Richardson v. Spiers et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Magistrate Judge John M. Roper on 1/3/2013 (wld) (Main Document 43 replaced on 1/3/2013) (wld).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RAYMOND RICHARDSON

PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11cv406JMR

LANCE SPIERS, DETECTIVE;
and CHRISTA GROOM, SERGEANT

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court pursuant to the Motion for Summary Judgment [34] filed
by Lance Spiers [Spiers] and Christa Groom [Groom]. To date, Raymond Richardson
[Richardson] has not filed a response in opposition. Having considered the Motion, along with
the entire record and the applicable law, this Court finds the motion is well-taken and should be
granted. Accordingly, this Court recommends that this case should be dismissed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Richardson was arrested on January 7, 2011, by Spiers on charges of felony child abuse
and violation of probation. [34-1.] Richardson was ultimately indicted on a charge of child abuse
on December 7, 2011. [34-5.] According to Richardson, Spiers and Groom “falsely arrested and
held me without evidence due to careless investigation.” [1, p. 4.] He contends that his rights
were violated because it took over 270 days to indict him and the evidence was based on the
opinion of a doctor who, according to Richardson, was banned from practicing in another state.
[9.] Richardson waived arraignment on the charge on January 11, 2012. [34-10.] He further
waived his right to speedy trial on August 21, 2012. [34-11.]
ANALYSIS
Richardson claims that the defendants Spiers and Groom arrested him falsely. In order to
make a claim for unlawful arrest pursuant to § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment, a Plaintiff must

allege facts showing an officer lacked probable cause for the arrest. Government officials are
protected from charges of wrongful arrest where a reasonable official would believe probable
cause existed. See Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Mendenhall v. Riser,
213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000)). According to Groom, she received a call from the
Department of Human Services on January 5, 2011, about a possible child abuse case. [34-9, p.
1.] She and Spiers proceeded to the home at 196 Whitesand Road in Poplarville, Mississippi, to
investigate. [34-9, p. 2.] Richardson stated at that time that he was babysitting the two year old
son of Angel Grice when the child started having difficulty breathing. (Id.) He tried to
administer a breathing treatment which was unsuccessful and stated that Grice told him to call an
ambulance. (Id.)
Spiers and Groom spoke to Grice who stated that the child was fine when she left for
work at 8 am on January 4, 2011. (Id.) She had to return to the house soon after leaving for her
work badge, and the child appeared fine at that time. (Id.) At about 10 am, Grice received a
message to call home, and when she spoke to Richardson, she learned the child was having
difficulty breathing, at which time Grice returned home. (Id., p. 3.) The child was transported to
Forrest General Community Hospital and then to Batson Children’s Hospital, a division of the
University of Mississippi Medical Center [UMC], with a hematoma which required brain
surgery. (Id., p. 1.)
Spiers received a phone call at the office from Dr. Scott Benton, chief of Pediatrics
Forensic Medicine unit at UMC. [34-8, p. 2.] Dr. Benton stated that the child’s injury may have
been caused by a high velocity blow to the head; violent shaking or a combination of the two
incidents. (Id.) According to Dr. Benton, the injury was not sustained by coughing, choking or

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other related illness. (Id.)
On January 7, 2011, Spiers completed an affidavit in Justice Court and an arrest warrant
was issued for Richardson on a charge of felony child abuse. [34-8, p. 4.] Later that day, Spiers
went to Richardson’s home and arrested Richardson on the charge. (Id.) As of the date he filed
his Petition, Richardson was awaiting trial, and had not yet been convicted and sentenced for any
crime, and therefore should be designated as a “pre-trial detainee.”
Richardson's damages claims are subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). “The threshold question for a Heck-type analysis is whether a successful § 1983 suit
would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction.” Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679,
682 (5th Cir. 2001). In Heck, the Supreme Court ruled that a state prisoner cannot bring a § 1983
damages action directly challenging his confinement until and unless the reason for his
continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal, or otherwise called into question by a federal court's issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. A section 1983 claim that effectively
attacks the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until that conviction
or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. The Supreme Court imposed this requirement on
§ 1983 plaintiffs in order to avoid collateral attacks by the plaintiffs on convictions that are “still
outstanding.” Id.
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim challenges the factual determination that underlies his
conviction for resisting arrest. Therefore, the Court finds that a judgment in favor of Plaintiff

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would imply the invalidity of his resisting arrest conviction, which has not been reversed,
expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Heck,
512 U.S. at 486-87; see also DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007).
Heck bars claims for “unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” as well as claims “for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id.
at 486. Thus, unless his conviction has been overturned, a plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983
claim if prevailing on that claim would imply that his conviction was invalid. Thus, Plaintiff’s
claim in this case is barred by Heck.
Here, Plaintiff's damages claims, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his convictions on the drug charges against him. Plaintiff's confinement has not been remedied
by any of the procedures listed in Heck. Plaintiff's damages claims are therefore not cognizable
under § 1983, and the Court recommends that the claims should be dismissed. Because
Richardson’s § 1983 claim is barred by Heck, the Court need not address the alternative grounds
for dismissal of the complaint.
CONCLUSION
As of the date Robinson filed his petition, he was a pre-trial detainee, and had not yet
been convicted or sentenced for any crime. The Court finds that the Motion for Summary
Judgment [34] in this case should be granted and that all claims be dismissed without prejudice
to their being asserted again when the Heck conditions are met.
A separate Order in conformity with and incorporating by reference the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion shall issue. A copy of this memorandum opinion has been forwarded to
Plaintiff at his last known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. Each party shall

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bear their respective costs associated with this motion.
DATED this the 3rd day of January, 2013.

s/ John M. Roper, Sr.
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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