Wiregrass Homebuilders, Inc. v. Investment Acquisitions Group, LLC et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER finding as moot 51 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 63 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 8/2/11. (JCH)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WIREGRASS HOMEBUILDERS,
INC., a Georgia Corporation

§
§
§
V.
§
§
INVESTMENT ACQUISITIONS GROUP, §
LLC, CHARLES A. WEBB, III, LEWIS G. §
NEGROTTO, IV, NEGROTTO &
§
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, U.S. TITLE
§
COMPANY, PLLC, and
§
JOHN/JANE DOES 1-5
§
§
§
JANET TAYLOR-BRYAN, GLENDA
§
POULOS, FIRST REALTY, INC.,
§
COASTAL PROPERTY PROS, LLC,
§
COASTAL PROPERTIES AND
§
DEVELOPMENT, INC., RAYMOND R.
§
YATES, JAMES R. GUERINO, and
§
JOHN/JANE DOES 1-5
§

PLAINTIFF/
COUNTER-DEFENDANT
Civil No. 1:09CV256-HSO-JMR

DEFENDANTS/
COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS/
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE CERTAIN DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ASSIGNMENTS AND TO DISMISS, DENYING AS
MOOT CERTAIN THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS,
AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
BEFORE THE COURT are the Motion to Dismiss [51] filed by Third-Party
Defendants Janet Taylor-Bryan, Glenda Poulos, Coastal Property Pros, LLC, and
Coastal Properties and Development, Inc. [collectively, “Moving Third-Party
Defendants”], and the Motion to Side Aside Assignments and to Dismiss [63] filed by
Defendants Investment Acquisitions Group, LLC [“IAG”], Lewie G. Negrotto, IV
[“Mr. Negrotto”], Negrotto & Associates, PLLC [“Negrotto & Associates”], and U.S.
Title Company, PLLC [“U.S. Title”] [collectively, “Moving Defendants”]. Both

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Motions are now fully briefed. After consideration of the Motions, the pleadings, the
record in this case, and the relevant legal authorities, and for the reasons discussed
below, the Court finds that, because it lacks jurisdiction over this matter, Moving
Defendants’ Motion to Side Aside Assignments and to Dismiss [63] must be granted
in part and denied in part without prejudice. Moving Third-Party Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss [51] will be denied as moot, and this case will be dismissed
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Wiregrass Homebuilders, Inc. [“Wiregrass” or “Plaintiff”], filed its
Complaint [1] on April 6, 2009, invoking this Court’s diversity jurisdiction,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Compl., at ¶ 12. This dispute involves the purchase
of certain real property [the “Property”] located in Harrison County, Mississippi,
which was owned by Catherine Hanson and the Herbert C. Hanson Residuary Trust
[collectively, the “Hansons”] during the relevant time period, up and until June
2009, when the Hansons conveyed the Property by warranty deed to Wiregrass. Id.
at ¶¶ 13-14.
According to Wiregrass, Third-Party Defendant Janet Taylor-Bryan [“Bryan”]
was a real estate broker from Florida who acted as an agent for Wiregrass and
Northwest Florida Operations, Inc. [“Northwest”], “an affiliate company” of
Wiregrass, at all pertinent times. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. After Hurricane Katrina struck
on August 29, 2005, Bryan contacted Third-Party Defendant Glenda Poulos

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[“Poulos”], a real estate broker associated with Third-Party Defendant Coastal
Property Pros, LLC, in Gulfport, Mississippi. Id. at ¶ 17. After certain state
gaming legislation was enacted, Bryan and Poulos decided to seek available 300 to
400 acre tracts of property in Harrison County, Mississippi, for development. Id. at
¶ 18. Wiregrass alleges that Bryan and Poulos approached Defendant Lewis G.
(Skip) Negrotto, IV [“Negrotto”], a real estate attorney, about assisting them in
finding suitable property. According to Wiregrass, Bryan, Poulos, and Negrotto
agreed that Negrotto would share in the real estate commission, as an attorneyagent for their “client,”1 if they were successful in locating a property. Id. at ¶ 19.
Negrotto purportedly learned that the Hanson Property might be for sale,
and so advised Bryan and Poulos. When queried about the price the Hansons were
seeking for the Property, Negrotto allegedly told Poulos and Bryan that the asking
price was $13,500.00 per acre. Compl., at ¶¶ 20-21. Wiregrass and Northwest
decided to make an offer to purchase the Property at this per acre price. Id. at ¶ 21.
Northwest prepared and signed a Letter of Intent in December 2005, offering
to buy the Property at $13,500.00 per acre, for a total purchase price of
$4,972,500.00. Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Letter of Intent, attached as Ex. “1" to Compl.).
Wiregrass alleges that the Letter of Intent was delivered to Negrotto with
instructions that Northwest wanted to close the transaction immediately, before the
end of the year, if possible. Id. Wiregrass accuses Negrotto of meeting with a
Wiregrass refers to itself and Northwest as a singular “client” in its
Complaint. See Compl., at ¶¶ 18–19. For reasons which are discussed in more
detail elsewhere herein, it is telling that Wiregrass refers to itself and Northwest as
one indivisible “client” of Bryant, Poulos, and Negrotto.
1

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representative of the Hansons and advising that he had a buyer willing to purchase
the Property for a lower price, $10,600.00 per acre, a price which the Hansons had
indicated they were willing to accept. Id. at ¶ 23.
According to the Complaint, on January 5, 2006, Negrotto transmitted to
Poulos and Bryan a memorandum purportedly sent from Defendant Charles A.
Webb, III [“Webb”], to Negrotto, which represented that there was another
purchaser who had contractual rights to purchase the Property, namely Webb and
Defendant Investment Acquisitions Group, LLC [“IAG”]. Compl., at ¶¶ 24-26.
Wiregrass maintains that the memorandum represented that Webb and IAG would
be able to offer the Property to Northwest within a couple of weeks, under the terms
of Northwest’s Letter of Intent, when in fact the memorandum was a complete ruse
designed, drafted, and prepared by Negrotto and Webb to mislead and defraud
Northwest. Id. at ¶¶ 26-28. Wiregrass asserts that, at the time the memorandum
was transmitted to Poulos and Bryan, neither Webb nor IAG had any relationship
with the Hansons or any rights to the Property, and that Negrotto and Webb
conspired to obtain an option to purchase the Property from the Hansons for a
significantly lower amount than Negrotto had quoted Northwest. Wiregrass
contends that Negrotto’s plan was to then assign that option to Northwest for a
profit. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.
On February 1, 2006, Negrotto transmitted another memorandum,
purportedly from Webb, which Wiregrass asserts was actually drafted by Negrotto
in an attempt to hide his involvement in the transaction. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. The

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February 1, 2006, memorandum gave Northwest until 3:00 p.m. on Friday,
February 6, 2006, to execute the Assignment of the Option, but Northwest
requested that Negrotto secure an extension until Monday, February 10, 2006. Id.
at ¶¶ 35-36. Wiregrass alleges that Negrotto and Webb devised another
memorandum, purportedly from Webb to Negrotto, dated February 6, 2006, which
granted the requested extension, conditioned upon Northwest terminating/releasing
the Letter of Intent to the Hansons, and stated that Webb had a backup offer on the
Property, which Wiregrass alleges was not true. Id. at ¶¶ 36-39.
On February 7, 2006, Northwest executed the Assignment of the Option,
which provided that Northwest would pay the full price of $4,972,500.00 for the
Property. This meant that IAG would receive the excess over the undisclosed, lower
amount the Hansons were receiving for the Property. Compl., at ¶ 40. On June 7,
2006, Northwest assigned its rights under the Assignment to Wiregrass, and on
June 9, 2006, Negrotto conducted a closing of the transaction at his office. The
Hansons received $3,869,000.00 in gross sale proceeds. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42. Wiregrass
contends that, according to the HUD Statement provided by Negrotto, IAG received
$1,033,500.00 at the closing. Id. at ¶ 43. Wiregrass claims that the Hansons’ HUD
Statement did not disclose the amount Wiregrass actually paid for the Property,
and that neither it nor Northwest was aware that Negrotto and Webb had sold the
Property for $1,058,500.00 more than the Hansons were paid. Id. at ¶¶ 42-43.
In February 2009, the Hansons and Northwest each assigned to Wiregrass all
of their rights, title, and interest in and to any and all claims or choses in action

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they might have against IAG and “any other person, firm or entity arising out of or
in any way related to the preliminary negotiations, contracts, options, assignments,
sale, closing on” the Property. Assignments [3], attached as Exs. “6” and “7” to
Compl. Wiregrass then filed its Complaint on April 6, 2009.
B.

Procedural History
The Complaint asserts claims for breach of the standard of care, breach of

fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, tortious
interference with a business relationship, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, accounting,
disgorgement, and constructive trust on behalf of Northwest, see Compl., at ¶¶ 4895, and breach of the standard of care, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with a
business relationship, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, constructive trust,
disgorgement, and accounting, on behalf of the Hansons, see id. at ¶¶ 96-138.
Wiregrass advances no independent claims of its own.
On July 17, 2009, Defendants IAG, Negrotto, Negrotto & Associates, and U.S.
Title Company, PLLC [“U.S. Title”] [collectively, “Third-Party Plaintiffs” or
“Counter-Plaintiffs”], filed their Amended Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party
Claim [28]. They raise claims for breach of the standard of care, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference
with a business relationship, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, accounting,
disgorgement, and constructive trust against Third-Party Defendants Bryan, First
Realty, Inc., Poulos, Coastal Property Pros, LLC, Coastal Property and Development,
Inc., James R. Geurino, and Raymond R. Yates [collectively “Third-Party

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Defendants”]. Am. Answer, at ¶¶ 24-69. As Counter-Plaintiffs, they advance claims
for abuse of process, breach of the standard of care, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with a
business relationship, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, accounting, disgorgement, and
constructive trust against Wiregrass and Northwest. Id. at ¶¶ 71-127.
Third-Party Defendants Bryan, Poulos, Coastal Property Pros, LLC, and

Coastal Properties and Development, Inc., now seek dismissal of the Third-Party
Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4), (5), and (6). ThirdParty Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [51], at pp. 1-2. Defendants IAG, Negrotto, Negrotto &
Associates, and U.S. Title seek to set aside the Assignments from Northwest and the
Hansons to Wiregrass, and seek dismissal of this action. Mot. to Set Aside and to
Dismiss [63], at pp. 1-2. Because the issue of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction
is raised in the latter Motion [63], the Court addresses it first.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside and to Dismiss [63]
Defendants maintain that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to

join Northwest and the Hansons as Plaintiffs as real parties in interest, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, and as indispensable parties, pursuant to Rule
19. Mot. to Set Aside and to Dismiss [63], at pp. 1-2. They also contend that the
Assignments from Northwest and the Hansons to Wiregrass were improperly and/or
collusively made to create diversity jurisdiction where none existed, in contravention
of 28 U.S.C. § 1359, such that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Id. at p. 2. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is precluded from

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maintaining this action pursuant to Mississippi Code § 79-4-15.02, as neither
Wiregrass, Northwest, nor any of their other affiliates, are authorized to do business
in Mississippi via a Certificate of Authority, when they are in fact doing business
within the State. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has instructed that “[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in
conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Randall D.
Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ramming
v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).
1.

Legal Standard

A party invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proof
on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). To
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the Court may look to “(1) the
complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in
the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's
resolution of disputed facts.” Id. (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). Under the
circumstances and the record presented here, the Court finds that the third option is
the most appropriate, as there are disputed questions of fact which the Court must
resolve in order to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.
2.

Analysis

Section 1332 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of
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different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The party seeking to invoke federal
jurisdiction, Plaintiff Wiregrass in this case, has the burden of proving the facts
necessary to sustain jurisdiction. Harvey Const. Co. v. Robertson-CECO, Corp., 10
F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1994). While complete diversity appears on the face of the
Complaint, and there is no dispute that the requisite amount in controversy is
satisfied, Defendants argue that, but for the Assignments from Northwest and the
Hansons to Wiregrass, the Court would not have diversity jurisdiction. Mot. to Set
Aside and to Dismiss [63], at p. 2. Northwest and the Hansons are apparently

Florida and Mississippi citizens, respectively, as are some of the named Defendants.
Compl., at pp. 2-4. Wiregrass is diverse from all named Defendants, but asserts no
independent claims of its own in the Complaint, only ones on behalf of Northwest
and the Hansons.
Defendants first attack the Assignments on their face, arguing that
Northwest and the Hansons are the real parties in interest. Mot. to Set Aside and
to Dismiss [63], at p. 2. This is in effect an attack on Plaintiff’s assertion of

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as Northwest and the Hansons are
non-diverse parties from named Defendants. Defendants further contend that the
Assignments are improper and/or collusive and made to create diversity jurisdiction
where none existed, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1359. Id. Wiregrass responds that it
received a complete Assignment of the Hansons’ and Northwest’s claims, and as a
matter of law, the Assignment was not improper or collusive pursuant to § 1359.
Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at pp. 9–10.

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a.

Facial Attack on Assignments under Mississippi Law

In determining the identity of a real party in interest, a federal court sitting
in diversity must look to state law to determine which party holds the relevant
substantive right. Farrell Const. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, La., 896 F.2d 136, 140 (5th
Cir. 1990). The question here is whether, under Mississippi law, the Assignments
are valid on their faces, such that the Hansons’ and Northwest’s rights passed to
Wiregrass, making Wiregrass the real party in interest. This question goes more to
the merits of the case, in that it implicates the question of whether the Assignments
are valid under state law. This is a separate inquiry from whether the
Assignments, even if valid, were made for the purpose of improperly or collusively
obtaining diversity jurisdiction. Because the Court determines that it lacks
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1359, the Court need not resolve whether the
Assignments were valid under Mississippi law.
b.

Section 1359

Assuming for the sake of argument that the Assignments were valid under
Mississippi law, the Court must look behind them to assess whether they were
collusive pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1359. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 provides that “[a] district
court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment
or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the
jurisdiction of such court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1359. “Section 1359 is designed to prevent
the litigation of claims in federal court by suitors who by sham, pretense, or other
fiction acquire a spurious status that would allow them to invoke the limited
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jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 178 (5th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1990)). “[I]t
has generally been restricted to circumstances involving assignment of interests
from non-diverse to diverse parties to collusively create diversity jurisdiction.” Id.
“The purpose of the statute is to prevent the manipulation of jurisdictional facts
where none existed before-for example, through collusive assignments from a
non-diverse party to a diverse party.” Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1067. As the Court has
previously observed, the Assignments here were from non-diverse parties to a
completely diverse one.
Counsel for Wiregrass has submitted evidence, through his own Affidavit, Aff.
of Michael Holleman,at ¶ 3, attached as Ex. “1" to Pl.’s Resp. [75], to support the
position that jurisdiction was not a motivation, or even a consideration, in either
Assignment. Nevertheless, it is black-letter law that a federal court has an

obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction. MCG, Inc.
v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). This obligation,
coupled with section 1359's prohibition, requires the Court to determine whether a
party has been insinuated into an action in order to artificially invoke its
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1359; McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004).
The Court is under a parallel duty to take steps to assess whether any party has
been omitted from pending litigation in order to permit the unwarranted invocation
of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1359; McCulloch, 364 F.3d at 5.

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(1).

Presumption of Collusiveness

Though the Fifth Circuit has neither adopted nor rejected this approach,
other circuits have held that assignments between certain closely related entities
are presumptively ineffective to create diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., McCulloch,
364 F.3d at 6 (corporation to its sole owner); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S&N
Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 863 (2d Cir. 1995) (numerous air carriers to their not-forprofit representative created to function as clearing house and collection agent for
transactions between carriers and travel agents); Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de
Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 991–92 (9th Cir. 1994) (subsidiary to
parent corporation); Dweck v. Japan CBM Corp., 877 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1989)
(corporation to its officers or directors); Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n for
Human Rights, 608 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1979) (parent to subsidiary);
Prudential Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 546 F.2d 469, 475 (2d Cir. 1976)
(parent to wholly-owned subsidiary engaged in no business other than prosecution
of claim); but see Ambrosia Coal & Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1314
(11th Cir. 2007) (factually distinguishing Prudential and S&N Travel, and refusing
to apply presumption of collusion to “upstream” assignments–those from subsidiary
to parent); Herzog Contracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp., 976 F.2d 1062, 1067 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that “no inference of collusive invocation of jurisdiction can be
drawn from the simple fact that assignor and assignee are under common
ownership”).

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Those cases applying the collusive presumption allow for a method of
rebutting the presumption, but the ultimate burden of proving that jurisdiction
exists remains with the party invoking it. See, e.g., Airlines Reporting, 58 F.3d at
863 (“simply offering evidence of a business reason will be insufficient to rebut the
presumption. Instead, the burden falls on the party asserting diversity to
demonstrate that the reason given for the assignment is legitimate, not
pretextual.”); Prudential Oil, 546 F.2d at 476 (the assignee “may rebut or meet the
presumption by offering evidence that the transfer was made for a legitimate
business purpose unconnected to the creation of diversity jurisdiction”). With this
in mind, the party asserting jurisdiction must demonstrate that the “legitimate
business reason” given is actually legitimate, not pretextual. Airlines Reporting, 58
F.3d at 863. The Court finds that the weight of persuasive authority supports the
Court following the collusive presumption approach. The Court will therefore
utilize this approach in analyzing the Assignments in question here.
Notwithstanding the fact that Wiregrass and Northwest do not have a
parent-subsidiary relationship and do not have any officers, directors, or
shareholders in common, Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 6, they are
indisputably affiliated entities. Wiregrass’ own Complaint plainly states that
Northwest is “an affiliate company of WIREGRASS HOMEBUILDERS, INC.”
Compl., at p. 4. Though Wiregrass’ counsel now attempts to retreat from and soften
this statement in its own Complaint, Aff. of Michael Holleman, at ¶ 44, attached as
Ex. “1” to Pl.’s Resp. [75], the Court is persuaded that, to the extent there can be

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any factual dispute on this point, the record demonstrates that these entities are in
fact “affiliated,” such that the presumption of collusiveness should apply.
Leaving aside Wiregrass’ clear admission in its Complaint, the facts
contained in the record as a whole reveal how closely related these entities are. As
noted earlier, the Complaint refers to Wiregrass and Northwest by the singular
term “client.” Compl., at ¶¶ 18–19. Janet Taylor-Bryan, the real estate broker from
Florida, acted as an agent for both Wiregrass and Northwest. Id. at p. 4; Pl.’s Mem.
in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 10. Bryan also worked in 2005 for Wiregrass for
“other non-Mississippi developments.” Id. She has testified by affidavit that she
has served as real estate broker and agent “on other projects for each of the
companies in other states, individually and jointly.” Aff. of Janet Taylor-Bryan, at ¶
3, attached as Ex. “3” to Pl.’s Resp. [75].

When the parties learned of the Hansons’ purported asking price,
“NORTHWEST and WIREGRASS decided to make an offer on the property at the
full purchase price per acre provided by NEGROTTO.” Compl., at p. 5. Northwest
made the actual offer to purchase the Hanson Property, Compl., at p. 7, delivered
its original formal Letter of Intent on December 21, 2005, Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of
its Resp., at p. 11, and executed the Assignment of Option Contract with IAG on
February 7, 2006, Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 13. “Because Wiregrass
and Northwest hoped to develop the Hanson property together, Wiregrass paid the
$25,000.00 consideration for the assignment.” Id. “On June 7, 2006, two (2) days
before the closing, Northwest assigned its rights in the Hanson property to
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Wiregrass.” Id. at p. 14. Wiregrass now alleges that it and Northwest “are two
entirely separate companies which have, on occasion, developed properties in other
states together. They considered developing the Hanson Property together, before
Northwest decided not to participate.” Id. Wiregrass then closed on the Property
on June 9, 2006. Id.
However, Wiregrass and Northwest “are involved in property development in
the southeast and have developed some properties together.” Aff. of James R.
Guerino, at ¶ 3, attached as Ex. “2" to Pl.’s Resp. [75]; see Aff. of Janet Taylor-Bryan,
at ¶ 4, attached as Ex. “3" to Pl.’s Resp. [75]. Wiregrass and Northwest are also

represented by the same counsel in this case.
As with assignments between parent and subsidiary companies, the transfer
of legal title to the claims between closely related parties like Wiregrass and
Northwest can easily be arranged, increasing the potential for collusion and
compounding the difficulty in detecting the true purpose for the assignment. See
Airlines Reporting, 58 F.3d at 863. The Court therefore finds that the presumption
of collusion applies to Northwest’s Assignment of its rights, title, and interest to any
and all claims or choses in action in this case to Wiregrass.
The Court now turns to whether Wiregrass has rebutted the presumption of
collusiveness. After considering the pleadings and the undisputed facts, and
resolved disputed facts, the Court concludes that it has not. Though it has offered
conclusional statements about having legitimate business reasons for procuring the

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Assignments, Wiregrass has not satisfactorily articulated those reasons. Therefore,
§ 1359's jurisdictional barrier applies in this case, and dismissal is warranted.
(2).

Collusiveness under § 1359 without Applying the
Presumption

Even if the aforementioned presumption does not apply, the Court
nevertheless finds that Plaintiff Wiregrass has not met its burden of demonstrating
the existence of jurisdiction in this case. After evaluating the Assignments in
question under existing precedent, the Court is convinced that § 1359 applies, such
that it lacks jurisdiction. In conducting this analysis under § 1359, the Court is
guided by Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, and “its ultimate inquiry is
into motive and purpose with substantiality of stake a relevant but not controlling
indicator. . . .” Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharm. Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d
392, 399 (5th Cir. 1984).
On one hand, Plaintiff’s counsel’s Affidavit avers that jurisdiction was not a
motivation, or even a consideration, in procuring either Assignment. Aff. of Michael
Holleman, at ¶ 3, attached as Ex. “1" to Pl.’s Resp. [75]. On the other, there is
significant record evidence which raises doubt as to such assertions. Though they do

not have a subsidiary/parent relationship and do not have common shareholders or
boards, Wiregrass and Northwest are affiliated companies in the sense that they
are in business together and commonly work together on real estate transactions.
In determining whether assignments have been improperly or collusively
made, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the Third Circuit’s “motive/function” rule

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espoused in McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). See Bianca, 723 F.2d
at 395. This approach considers whether there was an intent to manufacture
diversity, and whether there is sufficient substance to the Assignment to allow it to
be recognized in a diversity suit. See id. at 396. The Fifth Circuit has noted that
this rule was “bouyed” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kramer v. Caribbean
Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). Id. at 395. The Fifth Circuit continues to apply the
“motive/function” rule in its § 1359 analysis. GDQ Corp. v. Brass, 229 F.3d 1148,
2000 WL 1239187, *1 (5th Cir. 2000) (“the inquiry under 28 U.S.C. § 1359 is guided
by the ‘motive/function’ rule . . . .”).
In examining federal court jurisdiction under the “anti-collusion” statute, the
Second Circuit has considered the following non-exclusive factors:
the assignee's lack of a previous connection with the claim assigned; the
remittance by the assignee to the assignor of any recovery; whether the
assignor actually controls the conduct of the litigation; the timing of the
assignment; the lack of any meaningful consideration for the assignment;
and the underlying purpose of the assignment.
Catskill Development, L.L.C. v. Park Place Entertainment Corp., 547 F.3d 115, 124
(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S&N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857,
862 (2d Cir. 1995)).
No single factor is dispositive. Id.
In Hytken Family Ltd. v. Schaefer, 431 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D. Tex. 2006), the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas applied a similar list
of factors. The court there explained that
[s]ince the Supreme Court's decision in Kramer, courts across the country
have considered the following factors: (1) whether there was nominal or
no consideration involved in the assignment; (2) whether the assignee
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had any previous connection to the assigned claim; (3) whether there was
a legitimate business reason for the assignment; (4) whether the timing
of the assignment suggests it was merely an effort to secure federal
diversity jurisdiction; (5) whether the assignor exercises any control over
the conduct of the litigation; and (6) whether the assignor retains any
interest in the action such as receiving a portion of the assignee's
recovery.
Id. at 699–700. The Court turns to an analysis of the relevant factors.
(a).

Consideration

Both Assignments purport to transfer assignors’ rights, title, and interest to
Wiregrass for “Ten and 00/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged. . . .”
Assignments [3], attached as Exs. “6” and “7” to Compl. Defendants argue that,
“[t]hough the Assignments state on their face that they were obtained for good and
valuable consideration, Wiregrass has provided no proof in its Initial Disclosure to
support that statement.” Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. [64] of Mot., at p. 2.
Wiregrass responds that the Hanson Assignment was a complete assignment
of the Hansons’ claims, and that as a matter of law, it was not improper or collusive
pursuant to § 1359. Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 9. Wiregrass
maintains that the consideration for the Assignment was the settlement of certain
state court litigation with Courtney Hanson, namely a replevin action by Courtney
Hanson and Bennie Saucier against Wiregrass, and a trespass action by Wiregrass
against Courtney Hanson and Bennie Saucier, which had been consolidated in state
court. Id. a pp. 10–11; Aff. of Michael Holleman, at ¶¶ 2, 25–26, attached as Ex. “1”
to Pl.’s Resp. [75]. Defendants point out that, of the Hansons, only Courtney

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Hanson was a party to those lawsuits, and that “Courtney Hanson has no legal
right to act on behalf of his mother, Catherine Hanson or the Hanson Family
Trust.” Defs.’ Rebuttal, at p. 2. They also allege that the Hanson Assignment was
not an arms length transaction. Id. The Court is persuaded that, because the
settlement involved a non-party to the present litigation and related transactions,
the consideration for the Hanson Assignment was only nominal.
As for the Northwest Assignment, Wiregrass points to its $25,000.00
payment to IAG on behalf of Northwest for the option contract for the Property.
Wiregrass states that this was sufficient consideration for the June 7, 2006,
Northwest Assignment, but admits that “[o]nly nominal consideration was paid for
the 2009 Northwest Assignment.” Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 29.
However, Wiregrass insists that “[t]he payment of $25,000.00 was sufficient
consideration to support both assignments.” Id.
The Court is not persuaded that Wiregrass’ $25,000.00 payment to IAG for
the 2006 Northwest Assignment was sufficient consideration for the 2009
Assignment. Wiregrass paid the $25,000.00 to IAG as a binder on the purchase of
the Property for Northwest’s benefit on February 9, 2006, and Northwest assigned
its rights in the Hanson Property to Wiregrass on June 7, 2006. Aff. of Franklin
Skinner, at ¶ 2, attached as Ex. “5" to Pl.’s Resp. [75]. It is unclear what benefit
Northwest would have received from a 2006 payment on its behalf to a third party
for assigning its claims and choses in action to Wiregrass in 2009.

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Moreover, the 2006 Assignment, signed by Northwest’s president, R. Richard
Yates, and Wiregrass’ president, Thomas F. Leonard, reads, in relevant part, as
follows:
For and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and
valuable considerations, cash in hand paid, the undersigned Northwest
Florida Operations, Inc., does hereby sell, convey, transfer and assign to
Assignee all of its rights, title and interest in and to that certain Option
Contract, subject to the modifications as stated here. A copy of Option
Contract is attached here as Exhibit A.
Upon execution of this Assignment, Assignee agrees to be bound by and
obligated to perform for and in the place of Optionor/Assignor as defined
in the Option Contract and in accordance with the terms and conditions
as added herein.
This Assignment of Option Contract shall inure to the benefit of and be
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, legal representatives,
successors, and assigns.
Assignment of Option Contract [75-8], attached as Ex. “1F” to Pl.’s Resp. [75].
Wiregrass has stated that it executed the subsequent Assignment in 2009
because its counsel thought it unclear whether the 2006 one “was sufficient to
convey some rights to assert claims against Negrotto and others.” Pl.’s Mem. in
Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 16. This “clarification” argument is not persuasive.
Wiregrass and Northwest each have distinct causes of action against Defendants,
based on the transactions at issue in this case. Northwest’s claims stem from its
own negotiations and interactions with Defendants, and Wiregrass’ independent
claims arise out of its dealings with Defendants, post-assignment of Northwest’s
Option Contract in 2006, including any claims related to the closing on the
Property.
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Wiregrass has elected not to pursue any of its own causes of action. Instead,
it has pursued only those Northwest and the Hansons possessed at the time the
Assignments were executed. The Court finds that the 2006 and 2009 Northwest
Assignments are distinct and convey different rights, such that the latter
Assignment was necessary to convey the causes of action asserted here. The Court
is not persuaded that the $25,000.00 paid by Wiregrass on Northwest’s behalf in
2006 can be properly deemed consideration for the 2009 Northwest Assignment.
Indeed, Wiregrass admits that “[o]nly nominal consideration was paid for the 2009
Northwest Assignment.” Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. [76] of its Resp., at p. 29; see Aff. of
James R. Guerino, at ¶ 9, attached as Ex. “2” to Pl.’s Resp. [75] (“Because Wiregrass
had advanced the Option money on the IAG Assignment of Option Contract, the
2006 Northwest Assignment and the 2009 Northwest Assignment were made only
for nominal consideration.”).
In sum, the Court concludes that Wiregrass gave only nominal consideration
for both the Northwest and the Hanson Assignments. Nominal consideration, even
if sufficient to support a valid assignment under state law, supports a finding that
these Assignments were improper or collusive for purposes of § 1359. See Hytken,
431 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
(b). Assignee’s Previous Connection to Assigned Claims
Wiregrass was involved from the beginning in the transactions which are the
subject of this lawsuit. It has claims which are distinct from those of Northwest as
well as those of the Hansons, yet it has only brought the claims previously held by
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Northwest and the Hansons. Wiregrass was not a complete stranger to these
transactions or the claims arising out of them. Out of an abundance of caution, the
Court will consider this factor to weigh against a finding of improper and collusive
Assignments.
(c). Reason for Assignments
The next factor is whether there was a legitimate business reason for
completing the Assignments. With respect to the Hansons, Wiregrass expressed its
desire to settle certain state court litigation with Courtney Hanson, but Wiregrass
has not submitted sufficient testimonial evidence explaining why obtaining the
Assignment from all of the Hansons was so important to it, particularly where it
had its own independent claims against Defendants but chose to forego them.
Though Wiregrass has offered conclusional statements that it had legitimate
business reasons for procuring the 2009 Northwest Assignment, it has not
articulated them. Wiregrass’ desire to develop the Hanson Property, which appears
from the record to be its business reason for obtaining the original 2006 Assignment
to purchase the Property, is distinct from its desire to pursue Northwest’s claims
against Defendants. Wiregrass has not offered a sufficient legitimate business
reason for these Assignments. This factor supports the conclusion that the
Assignments were improper and collusive.
(d). Timing of Assignments
The second Northwest Assignment was executed on February 28, 2009, and
the Hanson Assignment was executed on February 18, 2009. Both were executed
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within seven (7) weeks of Wiregrass initiating this litigation on April 6, 2009. The
Complaint was filed some nineteen (19) months after the alleged fraud was
discovered by Northwest’s and Wiregrass’ counsel herein. See Aff. of Michael
Holleman, at ¶ 15, attached as Ex. “1" to Pl.’s Resp. [75] (testifying that, during
Courtney Hanson’s deposition on September 5, 2007, in state court suit, counsel for
Wiregrass and Northwest recognized that some type of fraud or breach of duty may
have been perpetuated by Defendants). This timing suggests that both Assignments

were obtained merely in an effort to secure federal diversity jurisdiction. This
factor weighs in favor of a finding that the Assignments were effected for the
purpose of establishing federal diversity jurisdiction.
(e). Assignors’ Control over Conduct of Litigation
Though the parties have provided affidavit testimony that the assignors,
Northwest and the Hansons, retain no control over the conduct of the litigation, the
Court has noted previously that Wiregrass and Northwest share counsel in this
matter, after a waiver of conflict was signed. The Court is of the opinion that this
factor is neutral as to the assessment of collusiveness.
(f). Assignors’ Retention of Any Interest in the Action
In Kramer, the Supreme Court noted that it had “no occasion to re-examine
the cases in which [the] Court has held that where the transfer of a claim is
absolute, with the transferor retaining no interest in the subject matter, then the
transfer is not ‘improperly or collusively made,’ regardless of the transferor’s
motive.” Kramer, 394 U.S. at 828 n.9 (citations omitted). However, earlier
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Supreme Court precedent also indicates that, in evaluating the nature and validity
of absolute transfers, a court must examine the consideration exchanged for the
assigned claim. See, e.g., Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S.
327, 336–37 (1895) (recognizing presumption in every stage of cause of action in
federal court that it is without jurisdiction, unless contrary appears from record,
and holding that jurisdiction was collusively obtained when corporation made grant
of disputed land to newly-created, out-of-state corporation, with common
stockholders, without exchanging any valuable consideration).
In this case, the Assignments themselves do not explicitly state that
Northwest or the Hansons retained any interest in the action. They appear to be
complete transfers. However, neither do the Assignments include any provisions by
which they expressly disavow any continuing interest in the litigation or its
proceeds. The Court finds it difficult to conclude that, as closely affiliated as these
entities appear to be from the record, Northwest retains absolutely no interest in
the outcome of this litigation. Moreover, the Court has previously found that no
valuable consideration was actually exchanged between the parties for the 2009
Assignment. This negates the validity of the purported absolute transfers of
interest. In sum, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
Reviewing all of these factors and the record as a whole, Wiregrass has not
carried its burden of proving the facts necessary to sustain federal diversity
jurisdiction, even by a preponderance of the evidence standard. See Harvey Const.
Co. v. Robertson-CECO, Corp., 10 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court is left to
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conclude that the parties “have funneled what are essentially local disputes
between non-diverse parties into the federal courts,” a practice prohibited by section
1359. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2003). Reviewing the
factors above in toto, the Court is persuaded that 28 U.S.C. § 1359 deprives it of
original subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Bianca, 723 F.2d at 395.
Dismissal is therefore required. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).2
B.

Third Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [51]
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the original claim in this matter, it

must dismiss the entire action. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at

any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”). Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is therefore moot.
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is of the opinion that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this case. Dismissal is therefore required. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(h)(3).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, the Motion to
Side Aside Assignments and to Dismiss [63] filed by Defendants Investment
Acquisitions Group, LLC, Lewie G. Negrotto, IV, Negrotto & Associates, PLLC,

should be and hereby is GRANTED IN PART, to the extent it seeks dismissal of

Since the Court concludes that federal jurisdiction is lacking pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359, it expresses no opinion as to the validity the Assignments themselves under state
law.
2

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this action, and DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE, to the extent it
seeks to set aside the Assignments.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons
stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss [51] filed by Third-Party Defendants Janet
Taylor-Bryan, Glenda Poulos, Coastal Property Pros, LLC, and Coastal Properties
and Development, Inc., should be and hereby is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, this cause of action
is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 2nd day of August, 2011.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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