False Claims Act
[“FCA”], 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq. Relators filed an Amended Complaint [16] on
May 22, 2007, which remains the operative pleading. Relators allege that State
Farm attempted to shift its responsibility for Hurricane Katrina wind damage at
residential properties covered by both a homeowner’s insurance policy and a flood
insurance policy by classifying wind damage as storm surge damage, thereby
recasting State Farm’s liability for wind losses on such properties as flood losses
which the Government would be responsible to pay under the National Flood
Insurance Program [“NFIP”]. At the conclusion of a trial in this case, the jury
determined that State Farm had submitted to the Government a false claim and a
false record material to a false claim in connection with damage to the home of
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Thomas and Pamela McIntosh located in Biloxi, Mississippi. A more detailed
procedural history of this case can be found in the Court’s Order [1127] denying
State Farm’s Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law [1101] and for a New Trial
[1102].
Relators have charged that State Farm engaged in a scheme to defraud the
Government and have sought expansive discovery into flood claims made at
residential properties other than the McIntoshes’. It is undisputed that Relators
did not have firsthand knowledge of these other alleged claims. This Court has
previously determined that
[t]he McIntosh claim is the only instance of State Farm’s having
submitted an allegedly false claim of which the Relator Kerri Rigsby has
first hand knowledge, i.e. direct and independent knowledge sufficient to
support the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, in light of the decision of
the United States not to intervene.
Mem. Op. [343], at 10. For this reason, earlier in this litigation the Court limited
Relators’ request for discovery, stating that “[i]n the event the Relators prevail on
the merits of their allegations concerning the McIntosh claim, [the Court] will then
consider whether additional discovery and further proceedings are warranted.” Id.
On April 8, 2013, the jury reached its unanimous verdict on Relators’
remaining two claims. Specifically, the jury found that State Farm knowingly
presented, or caused to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
Government, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval in connection with
the McIntosh flood claim, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994), and that
State Farm knowingly made, used, or caused to be made or used, a false record or
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statement material to a false or fraudulent claim in connection with the McIntosh
flood claim, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2009). Special Verdict Form
[1092] at 2–3. The jury determined that the Government suffered damages in
connection with the McIntosh flood claim in the amount of $250,000.00. Id. at 3.
In light of the jury’s verdict, Relators now ask the Court to permit them to
initiate expanded discovery into claims on other properties insured by State Farm,
to impose the maximum civil penalty and award the maximum Relators’ share
allowable for FCA claims, and to award Relators their attorneys’ fees, expenses, and
costs.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Relators’ Request for Expanded Discovery
1.
The Parties’ Positions
Relators assert that they “have earned the right to take discovery regarding
the full scope of State Farm’s now indisputable fraud.” Relators’ Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. [1105] at 11. Relators contend that they have alleged a fraudulent scheme in
their Amended Complaint with sufficient particularity to obtain discovery not
limited to the specific examples of that fraud identified in the Amended Complaint.
Id. at 14.
State Farm responds that Relators are attempting to “claim smuggle” and
that the Court has no jurisdiction in this case over any other potential claims under
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at 8. State
Farm argues that the jury did not determine State Farm engaged in any “scheme”
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to defraud the Government and that Relators are not entitled to additional
discovery based upon any such alleged fraudulent scheme. Id. at 10–12. In support
of its position, State Farm points out that Relators’ conspiracy claim was dismissed
at trial for insufficiency of evidence. Id. at 18.
State Farm also maintains that Relators have not pleaded which additional
false claims State Farm submitted with particularity sufficient to provide a reliable
indicia that State Farm engaged in a scheme to shift Hurricane Katrina wind
damage to the Government through the NFIP. Id. at 12–16. State Farm contends
that Relators’ conduct in connection with the allegations “should have enabled
Relators to come forward long before now and allege specific facts sufficient under
Rule 9(b) to support additional alleged FCA violations, if there were such facts.”
Id. at 17. According to State Farm, Relators cannot now “‘discover’ their way into
‘original source’ status.” Id.
In an earlier Memorandum Opinion [343] entered on August 10, 2009, the
Court considered ten substantive Motions, including State Farm’s Motion to
Dismiss [98] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). At that
time, the Court found that Relators had stated their FCA claim as to the McIntosh
property with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). Mem.
Op. [343] at 9. Because the McIntosh claim was the only instance of State Farm’s
having submitted an allegedly false claim of which either Relator had firsthand
knowledge, the Court “limit[ed] the presentation of evidence in this action to facts
relevant to the McIntosh claim.” Id. at 10. “In the event the Relators prevail on the
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merits of their allegations concerning the McIntosh claim,” the Court stated that it
would “then consider whether additional discovery and further proceedings are
warranted.” Id. The Court did not state or indicate that expanded discovery would
automatically result from a favorable jury verdict on the McIntosh claim.
2.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may
be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “[C]laims brought under the FCA must
comply with the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) for claims of fraud.” United
States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 735 F.3d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quotation omitted).
With respect to the scope of discovery generally,
[u]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court
may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved
in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed
by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “A district court has broad discretion in all discovery
matters . . . .” Moore v. CITGO Refining and Chemicals Co., 735 F.3d 309, 315 (5th
Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Discovery rulings are committed to the sound
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discretion of the trial court.” McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir.
2013) (quotation omitted).
In United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2009), a
False Claims Act case in which doctors and a hospital allegedly billed Medicare and
Medicaid for services not performed, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered the level of detail required by Rule 9(b) in a False Claims
Act case.
[T]o plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud for a
False Claims Act § 3729(a)(1) claim, a relator’s complaint, if it cannot
allege the details of an actually submitted false claim, may nevertheless
survive by alleging particular details of a scheme to submit false claims
paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims
were actually submitted.
Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. The Fifth Circuit explained that the details which would
lead to a “strong inference” that false claims were “actually submitted” would
include items “such as dates and descriptions of recorded, but unprovided, services
and a description of the billing system that the records were likely entered into . . .
.” Id. at 190–91. In this context, however, Rule 9(b) “prevents . . . the filing of
baseless claims as a pretext to gain access to a ‘fishing expedition.’” Id. at 191.
Finding that the relator in that case, Dr. Grubbs, had alleged sufficient detail to
satisfy Rule 9(b), the Fifth Circuit “emphasize[d] that we decide only that the
allegations are sufficient to gain Dr. Grubbs access to the discovery process. We
leave to the able district court to manage this access-discovery targeted to the
claims alleged, avoiding a search for new claims.” Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
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3.
Analysis
In their briefing on the present Motion and in their Amended Complaint [16],
Relators rely upon their theory about State Farm’s alleged scheme to shift its
responsibility to pay claims for wind damage under State Farm homeowner’s
insurance policies to the United States Government through the NFIP as a
justification for the expansion of discovery. Even assuming Relators have pleaded
sufficient details regarding the existence of a scheme, as to any claims other than
the McIntosh claim, the Amended Complaint [16] lacks sufficient details that lead
to a “strong inference” that any additional claims were “actually submitted” to the
Government, as required by Grubbs.2 In other words, the Relators attempt to rely
upon the existence of a scheme and the single false McIntosh claim to open the door
to additional discovery into other suspected false claims, for which few if any details
at all have been pleaded. Grubbs requires more than simply adequately pleading
the existence of a scheme and one specific claim; information which would support
the strong inference that other claims were actually submitted is also necessary.
Grubbs teaches that under the circumstances of this case, the expansion of
discovery beyond the McIntosh claim would amount to, as Grubbs described it, a
“fishing expedition” for new claims. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190–91.
2
Relators did reference one other specific claim in their Amended Complaint [16],
the Mullins claim. Am. Compl. [16] at 20. However, the Court has previously determined
that Relators’ allegations regarding this property have “been shown to be invalid.” Mem.
Op. [343] at 3.
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Armed with knowledge of a purported scheme and evidence related to the
single McIntosh claim, Relators seek far-reaching, unfettered discovery in order to
search for new claims beyond the McIntosh claim, the only false claim of which they
have firsthand knowledge. Grubbs states that even if a complaint survives a Rule
9(b) challenge, discovery should be tailored to the claims alleged, so as to avoid a
search for new claims. Id. at 195. To allow expanded discovery in the fashion
Relators seek would permit improper smuggling of additional claims beyond the
single claim of which Relators have personal knowledge.
Had Relators pleaded sufficient facts to create a strong inference that State
Farm had submitted any other claims to the Government in conjunction with the
alleged scheme, the Court could “limit[] any ‘fishing’ to a small pond that is either
stocked or dead.” Id. at 191. However, Relators have not pleaded sufficient details
regarding any other claims to survive a Rule 9(b) challenge. Were the Court to
grant Relators’ request, discovery would necessarily be overly broad because the
Amended Complaint lacks enough detail to permit the Court to craft reasonable
discovery parameters. Beyond the McIntosh claim, the Relators’ conclusory
allegations in the Amended Complaint [16] as to the existence of other specific FCA
violations do not satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), and expanded
discovery would lead to an inappropriate fishing expedition for new claims. See
Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190–91. Relators’ request for additional discovery should be
denied.
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Relators have not sought leave to amend the pleadings to allege any
additional details about other claims. Relators have attached to their Reply [1112]
in support of the present Motion a list of “Revised Engineering Reports” supplied by
Forensic Analysis & Engineering Corporation. The list appears to reflect eighteen
(18) engineering reports performed on properties in addition to the McIntoshes’.
Relators assert that “State Farm coerced the results of an engineering analysis” on
these properties. Reply [1112] at 7. Even if this list attached to a Reply brief could
somehow be construed as a request by Relators to amend the pleadings, for the
reasons that follow Relators’ conclusory statements as to the import of these reports
would be insufficient to survive a Rule 9(b) challenge.
Relators obtained the list during discovery from former Defendant Forensic,
in response to an interrogatory that asked Forensic to “[i]dentify each engineering
report related to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina that was reviewed, updated,
changed, or altered in any way after such report was provided to State Farm.”
Forensic’s Resps. [992-2] at 4. The Fifth Circuit has held that the requirement for
particularity in pleading fraud “must be laid out before access to the discovery
process is granted,” and that courts are required to apply Rule 9(b) “with force,
without apology.” Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis in original). Other district courts in the Fifth Circuit have rejected
attempts to amend a fraud complaint based upon facts learned during discovery.
See, e.g., In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, LLC, Nos. 11-1659 &
13-508, 2014 WL 107870, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2014) (citing United States for the
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Use and Benefit of Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc. v. Grot, Inc., No. 4:05CV77, 2005 WL
2012263, at **2–3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2005)).
The central issue in this case has been State Farm’s adjustment of flood
claims under the NFIP. Relators have maintained throughout this litigation that
State Farm ordered engineering reports only in instances where it was adjusting
wind claims, and that the reports were contained in State Farm homeowners’ wind
claim files, not in flood claim files. The list attached to Relators’ Reply provides, at
most, reliable indicia that the owners of these eighteen (18) properties more likely
than not had a homeowners’ policy with State Farm, that those insured individuals
submitted a homeowners’ claim to State Farm for wind damage sustained during
Hurricane Katrina, and that the engineering reports in the homeowners’ claim files
were “reviewed, updated, changed, or altered in any way after such report was
provided to State Farm.” Forensic’s Resps. [992-2] at 4. It is unclear from Relators’
discovery request and the list itself what changes were made to the reports and
whether such changes had anything to do with flood damage, if any, sustained at
that particular property. State Farm’s conduct with respect to the adjustment of
homeowners’ claims, in and of itself, is insufficient to state a claim that State Farm
violated the FCA with respect to a particular flood claim.
For instance, Relators have not alleged that any of these eighteen (18)
properties were even covered by an SFIP, let alone an SFIP issued and adjusted by
State Farm. Even assuming all eighteen (18) properties were covered by a State
Farm issued SFIP, Relators have not offered sufficient detail to provide reliable
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indicia that would lead to a strong inference that any flood claims were actually
submitted on any of these eighteen (18) properties. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190.3
Even if State Farm somehow coerced Forensic to manipulate the engineering
reports for homeowners’ wind claim files, as Relators allege, this fact alone would
not necessarily mean that these properties were also covered by a State Farm
issued SFIP or that any claims, false or otherwise, were made on a particular SFIP.
The Court therefore finds that the inclusion of this list in a Second Amended
Complaint would not add sufficiently detailed factual allegations to overcome a
motion to dismiss. For these reasons as well, Relators’ request to expand discovery
should be denied.
B.
Relators’ Request for the Court to Impose Maximum Civil Penalty
Relators assert that “[i]n light of the magnitude of State Farm’s intentional
fraud upon the federal government, the Court should assess the maximum civil
penalty of $11,000 against State Farm.” Relators’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. [1105] at
17. Relators contend that “State Farm knowingly employed a systematic fraud in
the wake of a devastating natural disaster to enrich itself at the Government’s
expense.” Id. at 18.
3
The Court notes that one of the properties on the Forensic list was Terri Mullins’
property, which has already “been shown to be invalid.” Mem. Op. [343] at 3. The Mullins’
property identified in the Amended Complaint was located at 6057 Pine Tree Drive, Kiln,
Mississippi. Am. Compl. [16] at 20. In support of an earlier Motion to Dismiss [91], State
Farm supplied discovery responses from Terri and William Mullins’ lawsuit against State
Farm where the Mullins stated that they “never applied for or obtained flood insurance
with the National Flood Insurance Program for the property located at 6057 Pine Tree
Drive, Kiln, Mississippi.” Discovery Resps. [91-13] at 10–11.
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State Farm responds that “[a] jury’s finding of a single putative false claim
cannot be characterized as ‘systematic’ in any sense.” Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to
Relators’ Mot. [1108] at 24. State Farm maintains that there is no basis in the
record for imposition of the maximum penalty and that imposition of the minimum
civil penalty of $5,500.00 is appropriate. Id. at 23–24.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) provides that any person who violates § 3729(a)(1) “is
liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000
and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990 . . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2009); see Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation and Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat. 890
(1990). Pursuant to the adjustment, the civil penalty presently ranges from
$5,500.00 to $11,000.00. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9). The parties do not dispute that this
is the appropriate range for the Court to consider. See, e.g., Relators’ Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. [1105] at 6; Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at 23.
“Congress . . . afforded the federal trial courts considerable discretion in
calculating damages and ascertaining the amount of the civil penalty component,
within the statutory range.” Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl.
116, 124 (2007) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729). While the FCA “does not set any specific
formula for imposing civil penalties, [the Act] authorizes federal trial courts to
award monetary relief that will afford the Government a base civil penalty amount
that can be adjusted, in the court’s discretion, up to the statutory ceiling.” Id.
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (b)(1)). Considering the totality of the circumstances
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surrounding this case, including the evidence and testimony adduced at trial, the
Court is of the opinion that Relators’ request for the maximum civil penalty should
be granted in part and denied in part, and that a penalty in the middle of the range
is most appropriate. The Court will therefore assess a civil penalty against State
Farm in the amount of $8,250.00.
C.
Relators’ Request for the Court to Award Maximum Relators’ Share
Relators contend that they “are entitled to the maximum FCA relator fee of
30 percent in light of the burdens that they have carried, the substantial
contributions they have made with no assistance from the government, and the
sacrifices they have endured for seven years.” Relators’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot.
[1105] at 18. According to Relators, “[t]he ponderous docket in this case is a
testament to the Relators’ contribution and the oppressiveness of the burdens they
have endured.” Id. at 20.
The Government has responded to this portion of Relators’ Motion [1104] and
takes the position that Relators’ request for a share of the recovery should be denied
without prejudice as premature. Govt.’s Resp. [1106] at 1. According to the
Government, in most cases the United States Department of Justice is able to
negotiate an agreement with a relator’s counsel without the need for involvement
from the court, and this issue is not yet ripe for determination because State Farm’s
liability has not been adjudged with finality in light of the pendency of State Farm’s
post-trial Motions. Id. at 2. The Government also states that in the event the scope
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of proceedings are expanded, Relators might obtain a significantly larger recovery.
Id. at 3.
State Farm maintains that “[t]he Court should pretermit this issue
altogether.” Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at 24. State Farm
asserts that the Department of Justice and Relators should first determine any
Relators’ share, such that this matter is not ripe for judicial review and
adjudication. Id.
State Farm’s post-trial Motions and Relators’ request to expand the scope of
these proceedings have now been resolved. The Government has had ample time to
negotiate a resolution with Relators. The Government has cited no authority, and
the Court has found none, which requires the Court to give the Government any
additional time beyond what it has already had to negotiate a settlement. While
the Court appreciates the Government’s position, in the current procedural posture
of this case the Court finds that a stay pending such negotiation is not warranted.
The Court sees no just reason to delay resolution of the question of Relators’ share.
The Government has elected not intervene in this case. See, e.g., Notice [56]
at 1. If the Government does not proceed with an action under the FCA,
the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an
amount which the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil
penalty and damages. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and
not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement and
shall be paid out of such proceeds.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
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This matter has been pending for nearly eight (8) years, and Relators’ current
counsel has litigated this case for over five and a half (5 ½) years, responding to
numerous dispositive motions and voluminous pleadings. Relators have shouldered
the entire burden of prosecuting this matter and bringing the McIntosh claim to
verdict. Given the extensive amount of time and effort expended and the significant
expenses incurred by Relators, without any involvement by the Government, the
Court finds that the maximum 30 percent share is an appropriate award for
Relators. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). The Court will divide this share equally
between the two Relators in this case, 15 percent to Cori Rigsby and 15 percent to
Kerri Rigsby. Relators’ request for the Court to award the maximum share will be
granted.
D.
Relators’ Request for the Court to Award Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and
Costs
1.
The Parties’ Positions
Relators assert that they are entitled to an award against State Farm of their
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred to obtain the verdict against State
Farm. Relators’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. [1105] at 23. Relators seek fees, costs, and
expenses for work performed by the two law firms that currently represent them,
Weisbrod Matteis & Copley, PLLC [“WMC”] and Heidelberg Harmon PLLC [“HH”],
in the amounts of $1,232,735.06, and $287,346.34, respectively. Id. at 23–26.
Relators have also submitted a request for the fees, costs, and expenses of a law
firm that previously represented them, Gilbert LLP [“Gilbert”], in the amount of
$5,225,303.67. Id. Relators have supplied declarations and affidavits supporting
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the billings by WMC and HH; however, they have submitted only spreadsheets of
fees and costs reported by Gilbert. Relators “invited Gilbert to provide an affidavit
or declaration as to the reasonableness of the fees and expenses reflected on those
spreadsheets, and Gilbert has declined to do so at this time.” Id. at 24 n.59.
State Farm responds that Relators have failed to show any entitlement to an
award of legal fees and expenses and have failed to establish the reasonableness of
their litigation expense reimbursement requests. Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’
Mot. [1108] at 25 (citing Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th
Cir. 2006)). State Farm agrees that the lodestar analysis is appropriate in this
case, but argues that the hourly rates claimed for Gilbert attorneys are “patently
unreasonable for this jurisdiction” and that “the failure of Gilbert or anyone else to
provide proper support for the rates requested forfeits the opportunity to submit
any further evidence by affidavit or otherwise on the issue.” Id. at 27 (citing La.
Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 326 (5th Cir. 1999)). State Farm
complains that the documentation submitted does not identify the Gilbert attorneys
by name or experience. Id. at 27 n.7. State Farm also argues that the rates for
WMC are unreasonable in this district and are based upon rates within the District
of Columbia, and that HH “apparently already has been paid by either the Gilbert
firm or WMC . . . .” Id. at 28.
With respect to the number of hours expended by Relators’ counsel, State
Farm contends that the descriptions of work performed by Gilbert employees is too
vague to determine the nature of the work billed or whether the work was
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performed by an attorney or paralegal. Id. at 29. State Farm also complains that
Relators have submitted bills related to all claims, regardless of whether Relators
prevailed on them. State Farm argues that a significant downward adjustment of
at least one-third of the requested amounts should be made due to the number of
unsuccessful claims, including Relators’ claims for retaliatory discharge, reverse
false claim, and conspiracy, and due to the number of original Defendants, eleven
(11), who were voluntarily dismissed by Relators without the benefit of a
settlement. Id. at 29–30 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1974)). State Farm further suggests that an additional downward
adjustment from the lodestar calculation is warranted because “Relators have
refused to document their attorneys’ and fee [sic] requests with copies of their fee
agreements with their attorneys notwithstanding that the agreements were
requested by State Farm during discovery and ordered produced by this Court.”
Id. at 30.
State Farm posits that Relators’ retention of counsel from Washington, D.C.,
was unnecessary and unreasonably drove up the hourly rates, that the billing
records reflect purported “inefficiencies and duplication of effort,” and that “a
significant portion of the fees and expenses sought was unnecessarily incurred” as a
result of issues with Relators’ former counsel, whom this Court disqualified from
representing Relators. Id. at 32. Finally, State Farm argues that the out-of-state
travel expenses being sought were unnecessary because Mississippi counsel was
available, and other charges including in-office meals for Relators’ counsel, office air
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conditioning charges, and reimbursement for Kerri Rigsby’s credit card, are
unauthorized and are “classic examples of double dipping since they are already a
component of the attorneys’ hourly rates.” Id. at 32–33.
2.
Analysis
If the Government does not proceed with an action under the FCA, the person
bringing the action
shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court
finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the
defendant.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
a.
Attorneys’ Fees
(1)
Legal Standard
Relators and State Farm ask the Court to apply the lodestar method in
determining the amount of attorneys’ fees Relators should be awarded. Relators’
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. [1105] at 24; Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at
26. While neither side has cited the Court to any binding authority holding that the
lodestar method should be utilized in an FCA case, other Circuit Courts of Appeals
have approved use of this method in FCA cases. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2009); Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co.,
510 F.3d 610, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court finds this authority persuasive and
will employ the lodestar method to calculate the appropriate attorneys’ fee award in
this case.
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In the first step of this method, the Court determines the lodestar, which “is
calculated by multiplying the number of hours an attorney reasonably spent on the
case by an appropriate hourly rate, which is the market rate in the community for
this work.” Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). The resulting figure provides an objective basis upon which to make an
initial assessment of the value of a lawyer’s services. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 (1983). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award
and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. Id. at 436;
Black, 732 F.3d at 502. The Court should exclude from this initial fee calculation
hours which were not “reasonably expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The United
States Supreme Court has explained that:
[c]ases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary
widely. Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort
to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is
obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.
Id.
“[A]fter calculating the lodestar, a district court may enhance or decrease the
amount of attorney’s fees based on the relative weights of the twelve factors set forth
in [Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)].”
Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (quotation omitted).
The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill requisite to perform the
legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee charged for
those services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
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circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 502 n.7 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19).
The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the lodestar method yields a
fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve the objective of providing a reasonable
fee, and this presumption is a “strong one.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S.
Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010). Many of the Johnson “factors usually are subsumed within
the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensely, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9. The Fifth Circuit has likewise held that “[t]here is a
strong presumption of the reasonableness of the lodestar amount,” and has
instructed that “[t]he lodestar may not be adjusted to a Johnson factor that was
already taken into account during the initial calculation of the lodestar.” Black, 732
F.3d at 502 (citation omitted); see also Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800.
(2)
The Amount of Attorneys’ Fees Sought By Relators
The following charts summarize by law firm the requested hourly rate, billed
hours, and lodestar for each billing attorney and paralegal for whom Relators seek
an award of fees.
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Gilbert, LLP
Timekeeper, Position
Requested
Hourly
Rate
August J. Matteis, Attorney4
$525.00
2,441.2
$1,281,630.00
August J. Matteis, Attorney
$600.00
260.8
$156,480.00
Derek Y. Sugimura, Attorney
$400.00
1,531.6
$612,640.00
Derek Y. Sugimura, Attorney
$425.00
75.9
$32,257.50
Unknown Timekeepers (ADW,
AEJ, AS, BD, BW, CJB, CJL,
CMS, CS, CW, DLK, DNW, ED,
FD, GL, JAH, JCR, JG, JKP, JSR,
KJH, KTS, LAS, LCL, LCM, MAP,
MEJ, ML, MP, MTC, MMB, NB,
PC, TK, SDG, SV)
various
rates
6,916.95
$2,492,452.50
11,226.45
$4,575,460.00
TOTAL
Requested
Hours
Requested
Lodestar
Weisbrod Matteis & Copley PLLC
Timekeeper, Position
Requested
Hourly
Rate
Requested
Hours
Requested
Lodestar
August J. Matteis, Attorney
$505.00
1,146.6
$579,033.00
Derek Y. Sugimura, Attorney
$355.00
642.4
$228,052.00
William E. Copley, Attorney
$445.00
370.1
$164,694.50
Pamira S. Matteis, Attorney
$290.00
133.7
$38,773.00
Timothy M. Belknap, Attorney
$245.00
402.4
$98,588.00
2,695.20
$1,109,140.50
TOTAL
4
During the course of their work on this case while employed at Gilbert, LLP,
attorney August J. Matteis’ rate apparently increased from $525.00 to $600.00 per hour,
and attorney Derek Y. Sugimura’s rate increased from $400.00 to $425.00 per hour.
Gilbert Billing [1104-15] at 120. The Court has separated the hours expended by these two
attorneys at each of these hourly rates.
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Heidelberg Harmon PLLC
Timekeeper, Position
Requested
Hourly
Rate
Requested
Hours
Requested
Lodestar
C. Maison Heidelberg, Attorney
$375.00
616.6
$231,225.00
Laura K. Barbour, Attorney
$275.00
23.2
$6,380.00
Macie E. Sledge, Paralegal
$165.00
266.7
$44,005.50
906.5
$281,610.50
TOTAL
(3)
Discussion
The Gilbert and WMC firms are based in Washington, D.C. Relators seek
attorneys’ fees for these firms at hourly rates customarily charged by attorneys in
the Washington, D.C., area, but Relators’ counsel states that he has reduced the
customary billing rates for the attorneys at WMC by approximately ten (10) to
twenty-five (25) percent. Decl. of August J. Matteis, Jr. [1104-8] at 7. State Farm
argues that these rates remain unreasonable because they are derived from
Washington, D.C., data, and that the Court should look only to rates charged in the
Southern District of Mississippi. Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at
27–28.
In determining the lodestar, typically “‘reasonable’ hourly rates ‘are to be
calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’”
McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)); see also Black, 732 F.3d at 502. The Fifth
Circuit has carved out an exception to this general rule when “abundant and
uncontradicted evidence proved the necessity of [the plaintiff’s] turning to
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out-of-district counsel . . . .” Id. at 382. In that instance, counsel’s “‘home’ rates
should be considered as a starting point for calculating the lodestar amount.” Id.
In this case, Relators have submitted the Declaration of Zachary A. Kitts, who
graduated from law school in 2001 and practices qui tam litigation in the
Washington, D.C., area. Mr. Kitts states that there is only one other Jackson,
Mississippi, metropolitan area firm known to him that was qualified to handle this
case. According to Mr. Kitts, this particular firm was unavailable to take this case
because of its workload at the time. Decl. of Zachary A. Kitts [1104-14] at 3–5, 9.
Relators also present the Declaration of Kerri Rigsby in which she avers that
Relators “had a difficult time finding substitute counsel” after the Court disqualified
her prior counsel. Decl. of Kerri Rigsby [1104-7] at 2. Kerri Rigsby states that one
local law firm declined representation and that Relators met with “several out-ofstate firms” which did not agree to represent Relators. Id. at 2–3.
In contrast, State Farm has presented evidence that “retention of
Washington, D.C., counsel was not required” because “[n]umerous Mississippi
lawyers are capable of handling this type of case . . . .” Decl. of David W. Mockbee
[1107-2] at 15–16. Mr. Mockbee, who graduated from law school in 1974 and
practices in Jackson, Mississippi, identifies by name some of the Mississippi
attorneys who could handle a complex case of this nature. Id. at 17–18.
The Court notes that Mr. Kitts’ Declaration focuses only on attorneys he
knows in the Jackson, Mississippi, metropolitan area who he believes are qualified
to handle this type of litigation. Decl. of Zachary A. Kitts [1104-14] at 3–5, 9. His
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Declaration does not encompass Gulfport, Mississippi, where this Court sits. The
Court does not find Mr. Kitts’ Declaration persuasive on the unavailability of local
counsel, as there is no indication that Mr. Kitts has ever practiced in Mississippi or
is otherwise familiar with any Mississippi law firms beyond the one he references.
Likewise, Kerri Rigsby’s Declaration mentions speaking with only one local
law firm about representing Relators. Decl. of Kerri Rigsby [1104-7] at 2. There is
no evidence that Relators sought representation in the Gulfport, Mississippi, area.
Nor is there any indication that Relators contacted more than one Mississippi law
firm regarding representation.
Relators have not persuaded the Court by a preponderance of the evidence,
much less the “abundant and uncontradicted evidence” referenced by the Fifth
Circuit in McClain, that it was necessary for them to turn to out-of-district counsel
to prosecute this case. McClain, 649 F.3d at 382. Accordingly, the Court finds no
reason to deviate from the general rule that counsel’s reasonable hourly rates are to
be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community,
which is the Southern District of Mississippi. Id. at 381.
With respect to State Farm’s argument that any recovery of attorneys’ fees
should be reduced because Relators were not successful on all of their claims, the
Court must consider whether Relators failed to prevail on claims which were
unrelated to the claims on which they succeeded, and whether Relators achieved a
level of success that makes the hours expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee
award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium
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Power Techs., 575 F.3d 458, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2009). When distinctly different claims
for relief based upon different facts and legal theories are brought in the same suit
against the same defendant, counsel’s work on one claim will be unrelated to his
work on another claim. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, work on an
unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the
ultimate result achieved, and no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful
claim. Id.
Conversely, when a plaintiff’s claims for relief involve a common core of facts
or are based on related legal theories, much of counsel’s time will be devoted
generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours
expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court has explained
that “[s]uch a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the
district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. “There
is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court
may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply
reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Id. at 436–37.
In this case, the claims asserted against State Farm derived from the same
flood policy, the “same actors, and the same illegal intent to defraud the government
of money in violation of the FCA.” Longhi, 575 F.3d at 476. The Court finds that
the level of success achieved by Relators on the two claims which were presented to
the jury is sufficient to merit entitlement to a full attorneys’ fee award. See id. The
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Court has also reviewed the billing records and has found no easily separable,
duplicative efforts or unnecessary work hours with respect to unsuccessful claims.
See id. Based on the circumstances of this case, no reduction of hours is warranted
based upon which claims were successful and which were not. See id.
As for State Farm’s argument regarding attorneys’ fees expended on Relators’
claims against settling Defendants, the Fifth Circuit has held in a Clayton Act case
that a plaintiff’s settlement with one defendant did not bar recovery of costs and
attorneys’ fees to which the plaintiff may be entitled from the remaining defendants.
Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. Service Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir.
2012).5 Under the facts of this case, the Court finds this reasoning persuasive.
Moreover, Relators’ counsel avers in his declaration that he has “removed all time
that related only to the pursuit of Relators’ claims against former defendants.” Decl.
of August J. Matteis, Jr. [1104-8] at 6. Finally, several Defendants were dismissed
from this action prior to July 15, 2008, the earliest billing entry submitted to the
Court. See Order [192] (entered June 20, 2008, dismissing Defendants USAA
Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, and Nationwide Insurance
Company). A reduction in the requested attorneys’ fees is not warranted on this
basis.
5
The relevant provision of the Clayton Act provided that “any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including reasonable attorney’s fee.” Funeral Consumers Alliance, 695 F.3d at
336 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)).
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The Court is also unpersuaded by State Farm’s argument that a “significant
portion” of Relators’ requested fees were unreasonably expended due to the
disqualification of Relators’ counsel. Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108]
at 32. The Court notes that a significant portion of this litigation occurred prior to
the retention of Relators’ current counsel. Relators initiated this action on April 26,
2006, and the first billing entry for Relators’ current counsel while employed at
Gilbert does not appear until July 15, 2008.6 Relators do not seek attorneys’ fees for
this nearly twenty-seven month period at the outset of the case.
With respect to State Farm’s argument that the attorneys’ fees billed by HH
have already been paid by Gilbert, Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at
28, the spreadsheet of expenses supplied by Relators from Gilbert reflects that
Gilbert paid HH a “Professional Services Fee” as local counsel in this case each
month from about August 4, 2008, through October 31, 2011. Gilbert Expenses
[1104-16] passim. The first entry on the bills submitted for attorneys’ fees in this
case from HH is not until November 10, 2011, after the last payment was made by
Gilbert. HH Bills [1104-6] at 2. Based on the foregoing, the Court will not reduce
the attorneys’ fees awarded to Relators on this basis. The Court will address
Gilbert’s claimed expenses, including its payments to HH, when it addresses
Relators’ request for expenses.
6
Relators’ current counsel made their initial appearance in this case on July 30,
2008.
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Based on the foregoing, and having reviewed and considered the parties’
arguments, the evidence presented, and relevant legal authorities, the Court finds
that the number of hours reasonably expended by, and the reasonable hourly rates
for, each attorney and paralegal are as follows.
(a)
Unknown Timekeepers at Gilbert LLP
Relators seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,225,303.67 for work
performed by the Gilbert law firm and have submitted spreadsheets of fees billed by
Gilbert. The timekeepers are identified only by their initials. From the
documentation provided, the Court cannot ascertain the identity, position, or
experience level of any of the timekeepers, with the exception of attorneys August J.
Matteis and Derek Y. Sugimura, who remain counsel of record for Relators. Nor
have any of the timekeepers from Gilbert, other than Mr. Matteis and Mr.
Sugimura, submitted any type of declaration or affidavit supporting the hourly rate
or the number of hours billed. Without this information, the Court is unable to
ascertain whether the hourly rates listed or the amount of time expended is
reasonable for these unknown timekeepers. Relators have not properly supported
the fee request of these unidentified individuals, and the Court will disallow all time
entries from the unknown timekeepers at Gilbert. The Court will address the
entries of Mr. Matteis and Mr. Sugimura separately.
(b)
Attorney August J. Matteis
During his employment at Gilbert and while this case was pending, Mr.
Matteis’ billing rate apparently increased from $575.00 per hour to $600.00 per
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hour. With respect to work Mr. Matteis performed at WMC, his current firm,
Relators request a rate of $505.00 per hour. Mr. Matteis has practiced law for over
twenty (20) years in Washington, D.C., and is a partner at his firm. Decl. of August
J. Matteis, Jr. [1104-8] at 2–3. Mr. Matteis’ “customary billing rate for commercial
litigation is currently $630/hour.” Id. Relators have also submitted an affidavit
from an attorney practicing in this district who opines that “customary and
reasonable rates currently charged by litigation partners in Mississippi firms and/or
regional firms with offices in Mississippi are in the $400–$500 range.” Aff. of John
G. Corlew [1104-13] at 2.
The rates charged by Relators’ local counsel, C. Maison Heidelberg, who
practices in the Jackson, Mississippi, area are instructive. The Mississippi Bar
Association’s online Lawyer Directory reflects that Mr. Heidelberg has comparable
legal experience to Mr. Matteis. Mr. Heidelberg was admitted to practice law in
Mississippi in 1993. Miss. Bar Lawyer Directory, http://msbar.org/lawyer-directorysearch.aspx?searchTerm=Heidelberg&SearchField=memberLastName (last visited
Feb. 11, 2014). Mr. Heidelberg states in his declaration that his “billing rate for
commercial litigation ranges from $250/hour to $450/hour, depending on a variety of
circumstances that include the client’s ability to pay.” Decl. of C. Maison Heidelberg
[1104-9] at 2. Mr. Heidelberg billed his time in this case at an hourly rate of
$375.00. Id.
After reviewing the evidence presented and the record as a whole, including
Mr. Matteis’ and Mr. Heidelberg’s declarations and Mr. Corlew’s affidavit, the Court
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is of the opinion that Mr. Matteis’ requested hourly rates should be reduced to
$400.00 per hour. The Court finds that $400.00 is a reasonable hourly rate in this
legal community for an attorney of Mr. Matteis’ experience, given the complexities of
this case. This figure borders on the range Mr. Corlew articulated and falls within
the range of hourly rates Mr. Heidelberg, an attorney of comparable experience,
normally charges in Mississippi. Aff. of John G. Corlew [1104-13] at 2; Decl. of C.
Maison Heidelberg [1104-9] at 2. In fixing Mr. Matteis’ rate, the Court is cognizant
of the fact that “[h]ourly rates are to be computed according to the prevailing market
rates in the relevant legal market, not the rates that ‘lions at the bar may
command.’” Hopwood v. State of Tex., 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Leroy v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir. 1990)). The $400.00 per hour
rate is also relatively close to the $358.00 hourly rate State Farm says is the average
for senior partners in complex commercial litigation cases in Mississippi. Def.’s
Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at 31–32 (citing Aff. of David W. Mockbee
[1107-2] at 7).
Having thoroughly reviewed the billing records provided in their entirety, the
Court finds that Relators have shown that all of Mr. Matteis’ hours billed at both
Gilbert (2,702 total hours) and at WMC (1,146.6 hours) were reasonably expended in
this litigation. Multiplying these figures by a reasonable hourly rate of $400.00,
results in a lodestar for Mr. Matteis of $1,080,800.00 at Gilbert and $458,640.00 at
WMC, for a total lodestar for Mr. Matteis of $1,539,440.00.
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(c)
Attorney Derek Y. Sugimura
Mr. Sugimura graduated from law school in 2004. Following two (2) years as
a federal law clerk, he began his active practice of law in 2006. Decl. of Derek Y.
Sugimura [1104-12] at 2. In determining Mr. Sugimura’s lodestar, Relators ask the
Court to employ the hourly rate of $355.00 charged at his current firm, WMC.
Relators present evidence that Mr. Sugimura’s customary billing rate for commercial
litigation at WMC is $470.00 per hour. Id. The billing spreadsheet from Gilbert
indicates that Mr. Sugimura’s hourly rate increased from $400.00 to $425.00 during
the time he worked on this case at that firm.
Relators do not offer any evidence of a reasonable rate in this community for
Mr. Sugimura, who appears from the record to have been an associate during the
majority of this litigation. State Farm has submitted evidence that the average
rates in this community are $262.00 for a junior partner and $208.00 for an average
associate. Aff. of David W. Mockbee [1107-2] at 13. Based on the foregoing, and
given the absence of evidence on this point from Relators, the Court concludes that a
reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Sugimura would be $262.00 per hour given Mr.
Sugimura’s experience and expertise and the complexities of this case.
The Court further finds that Relators have demonstrated that all of Mr.
Sugimura’s hours billed were reasonably expended in this litigation, except for one
time entry at WMC totaling 0.5 hours and one time entry at Gilbert for 0.1 hours.
The time entry at WMC appears on February 26, 2013, and was for “[r]eview
lodgings for trial,” WMC Billings [1104-4] at 17, while the entry at Gilbert on July
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12, 2010, was for “[c]ommunicate with Hyatt hotels re extra bill,” Gilbert Billing
[1104-15] at 92. These charges are not recoverable. Deleting these two entries from
Relators’ submitted hours for Mr. Sugimura results in a total of 641.9 hours
reasonably expended in this litigation while at WMC, and 1,607.4 hours reasonably
expended while at Gilbert. Multiplying these figures by a reasonable hourly rate of
$262.00 results in a lodestar for Mr. Sugimura of $168,177.80 at WMC and
$421,138.80 at Gilbert, for a total lodestar of $589,316.60.
(d)
Attorney William E. Copley
Mr. Copley has actively engaged in the practice of law for nearly 15 years and
is a partner at his law firm. Decl. of William E. Copley [1104-10] at 2–3. Mr.
Copley’s customary billing rate for commercial litigation is $595.00, but Relators ask
the Court to employ a reduced rate of $445.00 per hour for Mr. Copley. Relators
have supplied an affidavit of an attorney practicing in this district who opines that
“customary and reasonable rates currently charged by litigation partners in
Mississippi firms and/or regional firms with offices in Mississippi are in the
$400–$500 range.” Aff. of John G. Corlew [1104-13] at 2. The Court notes that Mr.
Copley has not practiced law for as long as Mr. Heidelberg, who billed his time at a
rate of $375.00 in this case. Decl. of C. Maison Heidelberg [1104-9] at 2. State Farm
has presented evidence that the average hourly rates in this community in complex
commercial litigation cases are $262.00 for junior partners and $358.00 for senior
partners. Aff. of David W. Mockbee [1107-2] at 13. Based on the foregoing, the
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Court finds $358.00 to be a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Copley and is
commensurate with his experience and the complexities of this qui tam case.
Having thoroughly reviewed the bills supplied to the Court, the Court finds
the 370.1 hours billed by Mr. Copley to have been reasonably expended in this case.
Multiplying this figure by a reasonable hourly rate of $358.00 results in a lodestar
for Mr. Copley of $132,495.80.
(e)
Attorney Pamira S. Matteis
Ms. Matteis graduated from law school in 1993, but had engaged in the active
practice of law for only seven (7) years at the time she submitted her declaration in
this case in 2013. Decl. of Pamira S. Matteis [1104-11] at 2. Ms. Matteis’ customary
billing rate for commercial litigation is $325.00 per hour. Relators request a $290.00
per hour rate for Ms. Matteis. Relators do not offer any evidence of a reasonable
rate in this community for an attorney with the experience of Ms. Matteis. Based
upon her Declaration, Ms. Matteis’ experience would appear to be comparable to
that of Mr. Sugimura. For the reasons stated above with respect to Mr. Sugimura,
the Court finds that a reasonable rate in this legal community for Ms. Matteis would
also be $262.00 per hour.
The Court finds that all of Ms. Matteis’ 133.7 hours billed in this litigation
were reasonably expended. Multiplying Ms. Matteis’ $262.00 hourly rate by the
133.7 hours reasonably expended results in a lodestar of $35,029.40.
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(f)
Attorney Timothy Belknap
Mr. Belknap began his legal career in 2012. Decl. of Timothy M. Belknap
[1104-2] at 2. Mr. Belknap’s customary billing rate for commercial litigation is
$275.00 per hour, but Relators ask the Court to apply a reduced rate of $245.00 per
hour. Again, Relators do not offer any evidence of a reasonable rate in this
community for an attorney of Mr. Belknap’s experience. State Farm has presented
evidence that the average rates in this community in complex commercial litigation
cases are $208.00 for associates and $124.00 for paralegals. Aff. of David W.
Mockbee [1107-2] at 13. Based upon the descriptions in the time entries provided to
the Court, the work for which Mr. Belknap billed appears to resemble paralegal
work. Much of it involved preparing exhibits and working with vendors preparing
the same for trial. The Court will therefore reduce the rate charged for Mr.
Belknap’s work to $124.00 an hour, which it finds to be a reasonable hourly rate for
the type of work Mr. Belknap was primarily asked to perform in this particular
case.7
Relators have demonstrated that all of Mr. Belknap’s hours billed were
reasonably expended in this litigation, except for five (5) time entries totaling 45.7
hours. Relators have not shown that Mr. Belknap’s March 22, 25, 26, 27, and 28,
2013, time entries during trial for “Deposition witness preparation” for video
depositions are reasonable, and this time will be excluded from the Court’s
7
This reduction is not intended in any way to reflect negatively upon Mr. Belknap
but is due to the nature of the tasks Mr. Belknap was apparently asked to perform in this
case.
-35-
calculations. The Court therefore determines that Mr. Belknap reasonably
expended 356.7 hours in this litigation at a $124.00 hourly rate, resulting in a total
lodestar of $44,230.80.
(g)
Attorney C. Maison Heidelberg
Mr. Heidelberg was admitted to practice law in Mississippi in 1993. Miss.
Bar Lawyer Directory, http://msbar.org/lawyer-directory-search.aspx?searchTerm=
Heidelberg&SearchField=memberLastName (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). Mr.
Heidelberg practices in the Jackson, Mississippi, area and billed his time in this case
at a rate of $375.00 per hour. Decl. of C. Maison Heidelberg [1104-9] at 2. Relators
supplied the affidavit of an attorney also practicing in the Jackson, Mississippi, area
who opined that “customary and reasonable rates currently charged by litigation
partners in Mississippi firms and/or regional firms with offices in Mississippi are in
the $400–$500 range.” Aff. of John G. Corlew [1104-13] at 2. Based on the
circumstances of this case, the Court finds Relators’ requested $375.00 hourly rate
for Mr. Heidelberg to be reasonable.
The Court further finds that Relators have shown that all of Mr. Heidelberg’s
hours billed were reasonably expended in this litigation except for two entries
totaling 1.8 hours. These time entries appear on January 25, 2013, for “Deposition
of Plaintiff Burchfield,” and on March 7, 2013, for “Summarize for adjuster as
requested the investigation and information with respect to the peanut company
CONNIE CASE.” HH Bills [1104-6] at 15, 19. Neither entry appears related to this
case. Deleting these 1.8 hours from Relators’ bills from Mr. Heidelberg results in
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614.8 hours reasonably expended by him in this litigation. Mr. Heidelberg’s lodestar
therefore is $230,550.00.
(h)
Attorney Laura K. Barbour
Ms. Barbour was admitted to practice law in Mississippi in 2000, even though
she is presently inactive with the Bar Association. Miss. Bar Lawyer Directory,
http://msbar.org/lawyer-directory-search.aspx?searchTerm=Barbour&SearchField=
memberLastName (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). Having reviewed the evidence
presented by both sides, which the Court has previously discussed, the Court finds
that Ms. Barbour’s requested rate of $275.00 is excessive for contract work given
that State Farm presented evidence that the average rate in this community for a
junior partner is $262.00. Aff. of David W. Mockbee [1107-2] at 13. The Court will
therefore reduce Ms. Barbour’s hourly rate to $262.00 per hour which is
commensurate with her experience and is reasonable under the circumstances of
this particular case. Relators have demonstrated that all of Ms. Barbour’s hours
billed were reasonably expended in this litigation. The Court therefore determines
that Ms. Barbour reasonably expended 23.2 hours in this litigation at a rate of
$262.00 per hour, for a total lodestar of $6,078.40.
(i)
Paralegal Macie E. Sledge
Relators request fees at a rate of $165.00 per hour for Ms. Sledge, a paralegal
at HH. Relators have not submitted any evidence, beyond the Affidavit of Mr.
Heidelberg [1104-9] in which he declares that Ms. Sledge’s customary billing rate for
complex commercial litigation is $165 per hour, to support whether this is a
-37-
reasonable rate in this community. State Farm has presented evidence that a
reasonable paralegal rate in this area is $124.00 per hour. Decl. of David W.
Mockbee [1107-2] at 7, 13. Based upon the record before it, the Court finds that a
rate of $124.00 would be a reasonable rate for a paralegal of Ms. Sledge’s experience
and education.
Relators submitted bills for Ms. Sledge’s work totaling 266.7 hours. The Fifth
Circuit has held that paralegal work can be recovered as attorneys’ fees if the work
is legal in nature, rather than clerical. Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 681
(5th Cir. 2001). The Court finds that all of Ms. Sledge’s time entries represent time
reasonably expended on legal work in this litigation, except for one entry for 0.5
hours on March 14, 2013, for “Filing Tim’s Pro Hac documents and preparing
correspondence to clerk concerning same.” HH Bills [1104-6] at 19. This entry
reflects work which appears to be more clerical in nature and thus is not recoverable
as attorneys’ fees. See Vela, 276 F.3d at 681. At least one district court in this
Circuit has held that time spent seeking admission pro hac vice is not recoverable as
costs or fees. Davis v. Perry, No. SA-11-CA-788-OLG-JES-XR, - - - F. Supp. 2d, 2014
WL 106990, *24 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014). Deleting this 0.5 hours results in 266.2
hours of legal work reasonably expended by Ms. Sledge in this litigation.
Multiplying a reasonable hourly rate of $124.00 by the total hours expended results
in a lodestar for Ms. Sledge of $33,008.80.
-38-
(j)
Summary of Legal Fees
In sum, the Court finds that the total number of hours reasonably expended
in this matter by Relators’ attorneys and paralegals was 7,862.6 hours. After
excluding all time that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented, and
after taking into consideration all appropriate reductions, the Court calculates the
total lodestar for Relators’ recoverable attorneys’ fees in this matter as
$2,610,149.80. The Court has reviewed the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), in determining the
reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, and finds that no further adjustments are
warranted. The Court therefore finds that Relators are entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $2,610,149.80. The following charts
summarize the Court’s conclusions.
Gilbert, LLP
Hours
Reasonably
Expended
Lodestar
Timekeeper, Position
Reasonable
Hourly
Rate
August J. Matteis, Attorney
$400.00
2,702.0
$1,080,800.00
Derek Y. Sugimura, Attorney
$262.00
1,607.4
$421,138.80
Unknown Timekeepers
$0
0
$0
4,309.4
$1,501,938.80
TOTAL
-39-
Weisbrod Matteis & Copley PLLC
Timekeeper, Position
Reasonable
Hourly
Rate
Hours
Reasonably
Expended
August J. Matteis, Attorney
$400.00
1,146.6
$458,640.00
Derek Y. Sugimura, Attorney
$262.00
641.9
$168,177.80
William E. Copley, Attorney
$358.00
370.1
$132,495.80
Pamira S. Matteis, Attorney
$262.00
133.7
$35,029.40
Timothy M. Belknap, Attorney
$124.00
356.7
$44,230.80
2,649.0
$838,573.80
TOTAL
Lodestar
Heidelberg Harmon PLLC
Timekeeper, Position
Reasonable
Hourly Rate
C. Maison Heidelberg, Attorney
$375.00
614.8
$230,550.00
Laura K. Barbour, Attorney
$262.00
23.2
$6,078.40
Macie E. Sledge, Paralegal
$124.00
266.2
$33,008.80
906.5
$269,637.20
TOTAL
Hours
Reasonably
Expended
Lodestar
The Court is cognizant of the fact that the total award of attorneys’ fees in
this case, $2,610,149.80, exceeds the Government’s award of $750,000.00 treble
damages8 and the $8,250.00 civil penalty assessed against State Farm. However,
8
The jury determined that the Government suffered damages under the FCA in
connection with the McIntosh flood claim in the amount of $250,000.00. Special Verdict
Form [1092] at 3. Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), a person who violates that statute is
liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty “plus 3 times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.” 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a). Based on the jury verdict, the Court will treble the Government’s $250,000.00
damages in accordance with this statute. See id.; see also Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. v.
United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 126 (2007) (holding that Congress has “mandated the
imposition of treble damages” under the FCA).
-40-
this fact alone does not render the award excessive. See, e.g., Northwinds
Abatement, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 258 F.3d 345, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2001)
(applying Texas law and holding that the disproportion alone of an attorneys’ fee
award, which was more than three times the treble damages award and more than
nine times the actual damages, does not render the award of attorneys’ fees
excessive). This matter has been pending for nearly eight (8) years, and Relators’
current counsel have litigated this case for over five and a half (5 ½) years. During
that time, counsel have responded to numerous dispositive motions and voluminous
pleadings and spent eleven (11) days trying the case to verdict. Under the
circumstances of this case, and for the reasons stated earlier, the Court is persuaded
that an attorneys’ fee award for Relators in the amount of $2,610,149.80 is
reasonable.
b.
Expenses
Relators seek to recover a total of $779,174.07 in litigation expenses incurred
by the attorneys who have represented them since July 2008. Relators have
submitted documentation of their expenses. They request $649,843.67 in expenses
incurred by Gilbert; $123,594.56 incurred by WMC; and $5,735.84 incurred by HH.
State Farm responds that Relators’ requested expenses are “excessive and
inadequately supported.” Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Relators’ Mot. [1108] at 25. State
Farm argues that most of the out-of-state travel expenses were unnecessary
because Mississippi counsel was available to Relators. Id. at 32. State Farm also
maintains that some of the expenses for which Relators seek reimbursement “are
-41-
classic examples of double dipping since they are already a component of the
attorneys’ hourly rates or they are plainly unauthorized.” Id. at 33. State Farm
cites as examples in-office meals for Relators’ counsel, office air conditioning
charges, and reimbursement of fees for Kerri Rigsby’s credit card. Id.
(1)
Legal Standard
The parties have not directed the Court to any binding Fifth Circuit precedent
regarding the standard to employ in awarding a relator expenses under the FCA. In
an FCA case where expenses were awarded pursuant to 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(4), the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York explained that
expenses which are not recoverable as taxable costs
are shifted to the losing party in a case such as this where a statute
provides for the shifting of attorneys’ fees, as long as these costs are
identifiable, out-of-pocket expenses, as opposed to non-recoverable routine
office overhead, which must normally be absorbed within the attorney’s
hourly rate.
Pugach v. M&T Mortg. Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation
omitted).
The Court finds this reasoning persuasive and will exclude “routine office overhead”
from Relators’ expense award. Id.
(2)
Discussion
The Court has reviewed the expense reports submitted by each law firm and
will address the expenses incurred by each firm in turn.
(a)
Gilbert LLP
Relators request reimbursement of expenses incurred by Gilbert in the
amount of $649,843.67 and have submitted a spreadsheet of expenses for Gilbert.
-42-
Gilbert Expenses [1104-16] passim. Due to the sparse detail contained in the
Gilbert expenses spreadsheet, the Court finds that the majority of the expenses
sought lack adequate support and should be excluded. Many of the descriptions are
insufficient to inform the Court whether some of the expenses were reasonable or
even related to this case. The Court cannot discern from Gilbert’s submission the
nature of some of the expenses claimed and is unable to conclude that they were
reasonably and necessarily incurred.
As stated earlier, the Court also excludes all overhead expenses which are
normally absorbed into the attorney’s hourly rate. See Pugach, 564 F. Supp. 2d at
165. These include in-office or other “business” meals and local transportation or
parking charges which appear to have been incurred while the attorneys were not
traveling, as well as office air conditioning costs. The spreadsheet additionally
details payments made for messenger and delivery services to law firms who
represented other Defendants in this case who were dismissed before trial. Those
charges will not be assessed against State Farm.
The Gilbert spreadsheet also includes fees for some expert witnesses who
were not called as witnesses at trial or even listed on the witness list in the Second
Amended Pretrial Order [1071]. At least one of these experts was excluded from
testifying by the Court. See Order [823] (excluding the testimony of John A. Fowler).
Relators have not adequately supported these requests or explained why they would
be recoverable, and the expert witness fees and related expenses for these experts
will be excluded.
-43-
As for the professional service fees paid by Gilbert to HH for serving as local
counsel, the Court has not been provided the billing records supporting HH’s charges
to Gilbert. The Court would apply the same standard to such a reimbursement
request as it would apply to a request for attorneys’ fees. Without more detail
regarding these fees, including what tasks were performed, for how long, and by
whom, the Court cannot ascertain whether the requested fee reimbursements are
reasonable. Thus, the Court will exclude Gilbert’s requests for reimbursement of
HH professional service fees.
Subject to the foregoing, and having thoroughly reviewed Gilbert’s
spreadsheet of expenses, the Court finds that the following expenses from Gilbert
are recoverable.
Payee10
Description11
Accounting Date9
Cost Code
Descr [sic]
01-10-2011
Messenger
& Delivery
AUGUST J. MATTEIS, J COURTYARD BY MARRIOTT
$59.44
01-10-2011
Messenger
& Delivery
AUGUST J. MATTEIS, J COURTYARD BY MARRIOTT
$5.33
01-19-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Gilbert LLP to August Matteis
(Torrington CT) - 12.23.09
$14.99
01-22-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Gilbert LLP to Mr. Louis G. Fey, Jr.
- 1.14.09
$18.60
United Parcel
Service
Amount
9
Gilbert’s expense spreadsheet [1104-16] is not arranged in chronological order, but
rather is organized by month, day, and year. For ease of reference, the Court will employ
the same ordering method used by Gilbert.
10
A blank for the payee indicates that this column was also left blank on Gilbert’s
spreadsheet [1104-16].
11
The Court has quoted verbatim each of the descriptions from Gilbert’s expense
submission [1104-16].
-44-
01-22-2010
Witness
Fees
Insurance
Expert
Network
Expert: Louis Fey Jr.
01-26-2011
Travel Airfare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Gulfport MS - Attend Hearing 1.11-12.11
$516.50
01-26-2011
Travel - Car
Rental
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Car Rental - Derek
Sugimura - Gulfport MS - Attend
Hearing - 1.11-12.11
$387.38
01-26-2011
Travel Lodging
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Lodging - Derek Sugimura
- Gulfport MS - Attend Hearing 1.11-12.11
$133.28
01-26-2011
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Dinner with A.
Matteis, B. Davidson, and M.
Martinez - Derek Sugimura Gulfport MS - Attend Hearing 1.11-12.11
$164.00
01-26-2011
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Lunch with B.
Davidson and M. Martinez -Derek
Sugimura - Gulfport MS - Attend
Hearing - 1.11-12.11
$97.38
01-26-2011
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Derek Sugimura Gulfport MS - Attend Hearing 1.11-12.11
$124.05
01-26-2011
Travel Miscellaneous
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Miscellaneous - Gas Derek Sugimura - Gulfport MS Attend Hearing - 1.11-12.11
$15.02
01-26-2011
Travel Parking
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Parking - Derek Sugimura Gulfport MS - Attend Hearing 1.11-12.11
$24.00
01-28-2010
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Meeting with experts
and witnesses - 1.13-16.10
$99.68
01-28-2010
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - Dinner with M.
Heidelberg (Local Counsel) and J.
Fowler (Expert) - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Meeting with experts
and witnesses - 1.13-16.10
$206.94
-45-
$3,000.00
01-28-2010
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Meeting with experts
and witnesses - 1.13-16.10
$48.33
01-28-2010
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Meeting with experts
and witnesses - 1.13-16.10
$600.0012
01-28-2011
Professional Service
Fees
Butler, Snow,
O’Mara,
Stevens, &
Cannada,
PLLC
CD of Photographs re McPeeks
pursuant to subpoena and affidavit
$12.00
01-28-2011
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - Gulfport MS/
New Orleans LA - Hearing and
Meeting - 1.10-14.11
01-28-2011
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - Gulfport MS/ New
Orleans LA - Hearing and Meeting 1.10-14.11
01-28-2011
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - Gulfport MS/
New Orleans LA - Hearing and
Meeting - 1.10-14.11
02-24-2010
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - Hotel local taxes;
room was compted [sic] - August
Matteis - Gulfport MS - Meeting
with experts and witnesses 1.13-16.10
02-25-2011
Depositions/
Transcripts
Kati M. Vogt,
RMR, CRR
Transcript: Hearing 1.12.11
$108.00
02-26-2010
Duplicating
Merlin Law
Group, P.A.
Copy of Documents produced by
McIntoshes to State Farm
$497.02
02-26-2010
Professional
Service Fee
R. Ralph Sinno,
Ph.D.
Professional Services:
12.12.09-1.30.10 - Expert Fees
$204.30
$42.20
$600.0013
$37.44
$4,650.00
12
Relators request mileage reimbursement for Mr. Matteis, presumably from
Washington, D.C., to Gulfport, Mississippi, in the amount of $1,150.00. The Court does not
find this request reasonable in that airfare requested by other attorneys in this case for the
same route is roughly half this amount. The Court will therefore reduce Relators’
requested mileage reimbursement for Mr. Matteis to $600.00, which is comparable to the
expenses submitted by other of Relators’ counsel for airfare to, and ground transportation
in, Gulfport, Mississippi.
13
The Court again reduces the requested milage reimbursement for Mr. Matteis,
from $1,255.11 to $600.00.
-46-
03-04-2011
Travel Lodging
Business Card
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Gulfport MS - 1.1-12.11
03-04-2011
Witness
Fees
Insurance
Expert
Network
Expert Witness: Louis G. Fey, Jr.:
1.22-2.21.11 - Review depositions
and finalize review of deposition
testimony
$4,875.00
03-10-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Robert C. Galloway - Butler Snow
O’Mara et al
$15.85
03-15-2011
Messenger
& Delivery
Mr. Louis Fey Jr.
03-31-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Dusty Burdine,
CSR
Transcript: Pamela McIntosh
$568.00
03-31-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Dusty Burdine,
CSR
Deposition: Thomas McIntosh
$980.00
04-09-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
FedEx
Gilbert LLP to Maison Heidelberg 4.6.10
$71.53
04-16-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Amy Massey &
Associates
Timothy Marshall & Paul O'Connor:
4.4-5.10
$269.40
04-19-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
04-22-2010
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Bloomington IL - Take depositions
of J. Guevara and D. Carrigan 4.13-15.10
$173.59
04-22-2010
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Bloomington IL - Take depositions
of J. Guevara and D. Carrigan 4.13-15.10
$26.78
04-22-2010
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - August Matteis Bloomington IL - Take depositions
of J. Guevara and D. Carrigan 4.13-15.10
$600.0014
04-28-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Advantage
Reporting
Service
Deposition of Dan Carrigan and
Video depositon [sic] of Juan Lopez
Guevara
$2,101.00
Paralegal - Macie Sledge
14
$356.16
$9.45
$57.67
While the destination of this trip is Bloomington, Illinois, for the reasons stated
earlier, the Court reduces Relators’ requested mileage reimbursement for Mr. Matteis from
$773.86 to $600.00.
-47-
04-30-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
Messenger & Delivery - UPS Butler Snow O'Mara Stevens
Cannada - 4.20.09
04-30-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Capitol Process
Service, Inc.
Courier Service / Service of Process
05-08-2009
Professional
Service Fees
R. Ralph Sinno,
Ph.D.
Professional Service Fees 3.15-4.15.09
05-13-2009
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Jackson MS/ Laurel MS
-Depositions (King/Kelly) - 5.4-7.09
$397.42
05-13-2009
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - August Matteis Jackson MS/ Laurel MS Depositions (King/Kelly) - 5.4-7.09
$600.0015
05-13-2009
Travel Parking
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Parking - August Matteis Jackson MS/ Laurel MS Depositions (King/Kelly) - 5.4-7.09
$16.50
05-13-2009
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Jackson MS - Depositions 4.25-29.10
$548.91
05-13-2009
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Jackson MS - Depositions 4.25-29.10
05-13-2009
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - August Matteis Jackson MS - Depositions 4.25-29.10
$600.0016
05-14-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Conner
Reporting
Perry & Blalock [sic] Depositon [sic]
$1,770.00
05-15-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Video South
Depositions/Transcripts - Video of
A. King / J. Kelly
$410.00
05-15-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
Messenger & Delivery - UPS - GO
to Kerri Rigsby - 5.1.09
$38.65
05-15-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
Messenger & Delivery - UPS - GO
to Dr. Pat Fitzpatrick -5.4.09
$26.05
15
$5.14
$105.00
$7,987.00
$97.77
The Court reduces the requested reimbursement for mileage from $989.80 to
$600.00.
16
The Court reduces the requested reimbursement for mileage from $1,050.15 to
$600.00.
-48-
05-15-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
Messenger & Delivery - UPS - GO
to Office of Dr. Ralph Sinno - 5.4.09
$26.05
05-15-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
Messenger & Delivery - UPS - GO
to Cori Rigsby - 5.4.09
$60.90
05-15-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
Messenger & Delivery - UPS - GO
to Maison Heidelberg P.A. - 5.4.09
$103.25
05-15-2009
Supplies
Summit
Computers
Supplies - Equipment for hearing in
MS
$120.50
05-17-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Advantage
Reporting
Service
Depositions of Jim Damm taken on
5.6.2010
$767.00
05-20-2010
Travel - Car
Rental
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Car Rental - August
Matteis - Gulfport MS - Depositions
- 5.2-7.10
$502.17
05-20-2010
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Depositions - 5.2-7.10
$318.00
05-20-2010
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Depositions - 5.2-7.10
$386.98
05-20-2010
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - Dinner with clients
(Rigsby) - August Matteis - Gulfport
MS - Depositions - 5.2-7.10
$353.88
05-20-2010
Travel Parking
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Parking - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Depositions - 5.2-7.10
$95.00
05-20-2010
Travel Telephone
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Telephone at Hotel August Matteis - Gulfport MS Depositions - 5.2-7.10
$19.34
05-20-2010
Travel Train Fare
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Train Fare - August
Matteis - Gulfport MS - Depositions
- 5.2-7.10
05-21-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Interstate
Express
Gilbert LLP to Fed Emergency
Management - 5.4.10
$6.50
05-22-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Lori R. Migues,
SRC
Depositions/Transcripts - John
Kelly
$1,536.60
05-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
05-26-2010
Court
Reporter
August J. Matteis, J - The Island
View Casino Resort
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Depositon [sic] of Cody Perry
(4/27/10 and Terry Blalock (4/28/10)
-49-
$400.00
$36.28
$2,115.95
05-26-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Advantage
Reporting
Service
Deposition/Transcript of Mark
Wilcox
$785.50
05-26-2011
Conference
Call
Conference call moderated by
August Matteis
$32.61
05-29-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Depositions/Transcripts - Alexis
King
05-29-2009
Professional
Service Fees
R. Ralph Sinno,
Ph.D.
Professional Service Fees
4.16-5.10.09
06-03-2009
Travel Airfare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Gulfport MS - Attend Rigsby
hearing - 5.18-23.09
$405.90
06-03-2009
Travel Airfare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Memphis TN - Interview Dr. R.
Sinno - 5.13-14.09
$1,164.70
06-03-2009
Travel - Car
Rental
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Car Rental - Derek
Sugimura - Gulfport MS - Attend
Rigsby hearing - 5.18-23.09
$22.95
06-03-2009
Travel Internet
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Internet - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Attend prehearing
conference (5/13) and hearing
(5/20-22) - 5.12-23.09
$14.95
06-03-2009
Travel Internet
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Internet - Derek Sugimura
- Memphis TN - Interview
Dr. R. Sinno - 5.13-14.09
$3.95
06-03-2009
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Attend prehearing
conference (5/13) and hearing
(5/20-22) - 5.12-23.09
$124.26
06-03-2009
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Attend prehearing
conference (5/13) and hearing
(5/20-22) - 5.12-23.09
$87.08
06-03-2009
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Dinner with B.
Davidson - Derek Sugimura Gulfport MS - Attend Rigsby
hearing - 5.18-23.09
$66.06
-50-
$2,145.95
$12,900.00
06-03-2009
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Attend prehearing
conference (5/13) and hearing
(5/20-22) - 5.12-23.09
$600.0017
06-03-2009
Travel Miscellaneous
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Miscellaneous - Gas Derek Sugimura - Gulfport MS Attend Rigsby hearing - 5.18-23.09
$7.88
06-03-2009
Travel - Taxi
Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Taxi Fare - Derek
Sugimura - Gulfport MS - Attend
Rigsby hearing - 5.18-23.09
$32.00
06-03-2009
Travel - Taxi
Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Taxi Fare - Derek
Sugimura - Memphis TN Interview Dr. R. Sinno - 5.13-14.09
$32.00
06-04-2010
Witness
Fees
Insurance
Expert
Network
Expert Witness: Louis G. Fey, Jr.
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to USDC, S. District of MS 5.26.09
$43.45
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to US District Court - 5.13.09
$96.55
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Kerri Rigsby - 5.8.09
$22.20
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Courtyard Marriott at
Gulfport - 5.14.09
$181.00
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Courtyard Marriott at
Gulfport - 5.14.09
$98.15
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Courtyard Marriott at
Gulfport - 5.14.09
$98.15
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Courtyard Marriott at
Gulfport - 5.12.09
$162.75
06-11-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Courtyard Marriott at
Gulfport - 5.12.09
$156.65
06-11-2009
Professional
Service Fees
R. Ralph Sinno,
Ph.D.
Professional Srv.: 5.10-24.09
$24,870.00
06-11-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Rena White - USDC, S. Dist of
Mississippi
17
$2,400.00
$16.15
The Court reduces Relators’ request for mileage reimbursement for Mr. Matteis
from $1,065.84 to $600.00.
-51-
06-11-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Amanda B. Barbour, E - Butler
Snow O'Mara Stevens Cannada
$15.06
06-11-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Trans Time
Express
Gilbert LLP to US District Court 5.28.10
$45.47
06-11-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Trans Time
Express
Gilbert LLP to FIMA [sic] - 5.28.10
$24.32
06-11-2010
Travel
Insurance
Expert
Network
Travel Fees re Expert Witness:
Louis G. Fey, Jr. - 6.3-4.10
06-12-2009
Professional
Service Fees
Dr. Keith G.
Blackwell
Meteorological Expert - 3.23-5.22.09
06-18-2010
Court
Reporter
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Video Deposition: Linda Mucha
06-18-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
CDSC Video
Productions
Video Deposition: Juan Guevara
06-18-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Interstate
Express
Gilbert LLP to District Court (DC) 6.11.10
$14.00
06-18-2010
Process
Servers
Same Day
Process
Service, Inc.
Process Server: Brian Ford
$75.00
06-18-2010
Professional
Service Fees
David J. Favre
Sr.
Expert Fees: 5.22-6.2.10
$7,026.57
06-19-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Dusty Burdine,
CSR
Depositions/Transcripts - McIntosh,
Marion, and Renfroe Cases
$5,074.00
06-19-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Video South
Depositions/Transcripts - Video
Deposition: Alexis King
$250.00
06-19-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
United Parcel
Service
GO to Dave Favre, Sr. - 4.28.09
$26.05
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Jeffrey S. Bucholtz - United States
Department of Justice
$11.12
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Jeffery A. Walker - Butler Snow
$16.13
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Michael B. Beers, Es - Beers,
Anderson PC
$16.13
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
C. Maison Heidelberg - MAISON
HEIDLEBERG PA
$16.13
-52-
$5,147.11
$11,417.27
$624.55
$1,039.17
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Robert Galloway - Butler Snow
$16.13
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Don Burkhalter, Esq. - United
States Attorney for Mississi [sic]
$16.13
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Gues: [sic] Derek Sugimura - The
Hotel Minneapolis
$128.04
06-24-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Brian Ford - Brian Ford
06-24-2010
Travel Airfare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Jackson MS - Defend depositions 5.31-6.3.10
$679.80
06-24-2010
Travel - Car
Rental
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Car Rental - Derek
Sugimura - Jackson MS - Defend
depositions - 5.31-6.3.10
$283.95
06-24-2010
Travel Lodging
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Lodging - Derek Sugimura
- Jackson MS - Defend depositions 5.31-6.3.10
$470.88
06-24-2010
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Derek Sugimura Jackson MS - Defend depositions 5.31-6.3.10
$129.71
06-24-2010
Travel - Taxi
Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Taxi Fare - Derek
Sugimura - Jackson MS - Defend
depositions - 5.31-6.3.10
$40.00
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Cori Rigsby - Cori Rigsby
$18.88
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Kerri Rigsby - KERRI RIGSBY
$18.88
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Michael B. Beers, Es - Beers,
Anderson PC
$16.13
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Joyce R. Branda, Esq - United
States Department of Justice
$11.12
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Don Burkhalter, Esq. - United
States Attorney for Mississi [sic]
$16.13
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Gilbert LLP to FEMA - 6.1.10
$12.16
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Gilbert LLP to FEMA - 6.1.10
$34.10
06-25-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Gilbert LLP to US District Court
(Alex) - 6.7.10
$56.26
-53-
$21.06
06-25-2010
Process
Servers
MLQ Attorney
Services
Serve Subpoena: Brian Ford
$501.74
06-26-2009
Process
Servers
One Legal LLC
Process Servers - State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co.
$959.00
06-26-2009
Witness
Fees
Pat Fitzpatrick
Witness Fees - Pat Fitzpatrick Expert
06-30-2010
Conference
Call
Soundpath
Conferencing
Conference Call - Derek Sugimura 4.29.10
$9.29
06-30-2010
Travel Airfare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Minneapolis MN - Attend
Deposition - 6.15-18.10
$1,165.40
06-30-2010
Travel Lodging
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Lodging - Derek Sugimura
- Minneapolis MN - Attend
Deposition - 6.15-18.10
$677.01
06-30-2010
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Dinner with B.
Davidson - Derek Sugimura Minneapolis MN - Attend
Deposition - 6.15-18.10
$121.25
06-30-2010
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals -Derek Sugimura Minneapolis MN - Attend
Deposition - 6.15-18.10
$117.54
06-30-2010
Travel - Taxi
Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Taxi Fare - Derek
Sugimura - Minneapolis MN Attend Deposition - 6.15-18.10
$143.00
07-02-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Paradigm
Digital
Videography
Video Deposition of Jody Prince and
Michael Ferier
$1,113.75
07-02-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Paradigm
Digital
Videography
Video Deposition of Lisa Wachter
and John Conser
$1,186.25
07-02-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Louis G. Fey, Jr.
07-02-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of David J. Favre, Sr.
07-02-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
07-14-2010
Travel Airfare
Cheryl Ross - Heidelberg Harmon
PLLC
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Huntsville AL - Deposition of David
Haddock - 6.29-30.10
-54-
$1,200.00
$938.86
$1,224.89
$16.13
$258.40
$78.06
07-14-2010
Travel - Car
Rental
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Car Rental - Derek
Sugimura - Huntsville AL Deposition of David Haddock 6.29-30.10
07-14-2010
Travel Lodging
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Lodging - Derek Sugimura
- Huntsville AL - Deposition
of David Haddock - 6.29-30.10
$104.39
07-14-2010
Travel Meals
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Meals - Derek Sugimura Huntsville AL - Deposition of
David Haddock - 6.29-30.10
$34.00
07-14-2010
Travel Miscellaneous
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Miscellaneous - Inflight
Internet Charges - Derek Sugimura
- Huntsville AL - Deposition of
David Haddock - 6.29-30.10
07-14-2010
Travel - Taxi
Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Taxi Fare - Derek
Sugimura - Huntsville AL Deposition of David Haddock 6.29-30.10
$135.00
07-14-2010
Travel - Taxi
Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Train Fare - Derek
Sugimura - Huntsville AL Deposition of David Haddock 6.29-30.10
$19.00
07-14-2010
Travel Train Fare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Train Fare - Metro - Derek
Sugimura - Huntsville AL Deposition of David Haddock 6.29-30.10
07-15-2009
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Gulfport MS - Attend prehearing
conference (5/13) and hearing
(5/20-22) - 5.12-23.09
$39.30
07-16-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Video Deposition of David Randel
$1,049.50
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Pritchard
Production's
Video Visions,
Inc.
Deposition of David L. Haddock:
6.30.10
$556.25
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Conner
Reporting
Videotaped Deposition of Mark
Watson
$305.00
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Deposition of Stephan Hinkle
$950.65
-55-
$9.90
$1.60
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
TSG Reporting
Deposition of David Maurstad
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
TSG Reporting
Videotaped Deposition of David
Maurstad
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
TSG Reporting
Deposition of James Shortley
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
TSG Reporting
Videotaped Deposition of James
Shortley
$400.00
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
TSG Reporting
Videotaped Deposition of Gerald
Waytowich
$1,672.30
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
TSG Reporting
Deposition of Gerald Waytowich
$400.00
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Kerri Rigsby: 6.24.10
$2,153.25
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Robert Kochan:
6.30.10
$1,394.95
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Elizabeth Jones
$1,384.35
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Elizabeth Gallo
Court
Reporting
Transcript of Jesse Brian Ford
$2,059.66
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Videotaped Deposition of Kurtis
Gurley: 6.9.10
$1,176.40
07-23-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Videotaped Deposition of Charlene
Bosarge: 6.25.10
$520.30
07-28-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Cleeton Davis
Court
Reporters, LLC
Transcript of Mark Drain
$770.13
07-28-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Derek
Sugimura
Transcript of David Randel
$506.32
07-28-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Derek
Sugimura
Deposition of David Randel - 7.8.10
$200.00
07-30-2010
Conference
Call
Soundpath
Conferencing
Conference Call - Derek Sugimura 6.11.10
$18.18
-56-
$2,423.10
$650.00
$1,721.20
08-05-2008
Conference
Call
AT&T
TeleConference
Services
Telephone - Conference Call - AT&T
TeleConference Services - August
Matteis
$85.12
08-06-2010
Conference
Call
Soundpath
Conferencing
Conference Call - Derek Sugimura 7.12.10
$11.75
08-06-2010
Court
Reporter
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Transcript of Thomas McIntosh
deposition
08-06-2010
Court
Reporter
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Deposition of Gary Dailey
$1,008.30
08-06-2010
Court
Reporter
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Deposition of Robert Dean
$443.35
08-06-2010
Court
Reporter
Elizabeth Bost
Simpson, RDR,
CRR
Deposition of Mark Watson
$429.05
08-06-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
Advantage
Reporting
Service
Transcript of Jimm Damm
Depositon - 5.6.2010
$797.00
08-13-2009
Professional
Service Fees
David J. Favre
Sr.
Professional Srv: March-May 2009
$13,650.00
08-13-2009
Professional
Service Fees
Dr. Keith G.
Blackwell
Professional Service Fees - Expert
$1,035.12
08-15-2008
Conference
Call
AT&T
TeleConference
Services
Telephone - Conference Call - AT&T
TeleConference Services - August
Matteis
$169.27
08-15-2008
Conference
Call
AT&T
TeleConference
Services
Telephone - Conference Call - AT&T
TeleConference Services - Derek
Sugimura
$68.46
08-20-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Rex Deloach
$725.85
08-20-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
National Court
Reporters, Inc.
Deposition of Juan Guevara
$882.32
08-27-2008
Travel Airfare
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Airfare - August J. Matteis
Jr. - Fee from Washington DC to
Mississippi for deposition - Flight
was cancelled due to hurricane 8.27.08
$812.01
-57-
$634.20
08-27-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Kerri Rigsby Cambre - Kerri Rigsby
Cambre
$11.00
09-01-2010
Travel Lodging
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Lodging - August Matteis Nashville TN / Ridgeland MS Depositions - 6.21-26.10
$783.53
09-01-2010
Travel Meals
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Meals - August Matteis Nashville TN / Ridgeland MS Depositions - 6.21-26.10
$366.97
09-01-2010
Travel Mileage
August J.
Matteis Jr.
Travel - Mileage - August Matteis Nashville TN / Ridgeland
MS - Depositions - 6.21-26.10
$600.0018
09-15-2010
Travel Airfare
Derek
Sugimura
Travel - Airfare - Derek Sugimura Canceled Airfare re Trip to
Gulfport MS - 9.9.10
$231.90
10-15-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Thomas McIntosh
(5/5/10) and Pamela McIntosh
(5/6/10)
$1,373.17
10-29-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Amanda Barbour - Butler Snow
$14.61
11-19-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of Thomas McIntosh:
5/5/10 and Pamela McIntosh:
5/6/10
$627.94
11-19-2010
Depositions/
Transcripts
One Stop
Depositions
LLC
Deposition of John A Fowler:
6.3.2010
$247.94
11-19-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Honorable J.T. Nobli [sic] - United
States District Court
$15.91
11-19-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Honorable Robert H. [sic] - United
States District Court
$15.91
11-20-2009
Depositions/
Transcripts
Teri Norton,
RMR, FCRR
Trail [sic] transcript: Bossier v.
State Farm - 11.2-12.09
12-10-2009
Conference
Call
AT&T
TeleConference
Services
Conference Call - August Matteis 10.29.09
$223.11
12-16-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
Macie Sledge - Heidelberg Harmon
PLLC
$37.95
12-18-2009
Messenger
& Delivery
Messenger & Delivery - Gilbert LLP
to Fowler Engineers - 12.4.09
$7.84
18
United Parcel
Service
$1,106.50
The Court reduces the mileage reimbursement request from $1,115.86 to $600.00.
-58-
12-21-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
12-28-2010
Travel Airfare
12-29-2010
Messenger
& Delivery
12-30-2009
Professional
Service Fees
Augie [sic] Matteis
Business Card
$20.91
$481.40
Macie Sledge - Heidelberg Harmon
PLLC
The Tasa
Group
Travel - Airfare - August Matteis 11.30.10
$8.76
Review of Storm data/Property
inspection
TOTAL
$2,864.90
$180,756.78
In sum, based upon the evidence submitted, Relators have shown that
$180,756.78 of the expenses submitted by Gilbert were reasonably and necessarily
incurred. The Court will award expenses to Relators from Gilbert totaling
$180,756.78.
(b)
Weisbrod Matteis & Copley PLLC
Relators request reimbursement for $123,594.56 in expenses incurred by
WMC. While the Court finds the majority of these expenses were reasonably and
necessarily incurred, some should be excluded for the same reasons the Court denied
similar expenses submitted by Gilbert. For some requests, only limited descriptions
are provided, and the Court is unable to ascertain from the record whether they are
recoverable. Accordingly, the Court will exclude those expenses.
The Court also finds that some the requested expenses should be excluded
because they constitute overhead which is normally absorbed into the attorney’s
hourly rate. See Pugach, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 165. The requests for reimbursement
for office and other supplies, even though these may have been used during trial, are
-59-
overhead expenses. See id. The same is true for in-office meals, particularly a
breakfast meeting held on April 19, 2013, after the trial had concluded. See id.
The requests for mileage reimbursement from Washington, D.C., to Gulfport,
Mississippi, are not reasonable as submitted. The billing records are insufficient to
inform the Court which attorney or attorneys incurred these expenses. However, it
is apparent from the WMC expense report that other attorneys from the firm
incurred airfare during the same time periods and for the same purposes. The Court
will therefore reduce the mileage reimbursement requests to $600.00, which is
reasonable and consistent with the cost of airfare and ground transportation for one
attorney, as the Court did with respect to Gilbert’s requests. The Court will also
disallow requests for reimbursement for gasoline while traveling to Gulfport,
Mississippi, as such requests are duplicative of the requests for mileage rate
reimbursement.
Based on the foregoing, and having thoroughly reviewed the expense records
submitted by Relators for WMC, the Court finds that the following WMC expenses
are recoverable.
Date
Payee19
Description20
1/4/2013
FedEx Corporation
Courier Charges; Express overnight
2/27/2013
Sequential, Inc.
Outside Duplicating; PDF for 1
blowback, all black and white
Amount
$24.94
$649.04
19
A blank for the payee indicates that this column was also left blank on WMC’s
expense report [1104-5].
20
The Court has quoted verbatim each of the descriptions from WMC’s expense
report [1104-5].
-60-
2/27/2013
Timothy Belknap Weisbrod Mat [sic]
Travel Expenses - Lodging at the Beau
Rivage Resort & Casino
$131.71
2/27/2013
Timothy Belknap Weisbrod Mat [sic]
Travel Expenses - Air Fare on Delta
$253.80
3/4/2013
FedEx Corporation
Courier Charges; Express overnight
$26.20
3/7/2013
Capitol Copy & Imaging
Outside Duplicating by CCI in Jackson,
MS
3/11/2013
FedEx Corporation
Courier Charges; Express overnight
3/11/2013
Sequential, Inc.
Outside Duplicating
$2,490.15
3/12/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses - Mileage
$600.0021
3/12/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Meals while on travel for Pre-trial
conference
$125.75
3/12/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses Lodging while on
travel for pre-trial conference on behalf
of T. Belknap and D. Sugimura
$698.08
3/12/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses - Lodging at Beau
Rivage Resort
$131.71
3/12/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses - One way air fare on
Delta to Trial
$253.80
3/12/2013
FedEx Corporation
Courier Charges; Express overnight
$26.20
3/18/2013
Video South
Litigation Support; trial preparation
and presentations
$7,500.00
3/22/2013
Teri Norton,
RMR/FCRR/RDR
Court Reporting
4/1/2013
Video South
Litigation Support; Trial preparation
and presentations
$2,920.07
4/1/2013
Video South
Litigation Support; Trial preparation
and presentations
$21,187.50
4/2/2013
Insurance Expert
Network, LLC
Expert Witness Fee - Lou G. Fey, Jr.
$14,812.03
4/8/2013
Teri Norton,
RMR/FCRR/RDR
Court Reporting
21
$9,404.43
$16.97
$175.00
$2,347.20
For the reasons stated earlier, the Court reduces the request for $1,327.75 in
mileage to $600.00.
-61-
4/9/2013
Teri Norton,
RMR/FCRR/RDR
Court Reporting
$1,902.00
4/11/2013
Teri Norton,
RMR/FCRR/RDR
Court Reporting
$160.80
4/17/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Meals while on travel for trial in
Gulfport, MS
4/17/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses - Budget Car Rental
for traveling to trial in Gulfport, MS
$758.70
4/24/2013
R. Ralph Sinno, PH.D.
[sic]
Expert Witness Fee - R. Ralph Sinno,
PH.D. [sic]
$33,810.00
4/30/2013
David J. Favre, Sr.
Expert Witness Fee; David J. Favre Sr
4/30/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Meals while on travel for trial in
Gulfport, MS
4/30/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses - Mileage of 2, 745
[sic] while on travel for trial in
Gulfport, MS
4/30/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Meals while on travel during trial
4/30/2013
Weisbrod Matteis &
Copley PLL [sic]
Travel Expenses - Baggage handling for
flight to Gulfport, MS
4/30/2013
Dr. Keith G. Blackwell
Expert Witness Fee - Dr. Keith G.
Blackwell
TOTAL
$1,466.92
$7,500.00
$844.11
$600.0022
$556.76
$60.00
$5,637.51
$117,071.38
The Court will reduce Relators’ requested reimbursement of expenses from
WMC by a total $6,523.18. Relators have shown that the remaining entries from
WMC were reasonably and necessarily incurred. The Court will award expenses to
Relators incurred by WMC totaling $117,071.38.
(c)
Heidelberg Harmon PLLC
Relators request reimbursement in the amount of $5,735.84 for expenses
incurred by HH. Having reviewed the records submitted, Relators have shown that
22
The Court reduces the mileage reimbursement request of $1,523.47 to $600.00.
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all of the expense report [1104-6] entries from HH represent expenses that were
reasonably and necessarily incurred, with the exception of “Meals with counsel and
Scruggs in Gulfport and Oxford” in the amount of $485.11. HH Expenses [1104-6] at
23. This description is insufficient for the Court to ascertain whether this expense is
recoverable, particularly in light of the fact that it appears to constitute charges for
meals with Relators’ former counsel, who withdrew from this case in March 2008.
The Court will award expenses to Relators from HH totaling $5,250.73, reduced
from the $5,735.84 requested.
(d)
Summary of Expenses
In sum, the Court concludes that some of Relators’ expenses cannot be
allowed. Relators will be awarded a total of $180,756.78 in expenses incurred by
Gilbert, $117,071.38 incurred by WMC, and $5,250.73 incurred by HH, for a total
award of expenses in the amount of $303,078.89.23
c.
Costs
The Court will order that costs be taxed against State Farm in accordance
with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Within fourteen (14) days of the
date of entry of Final Judgment on Relators’ claims pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 54(b) and 58, Relators shall file any bill of costs in the form required
23
The Court notes that some of these expenses requested by and awarded to Relators
may also fit within the definition of “costs” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and
28 U.S.C. § 1920. In the event Relators file a bill of costs, Relators are reminded not to
include as costs any item awarded here as expenses.
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by the Clerk of this Court and in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(1) and Local Uniform Civil Rule 54(c).
E.
Rule 54(b) Final Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that
[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise,
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Before a district court can enter a Rule 54(b) certification,
“the court must determine that the judgment is final in the sense that it is an
ultimate disposition of an individual claim.” Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime
(America), Inc., 650 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
This Memorandum Opinion and Order resolves all outstanding claims
asserted by Relators in this case. All Defendants other than State Farm have been
dismissed, and the trial concluded with a jury verdict against State Farm. State
Farm’s Counterclaim [355], which the Court has bifurcated from Relators’ claim,
Order [363] at 2, remains pending, but the Counterclaim is separate and distinct,
and not dependent upon, Relators’ claims.
While Relators’ Amended Complaint [16] alleges violations of the FCA
against all Defendants, State Farm’s Counterclaim against Relators alleges
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violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (4), (5), and
state law claims for trespass to chattels, conversion, common law fraud, breach of
contract, civil conspiracy, vicarious liability, and violation of the Mississippi Trade
Secrets Act, Mississippi Code § 75-26-3. State Farm’s Counterclaim is dependent
upon facts and legal theories wholly distinct from those upon which Relators’ claims
relied. Having considered the entire record before it, and in light of judicial
administrative interests and the equities involved, the Court makes the express
determination that there is no just reason for delay of entry of final judgment on
Relators’ claims. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) and 58, the
Court will therefore enter a final judgment on Relators’ claims asserted against all
Defendants in this action, while State Farm’s bifurcated Counterclaim will remain
pending in this Court. The parties are directed to contact the Magistrate Judge
within fourteen (14) days of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order for
purposes of scheduling a Case Management Conference on State Farm’s
Counterclaim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Relators’ Motion [1104]
should be granted in part and denied in part. To the extent the Court has not
addressed any of the parties’ arguments, it has considered them and determined
that they would not alter the result.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Relators Cori
Rigsby and Kerri Rigsby’s Motion to Initiate Discovery, Impose Maximum Penalty,
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Award Maximum Relators’ Share, and Award Relators Their Attorneys’ Fees,
Expenses, and Costs [1104] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), the United States Government will be awarded
treble damages in the amount of $750,000.00, plus a civil penalty in the amount of
$8,250.00, for a total sum of $758,250.00. Relators will be awarded 30 percent of the
foregoing amount in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2), with 15 percent
awarded to Relator Cori Rigsby and 15 percent awarded to Relator Kerri Rigsby.
Relators are also entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$2,610,149.80 and expenses in the amount of $303,078.89, for a total award of
$2,913,228.69 in fees and expenses, as well as their costs upon submission of an
appropriate bill of costs.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 21st day of February, 2014.
s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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