Robinson v. Saucier et al

Filing 186

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 175 and granting 153 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Paul Fernandez, denying 166 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Scooter Robinson, denying 167 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed b y Scooter Robinson, denying 149 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, granting Motion to Dismiss filed by Russell Miller, Reggie Smith, Mike Johnson, Donnie Saucier, Sherman Gaspar, Joe Garcia, Pearl River County, Rob Williams, Julie Flowers, David Allison, Anthony Hales, denying 162 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Scooter Robinson, denying 169 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Scooter Robinson, denying 163 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Scooter Robinson, denying 170 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Scooter Robinson.Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 3/28/2013. (Brown, T.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SCOOTER LYNN ROBINSON
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-cv-556-HSO-JMR

DONNIE SAUCIER, PAUL FERNANDEZ,
MATTHEW CARVER, AND RUSSELL MILLER

DEFENDANTS

CONSOLIDATED WITH
SCOOTER LYNN ROBINSON
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-cv-245-HSO-JMR

JOHN DOE, EMPLOYEES OF PEARL RIVER COUNTY
ALSO KNOWN AS PRESIDENT OF
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR PEARL
RIVER COUNTY AND ITS EMPLOYEES,
JULIE FLOWERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, JOE GARCIA,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
MIKE JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, SHERMAN GASPAR,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
RETA LUMPKIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ROB WILLIAMS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
DONNIE SAUCIER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, PEARL RIVER COUNTY,
ANTHONY HALES, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS FOR PEARL RIVER COUNTY

DEFENDANTS

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION AND
ADOPTING MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER COMES BEFORE THE COURT upon Plaintiff Scooter
Robinson’s Objection [182] to the Report and Recommendation [175] of Chief
Magistrate Judge John M. Roper entered in this cause on January 28, 2013.
Defendants have filed a Response [183] in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to the

Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motion
[149] to Dismiss and Lift Stay filed by Defendants David Allison, Julie Flowers, Joe
Garcia, Sherman Gaspar, Anthony Hales, Mike Johnson, Russell Miller, Pearl River
County, Donnie Saucier, Reggie Smith, and Rob Williams be granted; that the
Motion [153] for Summary Judgment on the Basis of Qualified Immunity and Heck
v. Humphrey filed by Defendant Paul Fernandez be granted; that Plaintiff’s Motion
[170] for Summary Judgment be denied; and that various discovery Motions [162,
163, 166, 167, 169] filed by Plaintiff be denied.
The Court has thoroughly reviewing the findings in the Report and
Recommendation, in addition to the positions advanced in the Motions, Plaintiff’s
Objection, and the Response to Objection, and concludes that the Magistrate’s
Report [175] should be adopted as the finding of the Court. The Court further finds
that Plaintiff’s Objection should be overruled, the Motion [149] to Dismiss and Lift
Stay filed by Defendants David Allison, Julie Flowers, Joe Garcia, Sherman Gaspar,
Anthony Hales, Mike Johnson, Russell Miller, Pearl River County, Donnie Saucier,
Reggie Smith, and Rob Williams should be granted, the Motion [153] for Summary
Judgment on the Basis of Qualified Immunity and Heck v. Humphrey filed by
Defendant Paul Fernandez should be granted, Plaintiff’s Motion [170] for Summary
Judgment should be denied, and Defendants Donnie Saucier, David Allison, Reggie
Smith, Paul Fernandez, Matthew Carver, Russell Miller, Julie Flowers, Rob
Williams, Joe Garcia, Mike Johnson, Sherman Gaspar, Anthony Hales, as President
of Pearl River County Board of Supervisors, and Pearl River County should be
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dismissed with prejudice as Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
On January 17, 2009, Plaintiff escaped from the Pearl River County Jail.

Law enforcement officers pursued him in what became a multiple vehicle car chase.
The vehicular pursuit culminated at a road block where officers fired several shots.
Following the gunfire, Plaintiff once again accelerated his vehicle and forcefully
drove through the road block. Defendant Paul Fernandez, a Mississippi Highway
Patrol Trooper who was pursuing Plaintiff in his patrol car, made contact with
Plaintiff’s vehicle. The impact caused Plaintiff’s vehicle to spin and ultimately come
to a stop. As he exited his vehicle, Plaintiff announced that he had been shot. A
multi-count Indictment charged Plaintiff with aggravated assault on a police officer
and failure to stop a motor vehicle. Indictment, att. as Ex. “B” to Mot. for Summ. J.
B.

Procedural History
On December 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed this pro se civil action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983 action against Donnie Saucier, “Captain Reggie,” and David Allison.
By Order [40] entered on May 13, 2011, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his
Complaint and the following Defendants were added: Reggie Smith1, Paul
Fernandez, Matthew Carver, and Russell Miller. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
asserts an excessive force claim and other claims related to his conditions of

1

Reggie Smith was substituted for unknown “Captain Reggie.”
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confinement at the Pearl River County Jail.
On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second Complaint, instituting cause
number 1:11-cv-245 HSO-JMR, which asserted allegations identical to those
contained in cause number 1:10cv556 HSO-JMR. The second Complaint named the
following as Defendants: Julie Flowers, Rob Williams, Joe Garcia, Donnie Saucier,
Mike Johnson, Sherman Gaspar, Reta Lumpkin, Anthony Hales, as President of
Pearl River County Board of Supervisors, all in their individual and official
capacities. By Order [7] entered on October 11, 2011, Plaintiff was permitted to add
Pearl River County as a Defendant.2
On December 20, 2011, the Court entered an Order staying the case pursuant
to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), pending disposition of Plaintiff’s criminal
charges arising from the alleged use of excessive force during Plaintiff’s recapture
following his escape. Plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of both of these charges.
Judgment, att. as Ex. “C” to Mot. for Summ. J.
Defendants in cause number 1:10cv556 HSO-JMR, David Allison, Reggie
Smith, Donnie Saucier, and Russell Miller, together with Defendants in cause
number 1:11cv246 HSO-JMR, Julie Flowers, Joe Garcia, Mike Johnson, Sherman
Gaspar, Robin Williams, Donnie Saucier, Anthony Hales, as President of the Pearl
River County Board of Supervisors, and Pearl River County, filed a Motion to
Dismiss and Lift Stay [149] on June 13, 2012. On August 17, 2012, Defendant Paul

2

By Order [38] dated April 10, 2012, cause number 1:11cv245 HSO-JMR was
consolidated with this case.
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Fernandez filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [153] on the Basis of Qualified
Immunity. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [170] on January 22,
2013. In addition, Plaintiff has filed various discovery Motions [162, 163, 166, 167,
169].
On January 28, 2013, Chief Magistrate Judge John M. Roper issued his
Report and Recommendation addressing the foregoing Motions. Report and
Recommendation [175]. Plaintiff filed his Objection [182] to the Report and
Recommendation on March 8, 2013. In his Objection, Plaintiff asserts that certain
of the Magistrate’s factual findings were erroneous. Specifically, Plaintiff takes
issue with the finding that Defendant Paul Fernandez did not shoot Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further contends that it was objectively unreasonable for Fernandez “to fire
his gun at my vehicle in a residential area where there was a female passenger in
my vehicle.” Objection [182] at p. 2.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), if written objections are timely filed to a

magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations, the Court shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R.
CIV. P. 72(b). In so doing, the Court is not required to reiterate the findings and
conclusions of the magistrate judge, Koetting v. Thompson, 995 F.2d 37, 40 (5th Cir.
1993), nor need it consider objections that are frivolous, conclusive, or general in
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nature, Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1997).
Where no party has objected to a Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, the Court need not conduct a de novo review of it. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) (“a judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings and recommendations to which objection
is made.”). In such cases, the Court need only review the report and
recommendation and determine whether it is either clearly erroneous or contrary to
law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989).
B.

Analysis
1.

Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim

With respect to Defendant Fernandez’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Fernandez, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that the doctrine set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Plaintiff’s excessive
force claims. The Magistrate reasoned that inasmuch as “an essential element of
Robinson's claim in this case is that excessive force was used in his arrest, granting
relief on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's convictions.”
Report and Recommendation [175] at p. 5 [citations omitted]. He further reasoned
that Heck is applicable to bar Plaintiff’s excessive force claims because Plaintiff has
not demonstrated that his convictions or sentences were reversed, invalidated, or
expunged prior to bringing this suit under § 1983. Id. at p. 6.

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The Fifth Circuit has explained that
[t]he Heck court held that a civil tort action, including an action under
section 1983, is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments. [Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.] When a
plaintiff alleges tort claims against his arresting officers, “the district
court must first consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”
[Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 2000).] If so, the claim
is barred unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Id.]
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2007).
Thus, in order to determine whether Heck precludes Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that
Defendants used excessive force, the Court first must determine whether a
judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of
Plaintiff’s assault conviction. Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2006).
Based on the record, the Court finds the Heck doctrine is applicable to Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim to the extent success against any Defendant would
“necessarily imply” the invalidity of Plaintiff’s assault conviction.
Alternatively, to the extent the Heck doctrine would not bar Plaintiff’s claim,
Defendant Fernandez would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity in this
case as it cannot be said that, given Plaintiff’s status as an escaped prisoner and his
subsequent actions, and under the totality of the circumstances, the use of force by
Defendant Hernandez and the other Defendants was objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances. Finally, Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against Pearl

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River County stem from his excessive force claims against the other Defendants.
Because Plaintiff cannot show the violation of any constitutional right, summary
judgment is likewise appropriate in the County’s favor.
The Court has conducted an independent, de novo examination of the record
in this case in connection with the Report and Recommendation [175]. The record
lacks sufficient evidence indicating that any of the individual Defendants utilized
excessive force in apprehending Plaintiff, who was a fleeing escapee. The Court
finds that Plaintiff’s Objection [182] challenging the findings are not well taken or
supported by the record, and should be overruled. The Report and Recommendation
[175] is well reasoned, correctly finds the applicable facts, and applies the governing
legal standards. The Court concludes that it should be adopted as the opinion of the
Court as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claims. Defendants’ Motion [149] to Dismiss
and Motion [153] for Summary Judgment should be granted.
2.

Plaintiff’s Conditions of Confinement Claims

Plaintiff’s Objection focuses on his excessive force claim. He raises no
argument or objection to the Magistrate Judge’s findings on his conditions of
confinement claims. Plaintiff only states that he “has stated claims of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to his rights
and needs . . ..” Pl.’s Obj. [182] at p 1. Having conducted the required review, the
Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation thoroughly
considered all issues related to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims, and is
neither clearly erroneous, nor contrary to law. The Court, being fully advised in the
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premises, finds that the Magistrate Judge properly recommended that Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [149] should be granted in this respect. The Report and
Recommendation should be adopted as the opinion of this Court on Plaintiff’s
condition of confinement claims.
III. CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the record, relevant law, and for the reasons
stated herein, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff’s Objection [182] should be
overruled, and the Report and Recommendation [175] of Chief Magistrate Judge
John M. Roper should be adopted as the finding of this Court, along with the
additional findings made herein. Defendants’ Motion [149] to Dismiss and Lift Stay
and Defendant Fernandez’s Motion [153] for Summary Judgment should be
granted; Plaintiff’s Motion [170] for Summary Judgment should be denied; and
Plaintiff’s discovery Motions [162, 163, 166, 167, 169] should be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiff’s
Objection [182] filed in this cause is OVERRULED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, the Report and
Recommendation [175] of Chief Magistrate Judge John M. Roper entered on
January 28, 2013, is adopted in its entirety as the finding of this Court.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, the Motion [149]
to Dismiss filed by David Allison, Julie Flowers, Joe Garcia, Sherman Gaspar,
Anthony Hales, Mike Johnson, Russell Miller, Pearl River County, Donnie Saucier,
Reggie Smith, and Rob Williams is GRANTED.
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IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, the Motion [153]
for Summary Judgment filed by Paul Fernandez is GRANTED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, the Motion [170]
for Summary Judgment filed by Scooter Robinson is DENIED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiffs’ Motions
to Direct the Clerk to Mail all Electronically filed Documents [162, 163, 166] are
DENIED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiffs’ Motion
for a Copy of Electronically filed Documents [167] is DENIED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiffs’ Motion
for a Copy of Mississippi Department of Corrections Medical Records [169] is
DENIED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Donnie Saucier,
David Allison, Reggie Smith, Paul Fernandez, Matthew Carver, Russell Miller,
Julie Flowers, Rob Williams, Joe Garcia, Mike Johnson, Sherman Gaspar, Anthony
Hales, as President of Pearl River County Board of Supervisors, and Pearl River
County, are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS DEFENDANTS.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 28th day of March, 2013.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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