Page v. Harrison County, Mississippi et al

Filing 125

ORDER denying 119 Motion for Reconsideration re 117 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Discovery Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 05-02-2012 (Guirola, Louis)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AARON WAYNE PAGE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CAUSE NO. 1:09CV146-LG-RHW

HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
RR BRINK LOCKING SYSTEMS, INC.,
and JOHN DOES 1-5

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion [119] of Defendant RR Brink Locking
Systems, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court’s Order [117] denying summary
judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The Court determined that under
Mississippi law the Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred because at the time of his
injury, his disability of infancy had not been removed, even though he had been
“emancipated” from his parents by marriage. (Mem. Op. & Order, Dec. 14, 2011,
ECF No. 117). The Plaintiff has responded in opposition, and Brink has replied.
After due consideration of the matter, it is the Court’s opinion that the Motion for
Reconsideration should be denied.
D ISCUSSION
In Mississippi, an “infant” is a person under the age of twenty-one years.
M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 1-3-21. When a person is “under the disability of infancy,” certain
statutes of limitation otherwise applicable are tolled, beginning to run only “after his
disability shall be removed as provided by law.” M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 15-1-59. “The
disability of infancy is removed when a person attains the age of twenty-one years.”

Anderson v. R&D Foods, Inc., 913 So. 2d 394, 397 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Lawler v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Miss. 1990)).
Emancipation is the “freeing of a child for all the period of its minority from
the care, custody, control, and service of its parents; the relinquishment of parental
control, conferring on the child the right to its own earnings and terminating the
parent’s legal obligation to support it.” Burt v. Burt, 841 So. 2d 108, 111 (¶9) (Miss.
2001) (citations omitted). Under Mississippi law, a child is automatically deemed
emancipated from his parents when he reaches the age of twenty-one, marries, joins
and serves in the military, or is convicted of a felony and sentenced to two or more
years of incarceration. M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 93-11-65(8)(a). There are additional
limited statutory circumstances under which a court may make a finding that a
minor is emancipated. M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 93-11-65(8)(b). In the Memorandum
Opinion the Court has cited circumstances where emancipation of a minor through
marriage would not entitle that minor to treatment as an adult. For example, a
person under twenty-one years of age may not possess or purchase alcoholic
beverages. M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 67-1-81. The statute makes no exception for married
minors. Likewise, a person under twenty-one year of age may not play or be allowed
to place wagers in a casino. M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 75-76-155. No exception is made for
married minors.1
1

See also, Op.Atty.Gen. No. 98-0302, Harvey, June 19, 1998.
Activities such as gambling and consuming alcoholic beverages can not be
included in the term “profession or avocation” which a general removal of
disability of minority would allow the minor to practice; a general removal of
disability would not allow minors to practice such activities, absent a clear

-2-

Brink argues that the Court erred in holding that emancipation from one’s
parents is irrelevant to application of the minor’s savings statute in this case. Brink
contends that when the totality of a minor’s circumstances transform the minor into
an emancipated minor by operation of law, any and all disability of infancy faced by
the minor is removed and the minor is deemed to take on all of the rights and
responsibilities of an adult, including the running of any statute of limitations on
accrued causes of action. Brink cites White v. Abel, 802 So. 2d 98 (Miss. Ct. App.
2001) in support.
The White case concerned unpaid child support payments. The court found
that the minor’s mother had let the statute of limitations expire on her claim for
back child support, because the minor had been emancipated more than seven years
prior to the filing of the suit. Id. at 102; M ISS. C ODE A NN. § 15-1-43. Because of the
minor’s emancipation, there were no child support payments due within the seven
year limitations period. The minor did not join her mother in the lawsuit, but the
court noted that if she had, she could not have brought a successful claim for the
unpaid child support because “her time has run under [the minor’s savings statute].”
White, 802 So. 2d at 102.
By this statement, the court appears to have equated emancipation for
purposes of child support with the removal of the disability of infancy under the

expression of legislative intent that such is the case, and a general removal of
disability of minority does not authorize minors to engage in gambling
activities as prohibited by Section 75-76-155.

-3-

savings statute. With all due deference, the court appears to blur the legal
distinction between emancipation on the one hand, and removal of disability of
infancy on the other. Moreover, the court’s statement is tantamount to non-binding
dictum. It concerns a hypothetical factual situation, and the statement is
unnecessary to the result of the case. See Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372
F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2004).
Brink also cites as authority Justice McRae’s concurring and dissenting
opinion in another child support case. Justice McRae stated:
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (2000) specifically states that when “any
person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned” is a
minor at the time that the cause of action accrues, the statute of
limitations will not begin to run until that person either reaches the
age of twenty-one, or is emancipated.
Burt, 841 So. 2d at 114 (¶22). However, once again with deference to Justice McRae,
the statute does not use the term “emancipated.” Instead, it provides that a person
may bring an action “after his disability shall be removed as provided by law.” M ISS.
C ODE A NN . § 15-1-59. As the Court discussed in its Memorandum Opinion and
Order, Mississippi statutes allow for the removal of the disability of infancy in
certain circumstances before a minor reaches the age of twenty-one. Mississippi
has defined emancipation as something that either occurs despite infancy, or when
infancy ends. The Court therefore cannot rely on Justice McRae’s misstatement to
conclude that under Mississippi law emancipation equals removal of the disability of
infancy.
To be sure, Mississippi case law is less than clear on this point due to the

-4-

confluence of concepts of emancipation and the removal of the disability of infancy at
twenty-one years of age. Because these events occur simultaneously, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has used the term “emancipation” to mean reaching the age of
twenty-one. See, e.g., Shelnut v. Dept. of Human Servs., 9 So. 3d 359, 366 (Miss.
2009) (“the statute of limitations is tolled until the disability of infancy is removed
upon emancipation.”); Ladner v. Logan, 857 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 2003). Nevertheless,
the Mississippi Supreme court has also made it clear that a minor’s qualifying claim
is tolled while he is a minor. Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 955 So. 2d 764, 770
(Miss. 2007).
Absent statutory authority or a clear pronouncement from the Mississippi
Supreme Court, this Court’s remains persuaded that its original ruling is correct.
Moreover, if squarely presented with this issue, this Court is also convinced that the
Mississippi courts would hold that it is Plaintiff’s infancy that governs whether the
statute of limitations has run in this case, not his emancipation. The factual
findings requested by Brink regarding Page’s emancipation are therefore irrelevant.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [119]
of Defendant RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court’s
Order denying summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds is DENIED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 2 nd day of May, 2012.

s/

Louis Guirola, Jr.

LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

-5-