White v. Barclays Bank Delaware
Filing
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ORDER denying 22 Motion to Set Aside Judgment; denying 22 Motion Overrule Arbitration Award Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 12/04/2014 (Guirola, Louis)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT J. WHITE
v.
PLAINTIFF
CAUSE NO. 1:11CV436-LG-JMR
BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE
DEFENDANT
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINAL JUDGMENT AND
OVERRULE ARBITRATION AWARD JUDGMENT
BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s [22] Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment
and Overrule Arbitration Award and Judgment. Defendant filed an Opposition to
the Motion and requested that the Court award it “its attorney’s fees and costs
incurred to respond to a Motion which was filed by Plaintiff without substantial
justification.” (Opp. 6, ECF No. 23). After due consideration of the parties’
submissions, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be denied because
Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that vacation of the arbitration award is
warranted under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Since Defendant does not
state under what authority its request for fees and costs is made or otherwise offer
any legal support for the request, the Court is also of the opinion that Defendant’s
request for fees and costs should be denied.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff originally sued Defendant in the Circuit Court of Harrison County,
Mississippi, claiming that he had received numerous harassing phone calls from
Defendant about an alleged delinquent debt owed to it on a credit card account.
Defendant removed the action to this Court. It then filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration based on the arbitration clause in its Card Member Agreement (CMA).
Plaintiff did not oppose that Motion and requested that the Court dismiss the action
without prejudice so that the parties could pursue arbitration. Therefore, by
agreement of the parties, the Court granted the Motion to Compel Arbitration and
dismissed this action without prejudice. (See Agreed Order, ECF No. 18).
The parties proceeded to arbitration through the American Arbitration
Association. After a telephonic hearing, the arbitrator denied relief to Plaintiff and
awarded Defendant the sum of $24,852.83 in credit card charges and fees incurred
by Plaintiff by Award dated May 15, 2014. Defendant moved this Court to enter
judgment on the Award, which the Court did by Order dated July 14, 2014.
Plaintiff then filed the subject Motion requesting that the Court set aside the
judgment and overrule the arbitration award.
DISCUSSION
Courts “limit review of arbitration awards to give deference to the decisions
of the arbitrator.” 21st Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Manchester Fin. Bank, 747 F.3d 331,
335 (5th Cir. 2014). “‘Judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily
narrow.’” Id. (citation and ellipses omitted). The Court may vacate an arbitrator’s
award in the following limited circumstances set forth in the FAA:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrator;
(3) where the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
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which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrator exceeded his powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10; see also 21st Fin. Servs., 747 F.3d at 335. It is Plaintiff’s burden to
show that the arbitration award should be vacated on one or more of these grounds.
See 21st Fin. Servs., 747 F.3d at 336; Parker v. J C Penney Corp., Inc., 426 F. App’x
285, 288 (5th Cir. 2011).
Even though Plaintiff agreed to arbitration, he now contends that “Defendant
has moved [the] case to the exact venue that it tends to have an unfair advantage
over plaintiffs.” (Mot. 1, ECF No. 22). “[E]ven if the Court were to assume that
[Plaintiff] never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with [Defendant], the evidence
before the Court reveals that [Plaintiff] waived any right to object to the
arbitrabilility of the dispute by voluntarily submitting to arbitration and
participating at arbitration.” Garner v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 3:05cv1029-R,
2006 WL 2354939, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2006); Reynolds v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
No. 96-2800, 1997 WL 269484, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1997) (“Plaintiff waived any
objection to the arbitrability of the claims when he voluntarily submitted them to
arbitration[]. . . . Therefore, Plaintiff cannot now contend that his . . . claims were
not arbitrable.”) (citing Piggly Wiggly Operators’ Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly
Operators’ Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1, 611 F.2d 580, 584
(5th Cir. 1980)). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s after-the-fact attempt to assert his
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alleged right to a jury trial once the arbitrator rendered a decision against him.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions that Defendant somehow
“paid off” the arbitrator, that Plaintiff was “manipulated to a telephone
conferencing hearing,” and that Plaintiff “requested a[n] in person hearing but was
denied[,]” (Mot. 1, ECF No. 22), are insufficient to show that the arbitrator was
biased or otherwise engaged in misconduct warranting vacation of the arbitration
award. See, e.g., Householder Group v. Caughran, 354 F. App’x 848, 852 (5th Cir.
2009) (party seeking vacation of arbitration award must set forth specific facts, not
unsupported assertions). The Court also finds unpersuasive Plaintiff’s argument
that he “was forced to go through arbitration pro se[,]” (Mot. 1, ECF No. 22), which
the Fifth Circuit has determined “does not establish that the arbitrator’s award
should be vacated.” See Parker, 426 F. App’x at 289.
Finally, while Plaintiff claims that his “biggest complaint for injustices [sic]
is the Credit Card member Agreement[,]” (Mot. 1, ECF No. 22), the Court will not
disturb the arbitrator’s evidentiary findings with respect to the applicability of the
CMA to Plaintiff and his liability for the credit card account balance. The
arbitrator found in pertinent part as follows:
I find that Barclays has presented adequate proof that it is owed
$24,852.83 for charges and fees incurred on the credit card account
that Mr. White admits he used. Although Mr. White contends that he
did not sign the credit card application and that he was not provided
with a copy of the CMA, the weight of the evidence does not support
these contentions. In any event, Mr. White’s acceptance and use of the
card makes him liable for the account balance.
(Award 3, ECF No. 23-2). “‘[A]rbitrators have broad discretion to make evidentiary
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decisions.’” Parker, 426 F. App’x at 289 (citing Int’l Chem. Workers Union, Local
683C v. Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 2003)). Courts typically
do “not review the adequacy of an arbitrator’s evidentiary rulings.” See id. (citing
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Neuhoff Bros., 481 F.2d 817, 820
(5th Cir. 1973)). Plaintiff “has not explained why [this Court] should overlook this
precedent and disturb the arbitrator’s determination.” See id. His mere
disagreement with the arbitrator’s findings is not a basis for this Court to vacate
the arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; see also, e.g., Dunkley v. Mellon Investor
Servs., 378 F. App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The District Court properly
determined that [plaintiff’s] mere disagreement with the Arbitrator’s reasoning did
not provide a basis to disturb the award.”).
To the extent Plaintiff makes any additional arguments – and those are
difficult to discern from his Motion – the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his
burden of establishing one or more of the limited circumstances for vacation of an
arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10. Because Plaintiff has not shown that
he is entitled to vacation of the award under the FAA, there is no basis for the
Court to vacate the award or to set aside the judgment entered thereon.
Finally, Defendant’s argument in support of a claim for attorney’s fees is
limited to the last sentence of the Motion response.1 Because Defendant has not
1
“Barclays Bank Delaware requests this Honorable Court deny Plaintiff’s
Motion to Set Aside [22] and award Barclay’s its attorney’s fees and costs incurred
to respond to a Motion which was file by Plaintiff without substantial justification.”
See (Opp. 6, ECF No. 23).
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provided any legal support for its request for attorney’s fees and costs, that request
is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [22] Motion to
Set Aside Final Judgment and Overrule Arbitration Award and Judgment is
DENIED, and that Defendant’s request for fees and costs is DENIED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 4th day of December, 2014.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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